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The thesis will demonstrate that the various uses of jazz music as propaganda in 
World War II were determined by an evolving relationship between Axis and Allied 
policies and projects. The limited previous scholarship in the area, however, has 
EHHQ UHVWULFWHG WR µVLQJOH-FRXQWU\VWXGLHV¶ZKLFKSUHVHQWRQO\QDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHV
with little reference to the broader international context. Within a comparative 
framework, the thesis will trace and contextualise the international development of 
µSURSDJDQGD MD]]¶ IURP HDUO\ LVRODWHG EURDGFDVWV WR FRQVROLGDWLRQ LQ WKH IRUP RI
regular programming and dedicated musical ensembles. 
A wide range of English- and German-language sources including Mass 
Observation, oral history, trade magazines and archive material from Britain, 
Germany, the USA and Canada will be utilised and cross-referenced to provide an 
unprecedented perspective on wartime uses of broadcast propaganda. Although a 
significant number of British and German documents relating to propaganda were 
destroyed during and after the war, the breadth of the research will allow 
reconstruction and analysis of various propaganda programmes from a multitude of 
standpoints. The thesis will also explore contemporary cultural, social and political 
considerations in Britain, Germany and the USA, thus not only increasing the scope 
and perspective of the discourse, but also reflecting the diversity of the interrelated 
factors which influenced wartime popular culture and propaganda. 
The thesis will make a number of significant contributions to the historiography of 
the field. Analyses of previously overlooked Allied and Axis propaganda projects 
will highlight the diversity of the methodologies regarding the use of music for 
propaganda purposes. Moreover, the international scope will facilitate an imperative 
UHDSSUDLVDO RI %ULWLVK µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD UDGLR VWDWLRQV RI 6HIWRQ 'HOPHU DQG WKH 
Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which were hugely successful and yet have been 
unjustifiably neglected by prior historiography. The popularity and psychological 
DGURLWQHVV RI 3:(¶V EURDGFDVWV ZLOO EH MX[WDSRVHG ZLWK WKH GHPRQVWUDEO\ LQIHULRU
quality anGHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI*HUPDQµEODFN¶SURJUDPPLQJIRU%ULWDLQDQGWKH86$
ZKLFKH[SRVHGFRQVLGHUDEOHOLPLWDWLRQVWR-RVHSK*RHEEHOV¶DELOLWLHV7KHWKHVLVZLOO
DOVR H[SORUH *RHEEHOV¶ DWWHPSWV WR QXUWXUH DQ µLQGLJHQRXV¶ 1HZ *HUPDQ
Entertainment Music, and demoQVWUDWH WKDW WKH 3URSDJDQGD 0LQLVWHU¶V LQDELOLW\ WR
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come to terms with jazz, both for German audiences and as a tool for propaganda 
broadcasts to the enemy, ceded an extremely important advantage to the Allies.  
A radical revision of the character and work of Hans Hinkel, an influential figure in 
the Nazi cultural apparatus who has nonetheless been the subject of very little 
scholarly attention, will also be provided. While a central component of the thesis is 
the assertion that Goebbels was far less pragmatic than has been acknowledged by 
SULRUKLVWRULRJUDSK\+LQNHO¶VUHSXWDWLRQDVDQLGHRORJLFDOO\ULJLGUHDFWLRQDU\ZLOOEH
challenged by cross-referencing oral history sources and documentary evidence. 
Furthermore, the comparative framework will be used to show conclusively that the 
problems of appropriate musical programming for the Forces, which fell within 
+LQNHO¶V UHPLW ZHUH QRW UHVWULFWHG WR *HUPDQ\ EXW ZHUH SDUW RI D EURDGHU
international discourse regarding music¶V UROHLQ the maintenance of morale. It will 
facilitate a wide-ranging exploration of the uses of music and broadcasting to 
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West Hampstead in June 2012, and the interview was memorable not only for the 
extraordinary opportunity to discuss at length the content of the thesis with the 
%%&¶V leading wartime jazz producer and DJ, but also for the warmth and humour of 
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visit them again, our subsequent friendship with Penny, Katy, Kath and other 




I have unfortunately been unable to meet the wartime jazz aficionado Peter W. G. 
Powell in person before the submission of the thesis, but have nonetheless benefited 
greatly from his assistance 0U 3RZHOO¶V GHWDLOHG DQVZHUV WR my written questions 
have helped to clarify a number of important points, and provided a first-hand 
account of the listening habits and experiences of a young jazz fan in wartime 
London. He has also generously sent me a pre-publication manuscript relating to the 
landmark First English Public Jam Session of 1941, which he attended, as well as 
numerous copies of articles, photographs and concert programmes which are not 
available in any archive. 
I was introduced to Mr Powell by Dr. Catherine Tackley of the Open University, a 
preeminent historian of British jazz with whom I shared a panel at the University of 
London in January 2013 (which coincidentally was held in the former headquarters 
of the Ministry of Information). She has been very helpful and encouraging of my 
work, and has been kind enough to send me an unpublished chapter of hers from a 
forthcoming publication. The comments of the reviewers for my forthcoming article 
in the Jazz Research Journal, which is edited by Dr. Tackley, were also extremely 
useful in sharpening my interpretations of a number of aspects relating to British jazz 
during wartime, and pushed me to consider the dominant discourse surrounding the 
KLVWRULRJUDSK\RI%ULWDLQ¶s home front in greater detail. 
The international nature of the thesis has led me to a number of archives in Britain, 
Germany and North America, and I have been very professionally assisted on my 
many visits by the staff at the National Archives, Kew, the Bundesarchiv, Berlin and 
the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland. I am 
grateful to Dr. Wolfram Knauer at the Jazzinsitut Darmstadt, Jeff Walden at the BBC 
Written Archives Collection and Suzanne Dubeau at the Clara Thomas Archives and 
Special Collections at York University, Toronto for their personal assistance in 
navigating the material at their institutions. David Nathan of the excellent National 
Jazz Archive at Loughton provided cordial support, in spite of the fact that our 
respective football teams Brentford and Leyton Orient were engaged in a bitter 
promotion battle during the latter part of the thesis. 
,DPYHU\JUDWHIXO WR WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI.HQW¶V6FKRRORI+LVWRU\IRU WKH WKUHH-year 
studentship which made it possible for me to undertake the PhD. My research trips to 
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expert Stephan Wuthe. On Kate Donovan aQG'DYLGO\¶Vradio programme Play with 
Music and Words I was given the opportunity to discuss jazz in the Third Reich for a 
new audience in November 2012, and the invitation of Kate Davison to speak at 
Marx is Muss 2013 in Berlin offered a similarly welcome chance to present and 
debate these ideas outside of the academic milieu. While I have generally avoided 
engaging with the existential connotations of jazz during wartime in the thesis, such 
informal encounters have repeatedly challenged me to consider the more abstract 
aspects of the subject matter. 
Last but not least I thank my parents, Chris and Inge, who have helped me over the 
years in ways too numerous to list, and more-or-less cheerfully resigned themselves 
to my return to the household during the periods when I was teaching at Kent. My 
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full responsibility for any that may remain. And I dedicate the thesis to Olya, not 
only for having been a continuous source of love, support and kindred jazz 
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Introduction and Historiography 
 ³6RLWVHHPVWKDW6ZLQJLVPRELOLVHGDQGZLOOSOD\LWVSDUWLQWKHFRPLQJVWUXJJOH´ 
(B. M. Lytton-Edwards, October 1939)1 
  
                                                 
1
 NJA Melody Maker µ.HHSWKH6ZLQJ)ODJ)O\LQJ%HFDXVH0HQ*HW,QWR .KDNL,W'RHVQ¶W0HDQ
7KDW7KH\)RUJHW7KDW7KH\$UH5K\WKP)DQV¶ by B. M. Lytton-Edwards, October 1939, p.13. B.M. 




7KH WKHVLV RZHV LWV JHQHVLV WR 0LFKDHO + .DWHU¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW &KDUOLH DQG KLV
2UFKHVWUD -RVHSK *RHEEHOV¶ (QJOLVK-language propaganda jazz band, was 
HVWDEOLVKHGWR³SD\WKHHQHP\EDFNLQNLQG´2 .DWHU¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQRI
the Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (RMVP) to combine 
jazz music and propaganda was a direct response to the British use of jazz music in 
broadcasts to Germany caused me to reflect upon the importance of the international 
context in shaping wartime cultural propaganda. Subsequent enquiry revealed that 
existing studies in the field were country-specific, with only passing references made 
to the activities of other nations.3 By examining previously-overlooked propaganda 
projects and programmes, as well as reappraising others in the light of new evidence 
and the cross-referencing of materials from British, German and North American 
archives, I will demonstrate that UHVSHFWLYH QDWLRQV¶ utilisation of jazz music as 
propaganda during World War II did not occur in a vacuum. It was shaped by the 
evolving relationship between Axis and Allied propaganda policies, which directly 
impacted upon and influenced one another, and thus the phenomenon can only be 
properly understood within an international frame of reference. The comparative 
analysis will challenge and elaborate upon earlier scholarly efforts in this area and 
make a significant contribution to a broader understanding of the subject. 
The international scope of the thesis will also facilitate a re-HYDOXDWLRQRI*RHEEHOV¶
limitations as a propagandist. In the following chapters I will use British, German 
and American archive and interview materials to explore not only the Propaganda 
0LQLVWHU¶V F\QLFDO DQG SUDJPDWLF ZLOOLQJQHVV WR FRQWUDYHQH WKH 1D]i 
Weltanschauung in the name of the war effort, but also the extent to which he was 
unable to come to terms with jazz as a medium for influencing German or enemy 
morale. In particular, I will demonstrate that he failed to capitalise on the 
                                                 
2
 Michael H. Kater, Different Drummers: Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany. Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1992, p.130. 
3
 See for example Kater, Different Drummers, pp.122-ZLWKUHJDUGWR1D]L)RUFHV¶SUHGLOHFWLRQIRU
Anglo-American broadcasts, Horst J. P. Bergmeier and Rainer E. Lotz, +LWOHU¶V$LUZDYHV7KH,QVLGH 
Story of Nazi Broadcasting and Propaganda Swing, New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1997, pp.155-
 IRU %ULWLVK PRQLWRUV¶ DQG PHGLD UHFHSWLRQ RI 5093 SURSDJDQGD &KULVWLQD %DDGH Victory 
through Harmony: The BBC and Popular Music in World War II. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012, pp.48-49 
for the popularity of Fécamp, Radio International with the BEF, and S. Frederick Starr, Red & Hot: 
The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, New York: Limelight Editions, 1994, pp.188-194 for the 
unprecedented influx of American (jazz) music into the Soviet Union between 1941-1945. 
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opportunities presented in the early months of the war due to the dramatic reduction 
by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)4 of its Home Service entertainment 
output. Because hostility toward Germany was relatively low given the lack of initial 
military engagement, I will argue in Chapter Two that the RMVP missed 
opportunities to manipulate British public opinion through entertaining and 
subversive programming. Meanwhile, an inability to sufficiently cater to German 
Forces created openings for malevolent enemy projects which succeeded in 
combining exciting musical programming with misinformation, such as the Political 
Warfare Executive (PWE) stations Soldatensender Calais and Kurzwellensender 
Atlantik. B\FRQWUDVWLQJWKHZRUNRI*RHEEHOVZLWK3:(¶V%HUOLQ-born propagandist 
6HIWRQ 'HOPHU , ZLOO LOOXVWUDWH WKDW WKH ODWWHU¶V UHVRXUFHIXOQHVV DQG QXDQFHG
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKLVWDUJHWDXGLHQFHRIWHQUHVXOWHGLQIDUVXSHULRUµEODFN¶SURSDJDQGD
SURMHFWV WKDQ WKH 5093¶V RIWHQ UDWKHU QDwYH HIIRUWV )DU IURP EHLQJ ³WKH ZDU WKDW 
+LWOHU ZRQ´5 I will draw on a wider range of sources and perspectives which 
indicate that propaganda was frequently employed with greater adeptness, 
intelligence and success by British and US agencies. 
The problem was exacerbated for the RMVP because, although categorised as 
µGHJHQHUDWH¶ PXVLF entartete Musik) by the NSDAP, jazz was nonetheless hugely 
popular with younger Germans and Forces listeners.6 *RHEEHOV¶VWUXJJOHWRUHFRQFLOH
ideology and popular taste was characterised by the quixotic search for a neue 
deutsche Unterhaltungsmusik µ1HZ *HUPDQ (QWHUWDLQPHQW 0XVLF¶7 and in 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four I will analyse these broadly unsuccessful attempts 
WR LPSRVHSRSXODUFXOWXUH µIURPDERYH¶. ,QGHHG LQ VSLWHRI*RHEEHOV¶HOHYDWLRQRI
the provision of quality modern rhythmic music to the level of a national duty in 
wartime, his insistence on musical guidelines for dance bands and refusal to co-opt 
Anglo-$PHULFDQ MD]]IRUGRPHVWLFDQG)RUFHV¶FRQVXPSWLRQ OHG WRFRQYROXWHGDQG
expensive efforts to cultivate a state-VSRQVRUHGDQGVXLWDEO\µ*HUPDQ¶DOWHUQDWLYH%\
                                                 
4
 )RUSXUSRVHVRIDFFXUDF\WKHDFURQ\PZLOOEHZULWWHQDVµ%%&¶LQFLWDWLRQVIURPFRQWHPSRUDU\
documents and as the now-VWDQGDUGµ%%&¶LQWKHERG\RIWKHWH[W 
5
 As asserted in the eponymous publication, see Robert Edwin Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won: 
Goebbels and the Nazi Media Campaign. New York: Paragon House, 1987. 
6
 See 0LFKDHO+.DWHUµ)RUELGGHQ)UXLW"-D]]LQWKH7KLUG5HLFK¶The American Historical Review 
94.1 (February 1989), pp.11-43 and Will 6WXGGHUWµ³7KH'HDWKRI0XVLF´7KH1D]LV¶5HODWLRQVKLS
ZLWK-D]]LQ:RUOG:DU,,¶Skepsi 5.2 (2013), pp.26-39 IRUWKH1D]LV¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKMD]] 
7
 Although a number of similar euphemisms were used for the officially-commissioned attempts to 




offering the first scholarly analysis of the variety programme Frohe Stunde am 
Nachmittag µ+DSS\ +RXU LQ WKH $IWHUQRRQ¶8 which Goebbels explicitly initiated 
for this purpose, I will shed new light on the weaknesses and internal contradictions 
of New German Entertainment Music that would also plague the more ambitious 
Deutsches Tanz- und Unterhaltungsorchester µ*HUPDQ 'DQFH- and Entertainment 
Orchestra¶, henceforth DTUO) after Frohe Stunde¶V GHPLVH9 By contrast, Chapter 
Three will provide a substantial reappraisal of Hans Hinkel, a major figure in the 
16'$3¶V DWWHPSW WR PRXOG *HUPDQ FXOWXUDO OLIH ZKRVH UROH LQ WKH 7KLUG 5HLFK
still awaits more comprehensive scholarly attention. Utilising previously 
XQSXEOLVKHG DFFRXQWV IURP MD]] PXVLFLDQV UHJDUGLQJ +LQNHO¶V SULYDWH YLHZV RQ
musical culture and policy in Germany, as well as his hitherto-overlooked popularity 
with jazz musicians, I will illustrate that Hinkel, who was responsible for radio 
entertainment between 1942-44 and the head of wartime Truppenbetreuung µ$UPHG
)RUFHV¶HQWHUWDLQPHQW¶ZDV LQ IDFWD IDUPRUHFRPSOH[DQGSUDJPDWLF ILJXUH WKDQ
prior scholarship has suggested. Furthermore, I will argue that his scepticism vis-à-
vis German bands reproducing Anglo-American music was valid, based on the 
relative failures of projects such as Frohe Stunde, the DTUO and Charlie and his 
Orchestra. Based on the new evidence, he may well have privately preferred to 
XWLOLVH DXWKHQWLF $PHULFDQ µGHJHQHUDWH¶ PXVLF RQ WKH DLUZDYHV UDWKHU WKDQ LQIHULRU
Germanic copies. 
It was the original intention of the thesis to offer a comparative analysis of the 
international uses of jazz music as propaganda during World War II without 
restricting its focus to specific nations. It soon became clear, however, that the scope 
was overambitious, and the subsequent decision to focus on Britain, Germany and 
the USA has allowed me to develop comparative and nuanced analyses of the 
methodologies and problems of each of the three belligerents. Nonetheless, due to 
the later entry of the USA into the war, as well as the greater accessibility of 
European archives, inevitably the research presented in the thesis is weighted more 
heavily towards Britain and Germany. Moreover, on occasion the thesis explores 
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mention of Frohe Stunde is dated 21st October 1941, less than one month after the plans for the DTUO 
were initiated (see Chapter Three). 
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areas which are only peripherally within its remit, most notably by contributing the 
first academic study of the Japanese entertainment propaganda programme Zero 
Hour, which broadcast to US Forces in the South Pacific and appears to have 
involved self-reflexive sabotage on the part of its reluctant Anglophone participants. 
Retaining a degree of flexibility within the framework of the thesis has allowed me 
not only to examine important but overlooked areas of World War II propaganda, but 
also to elucidate the potential risks presented by the failure of the Special Services 
Division (SSD) to provide acceptable light entertainment for GIs in the South 
Pacific. 
Indeed, the comparative nature of the thesis has highlighted not only the limits to 
*RHEEHOV¶HIIHFWLYHQHVVDVDSURSDgandist, but also the degree to which the British 
and US propaganda and cultural apparatuses similarly struggled to provide their 
Forces with appropriate and acceptable musical broadcasting. Building on the work 
of the historians Martin Doherty and Angus Calder,10 I will draw on a range of 
%ULWLVK VRXUFHV WR FKDOOHQJH WKH µ3HRSOH¶V :DU¶ GLVFRXUVH RI D KDUPRQLRXV KRPH
front. In doing so, I will demonstrate that Nazi propaganda broadcasts were 
potentially extremely dangerous for British morale, because they targeted existing 
currents of opinion and could seek to exacerbate domestic tensions in the absence of 
PLOLWDU\ HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK WKH HQHP\ 7KH %%&¶V VHOI-SHUFHSWLRQ DV WKH QDWLRQ¶V
cultural educator will also be analysed and criticised regarding the more utilitarian 
requirements of broadcasting during wartime, and in Chapter Four I will review its 
controversial attempt to control popular music content via the bans on slush (overly-
sentimental music DQG µMD]]LQJ WKH FODVVLFV¶ (dance-oriented arrangements of 
classical melodies). This will entail using not only British sources, but also 
presenting an unprecedented and previously unpublished German perspective on 
British policy in an English-language talk delivered by jazz aficionado Wolf Mittler 
of the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft (RRG).11 Chapter Five will utilise a range of 
American sources to assay the various problems and challenges faced by the Office 
of War Information (OWI) in the USA; by looking at racial tensions and the violence 
towards the predominantly Mexican-American and African-American µ]RRW¶ jazz 
                                                 
10
 M. A. Doherty, Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the 
Second World War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000 and Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz. 





subculture, I will draw parallels between the US and Britain in terms of the 
opportunities presented to the RMVP during periods of relative inactivity and 
boredom, described by the British Medical Journal in 1942 as the danger presented 
E\ WKH ³PRQRWRQ\RIZDLWLQJ´12 By analysing conditions in Britain, Germany and 
the USA in tandem, the thesis will demonstrate that Nazi propaganda missed a 
number of opportunities to influence enemy listeners, and that these might have been 
better exploited by a more competent and pragmatic approach to jazz music and 
popular taste. 
This introductory chapter will serve four purposes. Firstly, it will define two key 
WHUPVµMD]]¶DQGµSURSDJDQGD¶ZKLFKDUHRSHQWRGLYHUVHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVLQRUGHUWR
clarify the methodology and remit of the thesis. Secondly, it will provide an 
overview of the archives visited and important primary sources used as well as their 
respective significance in generating new knowledge. Thirdly, it will discuss the 
nature and quality of relevant existing secondary literature in order to illustrate both 
the work that has already been carried out in this field and define what remains to be 
done, highlighting the need for a comparative international approach to the subject 
matter. Finally, it will consider the complicated question of audiences for World War 
II jazz broadcasts and general issues relating to the analysis of the reception and 
relative success of propaganda. The initial task, however, must be to establish 
workable definitions of the two central elements to the thesis: jazz and propaganda. 
Terminology 
Defining Key Terms: Jazz 
Our understanding of jazz music in the following chapters must be based on 
contemporary cultural realities and perceptions during World War II, rather than 
retrospectively from a modern-day perspective. The musicologist Christina Baade 
notes that during the war the BBC had difficulties distinguishing between dance 
music, jazz and swing,13 and indeed as late as 1943 a Listener Research 
TXHVWLRQQDLUH GHILQHG µVZLQJ¶ DV RQH RI WKUHH VXEFDWHJRULHV RI GDQFH PXVLF
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 5 ' *LOOHVSLH µ*HUPDQ 3V\FKRORJLFDO :DUIDUH $Q $PHULFDQ 6XUYH\¶ The British Medical 
Journal 1.4239 (4th April 1942), pp.445-448. Here p.447. 
13
 Baade, Victory through Harmony, p.349. 
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DORQJVLGH µVWUDLJKW¶ DQG µVWULFW-WHPSR¶ GDQFH PXVLF14 leading the radio critic 
µ'HWHFWRU¶ (GJDU -DFNVRQ RI WKH MD]] WUDGH MRXUQDO Melody Maker to protest that 
³%%&/LVWHQHUµ5HVHDUFK¶LQWR'DQFH0XVLF LVQ¶W>/LVWHQHU5HVHDUFK@´15 Not all 
at the Corporation laboured under such misapprehensions; Charles Chilton, the 
%%&¶V OHDGLQJ ZDUtime jazz broadcaster and producer, told me emphatically that 
µMD]]¶ DQG µGDQFH PXVLF¶ ZHUH PXWXDOO\ H[FOXVLYH HQWLWLHV16 and the contents and 
UHSXWDWLRQRIKLV µ5DGLR5K\WKP&OXE¶ DUH HYLGHQFH WKDW KLV VHQWLPHQW DW WKH WLPH
was consistent with this.17 However, even Melody Maker devoted a great deal of 
coverage to dance bands, albeit because jazz was a minority taste and mainstream 
appeal was needed in order to remain profitable through sales and advertising 
revenue.18 Moreover, many dance musicians, including the popular Geraldo, jumped 
RQWKHVZLQJEDQGZDJRQGXULQJWKHµ%ULWLVKVZLQJFUD]H¶RIDQGGDQFHEDQG
EURDGFDVWV RYHU WKH %%& ZRXOG XVXDOO\ RIIHU µVRPHWKLQJ IRU HYHU\RQH¶ IURP
VDFFKDULQHFRPPHUFLDOWXQHVWRµKRW¶VZLQJQXPEHUV19 
The boundaries were most fluid, of course, in the eyes of the non-specialist general 
public. For aficionados such as Chilton and his contemporaries in the USA or 
*HUPDQ\WKHVXEWOHWLHVEHWZHHQµMD]]¶DQGµGDQFH¶ZHUHHDVLHUWRGLVFHUQDQGWKH\
broadly shared the view of Hans Blüthner of the illegal Berlin-Melodie-Club, which 
was active for most of the duration of the Third Reich, who insisted in a letter to the 
amateur historian Horst J.P. Bergmeier that the music of Duke Ellington, Louis 
$UPVWURQJ %L[%HLGHUEHFNHHW DO ³was much too sacred to us to throw it into the 
GDQFHSRW´20 Indeed, the quasi-religious veneration of American jazz musicians over 
domestic groups, and the sharp distinction between jazz and dance music, is 
representative not only of the German jazz aficionados but also of their 
contemporaries in Britain. 
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 NJA Melody Maker µ%%&/LVWHQHU³5HVHDUFK´LQWR'DQFH0XVLFLVQ¶W¶E\µ'HWHFWRU¶th June 
1943, p.1. 
16
 Chilton interview 2012. 
17
 See Baade, Victory through Harmony, pp.105-130. 
18
 Jim Godbolt, A History of Jazz in Britain 1919-50. London: Northway Publications, 2005, pp.127-
128. 
19
 Christina %DDGH µ³7KH'DQFLQJ)URQW´'DQFH0XVLF'DQFLQJDQG WKH%%& LQ:RUOG:DU ,,¶
Popular Music 25.03 (2006), pp.347-368. Here p.350. 
20
 JZD Hans Blüthner papers. Blüthner to Horst J.P. Bergmeier, 18th January 1984. 
 8 
 
In Germany, the distinctions between jazz and dance music were further blurred due 
to the delayed introduction of jazz to the Weimar Republic.21 With American bands 
unable or reluctant to tour the country due to sanctions and inflation in the aftermath 
of World War I, the first jazz group from the USA did not reach German soil until 
1924, and American record companies were reluctant to export to the economically 
ZHDN :HLPDU 5HSXEOLF *HUPDQ µMD]]¶ EDQGV LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI ILUVW-hand 
H[SHULHQFHRIWKHPXVLFJHQHUDOO\ZRUNHGE\JUDIWLQJ³UDJWLPHV\QFRSDWLRQVDQGDQ
XQLQKLELWHG SHUIRUPDQFH VW\OH´ RQWR H[LVWLQJ :LOKHOPLQH JHQUHV VXFK DV PLOLWDU\
music, Radaukapellen QRYHOW\µUDFNHWEDQGV¶DQGPRVWQRWDEO\VDORQRUFKHVWUDV22 
The music historian J. Bradford Robinson points out that the most popular early 
German jazz groups (such as those of Dajos Béla, Barnabás von Géczy, Marek 
Weber and Bernard Etté) were simply salon orchestras which had been rechristened 
as jazz bands whilst essentially retaining the same structure under the leadership of a 
Stehgeiger (lead violinist), and a manual was even issued in 1928 providing 
instructions on how to convert a salon orchestra into a jazz band.23 This model 
persisted in the German musical imagination and was to remain the dominant format 
of the jazz band right up to the end of the Third Reich. 
The contemporary distinctions between jazz and swing, too, were complicated, and 
the subject of much debate in Britain among connoisseurs. Before and during World 
:DU ,,%ULWLVK MD]]GLVFRXUVHZDVGRPLQDWHGE\ZKDWPD\EURDGO\EH WHUPHG µWKH
SULPLWLYLVWSRVLWLRQ¶24 ZKLFKKHOGWKDWVZLQJZDVD³SRSXODU>ZKLWH@PXVLFZKLFKLV
D FKHDS LPLWDWLRQ RI WKDW SURGXFHG E\ 1HJUR FRPELQDWLRQV´ ZKLOH RQO\ RU
predominantly) African-American musicians were considered to play authentic 
jazz.25 According to this view, swing was a white, slick and commercial copy, while 
jazz was African-AmericDQ UDZ DQG LQVWLQFWLYH 7KH SULPLWLYLVWV¶ IDOVH GLFKRWRP\
can also be seen in the context of the political and cultural backlash during the 1930s 
against the racist ideology and rhetoric of the Nazis among British jazz fans, which 
also saw Melody Maker take a public stand against domestic anti-Semitism and draw 
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 -%UDGIRUG5RELQVRQµ7KH-D]](VVD\VRI7KHRGRU$GRUQR6RPH7KRXJKWVRQ-D]]5HFHSWLRQLQ






 6HH WKH H[WHQVLYH FULWLTXH RI WKH µSULPLWLYLVW SRVLWLRQ¶ LQ Lee B. Brown µ3RVWPRGHUQLVW -D]]
7KHRU\ $IURFHQWULVP 2OG DQG 1HZ¶ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57.2 (1999), 
pp.235-246. 
25
 Radio Rhythm Club script dated 11th February 1943, cited in Baade, The Dancing Front, p.349. 
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attention to the injustices suffered by African-American musicians in the USA.26 
+RZHYHUE\&DUOR%RKOlQGHU DPHPEHU RI WKH ZDUWLPH )UDQNIXUW µ+DUOHP¶
Group,27 could confidently and accurately VWDWH³MD]]LVWKHXPEUHOOD- and collective 
WHUPDQGVZLQJLVDVW\OHLQWKLVGHYHORSPHQW´28 
Defining Key Terms: Propaganda 
The thesis will therefore include all of these musical genres and sub-genres in its 
examination of the uses of jazz as propaganda, for only in this way can it reflect 
contemporary cultural perceptions and usages. This necessity has become apparent 
during the research, and similarly it is only through the practical application of a 
semantic framework onto the source material that an appropriately flexible definition 
RIµSURSDJDQGD¶KDVEHHQUHDFKHG7KHKLVWRULDQ'DYLG:HOFKGLVWLOVWKHHVVHQFHRI
WKH5093¶VGRPHVWLFSURSDJDQGDLQWR³PRELOLVDWLRQDQGFRQWURO´29 and notes that 
³ZKHQever public opinion is deemed important, there we shall find an attempt to 
LQIOXHQFH LW´30 :HOFK¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW LQ *HUPDQ\ ³WKH SROLWLFDO IXQFWLRQ RI
propaganda was to coordinate the political will of the nation with the aims of the 
6WDWH´31 was equally true of Britain and the USA during World War II, and the 
LQFUHDVLQJO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGXVHRIQRWRQO\µZKLWH¶SURSDJDQGDLQZKLFKWKHVRXUFHLV
GHFODUHGEXWDOVRµJUH\¶DQGµEODFN¶SURSDJDQGDLQZKLFKWKHVRXUFHLVDPELJXRXV
or concealed respectively) requires a nuanced and multifaceted interpretation of the 
term propaganda itself. 
,QKLV1XUHPEHUJGHIHQFH+DQV)ULW]VFKHZKROHGWKH5093¶V3UHVV'LYLVLRQIURP
January 1939 until March 1942 and its Broadcasting Division from November 1942 
until May 1945,32 arrived at a concise and suitably neutral definition of propaganda 
which will also serve the thesis LW LV³WKHDUWRIDZDNHQLQJ WKRXJKWVRU IHHOLQJV LQ
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 Godbolt, A History of Jazz in Britain, p.129. 
27
 Kater, Different Drummers, pp.149-150. See also Michael Zwerin, Swing under the Nazis: Jazz as a 
Metaphor for Freedom. New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000, pp.48-56. 
28
 Carlo Bohländer and Karl-Heinz Holler. Jazz Führer. Leipzig: Edition Peters, 1977. 
Bohländer 1977, p.18. 
29
 David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 
p.2. 
30
 Ibid, p.6. 
31
 Ibid, p.61. 
32
 Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939-1945. Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain 
and Germany. London: Faber, 2010, p.508. 
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RWKHU SHRSOH ZKLFK WKH\ ZRXOG QRW KDYH WKRXJKW RU IHOW ZLWKRXW WKLV VWLPXOXV´33 
Thus attempts to bolster morale also constitute propaganda, and yet are seldom 
considered to be such. It is important to recognise this because government agencies 
such as the RMVP, the Ministry of Information (MoI) and OWI used music and 
broadcasting in an organised and concerted effort to produce certain desired 
psychological or emotional effects in their own soldiers and civilians for the benefit 
of the war effort. The first task is to divest propaganda of the traditional pejorative 
associations which continue to limit contemporary perspectives on this form of 
communication,34 and recognise it as a complex variety of processes with differing 
goals and relationships to the truth; the one consistent element in all propaganda is 
the attempt to exert some form of influence over the recipient. 
Indeed, the manifold possible forms and purposes of propaganda will be 
demonstrated throughout the thesis. Consistent with the contemporary usage of the 
terminology in World War II, I will be interpreting psychological warfare as a 
component and variety of propaganda operations,35 ZKLFK VDZ %ULWDLQ¶V PWE, the 
USA¶V 3V\FKRORJical Warfare Branch (PWB) and the Anglo-American Political 
Warfare Division/Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force 
3:'6+$()UHVSRQVLEOHIRUµJUH\¶DQGµEODFN¶SURSDJDQGD7KLVZDVFRQGXFWHG
under the auspices of psychological warfare, and a 1942 review in the British 
Medical Journal of an American study of German psychological warfare found that 
SURSDJDQGD ZDV WKH RXWFRPH RI ³FROGO\ VFLHQWLILF >SV\FKRORJLFDO@ HQTXLULHV´ WKH
results RIZKLFK ZHUH ³VFLHQWLILFDOO\ FRmpiled and then its effect on the masses at 
KRPHDQGDEURDGFDUHIXOO\FDOFXODWHG´36 The problems of such claims to scientific 
accuracy will be discussed below with regard to public opinion research, but 
certainly the diversity of attempts to manipulate public opinion refute the crude 
definitions of propaganda parodied by the British civil servant and historian Michael 
Balfour, who suggested that ³>D@VSDGHFDQQRWEHFDOOHGDVSDGHEXWPXVWEHHLWKHUD
primitive tool for exploiting the toil of the down-trodden masses or else a nobly-
                                                 
33
 Hans Fritzsche and Hildegard Springer, Es Sprach Hans Fritzsche: Nach Briefen, Gesprächen und 
Dokumenten. Stuttgart: Thiele, 1949, p.193. 
34
 As observed in Welch, The Third Reich, 2002. 
35
 See also -RKQ:5LOH\ -U DQG/HRQDUG6&RWWUHOO µ5HVHDUFK IRU3V\FKRORJLFDO:DUIDUH¶ The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 21.1 (1957), pp.147-158. Here p.150. 
36
 Gillespie, German Psychological Warfare, p.447. The article is reviewing a publication by Ladislas 
Farago for the [American] Committee for National Morale. 
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conceived instrument with which the honest labourer can expend his energies for the 
XVHRIWKHFRPPXQLW\´37  
However%DOIRXU¶VRZQDVVHUWLRQWKDWSURSDJDQGDLVXVXDOO\XQGHUWDNHQ³WRLQGXFH
DFWLRQRQWKHSDUWRIRWKHUV´38 is equally unsatisfactory. The use of music as a form 
of propaganda constitutes a more complex and abstract relationship between medium 
and message, as well as between communicator and recipient. US military 
intelligence operative Walter Cerf defined such a relationship in 1942 as the 
ZLHOGLQJRIµFXOWXUDOSRZHU¶DIRUPRIVRFLDOSRZHUZKLFK³PHDQVWKHFDSDFLW\RIDQ
individual (or group of individuals) to produce desired effects in other people and to 
SUHYHQWRWKHUSHRSOHIURPH[HUWLQJXQGHVLUHGLQIOXHQFHXSRQKLP´39 Cerf observes 
that expressive media such as music and painting, like language, convey meaning on 
a sensory basis,40 and can thus in theory be used by groups of individuals in order to 
exert cultural power over the recipient with the intention of inducing a particular 
response. Nonetheless, because the relationship between text and audience was an 
interactive process,41 these efforts could also result in what the philosopher Isaiah 
%HUOLQGHVFULEHVDVWKH³XQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHVXQIRUHVHHQDFFLGHQWDOUHVXOWVQRW
µPDGH¶E\WKHDFWRUV´.42 Welch, moreover, notes that Nazi propaganda content was 
itself influenced by existing public opinion rather than etched upon a tabula rasa,43 
and the attempts to use cultural power were similarly dictated by the tastes and 
prejudices of its potential audience. For the reasons outlined above, all organised 
attempts by state agencies to exert psychological influence, regardless of form or 
function, will be understood as propaganda in the following chapters. 
Primary Sources 
The international nature of the thesis has involved using archives in four different 
countries across two continents. The German sections of my research began at the 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, which houses the surviving documents of the 
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 Walter &HUI µ)UHHGRP RI ,QVWUXFWLRQ LQ :DU 7LPH¶ The Public Opinion Quarterly 6.4 (Winter 




 As noted in Riley, Jr./&RWWUHOO-Uµ5HVHDUFKIRU3V\FKRORJLFDO:DUIDUH¶S 
42
 Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas. London: John 
Murray, 1990, p.63. 
43
 'DYLG:HOFKµ1D]L 3URSDJDQGDDQGWKH9RONVJHPHLQVFKDIW&RQVWUXFWLQJD3HRSOH¶V&RPPXQLW\¶
Journal of Contemporary History 39.2 (April 2004), pp.213-238. Here pp.215-216. 
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Nazi broadcasting, cultural and propaganda apparatuses. The papers of the RRG 
were particularly valuable as a selective window onto the debate and policy 
regarding music, particularly jazz and dance music, on German radio. The minutes 
RIWKH55*¶VPHHWLQJVDQGFRQIHUHQFHVDOORZHGPHWRJDXJHWKHGHJUHHRIIOH[LELOLW\
and pragmatism to which NSDAP bureaucrats were willing to commit, whilst the 
discovery of documents relating to the previously-overlooked Frohe Stunde am 
Nachmittag provided important new evidence of the laboured attempts to develop 
New German Entertainment Music. By demonstrating the difficulty of translating the 
open-minded rhetoric into successful programming, these sources highlighted the 
disconnect between theory and practice thDW ZRXOG FKDUDFWHULVH *RHEEHOV¶ own 
relationship with jazz music throughout the course of the war. The RMVP 
documentation relating to the DTUO, the Propaganda MinisteU¶VDPELWLRXVDWWHPSW
to create a de facto State Jazz Orchestra on the Soviet model,44 enabled me to 
UHDSSUDLVHWKLVDUHDRIFXOWXUDOSURSDJDQGDDQGWROLQNWKHRUFKHVWUD¶VJHQHVLVWRWKH
failure of Frohe Stunde. Through the jazz-related correspondence of PHWHU5DDEH¶V
Reichsmusikkammer (RMK), the futility of the Nazi position in comprehending and 
dealing with the challenge posed by jazz became particularly apparent.45 
The papers of Hans Hinkel have been a further invaluable source at the 
Bundesarchiv. His various essays and speeches provide a counterweight to the 
SUDJPDWLF YLHZV HVSRXVHG E\ *RHEEHOV DQG WKH 55*¶V 'LUHFWRU-General, 
Reichsintendant Heinrich Glasmeier;46 indeed, Hinkel never publicly wavered from 
his 1933 assertion that radio should serve a didactic cultural-political role,47 and is 
therefore generally considered by historians to have been either an uncultured 
opportunist or a philistine.48 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, in Chapter 
Three I will challenge previous conclusions regarding Hinkel on the strength of 
unpublished sections of two interview transcripts which I viewed at the Michael H. 
Kater fonds in the Clara Thomas Archives and Special Collections at York 
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 For the various State Jazz Orchestras of the USSR, see Starr, Red & Hot, pp.175-180. 
45
 See for example BA R65I/41 for the correspondence between Hinkel, Raabe and the retired 
Viennese music publisher Norbert Salb. 
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 For Glasmeier, see R55/695 Protokoll der Arbeitstagung Abteilungsleiter ± Musik des 
Großdeutschen Rundfunks, 2 - 3 Oktober 1941, p.2. Georg Haentzschel of the DTUO, however, 
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University, Toronto. During the late 1980s, Kater interviewed numerous protagonists 
from the era, accumulating a wealth of interviews and correspondence material 
which constitute a hugely valuable supply of unused first-hand accounts. The fonds 
also contain other important primary sources suFK DV FRSLHV RI :HUQHU 'DQLHOV¶ 
newsletter, Musikalische Feldpost µ0XVLFDO )LHOG 3RVW¶ ZKLFK ZDV FLUFXODWHG
among jazz fans in the German military. The ability to use these fonds has enabled 
the integration of important oral history into the thesis in spite of the fact that the 
majority of the protagonists have long since passed away. 
Among the many useful resources at the Jazzinstitut Darmstadt, I was able to view 
the personal papHUVEHTXHDWKHGWRWKHLQVWLWXWHE\PHPEHUVRIWKH7KLUG5HLFK¶VMD]]
community. The multitude of correspondence left by Hans Blüthner of the Berlin-
Melodie-Club, as well as the often-unpublished manuscripts of GDR jazz expert 
Wolfgang Muth, were particularly helpful for the light they shed on jazz culture in 
1D]L *HUPDQ\ 'DUPVWDGW¶V %ULWLVK HTXLYDOHQW WKH 1DWLRQDO -D]] $UFKLYH DW
Loughton, holds CD-ROM copies of the complete Melody Maker back catalogue, 
which have proven invaluable. While the journal often voiced controversial opinions, 
and Charles Chilton commented plausibly that the regular attacks on the BBC were 
motivated by a desire to sell newspapers rather than genuine jazz advocacy, the 
journal remains an essential source for an understanding of the British jazz scene 
during World War II, as asserted by wartime aficionado Peter W.G. Powell.49 While 
the varying quality of its commentaries and commentators must always be taken into 
account, it remains broadly representative of wartime jazz discourse in Britain and is 
an invaluable source for understanding this. 
The BBC Written Archives Centre in Caversham houses the CRUSRUDWLRQ¶V ILOH RQ
Melody Maker, which, indicative of the necessity for a thesis of this nature, was 
opened for the first time since the end of the war in preparation for my visit. This has 
HQDEOHG PH WR VWXG\ WKH %%&¶V RZQ SHUVSHFWLYH RQ LWV WURXEOHG EXW EURDGO\
collaborative relationship with Melody Maker ZKLFK DOVR LQYROYHG WKH ODWWHU¶V
journalists taking part as expert commentators on Radio Rhythm Club. Moreover, 
regular Melody Maker writer Spike Hughes served as an expert advisor to the BBC 
regarding the quality control of broadcast dance bands, and provided a regular flow 
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 Powell to the author, 4th February 2013. 
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of external criticism, albeit of varying quality and perspicacity. The various BBC 
departmental memoranda and correspondence relating to dance music policy and 
controversial initiatives such as the ban on slush DQGµMD]]LQJWKHFODVVLFV¶DOVRNHSW
at Caversham, provided an important insight into the weaknesses and cultural 
SUHMXGLFHV WKDW KDPSHUHG WKH %%&¶V DWWHPSWV WR HIIHFWLYHO\ XVH MD]] DV D
psychological buttress for the Forces and civilians. 
At the National Archives in Kew I worked primarily with the archives of the Foreign 
Office and the Home Office, the former containing the papers of PWE, including 
WKRVHUHODWLQJWRLWVYDULRXVµEODFN¶DQGµJUH\¶UDGLRVWDWLRQVHXSKHPLVWLFDOO\WHUPHG
µ5HVHDUFK 8QLWV¶ The pioneering role of Sefton Delmer in using jazz and dance 
music for subversive purposes is often overlooked in the historiography of World 
War II propaganda, and yet, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Five by cross-reference 
with German sources, gave the Allies a powerful psychological advantage, caused 
the Nazi leadership great concern and was genuinely harmful to the German war 
effort. The Foreign Office papers also include notes on the reception of overt and 
covert German propaganda, with qualitative assessments and reports on the 
effectiveness of both German and Allied psychological operations. By using these 
sources in conjunction with materials from the Bundesarchiv in Berlin and Federal 
Communications Commission ()&& PRQLWRUV¶ UHSRUWV KRXVHG DW WKH National 
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, I will 
FRPSDUDWLYHO\ DQDO\VH %ULWLVK *HUPDQ DQG $PHULFDQ µEODFN¶ HIIRUWV DQG WKHLU
reception in the target countries.50 In doing so, the thesis will explore comparisons 
between methodologies, and make a significant contribution to the field by 
reappraising the imbalanced view of Anglo-American psychological warfare 
cooperation51 and the alleged ineffectiveness of British propaganda.52 
The online archive of Mass Observation, the Sussex-based social research 
organisation, has also been immensely useful for examining areas such as jazz 
PXVLFWKHDXGLHQFHIRUWKHEURDGFDVWVRI:LOOLDP-R\FHDNDµ/RUG+DZ-+DZ¶DQG




 As represented in Christof Mauch, Schattenkrieg gegen Hitler: Das Dritte Reich im Visier der 
amerikanischen Geheimdienste 1941 bis 1945. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999. 
52
 See Balfour, Propaganda in War, p.438. +LVDVVHUWLRQWKDW%ULWLVKSURSDJDQGD³PXVW«EHVDLGWR
KDYH IDLOHG´ ZLOO EH UHIXWHG LQ Chapter Five with regard to the work of PWE/Delmer, Anglo-
$PHULFDQFRRSHUDWLRQXQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRI3:'6+$()DQGWKHVXFFHVVIXOFRRUGLQDWLRQRIµEODFN¶
with military intelligence between 1943-45. 
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the psychological impact of the Blitz upon the citizens who lived through it. Of 
SDUWLFXODU LQWHUHVW ZHUH WKH µILOH UHSRUWV¶ FRQVLVWLQJ RI DQDO\VHV FRPSLOHG E\ WKH
organisation based on both covert observation and information directly supplied 
through interviews. These must not be read as empirical evidence in spite of their 
apparent aspirations to scientific accuracy; no information such as participant 
numbers or methodology is provided, and accordingly numerical data from the 
reports is employed in the thesis with the appropriate caution. Nonetheless, the 
commentaries and recommeQGDWLRQV E\ WKH UHSRUWV¶ DXWKRUV DUH LQ WKHPVHOYHV
important historical documents, and the representations of contemporary British 
society and musical tastes is broadly supported by the other evidence. A further 
important discovery was a previously unpublished report compiled by Mass 
Observation in its occasional (and controversial) governmental advisory capacity for 
the Ministry of Supply; drawn up with the assistance of the songwriter Annette 
Mills, it represents the only known British attempt to set out a theoretical and 
psychological basis for jazz propaganda, and one that presages the later American 
integration of advertising methodologies into psychological warfare.53 
Moreover, the diaries kept for Mass Observation by correspondents from a range of 
backgrounds have allowed me to integrate highly individualised perspectives into the 
thesis. These provide first-hand accounts of important factors such as Lord Haw-
+DZ¶VDOOHJHGSRSXODULW\ZLWKZRUNHUVLQ*DWHVKHDGRUWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOLPSDFWRI
the Blitz on a Maida Vale housewife, and have been used to illustrate various factors 
such as fatigue, fears and anti-government sentiment which might have been 
exploited by more effective Nazi propaganda output. Nick Hubble, a biographer of 
the organisation, has noteG³0DVV2EVHUYDWLRQPDWHULDOVKRXOGQHYHUMXVWEHYLHZHG
as a source of illustrative quotes concerning various aspects of the wartime 
H[SHULHQFH EXW QHHGV WR EH UHDG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ORJLF RI 0DVV 2EVHUYDWLRQ´54 
Regarding the diaries, this logic includes a higher degree of self-reflexivity than 
PLJKWEHIRXQGLQDSULYDWHMRXUQDODVZHOODVWKHGLDULVW¶VSRWHQWLDOSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH
Mass Observation staff as interlocutors. It must be considered that, consciously or 
                                                 
53
 Mass Observation Online. File Report 197 ± Propaganda ideas (unsigned memo to Chief Public 
Relations Officer, Ministry of Supply), 13th June 1940.. 
54
 Nick +XEEOH µ5HYLHZ RI 0DVV 2EVHUYDWLRQ 2QOLQH¶ Reviews in History (review no. 969: 
http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/969), October 2010. A number of critical essays are also 
available on the Mass Observation Online website containing further academic considerations such as 
FODVVDQGJHQGHULQUHODWLRQWRWKHXVDJHRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VZRUNLQWKH writing of social history. 
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XQFRQVFLRXVO\ WKH GLDULVW LV µZULWLQJ IRU DQ DXGLHQFH¶ DQG WKHUHIRUH 0DVV
Observation diaries must be read with caution, whilst recognising that a significant 
part of their value as evidence results from their subjectivity and idiosyncrasies.55 
Indeed, the sheer multitude of voices and viewpoints available presents the 
researcher with the problem that their utilisation must be, to paraphrase Calder, 
³QHFHVVDULO\ « UDWKHU RSSRUWXQLVW DQG UDQGRP´56 +XEEOH VXJJHVWV WKDW ³>W@KH
apparent blurring of vision resulting from those simultaneous perspectives is 
indicative of the difference between Mass Observation and other ways of seeing. It is 
WKHWDVNRI WKHUHVHDUFKHUWRUHVROYHWKLVIRUPRIREVHUYDWLRQLQWRIRFXV´57 but it is 
HTXDOO\LPSRUWDQWWKDWWKLVµIRFXV¶GRHVQRWHQWDLOSODFLQJWRRJUHDWDQHPShasis on 
personal accounts at the expense of an accurate reading of a mass event. I have 
therefore endeavoured to cross-reference significant information from the diaries 
with other sources whenever possible, for example by citing BBC Listener Research 
to FRUURERUDWH GLDULVWV¶ DFFRXQWV RI WKH UHFHSWLRQ RI /RUG +DZ-Haw broadcasts in 
Chapter Two. 
Additional valuable online resources have been the digitised Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) archive and Hansard Online. The FBI archive has allowed me to 
FRQWULEXWHWKHILUVWVFKRODUO\VWXG\RIWKHZRUNRI,YD7RJXUL'¶$TXLQRDNDµ2USKDQ
$QQ¶DQGWKH-DSDQHVHZero Hour programme, broadcast to US Forces in the South 
Pacific. The transcripts, interview excerpts and other material provided in the files 
IRU'¶$TXLQR¶VFRQWURYHUVLDOSRVW-war treason trial have allowed me to explore this 
remarkable and unprecedented example of highly self-reflexive propaganda, which 
appears in content and presentation to be an attempt at sabotDJHRIWKHSURJUDPPH¶V
propagandistic goals. Furthermore, the Hansard Online archive of Parliamentary 
speeches and debate has provided an advantageous window on contemporary British 
political discourse regarding such subjects as jazz, propaganda and public opinion 
surveys. I have integrated this into the narrative to illustrate areas of political 
discord, alternative opinions and the general Parliamentary climate on individual 
issues. In turn, this has helped to show that no consensus existed on seemingly 
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uncontroversial aspects of prosecuting the war, such as the purpose of broadcasting 
and the use of governmental propaganda. 
The National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland 
contains the archives of OWI, which have allowed me to rectify the relative absence 
of scholarship on this important and yet neglected aspect of the US war effort, whilst 
SURYLGLQJ WKH ILUVW VWXG\ RI 2:,¶V ZRUN LQ DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQWH[W 7KLV LV
SDUWLFXODUO\ QHFHVVDU\ EHFDXVH WKUHH TXDUWHUV RI 2:,¶V EXGJHW ZDV assigned to its 
Overseas Branch,58 indicating its priorities and implicitly contradicting the historian 
&KULVWRI0DXFK¶VPLVWDNHQDVVHUWLRQ WKDW2:,¶VPDLQGXW\ZDV WR VSUHDGQHZVRI
American victories. A much subtler reading of the activities and remit of Elmer 
DaviV¶ organisation is required, and will be provided in Chapter Four and Chapter 
)LYH ZLWK WKH ODWWHU FRQWDLQLQJ DQDO\VHV RI 2:,¶V DWWHPSWV DW FXUDWLQJ DQG
influencing the national mood, including countering racial tensions and domestic 
extremist pURSDJDQGD7KH)&&PRQLWRUV¶ UHSRUWVDUHDQH[FHOOHQW UHVRXUFHIRU WKH
American reception of Nazi propaganda, including content analyses and critical 
assessments. Based on these documents, in Chapter Four I have produced the first 
detailed scholarly analysis of the ambitious psychological warfarH RI WKH 5093¶V
Station Debunk.59 The visible evolution and alteration of the content on a trial-and-
error basis provides a detailed insight into *RHEEHOV¶QDLYHW\YLV-à-vis the regional 
and cultural differences in the United States which resulted in the targeting of jazz 
music at rural Midwestern audiences.60 
The historical scope of the thesis has provided very few chances to generate new oral 
history,61 but in the British section of the research I benefited from contact to two 
protagonists of the wartime British jazz scene. Aficionado Peter W. G. Powell 
provided me with a wealth of reproduced primary documents and other material 
relating to jazz during the war, especially the landmark HMV First Public Jam 
6HVVLRQLQZKLFKKHDWWHQGHGDQG.HQ-RKQVRQ¶VSRSXODU:HVW,QGLDQ'DQFH
                                                 
58
 NARA RG 306 Box 235 OWI, Elmer Davis 1942. Remarks of Elmer Davis, The New York Times 
Hall, 28th October 1942. 
59
 Elements of my research on Debunk have been discussed in a different context in my article in Sala 
(ed.), Music and Propaganda. 
60
 Bergmeier/Lotz, +LWOHU¶V $LUZDYHV, pp.220-221 offers a brief outline of the programme but 
VXUSULVLQJO\ PDNHV QR PHQWLRQ RI LWV LQLWLDO MD]] FRQWHQW )RU *RHEEHOV¶ FXOWXUDO SUHMXGLFHV DQG
condescensiRQWRZDUGVWKH86$VHH6WXGGHUWµ7KH'HDWKRI0XVLF¶S 
61
 As noted above in this section, an important exception has been the wealth of tapes and interview 
transcripts at the Michael H. Kater fonds. 
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Orchestra, with whom he toured. In addition to the copies of contemporary 
newspaper accounts, as well as his own articles, he has assisted me on a number of 
points relating to radio programmes, listening habits, German propaganda, the 
$PHULFDQ)RUFHV¶SUHVHQFHLQWKH8.DVZHOODVJHQHUDOTXHVWLRQVUHODWLQJWRMD]]LQ
Britain during the war. I was also able to interview the B%&¶V&KDUOHV&KLOWRQDQG
his wife Penny, herself a wartime employee of the BBC Italian Service, and their 
answers have proven invaluable in reassessing the role of the BBC early in the war, 
WKH %%& )RUFHV 3URJUDPPH DQG &KLOWRQ¶V RZQ Radio Rhythm Club. Moreover, I 
could prepare my lines of questioning by elaborating upon or avoiding areas already 
covered by the British jazz writer and historian Jim Godbolt in his extensive 1989 
interview with Chilton, which is available online at the British Library Sounds 
collection. It is consistent with the dearth of evidence of reception of German 
propaganda jazz in British and American archives that, when asked, neither Powell 
nor the Chiltons were DZDUHRIWKH5093¶VZDUWLPHHIIRUWVLQWKLVUHVSHFW 
Secondary Texts 
The interdisciplinary nature of the thesis has included drawing on a diverse range of 
secondary literature to support the research. The starting point, as has been noted in 
the introduction, was German jazz propaganda, which is first referred to in print by 
Horst H. Lange in Jazz in Deutschland. Die deutsche Jazz-Chronik 1900-1960, 
published in 1966.62 This discography by Lange, a Berlin record collector and disc 
jockey in the immediate post-war period, contains no citations and is now greatly 
outdated from a historiographical perspective by the more recent works covering 
German jazz from a musicological, historical and sociological perspective.63 
Nonetheless, for many years it was the only book available on the subject of German 
MD]]KLVWRU\DQGFHUWDLQO\LWGHDOWIRUWKHILUVWWLPHZLWKWKH5093¶V&KDrlie and his 
Orchestra project and thus propaganda jazz in general. Published in 1977, Joachim-
EUQVW%HUHQGW¶VEin Fenster aus Jazz µ$:LQGRZRI-D]]¶DFNQRZOHGJHVLWVGHEWWR
                                                 
62
 Horst H. Lange, Jazz in Deutschland: Die deutsche Jazz-Chronik 1900-1960. Berlin: Colloquium 
Verlag, 1966. 
63
 See for example Kater, Different Drummers, Bergmeier/Lotz, +LWOHU¶V $LUZDYHV, Joachim Ernst 
Berendt, Ein Fenster aus Jazz: Essays, Portraits, Reflexionen. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1977. See also 
Detlev Peukert, Jürgen Reulecke and Adelheid Gräfin zu Castell Rudenhausen (eds.), Die Reihen fast 
geschlossen: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags unterm Nationalsozialismus. Wuppertal: Hammer, 
1981 and Detlev Peukert, Volksgenossen und Gemeinschaftsfremde: Anpassung, Ausmerze und 
Aufbegehren unter dem Nationalsozialismus. Köln: Bund Verlag, 1982. 
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Lange64 but also fails to provide citations. Rather than being only a work of jazz 
historiography, it takes the form of a wide-ranging cultural and musicological 
analysis of the German and international jazz scenes of the past and present, and 
offers a series of prognoses for the future. The chapter on the history of jazz on 
German radio from 1924-1975 is of particular interest regarding the thesis,65 and 
offers a cogent interprHWDWLRQ RI WKH 1D]LV¶ UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK µGHJHQHUDWH¶ PXVLF
which Berendt usefully sets within a broader scheme of German cultural history. As 
Welch notes, far from being an historical aberration, Nazism belonged to an 
intellectual lineage dating back at least as far as late eighteenth-century völkisch 
romanticism,66 and therefore the persecution of jazz must be understood as a 
continuation of deep-URRWHGKRVWLOLW\WRZDUGVµDOLHQ¶DQGPRGHUQFXOWXUDOSURGXFWLRQ
ZKLFKKDGH[LVWHGORQJEHIRUHWKH16'$3¶VVHL]Xre of power in 1933.67 
%HUHQGW¶V SLYRWDO UROH LQ WKH SRVW-war promotion of jazz in West Germany has 
recently been given book-length attention by the cultural historian Andrew Wright 
Hurley,68 but his contribution to the historiography of pre-war and wartime German 
jazz is best-VHUYHG E\ KLV UROH DV RQH RI WKH NH\ LQWHUYLHZHHV LQ .DWHU¶V Different 
Drummers: Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany. .DWHU¶VPRGXVRSHUDQGLLVEURDGO\
GLFWDWHGE\WKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKµMD]]¶PXVLFDQGFXOWXUHZDVDWRROof 
resistance or compliance during the Third Reich, and he is thus too ready in some 
instances to pass judgement on acts of collaboration.69 Tim Mason rightly points out 
ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHVWXG\RIWKH7KLUG5HLFKWKDW³WKH>KLVWRULDQ¶V@REOLJDWLRQLVQRWDn 
invitation to moralize about the past, but a command to understand in the broadest 
possible context. Understanding and explaining are themselves moral and political 
DFWV´70 DQG.DWHU¶VGHVFULSWLRQLQDODWHUERRNRIWKHPXVLFDOSURIHVVLRQLQWKH7KLUG
ReLFK DV FRQVLVWLQJ RI ³JUD\ SHRSOH DJDLQVW D ODQGVFDSH RI JUD\´ ZRXOG DOVR KDYH
been sufficient commentary in this case.71 Nonetheless, the book remains the seminal 
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 Berendt, Ein Fenster aus Jazz, p.289. 
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 Andrew Wright Hurley, The Return of Jazz: Joachim-Ernst Berendt and West German Cultural 
Change. New York: Berghahn, 2009. 
69
 Kater, Different Drummers, p.119, p.120, p.135, p.200.  
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 Tim 0DVRQ µ(QGLQJV DQG%HJLQQLQJV¶ History Workshop 30 (Autumn 1990), pp.134-150. Here 
p.127. 
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 Michael H. Kater, The Twisted Muse: Musicians and their Music in the Third Reich. Oxford: 
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study of jazz in the Third Reich, interweaving original research on a variety of 
cultural and SROLWLFDODVSHFWVZLWKOHDUQHGDQDO\VLVDQGWKHDXWKRU¶VRZQEDFNJURXQG
as an accomplished jazz musician lends weight to his musicological critiques, which 
are nonetheless supported where possible by the opinions of his expert 
correspondents and interlocutors.72 , ZLOO EH LQWHUURJDWLQJ .DWHU¶V VRXUFHV IURP DQ
international standpoint, and, by cross-referencing these with material from German, 
British and American archives, will engage with his findings in a critical 
intertextuality throughout the thesis. 
A IXUWKHUVLJQLILFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHVWXG\RIWKH5093¶VXVHRIMD]]ZDVPDGH
by Horst J.P. Bergmeier and Rainer E. Lotz with +LWOHU¶V$LUZDYHVWKHLQVLGH6WRU\
of Nazi Radio Broadcasting and Propaganda Swing, a political history of Nazi 
English-language radio propaganda. The authors are not professional historians, and 
indeed announce from the outset that their respective strengths are biographical 
material and discographies.73 As such, the book offers little by way of analysis and 
interpretation, providing instead minutiae relating to German radio propaganda 
activities and structures, alongside biographical sketches of the various protagonists. 
Like Kater, they were able to integrate a great deal of important oral history into 
their study, interviewing and corresponding with numerous musicians, broadcasters 
DQG IRUPHU EXUHDXFUDWV GXULQJ WKH ERRN¶V OHQJWK\ JHVWDWLRQ SURFHVV74 The chapter 
HQWLWOHG µ3URSDJDQGD 6ZLQJ¶75 is most relevant for the purposes of the thesis, and 
focusses on the two most prominent RMVP projects in this area, the DTUO and 
&KDUOLH DQG KLV 2UFKHVWUD 7KH\ DOVR VXSSO\ DQ RYHUYLHZ RI *RHEEHOV¶ DPELWLRXV
1942 reorganisation of the RRG, which was intended to replace Party stalwarts with 
genuine experts in the respective fields, regardless of their political credentials, and 
effectively saw Hinkel taking control of all radio entertainment. Lotz provides a 
ninety-page discography of all traceable Nazi propaganda jazz recordings, complete 
with personnel, recording dates and lyrics, reconstructed from Deutsche 
Grammophon recording ledgers and interviews with surviving musicians. However, 
in Chapter Two I will discuss a previously XQPHQWLRQHG1D]LSDURG\RI µ6LHJIULHG
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but is also significant because the evidence suggests that Nazi anger at the British 
RULJLQDO RI µ6LHJIULHG /LQH¶ PD\ KDYH EHHQ WKH FDWDO\VW IRU WKH 5093¶V SROLF\ RI
parodying British music. A further notable omission is the brief two-page treatment 
of Station DebunkWKH5093¶VµIUHHGRPVWDWLRQ¶LHµEODFN¶VWDWLRQIRUWKH86$
which surprisingly makes no mention of its jazz content, and yet the shifting target 
audiences and XVH RI PXVLF UHYHDO LPSRUWDQW XQFHUWDLQWLHV DQG IODZV LQ *RHEEHOV¶
methodology. In Chapter Four I have rectified this situation with an extensive study 
of the station using Federal Communications Commission (FCC) PRQLWRUV¶UHSRUWV 
The most recent addition to the canon of literature on German pre-war and wartime 
MD]]LV6WHSKDQ:XWKH¶VSwingtime in Deutschland. A leading figure in the revival of 
swing music and culture in Germany, Wuthe was personally acquainted with 
surviving aficionados and musicians, incOXGLQJ )UDQ] µ7HGG\¶ .OHLQGLQ DQG 3ULPR
Angeli of Charlie and his Orchestra, and integrates decades of research into a book 
structured around the cultural and technical aspects of jazz and dancing in the 
Weimar Germany and the Third Reich. As such, it has been valuable as background, 
but much of the information is largely beyond the remit of the thesis. I have, 
however, cited his original research regarding the genesis of Charlie and his 
Orchestra to support my argument that the orchestra existed before it was 
commissioned by the RRG/RMVP. During a conversation with Wuthe in Berlin in 
December 2011, he told me that he had only cursorily covered the subject of 
propaganda jazz in his book because previous work in the area by Kater and 
Bergmeier/Lotz had rendered further literature in the field largely superfluous.77 The 
thesis will demonstrate that adopting an international and comparative perspective on 
the uses of jazz as propaganda has in fact opened valuable new avenues of 
exploration and facilitated important new findings, as outlined in this chapter. 
Although also constructed around oral history interviews with leading protagonists 
IURPWKH7KLUG5HLFKMD]]PLOLHX0LNH=ZHULQ¶VSwing under the Nazis: Jazz as a 
Metaphor for Freedom is a far less reliable source than Kater and Bergmeier/Lotz. 
7KH ERRN RSHQV ZLWK WKH DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³>Z@ULWLQJ D JRRG UHDG FDPH ILUVW «
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Names, dates, and places are factual, although it became increasingly difficult to 
separate imagination from fact. Imagination itself beFDPHRQHPRUHIDFW«6RPH
FKDUDFWHUV DUH FRPSRVLWHV « 7KH PRVW HYRFDWLYH YHUVLRQV ZHUH XVHG´78 
Accordingly, the noted musician-turned-writer offers what is primarily a work of 
poetical journalism, lacking in historiographical credibility and of limited academic 
value =ZHULQ¶V self-professed emphasis on storytelling over accuracy renders his 
transcriptions of the interview material unreliable, although in some instances it was 
possible to check these against his correspondence with Hans Blüthner,79 which is 
preserved at the Jazzinstitut Darmstadt. Nonetheless, while occasionally distorted by 
Germanophobia,80 =ZHULQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIMD]]LQWKH7KLUG5HLFKLV
of use in explaining the problems that Goebbels and the Nazi cultural apparatus had 
in coming to terms with the art form from a philosophical perspective and can be 
considered a worthwhile addition to the literature on the subject. 
The same caution must be used in handling the non-fiction work of Czech writer 
Josef âNYRUHFNêZKRexperienced life as a jazz fan and amateur musician both in 
the Nazi Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and in Soviet-occupied 
Czechoslovakia. âNYRUHFNê¶VUHFXUULQJWKHPHVDVDQRYHOLVWDUHMD]]DQGUHSUHVVLRQ
in Nazi- and Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia, and these preoccupations are carried 
over into his essays. His anecdotal evidence has been utilised by journalistic writers 
such as Zwerin as well as serious historians like the Sovietologist S. Frederick Starr, 
and continues to appear in contemporary articles on the subject.81 However, it must 
be noted that evidence such as the ten-point anti-MD]]HGLFWZKLFKâNYRUHFNêFODLPV
to have seen in the Protectorate, and is sometimes cited verbatim as a primary 
source, is recounted from memory many years after the event.82 The fact that he 
DVVXUHVXVWKDWLWLV³IDLWKIXOO\´83 memorised is insufficient to admit this as concrete 
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HYLGHQFH RI 1D]L FXOWXUDO SROLF\ LQGHHG WR XQTXHVWLRQLQJO\ DFFHSW âNYRUHFNê¶V
reconstructions of documents is to disregard the complexity of human memory,84 
which recent advances in the field of neuroscience suggest is prone to embellishing 
negative past events with falsifications.85 Moreover, cognitive research demonstrates 
that memory retrieval is a constructive process,86 and semantic or associative 
similarity with later texts can lead to the integration of these subsequent experiences 
into the construction (or reconstruction) of earlier memories.87 These warnings must 
be borne in mind with all oral history and first-hand accounts utilised in the thesis, 
which is often supplied by subjects who are recalling traumatic or unpleasant 
experiences88 and wherever possible I have cross-referenced these with other 
sources. 
BRWK =ZHULQ DQG âNYRUHFNê appear to view the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships as 
morally equivalent totalitarian states. Whatever the other dangers of this approach, 
by interpreting the Third Reich as a monolithic µWRWDOLWDULDQ¶HQWLW\, it risks obscuring 
the complexities and contradictions of Nazi cultural politics and their relationship 
with jazz. While considerations of the nature of totalitarianism are beyond the remit 
RI WKH WKHVLV WKH IROORZLQJ FKDSWHUV ZLOO GHPRQVWUDWH WKH WUXWK RI ,DQ .HUVKDZ¶V
DVVHUWLRQWKDW³WKHGLVDGYDQWDJHVRILWVGHSOR\PHQW>DVDFRQFHSW@JUHDWO\RXWZHLJK
its possible advantages in attempting to characterize the essential nature of the Nazi 
UHJLPH´89 There is now manifold scholarly evidence that neither Stalin nor Hitler 
VXFFHHGHG DV +DQQDK $UHQGW FODLPHG LQ ³RUJDQL]LQJ WKH PDVVHV LQWR D FROOHFWLYH
mass iQRUGHU WREDFNXS WKHLU OLHV´90 and the thesis will refute such intentionalist 
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readings of the Third Reich.91 Through the prism of culture, it will illustrate that 
structural determinants92 GXULQJZDUWLPHIRUH[DPSOH)RUFHV¶PXVLFDO WDVWHVERWK
limited tKH5093¶VFDSDFLW\IRULGHRORJLFDOLQGRFWULQDWLRQDQGGLFWDWHGWKHQDWXUHRI
the state-commissioned musical projects such as Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag and 
the DTUO. 
,QGHHGLWLVZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIVXFKVWUXFWXUDOFRPSOH[LWLHVWKDWâNYRUHFNêLVPRVW
useful. His powerful arguments, based on these personal experiences, as to why jazz 
music cannot simply be co-opted or replicated by a state have aided me in 
interpreting the sources I have worked with at the Bundesarchiv, although they also 
KDYH EURDGHU LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WKH %%&¶V VWUXJJOHV with popular taste such as the 
slush ban: 








it can also be applied to the 5093¶V VWUXJJOH WR FUHDWH D SRSXODU DOWHUQDWLYH.94 
âNYRUHFNê¶V reflections on the contradictions between jazz and politics have 
contributed to a definition of what the American conductor and musicologist Leon 
%RWVWHLQKDVHOVHZKHUHFDOOHG³WKHKLVWRULFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHRIPXVLFDVDUHVXOWRI LWV
FKDUDFWHU´95 MusLFDOUHFHSWLRQQRWHV%RWVWHLQ³JRHVZHOOEH\RQGQRWLRQVRIWH[W´96 
DQG DQ H[SODQDWLRQ RI *RHEEHOV¶ VWUXJJOH ZLWK MD]] ZKLFK UHVWULFWV LWVHOI WR WKH
politico-FXOWXUDO TXHVWLRQ RI µGHJHQHUDWH¶ DUW LV LQVXIILFLHQW (YHQ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI
WKH5093¶VSUDJPDWLc wartime efforts and officially-backed initiatives to cultivate 
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ZKLFK SDUDOOHOHG WKH ³H[SORVLYH FUHDWLYH HQHUJ\´ DQG ³WUXH DUW´ RI MD]] ZDV D
decisive factor in what I will argue was the inevitable failure of New German Dance 
Music.97 
The first scholarly work to explore in depth the relationship between jazz and a 
political regime was S. Frederick StDUU¶V Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet 
Union )LUVW SXEOLVKHG LQ  OLNH .DWHU¶V Different Drummers it combines 
political, cultural and social history, albeit with a far broader temporal range and 
wider international perspective that takes into account the impact of American 
actions on Soviet policy.98 Indeed, the unprecedented numbers of imports of 
American jazz music to the USSR during the war in the name of Allied solidarity, 
which also saw numerous Red Army jazz bands entertaining the Soviet Forces, 
would be a valuable subject of study in its own right.99 Starr combines his credentials 
as a noted Dixieland jazz musician and a world-renowned scholar of Russia to 
provide a sweeping history of Soviet jazz that runs parallel to the evolution of jazz 
itself, from Cake-Walk lessons in Tsarist Russia to ethnic fusion jazz in the Soviet 
&DXFDVXV RI WKH V ,QLWLDOO\ LQWHQGHG DV D WUDQVODWLRQ RI $OH[HL %DWDVKHY¶V
monograph Sovetskii dzahz (Soviet Jazz),100 WKHERRNLV³UHWROGIURPWKHVWDQGSRLQW
of its significance to the history of Soviet culture as a whROH´101 with a structure that 
LV GLYLGHG FKURQRORJLFDOO\ LQWR WZHOYH ORRVH µHUDV¶ ZKLFK DUH GHVLJQHG WR UHIOHFW
either the musical, political or social developments relating to jazz music and Soviet 
affairs. 
Some of the relevant literature relates more generally to aspects of propaganda. The 
ILUVWRIWKHVHZDVWKHµPHPRLUV¶DFRPSLODWLRQRIGHIHQFHVWDWHPHQWVIURPWKH
1XUHPEHUJ 7ULDOV LQWHUYLHZ PDWHULDO DQG UHPLQLVFHQFHV RI 0RVFRZ¶V /MXEMDQND
prison) of Hans Fritzsche, the head of German radio entertainment during the war, 
who was tried at Nuremberg as the most senior surviving RMVP representative. The 
ERRN¶VEULHIIRUHZRUGGHFODUHVLWWREH³FRQWHPSRUDU\GRFXPHQWV«LQWHQGHGDVD
contribution toward the clarification of events, the repercussions of which we are 
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member Hildegard Springer, it leaves no room for critical handling of the dubious 
VRXUFH PDWHULDO ,QGHHG RQH RI WKH FKDSWHUV LV HQWLWOHG µ-XVWLILFDWLRQ¶103 and the 
ERRN¶VUDLVRQG¶rWUH of exculpating its subject in both the Nuremberg courtroom and 
the eyes of posterity do not lend it credence as a reliable source for objective 
FODULILFDWLRQ 1RQHWKHOHVV WKH FKDSWHU RQ µ3URSDJDQGD 7KHRULHV¶ RIIHUV D XVHIXO
account RIUDGLRZDUIDUHIURP)ULW]VFKH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHUHLWHUDWLQJWKH5093SROLF\
of attacking governments rather than populations104 DQGDGPLWWLQJWKH³VHOI-HYLGHQW´
German usage of propaganda as a means of attempting to cause rifts between the 
Allies.105 Moreover, his complaints about the activities of Sefton Delmer and PWE 
LQDGYHUWHQWO\ RIIHU IXUWKHU HYLGHQFH RI 'HOPHU¶V VXFFHVV )ULW]VFKH GHQRXQFHV WKH
%ULWLVKXVHRI³SRUQRJUDSKLFGHSLFWLRQV´RQWKHFODQGHVWLQHVWDWLRQGustav Siegfried 
Eins (GS1),106 which he contends were so crude that he refused to inflict the task of 
transcribing their content on his stenographers. While Fritzsche claims never to have 
used such measures, this was merely a question of remit; GS1 was functioning as a 
µEODFN¶VWDWLRQZKLOH)ULW]VFKHKLPVHOIZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUµZKLWH¶SURSDJDQGDDQG
in Chapter Three of the thesis I will provide evidence that the RMVP indeed 
employed similar strategies. As has been noted above, the fact that Delmer was more 
successful than Goebbels in H[SORLWLQJWKHPHGLXPDQGWKHSRWHQWLDORIµEODFN¶LVD
central component of the thesis. 
'HOPHU¶V DXWRELRJUDSK\ Black Boomerang was published in 1962, and it is 
testament to the need for a thorough critical appraisal of the work of PWE and its 
associated agencies that, more than fifty years later, it remains the definitive text in 
WKLV DUHD 'HOPHU¶V DFFRXQW LV QRW VFKRODUO\ DQG SURYLGHV QR UHIHUHQFHV IRU WKH
translated Nazi sources supplied in the appendix. Furthermore PDQ\ RI 'HOPHU¶V
wartime conversations with leading historical actors are cited word-for-word, in spite 
RI WKH IDFW WKDW WKH\ DUH SUHVXPDEO\ UHFRQVWUXFWLRQV IURP 'HOPHU¶V PHPRU\
Nonetheless, both the PWE archives at Kew and the RMVP files at the Bundesarchiv 
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VHHP WR FRUURERUDWH 'HOPHU¶V DFcount,107 and WKH WKHVLV ZLOO VKRZ WKDW 'HOPHU¶V 
FHQWUDOUROHDVWKHFUHDWLYHIRUFHEHKLQG3:(¶VVXFFHVVIXOHIIRUWVwas undisputed by 
his contemporaries 7KH ERRN RIIHUV D OHDGLQJ SURWDJRQLVW¶V RZQ FRPPHQWDU\ DQG
reminiscences on his work and the genesis of WKHYDULRXV µEODFN¶SURMHFWV DQGKDV
been an important point of reference for the thesis. Recently this has been 
complemented by the establishment of an online Sefton Delmer Archive,108 a very 
useful resource which includes abridged translations of scripts from the bogus 
Soldatensender and the earlier GS1DVZHOODVµ(YLGHQFHRI5HFHSWLRQ5HSRUWV¶DQG
unpublished essays by Delmer.109 
'HOPHU¶V VRQ )HOL[ GHVFULEHV /HH 5LFKDUGV WKH HGLWRU RI WKH psywar.org website 
ZKLFK KRVWV WKH 6HIWRQ 'HOPHU $UFKLYH DV ³WKH DXWKRULW\ RQ PDWWHUV UHODWLQJ WR
3:(´110 Accordingly, 5LFKDUGV¶ ERRN The Black Art: British Clandestine 
Psychological Warfare against the Third Reich, is the most notable secondary 
literature relating WR WKHZRUNRI'HOPHU¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQ111 However, Richards cites 
the scarcity of transcripts and recordings of the content of PWE radio projects as the 
SULQFLSOHUHDVRQIRUKLVERRN¶VIRFXVRQSULQWSURSDJDQGDRIZKLFKPRUHHYLGHQFH
survives.112 By comparatively exploring British, German and American archive 
sources, the thesis will demonstrate that sufficient documentary evidence exists to 
JDXJH WKH JHQHVLV QDWXUH DQG LPSDFW RI %ULWLVK µEODFN¶ UDGLR DFWLYLWLHV VXFK DV
Gustav Siegfried Eins and the counterfeit Soldatensender. It will thus elucidate 
LPSRUWDQWDVSHFWVRI3:(¶VZRUNZKLFKUHPDLQVXQGHU-researched even by experts 
in the field. 
'DYLG*DUQHWW¶VThe Secret History of PWE: the Political Warfare Executive, 1939-
1945 ZDV ZULWWHQ DW WKH EHKHVW RI 3:(¶V Director-General,113 probably for the 
SXUSRVHV RI LQVWUXFWLRQ LQ SUHSDUDWLRQ IRU D SRWHQWLDO µQH[W ZDU¶ ZLWK WKH 6RYLHW
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Union,114 and remained in the Whitehall archives for over fifty years before it could 
finally be published in 2002 following the declassificDWLRQ RI 3:(¶V UHFRUGV
*DUQHWW¶VVWXG\LVWKXVZULWWHQDVDQLQWHUQDOKLVWRU\DQGRIIHUVDGHWDLOHGEXWP\RSLF
SHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VZRUN7KHERRNZDVZULWWHQIRUDSUDFWLFDODQGQRW
DVFKRODUO\SXUSRVHDQGHQWLUHDUHDVRI3:(¶VVWUXFWXUH(such as finance) have been 
omitted, presumably because they were considered to serve no educational 
function.115 Little attention is given to cooperation with American agencies, which 
DUH GLVPLVVHG DV ³>EHOLHYLQJ@ LQ SV\FKRORJLFDO ZDUIDUH LI RQO\ DV D YDULHWy of 
DGYHUWLVLQJ´116 in spite of the important role that Anglo-American cooperation 
played from 1942 onwards in the coordination of military intelligence and 
psychological warfare, culminating in the joint PWD/SHAEF. Moreover, the 
declassification of not only British, but also German and American documents has 
UHQGHUHG*DUQHWW¶VVWXG\in many ways outdated, although the aforementioned dearth 
of works on the subject ensures it a continued relevance. 
The lack of emphasis on Anglo-American cooperation is reciprocated by the 
KLVWRULDQ&KULVWRI0DXFKLQKLVVWXG\RI$PHULFDQµEODFN¶SURSDJDQGDRSHUDWLRQVLQ
SDUWLFXODU WKRVH RI :LOOLDP 'RQRYDQ¶V 2IILFH RI 6WUDWHJLF 6HUYLFHV 266 0DXFK
focusses almost exclusively on American activities and sources, to the detriment of 
his reading of the international context. He VWDWHVWKDW³>D@PRQRJUDSKRQWKHVKDGRZ
war [Schattenkrieg] against Hitler must first and foremost describe the projects and 
DFWLYLWLHVRI266´117 and yet he admits that British strategy and judgement are only 
taken into account insofar as they can be reconstructed from American archival 
sources and official accounts.118 British activities are thus relegated to the periphery, 
and PWE is mistakenly referred to as the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB),119 
indicating the degree of attention paid to the British aspect of Anglo-American 
RSHUDWLRQV:KHQ0DXFKZULWHV WKDW LQ WKHSURSDJDQGDZDUDJDLQVW*HUPDQ\³WKH
American Secret Service systematically exploited the vacuum in the area of German 
HQWHUWDLQPHQW PXVLF´120 he is essentially placing all of the credit for British or 
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Anglo-American innovations with US agencies, and thus distorting the pattern of 
HYHQWV VLQFH :LOOLDP 'RQRYDQ¶V 266 ZDV initially providing resources and 
expertise to support an existing British initiative.121 It is true, as he states, that 
µ2SHUDWLRQ0XVDF¶UHSUHVHQWHGDJHQXLQH$PHULFDQFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHZDUHIIRUW122 
but it was broadcast over stations created by Delmer and PWE, which, in turn, used 
the powerful AmHULFDQµ$VSLGLVWUD¶WUDQVPLWWHU. Such efforts were collaborative, and 
can only be properly understood in relation to one another. 
An attempt to situate the activities of OWI within a broader international discourse 
concerning the nature and structure of propaganda institutions was made by Allan 
Winkler in Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942-1945. 
:LQNOHU¶V DFFRXQW KDV EHHQ FRQILUPHG as accurate E\ 2:,¶V $VVLVWDQW 'LUHFWRU
Archibald MacLeish,123 and unfavourably contrasts OWI with the allegedly more 
efficient RMVP.124 In a review of the book, Theodore S. Hamerow disputes this 
conclusion, arguing instead that the RMVP was only superficially united on matters 
of policy. Hamerow suggests WKDW :LQNOHU¶V FRPSDULVRQV ZHUH QRW ZLGH-ranging 
enough, and that he takes at face value assertions of OWI staff such as MacLeish and 
Robert Sherwood that they had no intention of copying the German propaganda 
model, interested as they were in presenting RQO\ ³WKH WUXWK´125 Indeed, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, OWI Director Elmer Davis was frank about 
HPSOR\LQJ³WKHVDPHWHFKQLTXHVDV+LWOHU´LQRUGHUWRZHDNHQ*HUPDQUHVLVWDQFH126 
:KLOH VXEYHUVLYH µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD IHOO XQGHU WKH UHPLW RI OSS, and OWI 
attempted to cultivate a reputation for veracity, Davis acknowledged that the facts 
could be adjusted or edited to achieve a desired psychological impact in broadcasts 
to the enemy.127 A major distinction between the RMVP and American propaganda 
operations was the decentralised nature of the latter, which, upon British 
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recommendation, saw the delegation of different areas of propaganda and 
information to different organisations.128 
Hamerow makes the case for viewing the German and American propaganda 
apparatuses as dichotomies consisting of ³ideologues´ and ³UHDOLVWV´129 This 
approach, however, runs a similar risk of oversimplifying a variety of complex 
factors in which ideology and realism often were intertwined, most notably with the 
work of Goebbels, who combined ideological fanaticism with shrewd pragmatism. 
In the NSDAP, ideology and realism were not mutually exclusive entities, and it is 
impossible to separate the Party, as Hamerow does, into opposing factions of 
7HXWRQLF VXSUHPDFLVWV LGHRORJXHV DQG ³Wurst DQG EHHU´ WUDGLWLRQDOLVWV130 
0RUHRYHU WKH 86 JRYHUQPHQW¶V Dforementioned British-inspired division of 
information (OWI) and intelligence (OSS) agencies in 1942 meant that the liberal 
leading figures at OWI were able to pursue a progressive social agenda, for example 
in advocating increased racial integration, since this was not only compatible with, 
but also essential to the war effort. While ideology could be a burden to the RMVP 
during the war, the reverse was often true for OWI, although, as Cerf argued, 
IUHHGRPRIVSHHFKPXVW LQFOXGHWKHULJKWWRFULWLFLVHRQH¶s own government,131 and 
Chapter Five will show that OWI was therefore obliged to tolerate virulent and 
potentially damaging domestic criticism or slander, often from extreme right-wing 
quarters. 
The question of ideology and pragmatism is central to the thesis, and, as will be 
shown in the following chapters, this relationship took very different forms in each 
country. With regard to Nazi Germany, the study of the relationship of the arts and 
propaganda is a relatively recent development, and yet it is essential to an 
understanding of the work of Goebbels, who had a doctorate in German literature 
DQGKDGRQFHSRVVHVVHGOLWHUDU\DVSLUDWLRQV)LUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ'DYLG:HOFK¶V
ground-breaking work on the Nazi film industry paved the way for the study of 
GoebEHOV¶ DFWLYLWLHV LQ WKH UHDOPRI HQWHUWDLQPHQWDQGFXOWXUH LQJHQHUDO+HQRWHV
WKDW *RHEEHOV¶ LGHDV RQ WKH UHFRQFLODELOLW\ RI DUW DQG SURSDJDQGD GLIIHUHG JUHDWO\
from those of Hitler, who saw the two as mutually exclusive, and points to the 
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USSR that the propaganda content could be most effective when carefully packaged 
as entertainment.132 
:HOFK¶VSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\RI*HUPDQFLQHPDWLFSURSDJDQGDFDQEHVHHQLQWKHEURDGHU
conWH[W RI KLVWRULRJUDSKLFDO GHYHORSPHQWV WR ZKLFK 6 )UHGHULFN 6WDUU¶V ZRUN also 
belonged, namely the rediscovery of important and yet previously neglected areas of 
culture in dictatorships and the study of these within their political framework. This 
differs from the concomitant advances in Alltagsgeschichte, for example the 
innovative work of Detlev Peukert in West Germany, which tended to study the 
impact of political structures on individuals, as opposed to the integration, co-opting 
or production of cultural artefacts for use in the political realm. Writing at a time 
when neither film nor music as a form of propaganda were the object of mainstream 
KLVWRULFDOVWXG\:HOFKGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKH1D]LV¶völkisch ideology 
was reflected and perpetuated through German motion pictures, whether in 
romanticised representations such as Der Ewige Wald (µ(QFKDQWHG)RUHVW¶1936), or 
in attacks on the obstructive role the family could play in the attempt to build a 
National Socialist society.133 This includes a study of the 1D]LV¶UHVWUXFWXULQJRIWKH
German film industry and the strict censorship imposed, which ensured that they had 
a monopoly over what was shown in cinemas and could exploit this to impose their 
own Weltanschauung, disguised as entertainment, on audiences.134 The thesis will 
explore equivalent attempts with regard to New German Entertainment Music, a 
cultural enterprise with which the Propaganda Minister enjoyed far less success.  
Audiences 
:HOFK¶VZDUQLQJ WKDWZKHQDQDO\VLQJ WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVVRI ILOPVPDQ\ \HDUV ODWHU
KLVWRULDQV DUH ³ORRNLQJ IRU HYLGHQFH RI LQIOXHQFH DQG DUH WKHUHIRUH Serhaps more 
OLNHO\WRH[DJJHUDWHZKDWLQIOXHQFHZHPLJKWILQG´135 is equally valid for the thesis. 
In attempting to avoid this pitfall, it is imperative to consider the various sources for 
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the analysis and interpretation of audience reaction in each of the countries studied, 
as well as the socio-cultural demographics of these audiences. This set of 
methodological difficulties is common to the study of all reception of culture during 
World War II, when there were still few efforts to measure public opinion. Because 
the attempts to do this varied from country to country, these must be considered 
separately in order to assess the nature and reliability of the evidence. However, 
EHIRUH DQDO\VLQJ WDUJHW DXGLHQFHV¶ UHVSRQVHV WR MD]] SURSDJDQGD LW PXVW ILUVW EH
ascertained who these audiences were. 
The variety and possible combinations of religious, economic and regional identities 
lie beyond the remit of the thesis. As will be discussed below in Chapter Three, 
nascent attempts to gauge public opinion in Britain via the wartime social survey 
employed a cross-tabulation procedure in the hope of achieving a degree of scientific 
DFFXUDF\ EXW JLYHQ WKH µPDVV¶ FKDUDFWHU RI UDGLR OLVWHQLQJ LW LV VXIILFLHQW KHUH WR
confine ourselves to considering audiences in terms of broadly-sketched 
dichotomies. I have found no evidence of religious influence upon the reception of 
jazz in any of the countries discussed and thus, while it may have played a role 
(positively or negatively) in individual cases,136 it has not warranted special 
consideration. The role played by gender will be considered in Chapter Two with 
special reference to Britain, but has not in general been relevant to the research.137 
A significant but inconclusive factor in the reception of music and propaganda is 
class bacNJURXQG0DVV2EVHUYDWLRQUHJLVWHUHGWKHKLJKHVWDSSURYDOUDWHVIRUµMD]]¶
among the working and artisan classes, although the statistics are mitigated by the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VH[WUHPHO\EURDGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHJHQUHZKLFK LQFOXGHGQRYHOW\
tunes and popular song. On the other hand, the specialist Rhythm Club culture in 
both Britain and Germany was predominantly a middle-class phenomenon, and yet 
Charles Chilton, the man who arguably contributed most to serious jazz appreciation 
in Britain during the war, was himself a working-class cockney, which Christina 
Baade notes added to his appeal and credibility as a presenter.138 Meanwhile, Kater 
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suggests that certain aficionados from the German lower middle class used jazz as a 
vehicle for upward social mobility,139 but this statement is questionable in the light 
RIMD]]¶VµGHJHQHUDWH¶VWDWXVZLWKLQWKHofficial cultural discourse of the Third Reich. 
In Hamburg, the so-called Swing-Jugend µ6ZLQJ-<RXWK¶ZHUHSUHGRPLQDQWO\IURP
cosmopolitan, bourgeois-liberal backgrounds, although Stephan Wuthe notes that the 
Hamburg scene in fact consisted of two cliques, with a corresponding working-class 
FRQWLQJHQW ZKR³SUHIHUUHGZLOGGDQFLQJ WR FROOHFWLQJ UHFRUGV´140 and emulated the 
expensive Anglophile dress sense of their wealthier peers141 as best they could with 
clothes bought at cheaper shops such as C & A and Peek and Kloppenburg.142 
0RUHRYHU WKH VZLQJV¶ $XVWULDQ FRXQWHUSDUWV WKH Schlurfs, were pronouncedly 
proletarian,143 and, in spite of aesthetic and cultural similarities to the Swing-Jugend, 
WKH\ PRUH FORVHO\ UHVHPEOHG &RORJQH¶V Edelweisspiraten µ(GHOZHLVV 3LUDWHV¶ LQ
terms of their class origins and overtly rebellious behaviour.144 In the United States 
QRWRQO\FODVVEXWDOVR UDFHSOD\HGD UROH LQ WKHµ=RRW¶VXEFXOWXUHDQG WKH London 
µ+DUOHP¶GLVFRXUVHFRQWDLQV UDFLDO DQG UDFLVWDVSHFWVZKLFKZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHG LQ
Chapter Two. However, the broad popularity of swing music in the USA 
transcended both racial and economic distinctions, and the complex issue of race in 
American culture and society lies outside the subject matter of the thesis. 
Nazi Germany, as has been made clear by Kater and Wuthe, possessed a vibrant jazz 
FXOWXUHLQVSLWHRIWKHUHJLPH¶VYDULRXVDWWHPSWVWRHUDGLFDWHLWEven an acceptance 
of Nazi ideology could be compatible with HQMR\PHQWRIµGHJHQHUDWH¶PXVLFas was 
demonstrated by the high-ranking Nazis and SS officers who attended live jazz 
SHUIRUPDQFHV LQ WKH EDUV RI %HUOLQ¶V .DQWVWUDH RU GDQFHG WR LW DW RIILFLDO
gatherings.145 Such casual listeners notwithstanding, wKDWPD\EH WHUPHG µ*HUPDQ
MD]]FXOWXUH¶FDQEURDGO\EHGLYLGHGLQWRWZRDXGLHQFHJURXSV. These consisted of the 
generally younger and more flamboyant Swing-Jugend, for whom the music served a 
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predominantly utilitarian purpose as a background for dancing and parties, and the 
DILFLRQDGRV ZKR FRQJUHJDWHG LQ µHot &OXEV¶ LQ XUEDQ FHQWUHV DFURVV WKH 5HLFK146 
although the boundaries between the groups could be fluid.147 In embarking upon the 
thesis, I expected that the subject would bring me into more frequent contact with 
these groups and their activities than transpired, and during the research it became 
apparent that Alltagsgeschichte can be of limited use in the discussion of the 
cultural-political realm in which jazz music was utilised as propaganda. Such 
broadcasts were generally targeted at the layman in order to appeal to the broadest 
possible spectrum of listeners, so when analysing their goals and reception it is more 
effective to divide the audience into Forces and civilian categories. 
Forces audiences can be regarded as essentially homogenous. While this overlooks 
obvious discrepancies in personal taste and the inevitable fact that some soldiers 
abhorred jazz,148 radio listening in the Forces invariably occurred in groups and was 
therefore subject to the dictates of the majority. As will be demonstrated below, 
majority tastes in the German, British and American Forces favoured lively, modern 
music, with an emphasis on jazz and dance music in each case. Accordingly, from 
the German Soldatensender, the decentralised nature of which was hugely 
problematic for the RMVP, to the BBC Forces Programme (later General Forces 
3URJUDPPHDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHOHJDWLRQRI)RUFHV¶HQWHUWDLQPHQW
away from OWI to the Special Services Division (henceforth SSD), tailored content 
was broadcast specifically with the more robust programming demands of the 
military in mind. 
Civilian audiences, on the other hand, must be considered in terms of the differing 
WDVWHVRI UXUDODQGXUEDQSRSXODWLRQV&KDSWHU)RXUZLOO LOOXVWUDWH WKDW WKH5093¶V
targeting of jazz music at rural Midwestern populations in the USA via Station 
Debunk was an act of great cultural naivety, and surprising given that the RMVP was 
FOHDUO\DZDUHRIWKHGLIIHULQJWDVWHVRI*HUPDQ\¶VRZQSRSXODFHWDNLQJSDLQVQRWWR
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offend the more conservative sensibilities of rural listeners, even when it came to 
names of individual programmes.149 Particularly useful for studying the domestic 
audience reception of broadcasts are the Meldungen aus dem Reich µ'LVSDWFKHV
IURPWKH5HLFK¶150 DUHJXODUVHULHVRILQWHUQDOUHSRUWVFRPSLOHGE\2WWR2KOHQGRUI¶V
Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS µ6HFXULW\ 6HUYLFH RI WKH 66-Reichsführer¶
henceforth SD), with which the public mood and opinion were gauged and 
VXPPDULVHG E\ LQIRUPHUV D PHWKRGRORJ\ WKDW UHVHPEOHV 0DVV 2EVHUYDWLRQ¶V RZQ
µILOH UHSRUWV¶ LQ%ULWDLQ:HOFKQRWHV WKDWZKLOH WKH\PXVWEH WUHDWHGFULWLFDOO\DQG
there is disagreement over their value as evidence of public opinion in the Third 
Reich, the Meldungen aus dem Reich remain the best available source of this.151 
,QGHHGWKHEOXQWSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH6'¶VILQGLQJVZKLFKUHJXODUO\GUHZDWWHQWLRQWR
*RHEEHOV¶SURSDJDQGD Iailures, earned Ohlendorf numerous enemies, including the 
Propaganda Minister himself. In June 1944, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann forbade all 
official trustees and employees of the NSDAP from providing information to the SD 
LQWHUURJDWRUV FRPSODLQLQJ WKDW ³[t]he informers [V-Männer] of the SD apparently 
PRYHRQO\LQQHJDWLYHFLUFOHV´.152  
TKH WUHDWPHQW RI MD]] PXVLF LQ WKH µ&XOWXUDO $UHDV¶ VHFWLRQ RI WKHVH GLVSDWFKHV 
allows us to test their reliability. Notably, on 6th March 1941, the SD asserted that 
FRPSODLQWVDERXW³PXVLFLQWKHVW\OHRI-HZLVKMD]]IURPWKH:HLPDU5HSXEOLF´KDG
been increasing in the last few months, and claimed LW ZDV ³DERYH DOO VROGLHUV RQ
leave from the front who express their distaste at the [musical] situation in the pubs 
LQ WKHLU KRPHODQG´.153 However, this contradicts the majority of other sources 
UHJDUGLQJ)RUFHV¶WDVWHV, which overwhelmingly demonstrate a predilection for jazz. 
Accordingly, this raises the question of bias, and lends weight to GoebbelV¶ claims 
that the SD findings which were critical of the DTUO were inaccurate.154 In 
FRQVLGHULQJ WKH UHSRUWV¶ GLVSURSRUWLRQDWH HPSKDVLV RQ WKH SRSXODFH¶V KRVWLOLW\
towards jazz, it is therefore important to bear in mind the clear disconnect between 
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rural and urban receptions of jazz music, and because antipathetic responses towards 
the public playing of jazz (or what was taken as such) expressed in SD reports often 
stemmed from rural communities, these cannot be taken as indicators of broader 
public opinion. In utilising and interpreting such materials for the thesis, therefore, I 
have taken into account not just the contents of a source but also its geographical and 
socio-cultural context. 
The reception and impact of Allied propaganda was inevitably difficult to measure, 
not least because the draconian punishments that could be meted out for the illegal 
listening to foreign broadcasts meant that it was unlikely to be discussed in public 
spaces. Therefore, the most useful sources for this are often the official German 
reactions to such projects. For example, the attempts of Das Reich and Hans 
Fritzsche to publicly denounce GS1 as being of British origin155 can be interpreted as 
evidence of the project¶VVXFFHVV156 &RQFHUQHGOLVWHQHUV¶ OHWWHUVWR WKH5093WRR
will be cited as evidence of the degree to which such stations were being listened to 
and the responses they elicited.157 Moreover, the British PWE files have been 
particularly useful because information regarding the effectiveness and popularity of 
propaganda was readily available from interviews with POWs, as well as the 
bugging of POW accommodations. Other methods of information-gathering were 
DOVRDW3:(¶VGLVSRVDODVH[SODLQHGE\Dn internal report in 1943: 
In attempting to evaluate the success of an RU [Research Unit, LHµEODFN¶VWDWLRQ@IURPWKHDYDLODEOH
evidence (either direct from agents or refugees, or indirect from reactions in the country or countries 
to which it is addressed) it must be remembered that the volume of this evidence will vary. The two 
main factors affecting the volume of evidence are the number of intelligence channels from any 
country, and the technique of the RU (e.g. whether their content is sensational or not). Lack of 
evidence therefore should not be taken by itself as proof that an RU has failed in its object.158 
Nonetheless, in Chapter Three, I will reappraise the success of the most ambitious 
German jazz propaganda project, Charlie and his Orchestra, based on the almost 
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complete absence of evidence of its reception in the British and American archives. 
This omission is significant because William Joyce, to whose programme the music 
was allegedly attached, received a great deal of attention from British monitors, and 
thus the fact that they appear to have been completely overlooked contradicts 
previous scholarly assertions regarding WKHJURXS¶VQRWRULHW\159 The novelty of the 
RUFKHVWUDDVDµSURSDJDQGDMD]]EDQG¶DQGWKHLQWHUHVWRIFRQWHPSRUDU\UHDGHUVLQWKH
VXEMHFWPDWWHUKDVOHGDVSHU:HOFK¶VZDUQLQJ160 to evidence of its reception being 
sought too actively where in fact it is tenuous or non-existent. 
Like German audiences, it is most useful to divide British and American listeners 
into civilian and Forces categories, but the emphasis on the urban/rural divide is less 
pronounced than in the German archival evidence; while London (the BBC) and 
1HZ<RUNWKHµ%LJ)RXU¶QHWZRUNVIXQFWLRQHGDVFHQWUHVRIFXOWXUDOSRZHUZKLFK
attempted to exert influence on a national level, the völkisch ideology of the Nazis 
presupposed exaggerated deference to the conservative cultural tendencies of the 
rural population. In British broadcasting the far more apparent split is between 
DGPLUHUVRIµVHULRXV¶DQGµOLJKW¶LHFODVVLFDOYVMD]]GDQFHPXVLFDFRQIOLFWZKLFK
has been characterised by Charles Chilton DV³DOPRVWDUDFLDOWKLQJ´161 Moreover, it 
contained an aspect of classism and elitist snobbery which was reflected not only by 
WKH ³DQJU\ &RORQHOV´ZKR LQXQGDWHG WKH %%& ZLWK FRORXUIXO DQWL-jazz diatribes,162 
but also the Corporation itself. In making the case for more entertainment on the 
radio, the BBC magazine The Listener argued: 
The blunt truth is that a very great many of the people of this county ± certainly a majority ± are not 
DIIHFWHG«DWDOOE\%HHWKRYHQRU0LOWRQ7KH\DUHVLPSO\ERUHGE\PXFKgreat art; or they would 
be if they left their radio sets switched on. That is their misfortune; their lives are immeasurably 
poorer for the fact; and the B.B.C. always has been, and still is, doing its best to open the eyes and 
ears of the lowbrows to all that they are missing. But in a democratic state a great public body like the 
B.B.C. cannot dictate; it can only persuade. Nor can it ignore the tastes of such a very large proportion 
of its public.163 
$FFRUGLQJO\WKHWKHVLVZLOOFULWLTXHWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKWKH%%&¶VVHOI-perception 
DV WKH QDWLRQ¶V FXOWXUDO HGXFDWRU SHUVLVWHG GXULQJ ZDUWLPH WR WKH GHWULPHQW RI LWV
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ability to connect with the tastes of the many listeners who preferred µOLJKWHU¶IDUH
BBC Listener Research has been useful in this respect, revealing for example that 
ZKLOH RQO\ ³RQH LQ VHYHQ´ OLVWHQHUV HQMR\HG :DJQHU WKH PDMRULW\ ZDQWHG WR KHDU
dance music in the evening programming,164 and I have utilised other materials at the 
BBC Written Archives Collection such as memoranda and policy documents, as well 
as the critical Melody Maker articles from the National Jazz Archive, in order to 
H[DPLQHWKH%%&¶VFRPSOH[UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKSRSXODUPXVLFLQ:RUOG:DU,, 
Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has outlined the substantive contributions that the thesis 
will make to the broader academic discourse regarding the study of propaganda in 
World War II. Having discussed the most important primary sources and set out the 
relevant secondary literature, it has also demonstrated the necessity of a comparative 
study in this area. It has highlighted the benefits of both the international perspective 
and the focus on jazz and associated genres; the struggles of Britain, Germany and 
the USA to come to terms with and exploit this popular musical form provide 
valuable insights and reveal hitherto neglected strengths and shortcomings in the 
various propaganda apparatuses and policies.  
In order to analyse these most effectively, the following chapters will be structured 
chronologically and divided into blocks separated by key events, with the intention 
of presenting and studying the conflict as four different psychological phases. 
Chapter Two will deal with the period from the outbreak of war in September 1939 
until the beginning of the Battle of Britain on 10th July 1940; this will enable me to 
provide a comparative examination of the manner in which the British and the 
German information and propaganda apparatuses adjusted to the new situation and 
the role that jazz music played in these early wartime psychological activities. 
Chapter Three will discuss the period from the Battle of Britain until the eve of the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7th 'HFHPEHUZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQ WKH86$¶VHQWU\
into the war. The following fourteen months, which saw what one commentator aptly 
FDOOHG ³WKH WXUQLQJ RI WKH SV\FKRORJLFDO WLGH´165 will be covered in Chapter Four, 
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concluding with the German defeat at Stalingrad. My final chapter will focus on the 
period from February 1943, ZKLFKVDZ*RHEEHOVGHFODUHµWRWDOZDU¶RQWKH$OOLHVDW
%HUOLQ¶V6SRUWSDODVWXQWLOWKHHQGRIWKHZDU 
A central component of the thesis is the UHDSSUDLVDORI*RHEEHOV¶DELOLWLHVEDVHGRQ
the evidence of his insufficient wartime pragmatism with regard to *HUPDQ)RUFHV¶
musical tastes. This will be juxtaposed with a significant review of prior evaluations 
of Hinkel facilitated by the cross-referencing of valuable unused oral history 
interviews and the Hinkel papers at the Bundesarchiv. Furthermore, I will use 
British, German and American sources to analyse highly significant but neglected 
areas of propaganda historiography such as the Anglo-American cooperation on 
µEODFN¶SURMHFWVDQG the important work of Delmer and PWE. The thesis is the first 
comparative study of the activities of Britain, Germany and the USA in a major and 
yet under-researched area of propaganda and will facilitate a greater understanding 
of the dynamics and events involved in the radio propaganda war. 
Chapter Two will explore the British MD]] VFHQH¶V µPRELOLVDWLRQ¶ at the start of the 
war, with particular reference to Melody Maker. By providing the first scholarly 
discussion of tKHKHGRQLVWLFµERWWOHSDUW\¶ culture in London, and examining WKHµQHZ
NLQGRIDXGLHQFH¶FUHDWHG LQ WKH)RUFHVE\ WKHJURXS-listening environment, it will 
GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW WKH %%&¶V SRRU VWDUW WR WKH ZDU failed to adequately cater to 
civilians and Forces listeners alike. Previous historiography will be challenged to 
prove that tKH SRSXODULW\ RI :LOOLDP -R\FH¶V µ/RUG +DZ-+DZ¶ EURDGFDVWV posed a 
JHQXLQHWKUHDWWR%ULWDLQ¶VZDUHIIRUWDQGWKDWLWZDVSRVVLEOHIRUDOOHJHGO\KDUPOHVV
Nazi propaganda to resonate with sections of its British listenership in the boredom 
and LQDFWLYLW\ RI WKH µ3KRQH\ :DU¶ DQG WKH µFXOWXUDO EODFNRXW¶ ,QGHHG WKH ILUVW
months of the war, as will be shown, presented the RMVP with an excellent 







7KHµ&XOWXUDO%ODFNRXW¶: September 1939 ± July 1940 
³>7@KRVHZKR OLVWHQ WR WKHZLUHOHVVZLOO WHOO \RX WKDWDWSUHVHQWZHFDQSLFNXS LQ
England from eight to 10 German stations daily. If our own broadcasts are not 
attractive, if the news is dry, if the entertainment is mediocre, and if the music is of a 
low standard, which is what people complain of, the listener just turns the button 
and he gets a foreign broadcast. He may very well tune in to a German programme 
for its entertainment value, but he also gets a full measure of German propaganda, 
skilfully delivered and in excellent English. Do not let us undervalue the possible 
HIIHFWVRIWKLV´ 
                                   (Sir Samuel Hoare, House of Commons, 11th October 1939)1  
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On 2nd September 1939, Melody Maker ran a front-page article explaining how the 
war ± ³VKRXOGWKHFULVLVEUHDNWKHZURQJZD\´- would affect the jazz world and its 
protagonists.2 That same day, a seventeen-year-old Romford schoolgirl observed in 
her Mass Observation diary that, on a cinema visit, newsreel footage of Chamberlain 
ZDV ZLOGO\ DSSODXGHG ZKLOVW 0XVVROLQL¶V DSSHDUDQFHV ZHUH JUHHWHG ZLWK KLVVLQJ
³>:@KDW DQ DQWLFOLPD[ LW ZRXOG EH´ VKH QRWHG ³LI WKHUH ZHUH QR ZDU´3 At 11 
R¶FORFNWKHQH[WPRUQLQJKRZHYHUWKH%ULWLVKXOWLPDWXPWR+LWOHUH[SLUHGDQGZDU
was declared, with France joining Britain as its own ultimatum expired at 5 pm.4 The 
$PHULFDQ &%6 QHWZRUN¶V %HUOLQ FRUUHVSRQdent William L. Shirer opened his 
HYHQLQJEURDGFDVWZLWKWKHZRUGV³+HOOR7KHZDULVRQ´DQGUHSRUWHGWKDW*HUPDQ
UDGLR ZDV ³SOD\LQJ D VWLUULQJ SLHFH IURP WKH )RXUWK 6\PSKRQ\ RI %HHWKRYHQ
Sometimes the music stops and the proclamations which the German Führer issued 
at noon today are re-UHDG «7KHQ WKHPXVLFJRHVRQDQGSHRSOHKXGGOHFORVH WR
WKHLUVHWVIRUWKHQH[WSLHFHRIQHZV«´5 
7KH*HUPDQSRSXODWLRQPHW WKHGHFODUDWLRQRIZDUZLWK ³UHOXFWDQW OR\DOW\´6 rather 
than widespread popular enthusiasm,7 DQG 6KLUHU IRXQG ³QR H[FLWHPHQW « QR
hurrahs, no throwing of flowers ± QRZDU IHYHU QRZDUK\VWHULD´RQ WKH VWUHHWVRI
Berlin.8 Nonetheless, the quick succession of military victories in the early months 
of the war, skilfully exploited by Goebbels in popular newsreels,9 ensured a growing 
degree of national consensus; it was only with the turning of the military and 
psychological tide that this consensus waned.10 Initial British propaganda strategy 
ZDVODUJHO\GLVLQJHQXRXVZLWKWKH%%&¶V(XURSHDQ6HUYLce concentrating its efforts 
on attacking Hitler and insisting that a Nazi victory was impossible;11 an 
unconvincing message in the months of the Blitzkrieg. It is debatable whether or not 
                                                 
2
 NJA Melody Maker µ&ULVLV &RQVHTXHQFHV $ -D]] $FFRPSDQLPHQW WR WKH 0DUFK RI 7LPH¶ nd 
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3
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the lectures on morality to the German people, described by the contemporary 
American sociologist Kenneth Burke DSSDUHQWO\ ZLWKRXW LURQ\ DV ³D OLEHUDO
XQLYHUVLW\RI WKH DLU´,12 were as useless as Sefton Delmer later claimed.13 There is 
evidence that Germany possessed a surprising political diversity, even at levels of 
influence,14 but in the first year of the war, it was Germany that was conducting its 
propaganda campaign from a position of strength, supported as it was by mounting 
victories. 
This chapter will therefore focus primarily on aspects of British morale, and German 
attempts to diminish it, during the period from the outbreak of war on 3rd September 
until the eve of the Battle of Britain in summer 1940. Firstly it will explore Melody 
Maker¶V UHVSRQVH WR WKH GHFODUDWLRQ RI ZDU DQG WKH MRXUQDO¶V DGYRFDF\ RI WKH UROH
that jazz and dance musicians could play in maintaining national morale and 
psychologically strengthening the British Forces; this will be followed by an analysis 
RI WKH %%&¶V LQLWLDO ZDUWLPH PHDVXUHV UHJDUGLQJ MD]] DQG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW LQ
January 1940 of the entertainment-oriented BBC Forces Programme. By referring to 
WKHMRXUQDO¶VFRQWHQWDQGWKHCRUSRUDWLRQ¶VSUHYLRXVO\unopened Melody Maker file 
in its Written Archives Collection, as well as my 2012 interview with Charles and 
Penny Chilton, I will shed new light on the relationship between Melody Maker and 
the BBC; I will also discuss the important but neglected question of authorship in the 
journal and the necessity of understanding the backgrounds and prejudices of 
individual journalists in using this important source. Together these themes will 
elucidate the early wartime British broadcasting situation and the ways in which 
official acceptance of jazz was accelerated by the dictates of the war. Furthermore, 
using Metropolitan Police reports from the winter of 1939-1940, I will contribute the 
ILUVW VFKRODUO\GLVFXVVLRQRI³ERWWOHSDUWLHV´ a pre-war phenomenon which profited 
from the increased demand for hedonistic nightlife in wartime. This will enable me 
to explore the unofficial contribution of jazz music to the maintenance of morale, 
DQGWKHLPSDFWWKDWWKLVVXEDOWHUQµ+DUOHPLQ/RQGRQ¶FXOWXUHKDGRQ%ULWLVKMD]]DQG
                                                 
12
 .HQQHWK%XUNH µ:DUDQG&XOWXUDO/LIH¶ American Journal of Sociology 48.3 (November 1942), 
pp.404-410. Here p.410. 
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 See Eric .XUODQGHU µ%HWZHHQ 'HWURLW DQG 0RVFRZ $ /HIW /LEHUDO ³7KLUG :D\´ LQ WKH 7KLUG
5HLFK¶Central European History 44.02 [2011], pp.279-307. 
 43 
 
in nurturing the American-style jam sessions which would reach the BBC from 
1941.15 
I will also use primary sources such as the BBC Written Archives Collection and 
Mass Observation to reappraise the content and the reception, both official and 
public, of the initial broadcasts of the key figure in Nazi English-language 
broadcasting to Britain, William Joyce, aka Lord Haw-Haw. I will conclusively 
demonstrate that historians such as Kater and the Joyce biographer Peter Martland 
RYHUORRNWKHSRWHQWLDOWKUHDWRI-R\FH¶VZRUNDQGPistakenly believe that the state-
sanctioned policy of ridiculing Lord Haw-Haw through media such as comic strips 
DQG 0XVLF +DOO LQ IDFW FRPSOHPHQWHG WKH 5093¶V PHWKRGRORJ\ RI HQFRXUDJLQJ
repeated listening through entertainment and/or laughter. This debatable British 
SROLF\FRPELQHGZLWKWKH%%&¶VVORZVWDUWWRWKHZDUGXULQJWKHVR-called cultural 
blackout, presented Goebbels with an excellent opportunity to gain listeners and 
psychological influence. However, as will be demonstrated, he failed to adequately 
take advantage of this by providing an alternative entertainment programme tailored 
WR %ULWLVK WDVWHV , ZLOO VKRZ WKDW *RHEEHOV¶ ODWHU SUREOHPV ZLWK (QJOLVK-language 
entertainment propaganda were presaged by the deficiencies of these initial efforts to 
lower British morale. I will also FRQVLGHU WKH $PHULFDQ µ%LJ )RXU¶ QHWZRUNV¶
position on the war and the British and American efforts to foment interventionist 
opinion in the United States. Thus the chapter will explore and expound upon 
important aspects of the first year of the war which have been largely overlooked, 
ignored or misrepresented by prior scholarship. 
Britain 
Melody Maker and the BBC 
While German radio was co-opting Beethoven in order to inspire a martial mentality 
amongst the populace, the 9th September 1939 edition of Melody Maker found the 
journal in a similarly warlike spirit. The front page was divided into two parts, one 
³2XU -RE1RZ´RXWOLQLQJ the new responsibilities acquired by the musical press, 
and the other (³<RXU-RE1RZ´) targeted at British musicians and emphasising the 
                                                 
15
 Some aspects relating to Melody Maker, the BBC and bottle parties in Section One of this chapter 
are also discussed LQP\DUWLFOHµ³:H¶YHJRWD*LJLQ3RODQG´%ULWDLQDQG-D]]LQ:RUOG:DU,,¶
which is expected to be published in the Jazz Research Journal 6.3 in autumn 2014. 
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importance of music for wartime morale. Even the comic strip Billy Plonkit and His 
Band, a weekly feature which followed the exploits of a hapless jazz group, saw its 
heroes mobilised. TKHLU ZDUWLPH SUHPLHUH GHSLFWHG 3ORQNLW¶V JURXS PDUFKLQJ
complete with khaki uniforms, rifles and kit bags, as the band leader stares 
GHWHUPLQHGO\ LQWR WKH GLVWDQFH 7KH QRQFKDODQW FDSWLRQ UHDGV ³&KHHUKR )HOOHUV
:H¶YHJRW DJLJLQ3RODQG´16  
7KLV PRELOLVDWLRQ RI 3ORQNLW¶V ILFWLRQDO JURXS ZDV V\PEROLF RI WKH JHQHUDO
mobilisation of the jazz scene that was to take place that autumn,17 although the 
gravity of the situation was tempered with a tongue-in-cheek approach to 
international developments which, to paraphrase the historian Martin Doherty, can 
perhaps be described as ³EUDYDGR GLVJXLVHG DV KXPRXU GLVJXLVLQJ IHDU´18 Melody 
Maker repeated a new joke that, like the Soviet Union and Germany, the feuding 
dance musicians Bert Ambrose and Jack Harris were rumoured to be about to sign a 
non-aggression pact,19 and the South-West London Rhythm Club saw fit to assemble 
DZKLPVLFDOO\HQWLWOHGµ6XSUHPH:DU&RXQFLO¶ZKLFKGHFLGHGXQDQLPRXVO\WKDWWKH\
VKRXOG ³FRQWLQXH WRJULQGRXW jazz propaganda each Sunday between 3 p.m. and 6 
SP DW WKHLU KHDGTXDUWHUV´ ZLWK DQ RIIHU EHLQJ H[WHQGHG WR PHPEHUV RI QHZO\-
defunct Rhythm Clubs to join for no extra cost.20 
One week earlier, Melody Maker had insisted that jazz would be an active 
protagonist in the coming conflict: 
It is argued that jazz, in particular, being a virtual prerogative of youth, will be practically stilled by 
the mobilisation of the young men who now create it. That is a fallacy. Come what may, there will not 
even be a lull iQMD]]«0XVLFLQGHHGFRPHVULJKWLQWRLWVRZQLQWLPHVRIQDWLRQDOPHQDFHPXFK
PRUHVRWKDQLQWLPHVRISURVSHULW\EHFDXVHLWLVWKHPDLQSURSRIDQ\FRXQWU\¶VPRUDOHDQGQRWKLQJ
can be so important to a State as that its people should be inspirited to endure danger and stress with 
EXR\DQWFKHHUIXOQHVV´21 
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If much of Melody Maker¶VKXPRXUXSRQWKHRXWEUHDNRIZDUUHYROYHGDURXQGWKH
juxtaposition of the macro-significance of international politics with the micro-
significance of musical politics, there was, nonetheless, an earnest and adamant 
acknowledgement of the potentially crucial role that musicians could play in the war. 
In a front-page feature on 9th 6HSWHPEHUHQWLWOHGµ2XU-RE1RZ<RXU-RE1RZ¶WKH
MRXUQDO¶VWHFKQLFDOHGLWRU'DQ6,QJPDQPDGe this clear, albeit via a series of crude 
DQDORJLHVZLWKWKHSUDFWLFHVRIµMXQJOHVDYDJHV¶ZKLFKDUHQRWDOWRJHWKHUGLVVLPLODUWR
the pejorative terminology employed in Nazi attacks on jazz music, and belied the 
MRXUQDO¶VJHQHUDOO\SURJUHVVLYHVWDQFHWRZDrds racism:22 
Music has been used as an incentive to fighting men from time immemorial. If we are to believe that 
the savages of the jungle are merely a reflection of our earlier selves, then we can say with confidence 
that from the earliest dawn of time mankind has used music to stir himself up. 
The throbbing of jungle tom-toms has a stimulating effect on the warriors who dance to it. Savage 
WULEHVWKHZRUOGRYHUSUHSDUHWKHPVHOYHVIRUEDWWOHZLWKPXVLFRIVRPHNLQG«>@23 
$OWKRXJK FOXPVLO\ PDGH ,QJPDQ¶V HVVHQWLDO WKHVLV regarding the important 
motivational role of music during wartime was valid, and well-substantiated by 
%ULWLVK$PHULFDQDQG*HUPDQUHVHDUFKLQWRWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH)RUFHV¶ DQGHQHPLHV¶
)RUFHV¶ WDVWHV DW WKe time. It was therefore imperative that the BBC was quick to 
alter its policy in response to the new situation, but it failed to do so. The first weeks 
RI WKH ZDU VDZ D µFXOWXUDO EODFN-RXW¶ DV D UHVXOW RI UHVWULFWLYH DLU-raid precautions 
such as the ceasing of television broadcasts and all commercial radio stations,24 and 
the closure of football grounds, theatres, public museums and cinemas,25 as well as 
many places of nocturnal entertainment.26 The BBC Home Service was the 
CRUSRUDWLRQ¶Vsole radio channel, and even this was reduced to a skeleton staff, with 
most employees being sent home. Melody Maker¶V FULWLFLVP RI WKH QHZ OLPLWHG
VHUYLFHZDVYHKHPHQWDQGDQDUWLFOHLQWKHMRXUQDO¶V2FWREHUHGLWLRQHQWLWOHGµ%%&
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'HIHQGV,WV*UHDW:DUWLPH)ORS¶EHPRDQHG³the deplorable drop in the standard of 
EURDGFDVWHQWHUWDLQPHQWVLQFHWKHZDU´27 
The early Home Service wartime output has been well-documented by Christina 
Baade,28 who notes that gramophone sales in Britain doubled during September and 
October 1939.29 This figure supports B. M. Lytton-(GZDUGV¶30 pessimistic prediction 
in the same October edition31 of Melody Maker WKDW GXH WR WKH %%&¶V SRRU
performance and the cultural black-RXW³LWORRNVH[WUHPHO\SUREDEOHWRPHWKDWWKH
gramophone alone will keep us amused GXULQJWKHZDU´32 The problem, indeed, was 
also raised in Parliament by Labour MP Arthur Greenwood: 
,QWKHVHUDWKHUGXOODQGGUHDU\GD\VWKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJWREHVDLGIRULQFUHDVLQJEULJKWQHVV«,KHDU
HYHU\ZKHUHFRPSODLQWVDERXWWKH³ZHHSLQJ:LOO\´programmes that we have been given. We have to 
remember that in the conditions of war, with the limitations there are in public entertainment outside 
the homes, the B.B.C. becomes the main avenue of public entertainment for millions of our people. In 
these days of train restrictions, lighting restrictions, restrictions here, there and everywhere, and the 
determination on the part of the Government to make the life of everybody as miserable as possible, it 
would be well if we could have some brighter entertainment from the B.B.C.33 
7KH %%&¶V RXWSXW ZDV FHQWUHG RQ WKH RYHUZRUNHG &DQDGLDQ RUJDQLVW 6DQG\
Macpherson, whose popularity could not prevent growing frustration at the lack of 
variety on the airwaves.34 7KH %%&¶V 9DULHW\ 'HSDUWPHQW ZKLFK KDG EHHQ
evacuated to an ostensibly secret location code-QDPHG µ([EXU\¶ %ULVWRO35 was 
employing one band per fortnight beginning with the renowned dance band of Jack 
Hylton,36 ZKRVHILUVWEURDGFDVWZDVSUDLVHGE\(GJDU-DFNVRQDVVRXQGLQJ³MXVWOLNH
a first-rate American RXWILW WKH EUDVV EHLQJ UHDOO\ VXSHUE´37 Jackson was less 
HQWKXVHG E\ WKH µ6ZLQJ 5DPEOHUV¶ D QHZ JURXS ZKLFK SHUIRUPHG RQ WZR
FRQVHFXWLYH QLJKWV LQ 6HSWHPEHU VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW ³>D@V IDU DV , FDQ DVFHUWDLQ WKLV
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combination was recruited from the B.B.C. VariHW\2UFKHVWUD,IWKDW¶VZURQJ,KDYH
sincerely to apologise, for more laughably amateurish attempts at swing I have never 
KHDUG«38 
However, there were also indications in Melody Maker¶V 2FWREHU DWWDFNV RQ WKH
%%&¶VHDUO\ZDUWLPHRXWSXWRIWKHPRUHFRQVtructively critical role that the journal 
FRXOGSOD\,QDVHFWLRQHQWLWOHG³7KHµ00¶$VNV7KH>VLF@%%&´LWODXQFKHGD
slew of highly critical and bluntly-worded questions directly at the national 
broadcaster which nonetheless contained some valid SRLQWVWKDWUHIOHFWHGWKH%%&¶V
own priorities:  
Is it beyond the wit of all the men at the B.B.C to devise and provide a continuous daily entertainment 
radio service of 24 hours as a means of keeping up the spirits of the populace in general and civil 
defence workers in particular?  
Cannot [BBC Director-*HQHUDO@ 0U 2JLOYLH UHDOLVH WKDW DIWHU WKH FRQFOXVLRQ RI WKH %%&¶V
midnight news, there is nothing for these listeners to do but tune into the violent anti-British 
propaganda emanating from a treacherous renegade [Lord Haw-+DZ@LQ*HUPDQ\ZKRVH³PXVLFKDOO
DFW´WKRXJKXQFRQVFLRXVO\IXQQLHUWKDQ$UWKXU$VNH\VWLOOPDNHVDQ\GHFHQWVWRPDFKUHYROW" 
«:KDW¶VZURQJZLWKJLYLQJOLVWHQHUVLQVWHDGSOHQW\RIGDQFHPXVLFE\SOHQW\RIEDQGV"  
Why has BritisKUDGLRJRWWREHWKHZRUOG¶VZRUVWERUH"39 
The potential for such criticism to have an impact on BBC policy was evident from a 
memorandum from Godfrey Adams, the Director of Programme Planning, dated 1st 
August 1939. Adams DQWLFLSDWHG³DUHDFWLRQIURPWKHpublic that our purge of dance 
music has been too severe. We ought perhaps, therefore, be prepared for some 
FRQFHVVLRQLISUHVVXUHLVFRQVLGHUDEOH´40 On 20th September the CRUSRUDWLRQ¶V:HVW
RI(QJODQG3UHVV2IILFHU$-3+\WFKUHSRUWHG³FRQVLGHUDEOHLQterest in the dance 
EDQGVLWXDWLRQIURPVSHFLDOLVWSDSHUVVXFKDV0HORG\0DNHU´DQGUHTXHVWHG³DOLQH
RQIXWXUHSODQV´ZLWKZKLFKWRIHHGWKHPHGLD41 thus indicating the degree to which 
WKH%%&SDLGDWWHQWLRQWRWKHMRXUQDODQGWRRNDFFRXQWRILWVUHDGHUV¶ views from the 
outset of the war. Charles Chilton would later assert that Melody Maker¶VFULWLFLVPV
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1939, p.6. 
40
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41
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were predominantly motivated by the desire to sell newspapers,42 while Christina 
%DDGHGHVFULEHVWKHMRXUQDO¶V³SDVVLRQDWHDGYRFDF\IRU$PHULFDQPXVLF´43 vis-à-vis 
the BBC. The reality, however, was more complicated, and it is imperative to 
consider the individual journalists before interpreting the significance of their 
statements. 
Melody Maker Journalists3URSDJDQGDDQGµ-DFNVRQHVH¶ 
A nuanced reading of the relationship between Melody Maker and the BBC is 
QHFHVVDU\ EHFDXVH WKH HYLGHQFH VXJJHVWV WKDW 5D\ 6RQLQ¶V HGLWRULDO SROLF\ DOORZHG
the personalities and prejudices of individual journalists to assert themselves. Thus, 
while we can speak of the BBC as a homogenous entity insofar as the various 
differences of opinion expressed in memoranda, correspondence and meetings 
nonetheless resulted in tangible policies, Melody Maker was shaped by opinionated 
writers whose views and goals may have been at a variance with those of their 
FROOHDJXHV6LJQLILFDQWO\WKHUHZDVDIXQGDPHQWDOGLVDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQµ0LNH¶WKH
FULWLFDQGFRPSRVHU6SLNH+XJKHVDQGµ'HWHFWRU¶(GJDU-DFNVRQDVWRZKHWKHUWKH
BBC or the license payer should dictate musical programming, with Jackson arguing 
WKDW ³WKH OLVWHQHUV « WKURXJK WKHLU OLFHQVH IHHV SD\ WKHSLSHU VR WKH\ DQG WKH\
DORQHKDYHWKHULJKWWRFDOOWKHWXQH´44 This issue has been overlooked by previous 
scholarship, and yet the fact that two of the most prolific Melody Maker journalists 
disagreed on such a central issue is essential to an understanding of the jRXUQDO¶V
relationship with the Corporation; while Hughes was broadly supporting the status 
quo, Jackson was in effect giving popular taste primacy over the state-controlled, 
propagandistic uses of music. His seemingly innocuous comment is in fact a 
complete rejection of the way in which the BBC shaped its wartime musical policy.  
It is therefore of paramount importance that consideration is given to the identity of 
the individual journalist, insofar as it is provided. And yet in spite of her frequent use 
of Melody Maker as a source, Baade attributes quotations without comment. The 
SURYRFDWLYH ZHHNO\ FROXPQV RI µ0LNH¶ ³<RX PD\ KDWH KLV YLHZV« <RX PD\
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GLVDJUHHZLWKKLP«EXW\RXUHDGKLP´45 which garnered regular angry responses 
RQ WKH MRXUQDO¶V OHWWHUVSDJHFDQQRWEHXQGHUVWRRGZLWKRXW WDNLQJ LQWRDFFRXQW WKH
increasing classical tendencies of its author, who would later write the biography of 
the Glyndebourne Opera46 aQGDGPLWWHGLQWKDW³,PXVWKDYHERUHGWKHSDQWVRI
the average reader, who can only have been completely bewildered by my 
SUHRFFXSDWLRQ ZLWK WKH KDUPRQLF GUDEQHVV RI SRSXODU PXVLF>@´ )RU +XJKHV WKH
column, which started with the purpose of reviewinJ UHFRUGV PHUHO\ ³SURYLGHG D
convenient peg on which to hang theories and propaganda. Gradually, however, the 
UHFRUGV ZHUH IRUJRWWHQ DQG MXVW WKH WKHRULHV DQG WKH SURSDJDQGD UHPDLQHG´ +H
DEDQGRQHG WKH FROXPQ LQ WKH PLGGOH RI WKH ZDU ³WKURXJK VKHHU SV\FKological 
inability to take any further interest in the type of music with which my column was 
VXSSRVHG WR EH FRQFHUQHG>@´47 This disillusionment, together with his subsequent 
curriculum vitae, therefore provide context for HugheV¶ controversial contributions 
ZKLFKZHUHIDUIURPEHLQJWKH³SDVVLRQDWHDGYRFDF\IRU$PHULFDQPXVLF´GHVFULEHG
by Baade.48 
The writings of (GJDU-DFNVRQWKHMRXUQDO¶V PRVWYRFDODQGSUROLILFMD]]µDGYRFDWH¶
need to be handled especially carefully. Baade appears to acknowledge that 
-DFNVRQµ'HWHFWRU¶DUHWKHVDPHDXWKRU49 EXWZKLOHVKHQRWHVWKDWµ'HWHFWRU¶WRRND
hiatus between February-October 1940, there is no mentiRQ RI -DFNVRQ¶V ³PXOWL-
SVHXGRQ\PRXV´50 nature, or the probability that he was behind the stylistically 
VLPLODUZRUNRI µ(DYHVGURSSHU¶DQGµ'DEEOHU¶ZKLFKDSSHDUHGLQWKHMRXUQDO LQWKH
interim.51 Moreover, there are a number of mitigating factors which must be 
considered when discussing his views. Born in Edgware in 1895 to a Jewish family, 
Jackson changed his original surname (Cohen), and his ambivalent relationship to 
his own background may, Jim Godbolt plausibly asserts, have been a reason for his 
RZQ³KLJKO\RIIHQVLYH DWWLWXGH WR DQGGHVFULSWLRQVRIEODFNPXVLFLDQV´52 Jackson 
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was the first editor of Melody Maker, and his reign saw repeatedly-emphasised racist 
ELDV DQG ³GHWHUPLQHG HIIRUWV WR VPRWKHU LQWHUHVW LQ WKH JHQUH¶V >MD]]¶V@ JHQXLQH
PXVLF´53 positiQJ³DFULWLFDOGLFKRWRP\EHWZHHQEODFNDQGZKLWHMD]]FRPLQJGRZQ
KHDYLO\LQIDYRXURIWKHODWWHU´54  
While the newspaper subsequently adopted a more enlightened stance under the 
editorship of Ray Sonin, Jackson was reinstated and became its most vocal critic of 
the BBC during the war.55$V WKH MRXUQDO¶V UDGLR FULWLF XVLQJ WKH SVHXGRQ\P
µ'HWHFWRU¶DQGMD]]FULWLFXQGHUKLVRZQQDPHKHZDVLQDSRVLWLRQRISDUWLFXODU
influence, but his voluminous wartime contributions must be interpreted within the 
context of his rather clownish reputation among his contemporaries. For example, 
ZKHQ%DDGHQRWHV WKDW µ'HWHFWRU¶SUDLVHG/HVOLH3HURZQHRI Radio Rhythm Club¶V
³HQJDJLQJSUHVHQWDWLRQ´RI WKH OLIHRI WKH:HVW ,QGLDQEDQGOHDGHU.HQµ6QDNHKLSV¶
Johnson,56 which belatedly appeared six PRQWKVDIWHU-RKQVRQ¶VGHDWKLQWKH&DIpGH
Paris bombing on 8th 0DUFKVKHQHJOHFWVWKHFRQWH[WDQGLQWHUSUHWV-DFNVRQ¶V
positive reaction at face value. The ostensibly straightforward praise was in fact the 
result of a bitter exchange between Perowne and Jackson; one month earlier, 
Perowne had complained in an internal BBC circulating memorandum RI-DFNVRQ¶V
³KDUGO\ IDLU MRXUQDOLVWLFFULWLFLVP´FRQWDLQLQJ³GHILQLWHO\RIIHQVLYH´FRPPHQWVDQG
³GHOLEHUDWHO\ PLVOHDGLQJ UHPDUNV´ UHJDUding Radio Rhythm Club.57 Shortly before 
the release of the Jackson article cited by Baade, Perowne noted in another 
memorandum: 
I spoke in no uncertain terms to Edgar Jackson myself one day [about his criticisms of Radio Rhythm 
Club]. This would appear to have had some effect, because he has toned down considerably. You will 
be amused to hear that he rang me up after my broadcast on Ken Johnson last Wednesday, and 
showered me with praise to an almost embarrassing extent, saying that it was about the best 
prRJUDPPHKHKDGKHDUGLQ\HDUV/HW¶VKRSHWKDWWKHVHYLHZVDUHUHSUHVHQWHGLQWKHVRUGLGSHULRGLFDO
for which he writes.58 
Thus the personality of Jackson and his relationship to the BBC and Radio Rhythm 
Club, to which he sometimes contributed, are inextricable from an interpretation of 
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we could inform the readers of the Melody Maker of WKH UHDO UHDVRQIRU -DFNVRQ¶V
MDXQGLFH´59 and Charles Chilton suggested in 2012 that JaFNVRQ¶V DJHQGD ZDV
defined by self-SURPRWLRQ UHFDOOLQJ WKDW³>K@HZDVDOZD\VVD\LQJµQRWHQRXJK MD]]
>RQWKH%%&@¶± ZKDWKHUHDOO\PHDQWZDVµQRWHQRXJKPH¶´60 Indeed, by May 1943 
the BBC was actively avoiding employing Jackson, with Chilton writing to Spike 
Hughes:  
, DP DVNLQJ \RX QRZ ZKHWKHU \RX ZRXOG OLNH WR WDNH RYHU (GJDU -DFNVRQ¶V VSRWV LQ WKH >5DGLR
Rhythm] Club. I have been told not to use him unless it is absolutely necessary. I think you will agree 
that none of the programmes he puts over for the Club is necessary.61 
Therefore, while Baade may be technically right when she states that Jackson was 
RQH RI WKH ³PRUH NQRZOHGJHDEOH FULWLFV´62 his views cannot be treated simply as 
those of an expert jazz advocate. Chilton described him in retrospect as ³DELWRIDQ
LGLRW´63 and Jim Godbolt assigned the idiosyncratic journalist his own language 
³-DFNVRQHVH´64 meanwhile in the same interview Chilton spoke highly of Spike 
Hughes, who was respected enough in his capacity as a composer and critic to be 
commissioned as an adviser by the BBC in its internal quality control process for 
contract dance bands in 1943.65 Ray Sonin, indeed, also participated as expert 
commentator on Radio Rhythm Club without attracting any of the controversy that 
surrounded Jackson.66 Melody Maker is an inestimable source of British jazz opinion 
and advocacy during the war, but it is essential to bear in mind that its writers had 
individual tastes or agendas and enjoyed varying degrees of credibility with the 
Corporation. Authorship and context must constantly be considered in analysing its 
output. 
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A New Kind of Audience 
In one sense, at least, the BBC was quick to enliven its output in response to the war 
by lifting of the ban on the broadcasting of dance music on Sundays, to which it had 
been stubbornly adhering, with immediate effect.67 Baade argues that this measure, 
which was popular with a majority of listeners under the age of thirty, 68 was taken to 
prevent Britons from tuning into continental or enemy offerings,69 but the reality is 
PRUHFRPSOH[,QKLVDUJXPHQWIRUDµPQHPRQLFWXUQ¶LQWKHFXOWXUDOKLVWRULRJUDSK\
of the Great War, the historian Steven Heathorn asserts that the conflict accelerated 
WKHDGYDQFHRIPRGHUQLVPDQG³GHDOWDVHULRXVEORZWRRIILFLDOERXUJHRLVFXOWXUH´,70 
and a similar trend is also evident in :RUOG:DU,,¶VFXOWXUDOLPSDFWRQ%ULWLVKDQG
*HUPDQ EURDGFDVWLQJ :KLOH WKH QHHG WR NHHS OLVWHQHUV¶ GLDOV WXQHG WR %ULWLVK
wavelengths was certainly a primary concern, the move was also tantamount to an 
acknowledgHPHQWRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIGDQFHPXVLFLQKHOSLQJOLVWHQHUVWRUHWDLQ³DQ
HYHQEDODQFH´71 during the early days of the war; the lifting of the ban represented 
WKH ILUVW EORZ DJDLQVW RIILFLDO ERXUJHRLV FXOWXUH LQ ZDUWLPH %ULWDLQ DQG µ'HWHFWRU¶
plausibly suggested that it would perhaps have taken years to implement during 
peacetime.72 +H UHFRUGHG KHDULQJ 'XNH (OOLQJWRQ¶V Birmingham Breakdown and 
Ethel Waters singing Dinah on the BBC as early as Sunday 3rd September, calling it 
³D UHDO WUHDW WR ILQG WKLV OLJKWHr and more enlivening music at a moment when we 
FHUWDLQO\QHHGFKHHULQJXS´73 DQGWKHQH[WPRQWKREVHUYHGWKDW³ZHKDGPRUH6ZLQJ
record programmes in the first four weeks of the war than we had in any preceding 
VL[PRQWKV´74 
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More revolutionary still were WKHGHYHORSPHQWV LQ)RUFHV¶HQWHUWDLQPHQW75 taken in 
the wake of BBC Director-General Frederick W. 2JLOYLH¶V YLVLW WR WKH %() LQ
January 1940, where he found an audience of predominantly young men listening in 
groups whose demands were thus very different fURP WKRVHRI WKH%%&¶V VWDQGDUG
domestic target audience.76 The Times of London stated of his findings that: 
Listening conditions were entirely novel, and that the choice was not dictated by a change of taste on 
discarding mufti [civilian clothing], but rather by a change in conditions.  
Where, individually, a listener might have preferred more serious entertainment the dictates of the 
majority demanded lighter fare; listening was done in groups; that was to say that no programme was 
selected unless it was acceptable to at least half-a-dozen listeners at once.77 
Chilton recalls that wartime single-programme Home Service ³EURDGFDVW LQILQLWHO\
VRUWRISRSXODUVXJDU\PXVLF«RU6DQG\0F3KHUVRQSOD\LQJWKHEORRG\RUJDQIRU
four hours ± and people got fed up witKLW7KH\VWDUWHGSURWHVWLQJ´78 The situation 
was exacerbated in these group listening conditions, and Chilton maintains that 
2JLOYLH IRXQG WKDW WKH )RUFHV ³GLGQ¶W HYHQ OLVWHQ WR WKH %%& EHFDXVH WKHUH ZDV
nothing that they liked, except occasionally on Wednesday night there was Jazz 
Club´79 Accordingly, the French commercial broadcaster Fécamp, Radio 
International, which broadcast in several languages (including German) and played a 
Forces-oriented repertoire which included plenty of jazz and dance music, enjoyed 
great popularity with the BEF until it was closed by French authorities on 7th January 
DVDUHVXOWRIµVHFXULW\FRQFHUQV¶.80 However, no such measures could be taken 
against the Nazi propaganda with which Hamburg inevitably barraged the BEF, 
³SXWWLQJ RXW VWXII WKH\ NQHZ WKH WURRSV ZRXOG OLNH´81 including jazz music, and 
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British Forces tuned in eagerly to the broadcasts of British Nazi propagandist 
William Joyce, aka Lord Haw-Haw.82 
7KHUHVXOWRI2JLOYLH¶VYLVLWWR)UDQFHZDVWKH%%&)RUFHVProgramme, although in 
reality his visit merely confirmed what the Corporation had already been aware of 
UHJDUGLQJ)RUFHV¶WDVWHV3ULRUVFKRODUVKLSKDVRYHUORRNHGWKHIDFWWKDWSODQVZHUHLQ
fact already afoot for a complete daily programme for the Forces SULRUWR2JLOYLH¶V
trip, with The Times of London reporting on 28th December 1939 that specially-
WDLORUHG³GDQFHPXVLFWKHDWUHRUJDQYDULHW\OLJKWPXVLFDQGVSRUWVEURDGFDVWV´ZHUH
scheduled to be broadcast on an experimental basis via the Home Service every 
evening from 7th January 1940.83 The framework was thus already in place to satisfy 
WKH %()¶V GHPDQGV IRU ³D SXUHO\ OLJKW HQWHUWDLQPHQW FKDQQHO LQFOXGLQJ MD]] DQG
SRSXODUPXVLFZKLFKLVZKDWWKH\JRWHYHQRQ6XQGD\V´84 and accordingly, sixty-
three out RI WKHQHZ )RUFHV3URJUDPPH¶V HLJKW\-four hours per week consisted of 
specially-produced entertainment, with the remaining twenty-one hours being taken 
IURP WKH +RPH 6HUYLFH 7KH %() DV 2JLOYLH SXW LW ZHUH WR EH ³SDUWQHUV LQ WKH
VHUYLFH´DQGZHUHHQcouraged to register their criticisms and complaints regarding its 
output.85 
A piece written for Melody Maker by the popular bandleader Joe Loss upon his 
return from entertaining the BEF in France provides a vivid picture of the audience 
for the new programme: 
:HOOZKDWGLG,VHH",VDZWKHEHVWDXGLHQFHVLQWKHZRUOG«,VDZDPRVWPDUYHOORXVFDPDUDGHULH
between officers DQG PHQ« , VDZ KDUGELWWHQ soldiers crying with joy while they yelled out 
FKRUXVHV« LQ IDFW , VDZ HQRXJK WR FRQYLQFH PH SRVLWLYHO\ WKDW GDQFH EDQGV VWDQG DEVROXWHO\ DQG
unquestionably right on top as far as entertainment for the troops is concerned. 
A dance band contains everythinJWKDWDVROGLHUQHHGV,WJLYHVKLPOLJKWQHVVEULJKWQHVVDQGQRLVH«
UK\WKPWRH[KLODUDWHKLP«IULHQGOLQHVVIURPKHDULQJWKHWXQHVWKDWKHNQRZVDQGORYHVVRZHOO>@ 
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«>2IILFHUVZKRFHQVRUOHWWHUV@WROGPHWKDWDIWHUDGDQFHEDQGVKRZWKHOHWWHUVKRme contain an 
enthusiasm, a gaiety, and a whole-hearted appreciation that are never equalled at any other time. 
« [I]W¶V KLJKO\ LPSRUWDQW WR UHPHPEHU DOO WKH WLPH WKDW WKH PHQ ZKR JR WR D VKRZ ZDQW WR EH
entertained, not educated. 
«,XVHGWRDVNWKHER\V³'R\RXOLNHVZLQJ"´DQGWKH\HOORIDSSURYDO,JRWEDFNHYHU\WLPHQHDUO\
blew the roof off.86 
LosV¶ account is of particular relevance to the thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
KLV GHVFULSWLRQ RI )RUFHV¶ WDVWHV LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH ILQGLQJV RI Ogilvie, and is 
confirmed by other evidence of British, $PHULFDQDQG*HUPDQ)RUFHV¶SUHGLOHFWLRQV. 
However, KLV GHSLFWLRQ RI WKH VROGLHUV WUDQVFHQGV WKH PDVFXOLQH ³VROGLHU-KHUR´
archetypes which Baade notes the BBC was cultivating in its media representations 
of the BEF.87 Loss depicts high-spirited and homesick young men whose uses for 
dance music were both for emotional uplift and for the creation of a closer bond with 
WKH KRPH IURQW WKXV SDUDOOHOLQJ +DQV +LQNHO¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW RQH RI WKH SULPDU\
IXQFWLRQV RI ZDUWLPH EURDGFDVWLQJ ZDV ³WR IRUP D OLQN EHWZHHQ \RX >WKH VROGLHUV@
DQG WKH KRPHODQG´88 Secondly, he places deliberate emphasis on the (temporary) 
relaxation of hierarchies and the forging of a national community through the 
PHGLXPRIHQWHUWDLQPHQWQRWMXVWEHWZHHQ³RIILFHUVDQGPHQ´DQGPXVLFµVWDUV¶DQG
audiences, but also extending as far as the Royal Family; the Duke of Gloucester, at 
D&RPPDQG3HUIRUPDQFHLQ)UDQFHLVGHVFULEHGE\/RVVDVKDYLQJ³MRLQHGLQDOOWKH
IXQ >DQG@ VDQJ WKH FKRUXVHV ZLWK WKH EHVW RI µHP´ DQG ³SDUWLFXODUO\ DVNHG IRU QR
IRUPDOLWLHV « HYHQ WR WKH H[WHQW RI P\ JUHHWLQJ WKH audience with my usual 
µ+HOOR IHOOHUV KRZ DUH \RX"¶´ )LQDOO\ DQG SHUKDSV PRVW LPSRUWDQWly, is LosV¶ 
LWDOLFLVHGHPSKDVLVRIWKHIDFWWKDWWKHWURRSV³ZDQWWREHentertained, not educated´
a fact which had radical ramifications for British broadcasting. 
Inevitably, however, the popularity of jazz was not universal and some lovers of 
µVHULRXV¶PXVLFLQ WKH)RUFHVZHUHLQFHQVHG ,QDQ$XJXVWDUWLFOHIRUMusical 
Times, Patric Stevenson claimed: 
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[Radios in the barrack-room have] been the greatest curse and trial in my life as a recruit. That 
wretched receiver was never silent as long as there were men in the room. Should I find myself alone, 
I would seize the opportunity of switching it off, merely to find that the blare from the set in the next 
hut was almost as bad. « Readers can well imagine what torture it was for one who loves the 
classics, and to whom Delius, Elgar, Strauss and Sibelius are the gods of this earth, to be forced to 
listen to an over- amplified and distorted reproduction of the more popular periods of the B.B.C. 
Forces programme (or similar fare) blared out by a loud-VSHDNHUIURPHDUO\PRUQLQJWLOODIWHUµOLJKWV
RXW¶ 7KH DYHUDJH \RXQJ PDQ RI WKLV JHQHUDWLRQ VHHPV WR KDYH D SHUPDQHQW « craving for a 
background « RIµVZLQJPXVLF¶RUVRPHWKLQJZLWKµUK\WKP¶LQLW[.]89 
$Q LQWHUQDO %%& GRFXPHQW QRWHG WKDW VXFK ³XQVROLFLWHG FRUUHVSRQGHQFH
unsupported by planned enquiries, is often misleading. This is particularly so when 
« WKH VXEMHFW RI WKH FRUUHVSRQGHQFH LV VRPHWhing upon which some people feel 
VWURQJO\´90 Indeed 6WHYHQVRQ¶V FRQGHVFHQVLRQ LV UHDVRQDEO\ LQGLFDWLYH RI WKH
³DOPRVW«UDFLDO´91 divide between lovers of jazz and classical music at the time, 
and this sentiment was echoed by the BBC Press Officer B. B. Chapman, who drew 
D GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ³JRRG >LH FODVVLFDO@ PXVLF´ DQG ³YDULHW\´ LQ D OHWWHU WR WKH
Musical Times in November 1941.92 Nonetheless, the sudden wartime elevation in 
the status of jazz music at the BBC in response to the dictates of war exacerbated the 
situation for its detractors, and Chapman acknowledged that the CRUSRUDWLRQ¶V
continued efforts to extend classical repertoire on the Forces Programme were 
GLUHFWO\FRQWUDU\WR³PDMRULW\RSLQLRQ´93 It also, however, offers a detailed picture of 
radio-listening habits in the barracks which is antipathetic to jazz and yet 
complements and verifies the accounts of Loss and Chilton regarding its popularity 
with the Forces, as well as the findings of Ogilvie.94 Moreover, his reference to the 
³FUDYLQJ IRU D >PXVLFDO@ EDFNJURXQG´ LV SDUWLFXODUO\ VLJQLILFDQW EHFDXVH DV %DDGH
QRWHVEDFNJURXQGRU ³WDS OLVWHQLQJ´KDGSUHYLRXVO\EHHQGLVFRXUDJHGE\ WKH%%&
and yet was promoted for the BEF as a means of bonding within the group 
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environment.95 World War II did not only accelerate the retreat of official bourgeois 
culture on British airwaves; this culture, as represented by the state-controlled BBC, 
was also to be complicit in the creation of a popular alternative. 
µHarlem London¶+HGRQLVPDQG-D]]RQWKH+RPHFront 
The increased market for upbeat musical entertainment was also reflected on the 
home front by a surge in the demand for nightlife, which also found 
contemporaneous parallels in Berlin, where William L. Shirer noted on 29th October 
1939 that citizens ZHUH ³IORFNLQJ « DV QHYHU EHIRUH´ WR WKHDWUHV RSHUDV DQG
concerts.96 Melody Maker noted in its post- VE-'D\ ³'DQFH %DQG +LVWRU\ RI WKH
:DU´ 
After we had experienced two months of war, the West End was humming again, and the restaurants, 
night clubs, etc., were experiencing one of the biggest booms known. 
([DPSOHVRIWKLVZHUHVKRZQE\ILJXUHVDWWKH&DIpGH3DULVDQGWKH&DIp$QJODLV«>ZKLFK@ZHUH
pulling in record crowds. 
«)RXUPRUHEDQGVFDPHEDFNWRWRZQGXULQJ'HFHPEHU-DFN+DUULVDQG/HZ6WRQH¶VRXWILWVZHQW
into the El Morocco.97 
Sid Colin, guitarist and vocalist with the Royal Air Force Dance Band (aka The 
6TXDGURQDLUHV DOVR ODWHU REVHUYHG WKDW WKH ³SXEOLF¶V DSSHWLWH IRU HQWHUWDLQPHQW
VHHPHG VXGGHQO\ WR KDYH EHFRPH LQVDWLDEOH « (YHQ WKH Blitz did nothing to 
dampen the spirits of people who would never, it seemed, run short of excuses for a 
QLJKWRQWKHWRZQ´98 Indeed, revellers remained undeterred even after the bombing 
RI³WKHEHVWDLU-UDLGVKHOWHULQWRZQ´99 WKH&DIpGH3DULVLQ/RQGRQ¶V:HVW(QG on 
8th March 1941, which killed .HQµ6QDNHKLSV¶-RKQVRQDQG'DYHµ%DED¶:LOVRQRI
the popular :HVW ,QGLDQ 'DQFH 2UFKHVWUD DQG ³VRPH  PHPEHUV RI WKH &DIp¶V
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FOLHQWHOH DQG VWDII´.100 ³7KH :HVW (QG SDXVHG IRU D PRPHQW Rf hoUULILHG VLOHQFH´
recalls Colin, ³WKHQWKHGDQFHZHQWRQ´101 
This nightlife is inextricable from the development of British jazz during World War 
II. ,W SURYHG D KRWKRXVH IRU WKH FXOWXUH RI µMDP VHVVLRQV¶ ZKLFK the Soviet 
Ambassador to the USA, Alexander Troyanovsky, suggested in 1941 was a 
contributing factor to the rapid worldwide spread of jazz music.102 Accordingly, 
many of the musicians who would be subsequently broadcast over the BBC (via such 
outlets as Radio Rhythm Club and the HMV/Melody Maker First Public Jam Session 
of November 1941) actively participated in these speakeasy-style bottle parties103 at 
which after-hours jam sessions were the norm.104 %RWWOHSDUW\RU³GULQNLQJFOXE´)105 
culture was a pre-war phenomenon dating back at least as early as 1932,106 but it 
flourished in the early months of the war in the atmosphere of psychological tension 
and boredom. Musicologist Catherine Tackley notes that Radio Rhythm Club, 
LQLWLDWHGLQ-XQH³GUHZRQEODFNQHVVDQGWKHMDPVHVVLRQDVWURSHVRIauthentic 
MD]]´107 and these signifiers of authenticity were evident in a number of the bottle 
party venues, which ranged from up-PDUNHWHVWDEOLVKPHQWVVXFKDV5HJHQW6WUHHW¶V
Coconut Grove108 and the Paradise (both of which featured Harry Parry at various 
points during the war), as well as seedier locales in which the best jazz was to be 
found. Sid Colin asserts: 
It was at the other end of the spectrum that the true nightclub spirit asserted itself. In the basements 
below dress shops and Italian cafés, in the streets and alleys around Piccadilly and Soho, in the clip 
joints with their scruffy waiters, peroxided hostesses and I-have-an-uncle-in-the-Mafia proprietors, 
WKDW¶VZKHUHWKHUHDOPXVLFDODFWLRQZDV0RVWRIWKHVHSODFHVHPSOR\HGWKHVWDWXWRU\ILYH-piece band, 
a group that would be augmented and enhanced as night-time shaded into the wee small hours by 
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play a little jazz.109 
Jim Godbolt, too, recalls WKDW³LQWKLVVXE-world of night people the preference was 
IRU MD]] UDWKHU WKDQ IRU IRUPDO GDQFH PXVLF´ DQG UHFDOOV ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR WKH
famous, West Indian-RZQHG-LJ¶V&OXERQ:DUGRXU6WUHHWWKDW³PDQ\$UFKHU6WUHHW
jazzmen visited the club (and others OLNHLWµDIWHUKRXUV¶HVFDSLQJIURPWKHJLOGHG
fleshpots of their normal employment. In these less acceptable (socially speaking) 
environs where the air was undoubtedly fouler they (musically speaking) could 
EUHDWKHPRUHIUHHO\´110 
However, it is significant that, whilst on the surface the flourishing nightlife fits the 
EURDGHU µ3HRSOH¶V :DU¶ GLVFRXUVH RI D VRFLDOO\ DQG SROLWLFDOO\ FRKHVLYH %ULWDLQ D
closer inspection reveals a more complex picture. This ranges from isolated incidents 
such as the aftermath of the Café de Paris bombing, which saw the looting and 
plundering of valuables from the dead and the wounded,111 to the alleged threat that 
unregulated nightspots posed to the war effort. The latter concern led to the matter of 
bottle parties being raised on several occasions in Parliament, and on 18th March 
1940 Sir Patrick Hannon, the Conservative MP for Birmingham Moseley, decried 
WKH³very deplorable state of things in the City of London when young soldiers are, 
IURPWLPHWR WLPHEURXJKWZLWKLQ WKHDPELWRI WKHVHREQR[LRXVSODFHV´112 Indeed, 
besides the problem tKDWVROGLHUVDQG³ZDJHHDUQHUV´113 appear to have partaken in 
the unlicensed music, dancing and alcoholic consumption at bottle parties, which the 
government estimated operated between 10 p.m. - 6 a.m., was the additional use of 
coal, electricity, gas, food and other valuable commodities.114 The question of 
entertainment for soldiers on leave, however, complicated the matter of clamping 
down on such premises without offering alternatives, and the Home Secretary Sir 
John Anderson acknowledged that on Saturday 20th and 27th April 1940, 
experimental measures had been taken in the capital to allow licensed drinking in 
³VXLWDEOH´UHVWDXUDQWVXQWLOD.m.³Zith the object of providing for members of the 
Forces on leave adequate facilities for entertainment in the late evening under proper 
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FRQGLWLRQVDQGDWUHDVRQDEOHSULFHV´115 Anderson would not directly answer a query 
from Robert Morgan, Conservative MP for Stourbridge, as to whether the tentative 
HIIRUWV ZHUH ³LQWHQGHG WR UHGXFH WKH PHQDFH RI WKH ERWWOH SDUW\´116 but the latter 
SKHQRPHQRQ¶V SRSXODULW\ FHUWDLQO\ DSSHDUV Wo have influenced the decision. Again 
the status quo was ceding ground to public demand in the name of maintaining 
wartime morale. 
The El Morocco bottle party on Albermarle Street in Soho, which opened its doors 
on 6th December 1939,117 has been overlooked by historiographies of the war, but 
contemporary parliamentary debates and later recollections of protagonists indicate 
that it was broadly representative of the phenomenon. Indeed, the Metropolitan 
Police informed the Home Office on 8th April 1940 WKDW LW ZDV ³W\SLFDO RI PDQ\
>ERWWOH SDUWLHV@´118 As police witness reports cited below testify, the El Morocco 
IDOOVILUPO\LQWRWKHFDWHJRU\RIZKDW&ROLQUHIHUVWRDV³FOLSMRLQWV´DOWKRXJKIRULWV
first month on a nightly basis it featured two small jazz groups led by the popular 
EDQGOHDGHUV/HZ6WRQH³DQGKLV%DQG´DQGWKH$PHULFDQ-DFN+DUULV³DQGKLV(O
0RURFFR 2UFKHVWUD´119 ZLWK UHYHOOHUV SURPLVHG ³*D\ &RPSDQ\ *RRG )RRG WKH
EHVW %DQGV´120 and a demi-monde ambience created by the black walls and pink 
curtains.121 The police received several complaints about the El Morocco based on 
the alleged immorality practiced within, as well as the noise created by patrons in the 
small hours outside the club. An anonymous letter addressed to the Home Secretary 
but apparently sent to the Metropolitan Police claimed: 
There is a war on ± and we fail to understand why you continue to allow Night Clubs and Bottle 
3DUWLHVWRIORXULVK«5LFK0HQZLWKPRQH\WREXUQDQG'HJUDGHG:RPHQDUHWKHSDWURQVQLJKWO\
RI WKHVHKRUULEOHSODFHV «1RWKLQJEXW'ULQNDQG'LVVDSDWLRQ>VLF@ >RFFXU@DQG>LW@ LVD positive 
disgrace during this wartime period. 
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The proprietor of the El Morocco was an ex-City worker named Mark Godfrey, who 
according to the 0HWURSROLWDQ 3ROLFH ZDV ³D PRVW dangerous man´ with a lengthy 
criminal record.123 The London Evening Standard, however, regarded the El 
Morocco predominantly as a source of entertaining gossip, probably due to the fact 
WKDWLWZDVDOVRIUHTXHQWHGE\WKH³FDUULDJHWUDGH´ (upper-class and wealthy patrons) 
and titled celebrities such as Lady Charles Cavendish, aka Adele Astaire. In the 
QHZVSDSHU¶VLighter London FROXPQZULWWHQE\,DQ&RVWHU*RGIUH\¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQW
in particular was singled out on 2nd January 1940 as evidence of the emergence of a 
QHZ³+DUOHP/RQGRQ´DQG in an indication of the crude racism of the environment 
in which black musicians were operating within that time,124 &RVWHUFLWHV*RGIUH\¶V
LQWHQWLRQ ³WR RSHQ XS D UHDO 1HJUR FOXE OLNH the Plantation in New York, with a 
ceiling of half a water-PHORQDQG+DUOHP:KRRSLH´125 
0HWURSROLWDQ 3ROLFH ILOHV RQ WKH (O 0RURFFR VXEVWDQWLDWH 6LG &ROLQ¶V UHFROOHFWLRQ
ZLWK UHJDUG WR ERWWOH SDUWLHV LQ JHQHUDO WKDW XQGHUFRYHU SROLFH RIILFHUV ³LQVWDQWO\
recognisable though they invariably were, were for ever [sic.] haunting the joint in 
WKH KRSH RI FDWFKLQJ KLP >WKH SURSULHWRU@ RXW>@´126 Moreover, although Colin 
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKH³PLQLRQVRIWKHODZ´FRXOGEHHDVLO\LGHQWLILHG127 the El Morocco 
was under police surveillance and on several occasions undercover officers were 
able to enter the venue to partake in the illegal drinking or dancing. Their witness 
statements offer an insight into the nightlife of the so-called Harlem London during 
December 1939-January 1940; the initial reconnaissance of the El Morocco bottle 
SDUW\IRUH[DPSOHIRXQGWKDWWKHEDVHPHQWRI$OEHUPDUOH6WUHHW³LVDERXW¶E\
¶ >IHHW@ DQG FRQWDLQV D QXPEHU RI WDEOHV VHW URXQG D FHQWUDO GDQFLQJ IORRU 7KH
lighting is subdued but the premises, as a whole, are very well-appointed. Dance 
hostesses of the prostitute type are employed to entertain guests and coax them to 
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EX\GULQNV$FDEDUHWHQWHUWDLQPHQWLVJLYHQ´128 The witness statement of PC John 
Lynch dated 13th January 1940 observed WKDW ³>D@Q RUFKHVWUD RI VL[ ZHUH SOD\LQJ
dance music on the left of [the] entrance. About a dozen couples were dancing and 
approximately 50 persons were present. All of them appeared to be in possession of 
LQWR[LFDWLQJOLTXRU´129  
For those in the jazz community, the El Morocco and its ilk represented a 
³PLFURFRVPLF +DUOHP LQ WKH KHDUW RI WRZQ´130 with twenty-seven known bottle 
parties operating in the West End by March 1940.131 Less celebrated than upmarket 
venues such as the Café de Paris and the Paradise, or the predominantly black, 
³PDULMXDQD-VFHQWHG´132 surroundings of the Nest and -LJ¶V &OXE GXULQJ LWV EULHI
lifespan the El Morocco was nonetheless a significant enough fixture in the jazz 
world for its various music personnel changes to make the Melody Maker headlines 
several times, and to be featured in its May 1945 retrospective of wartime dance 
band activity. When Lew Stone was replaced by Ron Joynes and his Hawaiians, the 
journal insisted WKDW 6WRQH¶V GHSDUWXUH ³KDV QRWKLQJ ZKDWHYHU WR GR with the place 
EHLQJ UDLGHG >E\ WKHSROLFH@RQ0RQGD\QLJKW´133 and 6\GQH\.\WH¶V replacing of 
Jack Harris the next week was also front-page news.134 The headlines on 3rd 
)HEUXDU\  DOVR DQQRXQFHG WKDW 0LII )HUULH¶V EDQG ZRXOG KHOS WR ³KROG WKH
IRUW´135 for a week, providing a stripped-down seven-piece version of his twelve-
SLHFH VWDJH EDQG SULRU WR WKH ODWWHU¶V IRUWKFRPLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH DW WKH /RQGRQ
Palladium and national tour.136 This bottle party, then, represented a clear link 
EHWZHHQ6RKR¶VFULPLQDOPLOLHX and the British jazz scene, and when it was finally 
FORVHG LQ $XJXVW  DW WKH +RPH 2IILFH¶V EHKHVW DORQJ ZLWK RWKHU 6RKR ERWWOH
parties the Paradise, the Stork, the Boogie-Woogie, the Hi-de-KLDQG0DF¶VIRUWKH
UHDVRQWKDW³'UXQNHQQHVVWDNHVSODFHRQ WKHSUHPLVHV´WKHMelody Maker ran it as a 
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appeal the decision.137 
7KHµ+DUOHP¶QLFNQDPHLQHYLWDEO\LQYLWHVSDUDOOHOVZLWKWKHµ+DUOHPLQ0RQWPDUWUH¶
described by the anthropologist and Africanist William A. Shack, which emerged in 
inter-war Paris thanks to the large influx of African-American jazz musicians and 
aficionados to the city.138 This perhaps reflects a degree of escapism from the gravity 
of the situation in which Londoners found themselves, as well as a general 
fascination with Harlem in British jazz. Indeed, Melody Maker included a feature 
entitled ³+DUOHPHVHDV6KHLV6SRNH´, probably written by New York correspondent 
Leonard Feather, which even purported to introduce readers to the nebulous local 
vernacular.139 The superficial race-based assumptions of the nickname ignored the 
fact that the wartime London scene featured predominantly British-born or West 
Indian musicians, although some African-American GIs stationed on British soil 
would frequent West End clubs from 1942 onwards.140 As musicologist Catherine 
7DFNOH\ QRWHV GXH WR UDFLDO SUHMXGLFH PDQ\ RI /RQGRQ¶V EODFN PXVLFLDQV ZHUH
unable to find well-paid work, and were restricted instead to playing at bottle parties 
and in small clubs.141 Although there were notable exceptions to this rule, such as the 
:HVW,QGLDQ'DQFH2UFKHVWUD¶VLOO-fated residency at the Café de Paris, bottle parties 
and other disreputable establishments remained an important source of employment 
for black musicians. 
While there was a BBC ban on broadcasts from ³YLFHULGGHQ´ SUHPLVHVVXFKDV-LJ¶V
Club,142 ZD\VZHUHIRXQGWRFLUFXPYHQWWKLVVXFKDVZKHQWKH-LJ¶V&OXEEDQGXQGHU
Cyril Blake (featuring the Trinidad-born electric guitar pioneer Lauderic Caton) 
made four live records for the Regal-Zonophone label in December 1941143 which 
³FDSWXUH WKHUDZH[FLWHPHQW´RI WKHYHQXH´144 The discs were VROGDW WKH³EDUJDLQ
SULFH´RI WZR shillings, which Melody Maker QRWHG³ZLOO HQDEOH D IDQRI WKHPRVW
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OLPLWHG PHDQV WR NHHS XS ZLWK FXUUHQW MD]]´145 and were subsequently broadcast 
over the BBC,146 DOEHLWLQWKH³ORFDOL]HGVSDFH´RIRadio Rhythm Club.147 Due to the 
increase in demand for jazz music caused by the war, a number of the musicians 
from these bottle party sessions would become regular fixtures at the BBC, promoted 
to the airwaves in the name of morale. This culminated in the First English Public 
Jam Session on 16th November 1941, produced under the auspices of HMV, Melody 
Maker and the BBC. Peter W. G. Powell, a London wartime jazz aficionado who 
DWWHQGHG DQG VWHZDUGHG WKH VHVVLRQ DV D WHHQDJHU UHFDOOV WKDW ³LQ Whe main jam 
sessions were only to be heard in drinking clubs (in Soho) during the night hours or 
LQUK\WKPFOXEVVRWKLVHYHQWZDVDILUVWDQGYHU\VLJQLILFDQW´148 The significance of 
the famous event, indeed, was that this subterranean world of small-hours jam 
sessions, which had fomented in venues such as the El Morocco, reached the 
DLUZDYHVWRD³WXPXOWXRXVUHFHSWLRQ´IURPD-strong audience,149 and included 
YDULRXVPHPEHUVRI+DUU\3DUU\¶V5DGLR5K\WKP6H[WHWWKHPVHOYHVUHVLGHQWDWWKH
Coconut Grove bottle party),150 DVZHOODVVXUYLYRUVIURP.HQ-RKQVRQ¶V:HVW,QGLDQ
'DQFH2UFKHVWUD7KHMDPVHVVLRQ¶VSURJUHVVLRQIURPWKHERWWOHSDUWLHVDQG5K\WKP
&OXEV WR WKH DLUZDYHV ZDV DV 3RZHOO QRWHV ³D PLOHVWRQH IRU %ULWLVK MD]]´151 and 
would from 1941 directly cRQWULEXWHWRDQLPSURYHPHQWLQWKHTXDOLW\RIWKH%%&¶V
indigenous jazz output. 
The USA and Interventionism 
7KH86MD]]VFHQHPHDQZKLOHZDVDOUHDG\PRELOLVLQJRQ%ULWDLQ¶VEHKalf. Shortly 
before Christmas 1940, a midnight benefit concert was held at the Apollo Theatre in 
Harlem, New York, to fund a rolling kitchen for those left homeless by air raids in 
the East End of London,152 DWWUDFWLQJ ³D FDSDFLW\ FURZG RI +DUOHP VRFLDOLWHV DQG
MLWWHUEXJV IURP XSWRZQ DQG GRZQWRZQ´153 A number of African-American and 
white jazz stars were invited to participate, and this partisan engagement in spite of 
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official US neutrality was also reflected by the pro-British line of DownBeat, the 
most influential outlet of jazz opinion in America. With a monthly wartime 
circulation of around 80,000 copies,154 DownBeat reported the experiences of jazz 
fans and musicians in Europe, offering a one-sided reading of events which fostered 
sympathy not only for the British but also for the inhabitants of occupied countries. 
On 15th August 1941, IRU H[DPSOH LW GHVFULEHG WKH IDWH RI µ+DSS\¶ +DUU\ +DUGHQ
(real name 'DYLG 6WROMDURYLþ), the Czechoslovak-8NUDLQLDQ EDQGOHDGHU ZKR ³IOHG
+LWOHU¶V*HVWDSRRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGDIWHUQLQHPRQWKVRIWUDYHOILQDOO\IRXQGUHIXJHLQ
$PHULFD +DUGHQ « ZDV IRUFHG WR OHDYH KLV OLIH¶V VDYLQJV RI  ZLWK WKH
*HVWDSR´155 Moreover, on 1st October 1941 DownBeat reported that the Gestapo had 
banned a popular (unnamed) orchestra from giving concerts in Hamburg due to its 
SHUIRUPDQFHVRI³$QJOLFL]HGRU1HJURPXVLF´DQd reminded its readers with some 
exaggeration WKDW ³$PHULFDQ MD]] PXVLF ZDV RXWODZHG E\ +LWOHU \HDUV DJR %XW
IUHTXHQWO\ZRUGOHDNVRXWWKDWWKH*HVWDSRZDVIRUFHGWRµSHQDOL]H¶RUFKHVWUDVLQWKH
5HLFKIRUSHUIRUPLQJMD]]PXVLF´156 In the same edition, the journal noted: 
What jazz is in existence in blitz-WRUQ(XURSHKDVEHHQVTXHH]HGE\+LWOHU¶VHUVDW]³NXOWXU´LQWRQREOH
little Switzerland. That is, of course, not counting England [i.e. Britain] where jazz runs free, so far as 
it can with a great many of the musicians engaged in active service.  
« ,Q)UDQFH WKH LVVXHRI MD]] UHFRUGLQJV KDV YLUWXDOO\ FHDVHG VLQFH MD]] LV IURZQHGXSRQE\ WKH
Nazis and negro musicians are forbidden to record.157 
However, while the historian Eric Hobsbawm has convincingly pointed to extreme 
left-wing tendencies in the pre-war British jazz scene,158 DownBeat operated within 
certain cultural and ideological strictures, generally refraining from featuring 
African-American musicians on its front covers159 and operating within a patriotic 
discourse that treated communism and Nazism as moral equivalents. An article 
published on 1st August 1940 decried alleged American communist members of the 
0XVLFLDQV¶ 8QLRQ DV ³IRUHLJQ UDWV >ERULQJ@ IURPZLWKLQ WR XQGHUPLQH RXU FRXQWU\
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our ideals and oXU IUHH LQVWLWXWLRQV´160 and thus demonstrated at least the 
preconditions for isolationist sentiment. 
Nonetheless, DownBeat¶VDOOHJLDQFHVZHUHFOHDUO\UHIOHFWHGLQLWVGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKH
SOLJKW RI (XURSH¶V MD]] SURWDJRQLVWV ,Q D VLPLODU PDQQHU WR WKH EURDdcasts of 
London-based CBS correspondent Ed Murrow, the journal stressed the resilience and 
bravery of the British in the face of German aggression, for example in a short piece 
on 1st August 1940 reporting the interruption by an air-raid of a concert in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne: 
Air-raid sirens shrieked at midnight as Nazi bombers roared over the English coast, but Sid Millward 
DQGKLV1LW:LWVSHUVXDGHGDWKRXVDQGGDQFHUVWR³NHHSWUXFNLQJRQGRZQ´« 
Alto-saxist Millward and his music encouraged the crowd to disregard the sirens and kept them happy 
until the dance ended two hours later.161 
Thus DownBeat filtered European news items to American readers within this shared 
cultural paradigm which transcended national boundaries. The violent adjectives 
³VKULHNHG´ DQG ³URDUHG´ MX[WDSRVH ZLWK WKH EUDYHU\ RI WKH %ULWLVK PXVLFLDQV DQG
dancers, and certainly were not intended to encourage a neutral interpretation of the 
incident, and this can be said of the general position of the journal towards events in 
Europe prLRUWR$PHULFD¶VHQWU\LQWRWKHZDU 
Certainly Gallup polls from the period suggest that American public opinion firmly 
supported the British side of events, if not yet active intervention; indeed, research 
conducted on behalf of the US-based Institute for Propaganda Analysis concluded in 
WKDW³WKHILQGLQJVRI'U*DOOXS¶V,QVLWXWHUHDGOLNHWKHFRQFOXVLRQVRID%ULWLVK
%OXH %RRN´162 And on September 1st 1939, as German Forces crossed the Polish 
border, a Gallup poll found that 87% of Americans thought WKDW*HUPDQ\KDG³QR
OHJLWLPDWH GHPDQGV RQ 'DQ]LJ´163 $-3 7D\ORU¶V XQIRXQGHG DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³>D@OO
[America] had to offer was moral disapproval; and this was turned less against the 
GLFWDWRUV WKDQ DJDLQVW WKH SRZHUV ZKR IDLOHG WR UHVLVW WKHP´ DQG ³PDLQWain[ed] an 
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even-KDQGHGQHXWUDOLW\ZKLFKXVXDOO\EHQHILWHGWKHDJJUHVVRU´164 is contradicted by 
WKH ZRUN RI WKH (XURSHDQ FRUUHVSRQGHQWV IRU WKH µ%LJ )RXU¶ QHWZRUNV165 which 
UHIOHFWHG5RRVHYHOW¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLVWDJHQGD 
$ µ%DVLF 3ODQ IRU D 3XEOLF 5HODWLRQV $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ ZDV DSSURYHG E\ WKH MRLQW
Army-Navy board almost as soon as war broke out in Europe, and submitted to the 
White House on 10th June 1940, the day that Italy joined the German attack on 
France.166 This was intended to pave the way for the development of a propaganda 
apparatus with which to win over sceptical portions of the American populace to the 
interventionist cause by informing them of the gravity of the European situation and 
its implications for the United States. Like Neville Chamberlain, who was initially  
reticent about the creation of MoI as a state propaganda instrument in Britain,167 and 
presumably similarly mindful of the pejorative connotations which had remained 
attached to propaganda since the Great War, Roosevelt took no position regarding 
WKH 3ODQ UHO\LQJ LQVWHDG RQ SULYDWH LQGLYLGXDOV DQG RUJDQLVDWLRQV WR ³PDUVKDO WKH
RSLQLRQ´168 of American citizens toward interventionism. Commercial radio, indeed, 
played an important part in the transition of dominant American public opinion from 
isolationist to interventionist. All four major networks broadcast round-the-clock 
coverage of political and military developments,169 making a name for reporters such 
as Raymond Gram Swing, H. V. Kaltenborn, Edward R. Murrow and Elmer Davis, 
the future head of OWI.170 The historian Alfred Haworth Jones has noted that 
0XUURZ¶VUHSRUWVIURP/RQGRQ³SUHVHQWHGDQLQWHQWLRQDOO\V\PSDWKHWLFYLHZRIWKH
(QJOLVKZKLOHWKHWRQHRI:LOOLDP/6KLUHU¶VYRLFHDVKHEURDGFDVWIURP%HUOLQDV
well as his much-publicized difficulties with Nazi censors, left little doubt as to his 
DWWLWXGHWRZDUGWKH7KLUG5HLFK´171 With 82.8% of Americans owning radio sets by 
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world quite incompatible with the LPSUHVVLRQ RQ PDQ\ ODQGORFNHG OLVWHQHUV¶
PLQGV´173 
,WLVVLJQLILFDQWWKDWWKHVHEURDGFDVWVZKLFKEURXJKWWKHZDU³LQWR$PHULFD¶VOLYLQJ
URRP´174 and helped to nurture pro-British sympathies, were relayed by private 
networks and only made possible through sponsorship, thus presaging the 
convergence of commercial and patriotic agendas that was to play a significant role 
in American wartime domestic propaganda.175 The RMVP, too, attempted to use 
broadcasting to influence American opinion during the first year of the war, often in 
WKH IRUP RI LQIRUPDO LQWLPDWH µFKDWV¶ ZLWK WKH OLVWHQHU IHDWXULQJ $PHULFDQ
broadcasters and frequently utilising colloquialLVPVLH³GRQ¶W\RXWKLQN"´LQRUGHU
to create an illusion of impartiality and reason.176 However, the majority of opinions 
on the American airwaves broadly espoused an interventionist agenda, due also to 
WKH IDFW WKDW GRPHVWLF EURDGFDVWHUV¶ GHSHQGHQFH XSon sponsorship allowed the 
Roosevelt administration to remove the most prominent and vitriolic isolationist 
commentators such as Boake Carter and Father Charles Coughlin;177 by placing 
pressure on the sponsors of these programmes, it was possible to force them off the 
air without needing to risk the potentially negative publicity of official censorship, a 
strategy noted by the German government, which attempted to utilise the silencing of 
&RXJKOLQ³ZHOONQRZQIRUKLVILJKWDJDLQVW-HZU\DQG%ROVKHYLVP´178 to denounce 
5RRVHYHOW¶V ³UXWKOHVV WLQNHULQJ ZLWK VXFK OLEHUWLHV DV IUHHGRP RI WKRXJKW DQG
IUHHGRPRIWKH3UHVV´179 in their English broadcasts to the USA. 
William Joyce and Early German Propaganda to Britain 
While early German wartime broadcasts to the United States were aimed, as a 
FRQWHPSRUDU\ $PHULFDQ FRPPHQWDWRU VXJJHVWHG ³DSSDUHQWO\ DW D PDVV DXGLHQFH
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ZLWKKLJKVFKRROHGXFDWLRQRU OHVV´180 (perhaps reflecting the contempt with which 
Goebbels held American culture),181 RMVP programming for Britain was both more 
cerebral and more popular, targeted at a variety of potential defeatist factions and 
centred around its most talented English-language broadcaster, William Joyce, aka 
Lord Haw-Haw. Born to Irish parents in Brooklyn, New York in 1906, Joyce grew 
up in Galway before his Loyalist family fled to England, where in 1933 he applied 
IRU D %ULWLVK SDVVSRUW DQG MRLQHG 2VZDOG 0RVOH\¶V %ULWLVK 8QLRQ RI )DVFLVWV
(BUF).182 Expelled from the BUF in 1937 for unknown reasons, he formed the 
National Socialist League before escaping to Germany in August 1939, joining 
55*¶V (QJOLVK-language section and trialling successfully as a newsreader in 
September 1939,183 LQLWLDOO\EURDGFDVWLQJXQGHUWKHSVHXGRQ\Pµ:LOKHOP)UöKOLFK¶
Unhappy with both the style and the substance of the material which he was given by 
the RMVP-R\FHZDVVRRQZULWLQJQRWRQO\KLVRZQµ*HUPDQ\&DOOLQJ¶VFULSWVEXW
also almost single-KDQGHGO\ SURGXFLQJ WKH PDWHULDO IRU WKH 1D]LV¶ VHFUHW VWDWLRQV
broadcasting to England.184 
7KH µ+DZ-+DZ¶ PRQLNHU ZDV FRLQHG E\ WKH Daily Express UDGLR FULWLF µ-RQDK
%DUULQJWRQ¶185 and originally applied to several broadcasters, including Wolf Mittler 
and Norman Baillie-Stewart,186 before the RMVP capitalised on its success by 
attributing it solely to its most talented Anglophone employee, revealing his true 
identity via the German Overseas Service on 3rd August 1940.187 It is significant, 
however, that this publicity coup was facilitated almost single-handedly by the 
British media with the complicity of the government. The composite character Lord 
Haw-+DZZDVQRWPHUHO\DV$VD%ULJJVKDVVXJJHVWHGDSURGXFWRI³WKHORYHRIWKH
British press for personalizing policies and the atmosphere of boredom during the 
HDUO\ PRQWKV RI WKH ZDU´188 the BBC and MoI actively encouraged the public 
ULGLFXOHRI*HUPDQSURSDJDQGDZKLFKZDVGHVFULEHGE\%DUULQJWRQDVWKH³KHDOWK\
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British laughter [at Haw-+DZ@´189 The manifold social uses of humour (for example 
as a tool for resistance and subversion) have recently been highlighted by the 
VRFLRORJLVW (EHQH]HU 2EDGDUH ZKR DOVR FLWHV *DU\ $ODQ )LQH¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW
KXPRXUFDQ³VXVWDLQWKHPRUDOHDQGWKHFRKHVLRQRIJURXSV´190 Nonetheless, within 
the context of the RMVP¶V propaganda methodology, the appropriateness of such 
state-sanctioned subversion appears questionable, as was noted by the British public 
opinion pollsters Henry and Ruth Durant in 1940: 
,WZDVWKH/RQGRQVHQVDWLRQDOSUHVVZKLFKUHDOO\³PDGH´>+DZ-Haw]- which gave him his name and 
discovered him for the public. He was prominently featured as absurd, screamingly funny, hilarious 
entertainment. Evidently the purpose of this publicity was to dis- credit [sic.] the German broadcasts 
from the start. But, on the contrary, its immediate impact was to gain for them a growing audience.191 
Moreover, it is paradoxical that in spite of the employment of ridicule as the chief 
means of defence against Haw-Haw, his broadcasts were taken extremely seriously 
at official levels. The naivety of the British response to Haw-Haw, which conversely 
contributed to the popularity of his broadcasts (Daily Mirror FROXPQLVWµ&DVVDQGUD¶
ZHQW VR IDU DV WR ³XUJHQWO\ DVN´ DOO UHDGHUV ZKR ZHUH DEOH WR WXQH LQ WR *HUPDQ
propaganda to do so)192 is inadvertently revealed in a letter from the BBC Director-
General Frederick W. Ogilvie to Sir Campbell Stuart, head of the Enemy Propaganda 
Department,193 LQ'HFHPEHU7KH³+DZ-+DZTXHVWLRQ´ZURWH2JLOYLH³LVRI
great importance. We have never regarded it as the joke which it is supposed to be 
E\ VRPH´194 He noted that, in conjunction with MoI, the BBC had instigated the 
nucleus of what was to become its Listener Research surveys in order to gather 
TXDQWLWDWLYH GDWD UHJDUGLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶V UHFHSWLRQ RI -R\FH¶V EURDGFDVWV 2JLOYLH
argued: 
That Haw-Haw should be countered is of course agreed entirely: the only problem concerns the 
methods. It is undeniable that he is widely listened to at present: what is more doubtful is how 
listeners react to him. 
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Some believe him, others do not; many, consciously or unconsciously, probably absorb a good deal of 
ZKDWKHVD\V6XFKSRSXODULW\DVKHKDVPD\SDVVRULWPD\QRW« 
We are already doing much to counter him, and plans are at hand for doing much more. Ridicule 
being one of the most powerful weapons in the armoury (a FDUWRRQRI>'DYLG@/RZ¶VPD\EHZRUWK
half-a-dozen speeches). Haw-Haw is frequently guyed in our Variety programmes, - by skilled radio 
artists like [Arthur] Askey or the Western Brothers.195 
However, as an article in The Times of London on 28th December 1939 pointed out, 
³ODXJKWHU SOD\V D SDUW LQ WKHLU >WKH 1D]LV¶@ VFKHPH RI SURSDJDQGD 'U *RHEEHOV 
OHDUQW LQKLV ILJKW IRUSRZHU WKDW UHSHWLWLRQ FDQEUHDNGRZQ UHVLVWDQFH WR LGHDV´196 
This was ironic, since Ogilvie had, in his letter to Campbell Stuart, singled out The 
Times for criticism for its daily publication of Haw-+DZ¶V EURDGFDVW WLPHV DQG
ZDYHOHQJWKV WKXV³GD\DIWHUGD\ LQHIIHFWDFW>LQJ@DVHQHP\GLVWULEXWLQJ-DJHQW´197 
The dangers of repeat listening were also highlighted in 1940 by Henry and Ruth 
'XUDQW ZKR REVHUYHG WKDW ³>S@HRSOH WXQHG LQ µWR KDYH D JRRG ODXJK¶ EXW WKHQ
KDYLQJDFTXLUHGWKHKDELWVRPHEHJDQWRWKLQNµWKHUHPD\EHVRPHWKLQJLQZKDWKH
VD\V¶´198 and this is further substantiated by 2JLOYLH¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHFRQWHQWRIKLV
broadcasts, which was designed to appeal to existing currents of political thought 
and bore marked similarities to domestic journalism: 
Haw-Haw is not the clumsy craftsman he is sometimes imagined to be, nor is his work by any means 
³DOOOLHV´ZKLFKPHUHO\QHHGVKRZLQJXS+HLVREYLRXVO\DZHOO-informed syndicate; [sic.] and a great 
deal of his material is taken directly and quite fairly accurately from British sources, and is carefully 
shaped towards different sections of the British public in turn. Some of the talks on working class 
housing, for example, or unemployment, are almost indistinguishable from articles in The Daily 
Herald or The New Statesman, even when they are not verbatim quotations of them. Some of the talks 
about India or Palestine or about our alleged sabotaging of the League of Nations in the last few years 
might have come straight from The News Chronicle or the Manchester Guardian. Anti-semite [sic.] 
material runs closely parallel with Action; and so on. How are talks like these supposed to be 
effectively answered at 9.30 p.m. unless you are ready to suppress half the newspapers in this country 
the next morning?199  
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in regularly to Hamburg, three were occasional listeners and two never listened; by 
comparison four in every six listened to the BBC news. It concluded that  
[t]he blackout, the novelty of hearing the enemy, the desire to hear both sides, the insatiable appetite 
IRU QHZV DQG WKH GHVLUH WR EH LQ WKH VZLP KDYH DOO SOD\HG WKHLU SDUW LQ EXLOGLQJ XS +DPEXUJ¶V
audience and in holding it together. The entertainment value of the broadcasts, their concentration on 
undeniable evils in this country, their news sense, their presentation and the publicity they have 
received in this country, together with the momentum of the habit of listening to them, have all 
contributed towards their establishment as a familiar feature on the social landscape.200 
The potential significance RI -R\FH¶V FRQVLGHUDEOH %ULWLVK OLVWHQHUVKLS LV RIWHQ
XQGHUHVWLPDWHG RU PLVLQWHUSUHWHG E\ KLVWRULDQV .DWHU¶V GLVPLVVLYH DVVHUWLRQ WKDW
³>W@KH %ULWLVK OLVWHQHG PRUH WR -R\FH¶V EURDGFDVWV EHFDXVH WKH QDPHV RI IUHVKO\
captured Allied soldiers would regularly be spelled out, while at the same time they 
found Haw-+DZ¶VEDWKRVDPXVLQJ LIQRWDQXLVDQFH´201 is conclusively refuted by 
WKH HYLGHQFH QRW OHDVW WKH ILQGLQJV RI WKH %%&¶V RZQ H[WHQVLYH UHVHDUFK LQWR WKH
variety of reasons why Britons tuned into Hamburg.202 Moreover, Joyce biographer 
3HWHU0DUWODQG¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDW³>LQLWLDOO\@SHRSOHFDPHWRUHJDUGDOO WKHEOXVWHULQJ
sneering claims he [Haw-+DZ@ PDGH DV RQH ELJ MRNH´203 is an oversimplification 
which mistakes the BBC-endorsed policy of ridiculing Lord Haw-Haw for evidence 
of his failure. The tendency is to retrospectively dismiss the threat posed by Haw-
Haw in view of his subsequent decline in listening figures and the increasing 
obsolescence of his propaganda following the Battle of Britain and the downturn in 
German military fortunes, but this does not accurately reflect the nature of the 
potential threat he posed. Surveyed listeners frequently stated that a possible side 
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HIIHFWRI WXQLQJ LQWR+DPEXUJZDV WKDW LW ³PD\GHSUHVVRUIULJKWHQSHRSOH´204 and 
this ZDV UHLWHUDWHG E\ WKH SV\FKLDWULVW : $ 6LQFODLU LQ WKH %%&¶V PDJD]LQH The 
ListenerZKRZDUQHGLQ)HEUXDU\WKDW³>WKH1D]LV@DUHQRWWU\LQJWRDUJXHZLWK
\RXWKH\DUHWU\LQJWRGHSUHVV\RX´205  
-R\FH¶VEURDGFDVWZDVSODFHG LPPHGLDWHO\DIWHU WKH%%& news when two-thirds of 
Britons were already at their radio sets,206 and used the strong Hamburg wavelength, 
which was deliberately positioned very close to that of the BBC and therefore only a 
minor dial adjustment away.207 From the outset, Haw-Haw was a cause of genuine 
concern at both public and government levels;208 it is remarkable, therefore, that as 
ODWHDV$PHULFD¶V)&&ZDVVWLOOKDELWXDOO\DWWULEXWLQJWKHWLWOH³/RUG+HH+DZ´
[sic.] to the American Nazi propagandist Fred Kaltenbach in its internal 
communications209 DQG LQGHHG KDG LWV RZQ ³+HH +DZ´ >VLF@ ILOH210 with which to 
UHFRUGWKHIUHTXHQF\RI.DOWHQEDFK¶VEURDGFDVWV IURP%HUOLQ. TKHQDPH¶VRULJLQLQ
YHU\%ULWLVKFODVVGLVWLQFWLRQVDQG WKHVWRUPRISXEOLFLW\ WKDW DFFRPSDQLHG-R\FH¶V
early broadcasts to Britain were apparently lost on the FCC monitors. 
In tandem with the intended short-term psychological effects of Haw-+DZ¶V
broadcasts was a longer-term strategy of alienating listeners from the government 
and to convincing Britons that the war was contrary to their own interests. Michael 
%DOIRXU DUJXHV WKDW GXULQJ WKH 3KRQH\ :DU ³VXJJHVWLRQV WKDW WKH >%ULWLVK@
Government was inefficient, half-hearted, short-sighted and corrupt ± a staple theme 
± echoed the views of an appreciable part of the British public. But the natural 
inference was that a new team was needed to prosecute the war more vigorously ± 
hardly what the Germans wanted!´211 However, this view fails to take into account 
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WKHµOHIW-ZLQJ¶DQGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DQWL-Semitic dialectic employed in the Haw-Haw 
broadcasts, in which the British ruling class were attacked as representatives of 
µ-HZLVK¶ EXVLQHVV LQWHUHVWV212 These themes were also re-stated in the musical 
propaganda which apparently framed Haw-+DZ¶V SURJUDPPH WKURXJKRXW WKH ZDU
and as early as October 1939 BBC monitors picked up a syncopated interpretation of 
the popular 19th FHQWXU\ K\PQ µ2QZDUG &KULVWLDQ 6ROGLHUV¶ SHUIRUPHG E\ (UKDUG
%DXVFKNH¶V VZLQJ RUFKHVWUD ZLWK O\ULFV ZKLFK DVVHUWHG WKDW %ULWLVK VROGLHUV ZRXOG
³)LJKWDQGGLHIRU-HZUy/As we did before/You must die for Poland/Pay your debt of 
WKDQNV7R\RXUEHQHIDFWRUV,QWHUQDWLRQDOEDQNV´213 As with the lyrics of Charlie and 
his Orchestra, it is probable that the text was written by William Joyce, featuring as 
it does his staple motifs of anti-Semitism and hostility to international financiers, 
coupled with the caustic wit that characterised his news commentaries. The inference 
HQFRXUDJHG E\ -R\FH LV FOHDUO\ WKDW WKH ZDU VKRXOG QRW EH ³SURVHFXWH>G@ PRUH
YLJRURXVO\´214 but that it should not be prosecuted at all because it was for the 
EHQHILW RI µ-HZV DQG EDQNHUV¶ QRW %ULWLVK LQWHUHVWV DQG WKLV LGHD ZDV UHSHDWHGO\
emphasised in the Haw-Haw broadcasts and the lyrical content of Charlie and his 
Orchestra. 
7KH %%&¶V /LVWHQHU 5HVHDUFK UHJDUGing the potential resonance of the subjects 
addressed in Haw-+DZ¶V EURDGFDVWV IRXQG WKDW E\ IDU WKH PRVW VXFFHVVIXO OLQH RI
attack (deemed effective by 14.1% of respondents) was left-wing agitation, by 
GHVFULELQJ DQG HPSKDVLVLQJ ³%ULWLVK VRFLDO FRQGLWLRQV unemployment, distressed 
DUHDVVOXPVDQGZRUNLQJFODVVGLVWUHVVLQZDUWLPH´215 Next were the inadequacy of 
British old-age pensions (5.1%) and criticisms of British colonial policy and the 
handling of India and Palestine (3.4%). Importantly, allegations of Jewish influence 
in Britain (0.8%) and charges of governmental inefficiency and corruption (0.8%) 
were rarely mentioned.216 Since these represented staple themes for Haw-Haw (and 
later lyrical content for Charlie and his Orchestra), Hamburg appears to have erred in 
pursuing anti-6HPLWLFWKHPHVZKHQWKHUHZHUHDEXQGDQW³XQGHQLDEOH>VRFLDO@HYLOV´
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to exploit. Edith Dawson, a housewife in Gateshead, offered an indicator of both 
+DPEXUJ¶V SUREOHPV DQG LWV RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ D VHULHV RI GLDU\ HQWULHV IRU 0DVV
Observation in January 1940. Whilst claiming that Haw-+DZ ³Vpeaks much truth 
re[garding] -HZV´217 she showed relative indifference to his anti-Semitic attacks on 
Leslie Hore-Belisha. Her conclusion that Hore-%HOLVKD¶V efficiency as British War 
Minister was more important than his Jewish heritage ³-HZ"1RPDWWHUZKDW UDFH
>KHLV@LIKHJHWVWKLQJVGRQH´218 suggests a prioritisation of the national interest over 
personal prejudices, and may help to explain why anti-Semitic propaganda for 
British audiences was generally unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that, as Martin 
Doherty has demonstrated, considerable anti-Jewish sentiment existed in Britain at 
the time.219 Nonetheless, Dawson praised Haw-Haw DV³VKRZ>LQJ@XSWKHFDSLWDOLVW
V\VWHP DQG LQ D MRYLDO ZD\´ DQG EHLQJ ³JRRG IRU VRFLDOLVP here [in Britain]´220 
³:RXOGQ¶WPLVVKLPQRZ´VKHZURWHRQth -DQXDU\³7RP>GLDULVW¶VKXVEDQG@
DQG,NQRZKHVSHDNVWKHWUXWKRQ«VRFLDO	RWKHUSUREOHPV± I love his voice & 
PDQQHU7RPVSHDNVDWZRUN WRPHQ0RUH	PRUHSHRSOHµIHGXS¶ZLWKZDU6D\
Haw-+DZZDVULJKWWKDWµ&RQVHUYDWLYHVIRXQGWKLVZDUDYHULWDEOHJRGVHQG¶´221 
Her descriptions of workers and families not only listening to but also publicly 
discussing Haw-+DZ¶V LGHDV FRQWUDGLFW WKH %%& UHSRUW¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³>L@W LV
significant that the Hamburg points which meet with any substantial measure of 
approval from listeners are all ones which could [be], and frequently are, made 
within this country and are accepted as perfectly legitimate criticisms in no way 
inconsistent with a desire to prosecute the war to its successful conclusion. 
Genuinely defeatist propaganda apSHDUV WR IDOO RQ VLQJXODUO\ XQUHFHSWLYH HDUV´222 
The left-wing pacifist and journalist Denis Argent, too, wrote to Mass Observation 
WKDW ZDU ZDV LQHYLWDEOH EHFDXVH ³WKH ZKROH SURSDJDQGD PDFKLQH LV DJDLQVW SHDFH
&DSLWDOLVWVDUHPDNLQJPRQH\IURPZDU«	Whe Trade Unions are probably on the 
whole in favour of continuance because of vast [amount of] arms & war industries 
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HPSOR\PHQW´223 Haw-+DZ¶VDWWHPSWVWRPHUJHVXFKDQWL-capitalist scepticism with 
anti-Semitism, WRJHWKHUZLWKWKH5093¶VDIRUHPHQWLRQHGSURSDganda methodology 
RI EUHDNLQJ GRZQ OLVWHQHUV¶ UHVLVWDQFH E\ UHSHWLWLRQ FRXOG SRWHQWLDOO\ KDYH EHHQ
PRUHIUXLWIXOWKDQLWXOWLPDWHO\ZDV7KDW+DPEXUJ¶VDWWHPSWVWRXQGHUPLQH%ULWDLQ¶V
social cohesion would ultimately fail was by no means a foregone conclusion. 
Indeed, it is significant that the BBC adapted its output to meet the challenge 
presented by the German broadcasts, and 2JLOYLH¶V DVVHUWLRQ LQ WKH OHWWHU WR 6LU
&DPSEHOO6WXDUWWKDW³>W@KHEHVWGHIHQFHLVDWWDFNDQGLWVKRXOGEHDWWDFNRQ%ULWLVK
terms, not Haw-+DZ¶V´224 was unrealistic. Ogilvie objected to the suggestion that the 
%%& HQJDJHD VSHDNHU WR FRXQWHU -R\FH¶VEURDGFDVWVRQ WKH JURXQGV WKDW LWZRXOG
represent a propaganda coup for the RMVP, and this opinion was seconded by 
Goebbels, who noted in his diary on 5th -DQXDU\WKDW³>WKH%ULWLVKDUH@WDONLQJ
about him [Lord Haw-+DZ@DQGWKDW¶VZRUWKDJUHDWGHDO,Q/RQGRQWKH\ZDQWWR
employ someone to speak against him. That would be the best thing that could 
KDSSHQ WR XV´225 For Ogilvie, thLV ZRXOG SODFH WKH µ%ULWLVK +DZ-+DZ¶ RQ WKH
GHIHQVLYHIURPWKHRXWVHWDQG-R\FHFRXOGWKHQ³YDU\KLVERZOLQJDFFRUGLQJWRWKH
EDWVPDQ´226 Instead, the immediate British response to Haw-Haw was the necessary 
shedding of inhibitions about subjectivity on the BBC Home Service.227 The 
Corporation maintained its valuable reputation for truthful news reporting, but 
supplemented this with refutations of Nazi claims in programmes such as W. A. 
6LQFODLU¶V The Voice of the Nazi, a monthly broadcast which ran from December 
1939 to May 1940,228 as well as a dramatised series on the history of the NSDAP 
entitled In the Shadow of the Swastika.229 
However, the BBC would later adopt the strategy of responding to the RMVP on its 
German Service. Sefton Delmer, who would later characteristically proclaim that he 
³KDGQRJUHDWEHOLHILQWKHGU\DQGGUHDU\EXVLQHVVRIGHEDWLQJZLWKWKH1D]LVRYHU
the ether, an exercise of which the B.B.C. with its flock of would-be M.P.s was over-
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IRQG´ZDVQRQHWKHOHVVHPSOR\Hd by the Corporation in June 1941 to listen to Hans 
Fritzsche ³GRLQJKLVZHHNO\SHS-talk for the German public over Radio Berlin. Then, 
an hour and a half later, I was to tear Fritzsche to pieces with a reply over the 
*HUPDQVHUYLFHRIWKH%%&´ 230 'HOPHU¶VSRVW-ZDUFODLPWKDWWKHFRQFHSW³RR]HG
KXPDQ LQWHUHVW DQG OLVWHQHU DSSHDO´231 appears on the surface to be negated by the 
VWHDG\GHFOLQH LQ)ULW]VFKH¶VRZQ OLVWHQLQJ ILJXUHVGXULQJ WKHFRXUVHRI WKHZDU232 
thus indicating that at least one half of the bout was being increasingly avoided by 
their German audience. It is probable that the concomitant increase in German 
listener figures for British broadcasts (estimated by the Gestapo to be one million at 
the end of 1941 and fifteen million by the autumn of 1944)233 was more due to the 
progressive decline in the credibility of RMVP propaganda WKDQ 'HOPHU¶V RZQ
contributions,234 but it certainly affected Fritzsche into modifying his medium. He 
subsequently protested at the NurembeUJ7ULDOVWKDW³LQP\RSLQLRQthe tone [of my 
wartime broadcasts] always stayed several grades behind the severity of the tone of 
P\RSSRQHQW´235 
William Joyce was probably also responsible for scripting the programmes of the 
New British Broadcasting Station (NBBS), which first aired on 25th February 1940 
and continued until the end of the war,236 thus indicating the value which the RMVP 
SODFHG RQ WKH SURMHFW /LNH *RHEEHOV¶ ODWHU HIIRUW Station Debunk (described by 
Foreign Office monitors as DQ ³$PHULFDQ FRXQWHUSDUW´ WR 1%%6237 NBBS 
purported to be run by disgruntled patriots, and a senior BBC official noted in 
1RYHPEHU  WKDW WKH VWDWLRQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV KDG LQLWLDOO\ ³FDXVHG FRQVLGHUDEOH
FRQFHUQWRWKHDXWKRULWLHVLQWKLVFRXQWU\´238 The station was fascist in character and 
its PDWHULDOZDV IRXQGE\ WKH%%& WREH ³ZHOOFKRVHQ >VLF@ DQGDEO\KDQGOHG´239 
while its target audience was considered by the British monitor to be of a higher 
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VRFLDOFODVVWKDQWKHRWKHUWKUHH*HUPDQµIUHHGRPVWDWLRQV¶WR%ULWDLQ240 At a House 
of Commons debate on 25th April 1940, Unionist MP Dr. James Little raised the 
LVVXH RI 1%%6 ZKLFK ZDV ³GLVVHPLQDWLQJ *HUPDQ SURSDJDQGD RI D PLVFKLHYRXV
kind, by giving untruthful talks on imaginary happenings in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere over the British Empire, FRQFOXGLQJ WKHSURJUDPPHZLWK µ*RG6DYH WKH
.LQJ¶ DQG JUDPRSKRQH VHOHFWLRQV´241 Little claimed that many of his constituents 
ZHUH XQDZDUH RI WKH VWDWLRQ¶V *HUPDQ RULJLQV DV ZDV WKH %HQJDOL QRYHOLVW DQG
academic Sudhindra Nath Ghose, who described it in his April 1940 diary for Mass 
2EVHUYDWLRQDVD%ULWLVKµSLUDWH¶VWDWLRQDQGFLWHGGLVFXVVLRQV with friends as to why 
it was not jammed.242 
Indeed, the post-ZDU %%& UHSRUW FDOOHG WKH 1%%6 SURJUDPPHV ³UDWKHU FOHYHU
broadcasts to begin with and rather above the average.. >WKH 1D]LV¶@ EHVW HIIRUW
UHDOO\´243 Its methodology was noted by another Mass Observation correspondent 
who picked up the station in Liverpool in July 1940: 
I was trying to get America on the short-wave band, and heard this station, giving out advice to the 
Britishers [sic.]. We were to be invaded at any moment, and there were five hints given, which the 
announcer asked people to write down, and if they could, distribute them amongst their friends. It was 
simply propaganda to incite people to take up their baggage and start wandering, and thus adding to 
WKHFRQIXVLRQVLPLODUWRZKDWKDSSHQHGLQ%HOJLXPDQG)UDQFH7KH\GLGQ¶WVD\ZKHUHSHRSOHZHUHWR
JRWR«,SDUWLFXODUO\QRWHGWKHODVWKLQW³+DYH\RXUPRQH\UHDG\7KHEDQNVZLOOEHFORVHG´7KLV
I suppose, is to make people rush to the banks and take out all their money. The proceedings ended 
with the National Anthem. I have never heard such impudence in all my life.244 
It is noteworthy that this same tactic of sowing panic and encouraging civilians to 
clog the roads and create confusion and logistical difficulties would be employed 
more effectively by the Anglo-American PWD/SHEF in Germany in 1945, and there 
is no evidence to suggest that the advice given by NBBS were followed (or to 
VXSSRUW %HUJPHLHU DQG /RW]¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW 1%%6 EURDGFDVW WLPHV ZHUH OLVWHG LQ
British newspapers). Other features oI WKH 1%%6 ZHUH µILUVW DLG KLQWV¶ ZKLFK
detailed the gruesome injuries that might be sustained during an air raid (very similar 
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LQ QDWXUH WR 6HIWRQ 'HOPHU¶V µ(QJOLVK OHVVRQ¶ IRU *HUPDQ )RUFHV RYHU WKH %%&
German Service in 1940),245 as well as details of German invasion plans and coded 
messages to alleged saboteurs in Britain. However, the station was hampered by bad 
reception and unconvincing material; when it finally introduced a regular 
HQWHUWDLQPHQWIHDWXUHµ7KH2II-'XW\3URJUDPPH¶HYHU\6XQGD\DW p.m. (starting 
on 6th 0DUFK  WKH %ULWLVK PRQLWRUV QRWHG WKDW LW FRQVLVWHG RI ³UHFRUGLQJV RI
PRGHUQ PXVLF LQWHUVSHUVHG ZLWK ZHDN MRNHV ZLWK D SROLWLFDO PRUDO´246 By the 
summer of 1942 even this laboured attempt at propagandistic light entertainment had 
begun placing more emphasis on propaganda than on entertainment,247 but by that 
SRLQWWKHµSV\FKRORJLFDOWLGH¶KDGDOUHDG\WXUQHGLQ%ULWDLQ¶VIDYRXU 
Conclusion 
7KH %%&¶V SRRU VWDUW WR WKH ZDU DQG WKH µFXOWXUDO EODFNRXW¶ UHSUHVHQWHG DQ
opportunity upon which the RMVP failed to capitalise. The void created by the 
closure of all channels but the BBC Home Service, and the weakness of its initial 
entertainment output, saw many listeners turning to foreign broadcasts or the 
gramophone for entertainment, but this was gradually filled by the BBC Forces 
Programme in January 1940 and the progressive improvement of the Home Service. 
The Forces Programme itself was a response to a wholly new kind of audience with 
unique requirements and listening habits, and this served to further the cause of jazz 
in British broadcasting. Also important from the point of view of the musicological 
GHYHORSPHQW RI %ULWLVK MD]] ZDV WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI ³+DUOHP LQ /RQGRQ´ D
psychological by-product of the boredom and tension of the Phoney War which saw 
the jam session culture fostered in informal subterranean environs; as will be shown 
in the following chapter, this too would bear fruit on the British airwaves via public 
jam sessions and the specialist Radio Rhythm Club. Furthermore, the (intermittently 
constructive) criticism of Melody Maker during this period set the tone for an 
unofficial wartime collaboration between the journal and the Corporation, and I have 
highlighted for the first time the importance of consideration of individual 
journaOLVWV¶EDFNJURXQGVZKHQXWLOLVLQJMelody Maker as a source of wartime jazz 
advocacy. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that the period between September to December 1939 
offered the RMVP the chance to tailor entertainment broadcasts to the needs of 
British listeners and thus win a regular audience. In the absence of genuine 
widespread animosity toward Germany (although the historian Ian McLaine is 
exaggerDWLQJZKHQKHVWDWHV WKDWGXULQJ WKH3KRQH\:DU³KDWUHGRI WKH HQHP\GLG
not exist´248 D OLJKW SURJUDPPH RIIHULQJ ³SOHQW\ RI GDQFH PXVLF E\ SOHQW\ RI
EDQGV´249 stood a real chance of gaining popularity, as had the French station 
Fécamp, Radio International. The cabaret performances which accompanied William 
-R\FH¶V SURJUDPPHV LQ WKH HDUO\ PRQWKV RI WKH ZDU PDGH OLWWOH LPSDFW DW either 
public or governmental level, as can be judged by the almost complete lack of 
evidence of their reception in the considerable contemporary documentation 
concerning Lord Haw-Haw. Meanwhile, the NBBS, initiated in February 1940, 
alternated its commentaries with modern dance music but was not to have a 
dedicated entertainment feature for another thirteen months. Thus Goebbels failed to 
provide a convincing and genuinely entertaining alternative to fill the void during the 
µFXOWXUDOEODFNRXW¶LQ%ULWDLQDQGE\HDUO\WKH%%&KDGHVWDEOLVKHGWKH)RUFHV
3URJUDPPHDQGWKHQRYHOW\RIµOLVWHQLQJWRWKHHQHP\¶ZDVDOUHDG\ZHDULQJRII, with 
listening figures for Haw-Haw declining from February 1940 onwards.250 Unlike the 
Berlin-born Sefton Delmer, Goebbels lacked a sophisticated understanding of the 
target audience for his Anglophone propaganda, and while Joyce was successful 
when he focussed on social critiques, his anti-Semitism was received with 
indifference by the majority of British listeners. As will be demonstrated throughout 
the thesis, the RMVP lacked the pragmatism and cultural understanding to fully 
exploit the potential of entertainment as a form of propaganda to the enemy.  
The possible threat, however, has continuously been downplayed by historians of the 
era. &RQWHPSRUDU\$PHULFDQFRPPHQWDWRU6WDQOH\:DVKEXUQQRWHGWKDWPRUDOHLV³D
varying factor [which] ebbs and flows with vLFLVVLWXGHV DQG YLFWRULHV´251 but the 
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absence of either of these led to a heightened awareness of domestic social and 
political problems, as occurred in the USA during 1942, which the RMVP and its 
star Anglophone broadcaster sought to exacerbate. The questionable policy of 
encouraging the ridicule of Lord Haw-Haw, thereby effectively advertising and 
popularising Nazi propaganda in Britain, demonstrates a naivety and a lack of 
awareness vis-à-YLV *RHEEHOV¶ SURSDJDnda methodology, which The Times had 
already noted was based on encouraging repeated listening.252 Indeed, the 
retrospective dismissal of the threat posed by Haw-Haw does not reflect the 
contemporary concern at his attempts to exacerbate domestic political grievances in 
the boredom of the Phoney War, and ,DQ0F/DLQHSODXVLEO\DVVHUWVWKDW³>L@WVHHPV
as if the Ministry of Information was longing for the real war to begin in much the 
VDPH ZD\ DV WKH SXEOLF´253 Chapter Three will further explore the social and 
political complexities on the British home front with regard to public opinion and 
propaganda, as well as RMVP efforts to use jazz to foster discord in Britain whilst 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ QXUWXULQJ D *HUPDQLF DOWHUQDWLYH WR WKH µGHJHQHUDWH¶ PXVLF LQ WKH
Reich. With the beginning of the Battle of Britain on 10th July 1940, jazz was to 
prove an increasingly important weapon for both sides in the radio propaganda war. 
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µ+RW¶:DU: July 1940 ± December 1941  
 ³>-@D]]LVDPDMRULQWHUHVWLQWKHPDVVOLIHRIBritain. It can undoubtedly be used as 
DPDMRULQIOXHQFHRQPRUDOH«-D]]«UHPDLQVWKHELJJHVWXQRUJDQLVHGFKDQQHO
RISURSDJDQGDZKLFKH[LVWV´ 
      (Mass Observation, November 1939)1 
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The early summer 1940 saw, as Goebbels noted in his diary on 23rd 0D\ ³>K@DUG
WLPHVIRU$OELRQ´2 Defeat in Norway, the capitulation of the Low Countries and the 
fiasco of Dunkirk had taken their toll, and a report based on public opinion surveys 
and research by Mass Observation and the British Institute of Public Opinion found 
³D JHQHUDO IHHOLQJ RI GLVWUXVW DQG GHSUHVVLRQ´3 amongst the populace, and MoI 
FRQFOXGHGWKDW³SXEOLFPRUDOHZDVDWDORZHEE´4 Furthermore, this was exacerbated 
by the psychological stress of the impending Battle of Britain. One Maida Vale 
housewife criticised the BBC for offerLQJ ³VHQWLPHQWDO VWRGJH DERXW (16$
entertainments for factory meal-times - an impression that all is good in a lovely 
world ± DQG DOO WKH WLPH ZH¶UH JRLQJ IXUWKHU DQG IXUWKHU RYHU WKH HGJH RI WKH
SUHFLSLFH WKDW HQGV LQ GHIHDW ,I RQO\ ZH QHHGQ¶W EH VRRWhed and uplifted and 
EOLQGIROGHGDOOWKHWLPHRXUFROODSVHZRXOGQ¶WEHVREDGLILWFRPHV,IRQO\ZHFRXOG
IDFHIDFWVDQGNQRZZKDWZH¶UHXSDJDLQVW´5 In the USA, meanwhile, the magnitude 
of the European crisis was emphasised in the talks of anti-Nazi broadcasters such as 
MBS London correspondent Raymond Gram Swing, who reported over the Home 
Service of the BBC on 1st June: 
The intervening month since I have reported on actions and opinions in the United States has been 
incomparably momentous. It has seen WKHVPDVKLQJRIWKHµOLWWOH¶0DJLQRWOLQHWKHGHIHDWRIDJUHDW
Army; it has seen the conquest of the Low Countries; but it has seen the destruction of more than that 
± the destruction of many concepts, even concepts of warfare.« It has destroyed thoughts here ± 
comfortable, secure thoughts. It has wiped out a false feeling of distance, a general complacence.6 
This chapter will firstly analyse the social and political discourse regarding radio 
entertainment in Britain during summer 1940 and argue, in the spirit of Angus 
Calder and Martin Doherty,7 for a more complex understanding of British society 
WKDQ WKH µ3HRSOH¶V :DU¶ GLVFRXUVH RI D SROLWLFDOO\ DQG VRFLDOO\ FRKHVLYH %ULWDLQ
allows. This will include utilising Mass Observation diaries and parliamentary 
debate relating to jazz and entertainment, as well as the findings of the MoI public 
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RSLQLRQFDQYDVVHUVµ&RRSHU¶VVQRRSHUV¶7KHFRPSDUDWLYHQDWXUHRIthe thesis will 
thus not only contribute to a broader understanding of social and psychological 
conditions in Britain on the eve of the Blitz, but also set the context for both MoI and 
WKH5093¶VDWWHPSWVWRLQIOXHQFHWKHVHWKURXJKWKHPHGLXPRIHQWHUWDLQPHQW,ZLOO
also discuss the reasons behind the belated establishment of MoI, and its 
controversial attempts to gauge public opinion in Britain through the deployment of 
µ&RRSHU¶V VQRRSHUV¶ )ROORZLQJ IURPP\DUJXPHQW DERYH LQ&KDSWHU7ZR WKDW WKH
first months of the war presented Goebbels with an unprecedented opportunity to 
manipulate British public opiQLRQ,ZLOOGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWE\WKHHQGRIWKHµ3KRQH\
:DU¶ WKH SRWHQWLDO DXGLHQFH IRU *HUPDQ PXVLFDO EURDGFDVWV ZDV GZLQGOLQJ DV WKH
BBC increasingly took steps to cater to the demands of Forces and civilians. 
Moreover, using material from my 2012 interview with Charles and Penny Chilton, I 
ZLOOH[SORUH&KLOWRQ¶VVHPL-educational BBC programme Radio Rhythm Club within 
WKHEURDGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQWH[WDQGDUJXHWKDWWKH)RUFHV¶GHPDQGIRUXSEHDWPXVLF
could also serve a didactic function that was ironically FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH %%&¶V
perception of itsHOIDVWKHQDWLRQ¶VFXOWXUDOHGXFDWRU, which in turn increased demand 
IRUµDXWKHQWLF¶MD]]RQ%ULWLVKDLUZDYHV 
,ZLOODOVRUHDSSUDLVH&KDUOLHDQGKLV2UFKHVWUDWKH5093¶VILUVWRUJDQLVHGDWWHPSW
to exploit the British predilection for jazz and dance music. In doing so, I will make 
WKHFDVHIRU:LOOLDP-R\FH¶VDXWKRUVKLSRIWKHJURXS¶VSURSDJDQGDO\ULFVE\UHIHUULQJ
WR D SUHYLRXVO\ XQGLVFRYHUHG µ6LHJIULHG /LQH¶ SDURG\ IURP D /RUG +DZ-Haw 
broadcast in October 1939. The song predates all but one of the recordings listed in 
5DLQHU /RW]¶V GLVFRJUDSK\ DQG FRQWDLQV O\ULFV WKDW EHDU D VWULNLQJ UHVHPEODQFH WR
WKRVHXVHGLQWKHµ&KDUOLH¶UHFRUGLQJV7KLVVHFWLRQZLOODOVRUHYLHZWKHFRQIOLFWLQJ
accounts of the JURXS¶VJHQHVLVXWLOLVLQJXQSXEOLVKHGVHFWLRQVRI.DWHU¶VLQWHUYLHZV
with the musicians to support the case that the orchestra was not, in fact, 
commissioned by Goebbels, but that an existing band elected Lutz Templin as its 
leader and was integrated intRWKH5093¶VSODQVLQHDUO\Furthermore, I will 
challenge the evidence presented by Kater and Bergmeier/Lotz with regard to the 
JURXS¶V UHFHSWLRQ DQG DOOHJHG LPSDFW E\ XWLOLVLQJ %ULWLVK VRXUFHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH
Mass Observation archive and the Foreign Office and Home Office files relating to 
WKHUHFHSWLRQRIIRUHLJQSURSDJDQGDDVZHOODVWKH$PHULFDQ)&&PRQLWRUV¶UHSRUWV
I will demonstrate that there is in fact an almost complete lack of evidence of their 
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reception in Britain and the USA. The comparative nature of the thesis will facilitate 
a critical engagement with the existing scholarship on the orchestra, and allow me to 
correct inaccuracies and errors resulting from the narrower focus of single-country 
studies. 
Drawing on the unused interview materials at the Michael H. Kater fonds, I will also 
reappraise the role of Hans Hinkel, a significant figure in Nazi cultural life who 
QRQHWKHOHVVKDVODUJHO\EHHQQHJOHFWHGE\SULRUVFKRODUVKLS7KHUHDVRQIRU+LQNHO¶V
ever-increasing influence over cultural affairs over the course of the war has so far 
eluded scholars, who have broadly portrayed him as either uncultured opportunist or 
a dogmatically rigid philistine. These conclusions are supported by his published 
ZULWLQJV DQG UHFRUGHG VWDWHPHQWV OHDGLQJ %HUJPHLHU WR GHVFULEH KLP DV ³WKH VHOI-
DSSRLQWHG ZDUGHQ RI $U\DQ FXOWXUH´8 However, using previously overlooked 
PDWHULDO IURP .DWHU¶V LQWHUYLHZV ZLWK WKH MD]] PXVLFLDQV *HRUJ +DHQW]VFKHO DQG
Fritz Brocksieper, I will argue that his public statements with regard to culture in fact 
disguised a more pragmatic side with regard to the cynical exploitation of jazz music 
IRU WKH 1D]L FDXVH 7KLV ZLOO EH FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK *RHEEHOV¶ WKHRUHWLFDO IOH[LELOLW\
often expressed but never effectively translated into practice with regard to radio 
entertainment. This re-evaluation of both Hinkel and Goebbels will contribute 
towards a clearer understanding of their work and of National Socialist wartime 
cultural propaganda in general. 
1HZHYLGHQFHRI*RHEEHOV¶DWWHPSWVWRFUHDWHD1HZ*HUPDQ(QWHUWDLQPHQW0XVLF
that would provide an ideologically acceptable and suffLFLHQWO\µ*HUPDQ¶DOWHUQDWLYH
to jazz will be presented in a discussion of the short-lived 1941 entertainment 
programme Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag µ+DSS\ +RXU LQ WKH $IWHUQRRQ¶ 7KLV
project has so far received no mention in previous scholarship, and yet was 
extremely significant because it was commissioned by Goebbels to solve the 
SUREOHPSUHVHQWHGE\*HUPDQ)RUFHV¶SUHGLOHFWLRQIRU$QJOR-American jazz. I will 
demonstrate that there was no theoretical basis for New German Entertainment 
Music beyond a series of musical restrictions, and that the difficulties which the 
RMVP had with this project were inevitably to be repeated with the subsequent high-
profile DTUO. Based on the timing of the cessation of Frohe Stunde and the 
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founding of the DTUO, I will make the case for connecting the failure of the former 
directly to the foundation of the latter.  
Britain 
µ&RRSHU¶V6QRRSHUV¶DQG3XEOLF2SLQLRQ 
Given its delayed and uncertain genesis, it is unsurprising that MoI had a poor start 
to the war. On 29th November 1938, Neville Chamberlain deflected a question from 
Labour MP Arthur Henderson as to whether the government would consider 
establishing a Press and Propaganda department to deal with anti-British propaganda 
EURDGFDVW E\ ³FHUWDLQ RWKHU FRXQWULHV´9 +H VWDWHG WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW ³DWWDFK>HV@
great importance to the maintenance of the well-recognised tradition of objectivity 
DQGLQGHSHQGHQFHLQWKHSURYLVLRQRIQHZVE\%ULWLVKDJHQFLHV«DQGWKH\ZRXOG
deprecate any action that might be interpreted as an effort to introduce official 
FRQWURO´10 Moreover, resistance to the idea of a state propaganda apparatus was so 
great in Britain that the matter was debated in Parliament as late as 11th and 12th 
2FWREHU  &KDPEHUODLQ¶V 1RYHPEHU  VWDWHPHQW UHmained his public 
position until 15th June 1939, when he announced the intention to set up a Foreign 
Publicity Department of the Foreign Office, which was effectively a skeleton MoI to 
be enlarged upon the outbreak of war, whilst still maintaining that the government 
KDGQRLQWHQWLRQWRVHWXSD³0LQLVWU\RI,QIRUPDWLRQRU3URSDJDQGD´LQSHDFHWLPH11 
Accordingly, it was not until 4th September 1939 that MoI formally came into 
existence, while its German counterpart, the RMVP, had been active since 13th 
March 1933. Lord Macmillan, a Scottish barrister, was appointed Minister of 
Information (a position described by Library of Congress staff member Cedric 
/DUVRQDV ³WKHPRVWGLIILFXOW DQG WKDQNOHVVDVVLJQPHQWRIKLV ORQJDQG UHVSHFWDEOH
FDUHHU´12 and surrounded by an Advisory Council of illustrious Britons which 
included the BBC Director-General Frederick W. Ogilvie. Nonetheless, after two 
fiascos regarding the release of information, the American weekly Time could claim 
WKDW³>L@I/RUG0DFPLOODQ
VILUVWWDVNZDs to undo Britain's reputation for cleverness, 
                                                 
9
 Hansard Online. British News and Propaganda, 29th November 1938. Vol. 342 §239.  
10
 Ibid. See also &HGULF/DUVRQµ7KH%ULWLVK0LQLVWU\RI,QIRUPDWLRQ¶The Public Opinion Quarterly 
5.3 (Autumn 1941), pp.412-431. Here p.413. 
11
 Ibid, pp.412-414. 
12
 Ibid, p.416. 
 87 
 
he could not have started more brilliantly. Nobody could accuse Britain's propaganda 
of functioning smoothly last week. It was clumsy, amateurish, slow-starting, gave an 
impression like that of a sincere but badly staged show in which stagehands dropped 
WKLQJVGXULQJELJVSHHFKHVDQGWKHFXUWDLQFDPHGRZQDWWKHZURQJWLPH´13 
During a cabinet reshuffle on 5th January 1940, MacMillan was replaced as Minister 
of Information by the former BBC Director-General John Reith.14 &KDPEHUODLQ¶V
government itself, however, was increasingly beleaguered, and Alfred Duff Cooper 
recalls that, after accumulating Allied defeats, by late April 1940 there was a feeling 
GHYHORSLQJ LQ /RQGRQ¶V SDUOLDPHQWDU\ FLUFOHV ³ZKLFKZDV VKDUHG and strengthened 
by members of the Forces returning on leave, that there was something grievously 
ZURQJ ZLWK WKH FRQGXFW RI WKH ZDU´15 The failure of the Norwegian campaign 
resulted in a heated two-day debate in Parliament, followed on 10th May by the 
German invasion of Holland and Belgium; Chamberlain was subsequently convinced 
WRUHVLJQFKRRVLQJ:LQVWRQ&KXUFKLOORYHU/RUG+DOLID[DVKLVVXFFHVVRURQ³WKH
YHU\GD\ZKHQ+LWOHU ODXQFKHG WKH UHDOZDUXSRQ(XURSH´16 The new government 
was a coalition drawn up along strict party lines, and Churchill removed Reith as 
0LQLVWHURI,QIRUPDWLRQ³DSRORJHWLFDOO\´17 offering the post to Duff Cooper, whilst 
raising the ministerial status and stipulating that the Minister should henceforth 
attend all War Cabinet meetings in order to be informed of all developments. 
The events in France and Norway also served to nurture a strong feeling of British 
exceptionalism which was to manifest itself in a variety of ways. The psychologist 
W. A. Sinclair suggested over his The Voice of the Nazi programme for the BBC that 
WKH ZRUG ³PRUDOH´ SUHVXPDEO\ WRR QHXWUDO DQG FRVPRSROLWDQ EH UHSODFHG ZLWK
³JXWV´18 which represented an attempt to enshrine in language the sentiment 
H[SUHVVHGE\WKHIDPRXV'DYLG/RZFDUWRRQFDSWLRQHG³9HU\:HOO$ORQH´,QWKH
FDUWRRQDQLVRODWHG%ULWLVKVROGLHULVGHSLFWHG³VWDQGLQJGHILDQWO\RQDVKRUHQHDUO\
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engulfed by waves and shaking his ¿VW DW D VN\ IXOO RI 1D]L SODQHV´19 which, as 
Timothy Garton Ash has noted, represented a heightening of the British self-
perception as being an island nation, distinct from the continent.20 Morale, however, 
was too complex a concept to be distilled in this fashion, and Duff Cooper pointed 
out in Parliament that it was dependent on manifold and often mundane elements 
which transcended such simplified notions of courage and fortitude.21 Reith had 
already initiated steps to measure these factors by way of doorstep opinion polls, and 
ZLWK'XII&RRSHU¶VDSSURYDOWKHZDUWLPHVRFLDOVXUYH\ZDVVWDUWHGLQVXPPHU
in order to JDXJH ³ZKDW UHJXODWLRQV ZHUH FDXVLQJ XQQHFHVVDU\ GLVWUHVV ZKDW
VKRUWDJHV ZHUH EHLQJ PRVW IHOW DQG ZKHUH LQ IDFW WKH VKRH ZDV SLQFKLQJ´22 This 
YHU\PRGHUQIRUPRIPRUDOHDQDO\VLVZDVFRQVLGHUHGQHFHVVDU\EHFDXVH³FHQVRUVKLS
forbade the airing of certain JULHYDQFHVLQWKHSUHVV´23 and, as Henry Durant noted, 
WKHJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGDOPRVWFHUWDLQO\IDLOWRJDXJHWKHVWDWHRIQDWLRQDOPRUDOH³LI
reliance is placed on independent, objective facts such as food supply or the number 
of bombs dropped by the enemy on the home population. These factors must pass 
through and into people's consciousness before they express themselves as an effect 
RQWKHVWDWHRIPRUDOH´24 
Although the initiative was prepared before Duff Cooper took office, the ensuing 
furore in the national press saw much vitriol directed upon the new Minister of 
,QIRUPDWLRQZLWK WKHFDQYDVVHUVQLFNQDPHGµ&RRSHU¶V VQRRSHUV¶DQG0R, DFFXVHG
of spying. A Maida Vale housewife noted in a Mass Observation diary that her 
IULHQGV ZRUULHG WKDW LW ZDV ³WKH Whin end of the fascist wedge, because simple 
TXHVWLRQLQJPD\VRHDVLO\WXUQLQWREXOO\LQJ´25 and this parallel with Nazi domestic 
suppression was also raised in Parliament by Conservative MP Archibald Southby.26 
,QGHHG WKLV SRSXODU PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI 0R,¶s remit is in itself indicative of the 
FRQIXVLRQVXUURXQGLQJWKH0LQLVWU\¶VUROHLQ%ULWLVKSXEOLFOLIHWKHSHUFHSWLYH0DLGD
9DOHGLDULVWDUJXHGWKDW0R,¶VUROHZDVPLVXQGHUVWRRGDQGDFFXVHGWKHSUHVVRIVHOI-
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interest in its attacks on the government, and RIVSUHDGLQJ³WKDWRYHUZR>U@NHGIDOODF\
WKDW 0,¶V IXQFWLRQ LV OLPLWHG WR H[WHUQDO SURSDJDQGD :KR KDV WKXV GHILQHG DQG
GHOLPLWHG WKH 0,¶V IXQFWLRQ" 2I FRXUVH WKH SUHVV ZKR ZDQW D PRQRSRO\ ZLWK
UHJDUG WR WKH H[SUHVVLRQRISXEOLFRSLQLRQ´27 The analogies with the Third Reich, 
however crude and inaccurate, did reflect genuine public (and dubious media) 
concern that MoI was a symptom of a wartime condition which even a sympathetic 
$PHULFDQ SXEOLF RSLQLRQ DQDO\VW KDG GHVFULEHG LQ  DV ³WRWDOLWDULDQ
demRFUDF\´28 
Rather than the feared application of political pressure on those canvassed, the 
surveys aspired to scientific accuracy; the repetition of specific questions clustered 
DURXQGWKHFHQWUDOWKHPHRIWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VYLHZVRQWKHFRQGXFWRIWKHZDU29 was 
GHVLJQHGWRDOORZWKHHPHUJHQFHRIRSLQLRQµFXUYHV¶DQGWKHWUDFNLQJRIPRYHPHQWV
of opinion, while the securing of personal information such as religious 
denomination and gender was intended to facilitate cross-tabulation and the 
identification of the ZD\V LQZKLFKD UHVSRQGHQW¶VEDFNJURXQGPLWLJDWHGKLVRUKHU
answers.30 Moreover, the survey was also used to collect public feedback on the 
%%&¶VLQFUHDVLQJHPSKDVLVRQµOLJKW¶HQWHUWDLQPHQWDQGWKXVSURYLGHGDPPXQLWLRQ
against culturally conservative critics of the policy, allowing Duff Cooper to cite in 
3DUOLDPHQWWKHVRFLDOVXUYH\¶VILQGLQJVWKDW RIWKRVHFDQYDVVHG³GLGQRWUHVHQW´
music hall entertainments on the wireless.31 His chief antagonist in this debate was 
the Labour MP for Stoke-on-Trent, $QGUHZ0DF/DUHQZKR ODPHQWHG³the bastard 
form of Yankee low-GRZQMD]]PXVLF>RQWKH%%&@«>,@ILQVWHDGRIWKDWSVHXGR-
variety we had our own native talent it could have given us clean variety instead of 
WKHVWXIIZHKDYHKDGWRWROHUDWH´32 MacLaren continued: 
The wireless is so precious now that we cannot afford to lose a minute in any form of entertainment 
which gives to the world a false impression of the mental condition of the people of this country. I do 
not say that we should always have Beethoven or Sibelius, because I know there are varying degrees 
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of taste among the people, but have we fallen so low that in these solemn moments, when the entire 
nation, nay, the entire Empire, is listening to every syllable of a speaker conveying the solemnity and 
the enormity of the menace before us, that immediately the last syllable has died away on must come 
WKHPRVWDSSDOOLQJWUDVKWRZKLFKLWLVSRVVLEOHIRUPDQWROLVWHQ"«,NQRZWKHUHZLOOEHFULWLFVZKR
say that we must keep up the spirit of the people, but even if there be something in that argument, 
imagine the feelings of women waiting to hear something about the fate of their sons or their 
husbands when on come some trivial nigger boys, the corner men of a minstrel troupe. It is simply 
appalling.33 
MacLaren is voicing an outspoken opinion, and fellow MP George Muff rightly 
VXJJHVWHG WKDW KH ZDV ³QRW DQ RUGLQDU\ OLVWHQHU +H LV ZKDW , VKRXOG WHUP DQ
H[WUDRUGLQDU\ OLVWHQHU´34 It is nonetheless interesting to note that there was still no 
universal consHQVXVUHJDUGLQJUDGLRHQWHUWDLQPHQW¶VIXQFWLRQLQZDUWLPH'LVPLVVLQJ
the BBC/MoI methodology of using radio entertainment as a stimulus to civilian and 
)RUFHV¶ PRUDOH KH DGYDQFHG WKH DUJXPHQW WKDW UDGLR¶V IXQFWLRQ ZDV SULPDULO\ WR
project an image of BriWDLQ¶V UHVLOLHQWPLQG-set outwards for the benefit of foreign 
listeners. There are also remarkable similarities between these complaints and the 
observations of an SD report dated 20th 2FWREHU  WKDW ³HGXFDWHG FLUFOHV´ KDG
expressed their astonishment aWWKHLGHDWKDW³WKHKLWKHUWRSUHGRPLQDQWO\OLJKWSXUH
entertainment music broadcast [on German radio] is justified in these decisive days 
RI RXU QDWLRQ¶V VWUXJJOH IRU VXUYLYDO´35 Moreover, MacLaren makes an almost 
völkisch case for favouring indigenous BULWLVKPXVLFRYHU ³GHJHQHUDWH´ $PHULFDQ-
style numbers on the airwaves: 
The crooner and the jazz band are a foreign importation and are not native to this land. They come 
here from the backwoods of America and have the rhythm of the nigger running through them, with 
all that it implies. They do not belong to our people. « We have our own musicians and composers, 
our Elgars, as well as the native song and harmony of the three countries that compose this Kingdom. 
/HWXVH[SORLW WKHP«7KHUHDUHRWKHUNLQGVRIPXVLFQDWLYHWRWKHFRXQWU\DQGPRUHVXLWDEOHWR
the occasion. «) Whatever may be our predilections or taste in this matter, I think the Committee is 
united in believing that the instrument of broadcasting is far too valuable to be thrown away in 
rubbishy or degenerate forms of entertainment.36 
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This argument strikingly parallels the racist rhetoric of certain German critics,37 as 
well as the arguments of Hans Hinkel in favour of concentrating on German musical 
traditions rather than creating inferior replicas of an American cultural form. 
FurWKHUPRUH0DF/DUHQ¶VVXJJHVWLRn that broadcasting should be used to promote an 
atmosphere of solemnity and gravity in Britain, rather than to curate the national 
PRRGDQGPDLQWDLQPRUDOHZDVVLPLODUWR*RHEEHOV¶RZQDSSURDFK7KH3URSDJDQGD
Minister routinely used sombre radio content, the closure of entertainment venues 
and bans on dancing in an attempt to cultivate a desired sense of unity with the Front 
during military campaigns or following defeats38 and, as will be shown, modified 
PXVLFDO SURJUDPPHV¶ FRQWHQW VR DV QRW WR RIIHQG FLWizens in areas affected by air 
raids.39 There is no evidence that such a strategy was employed by Britain during the 
war, and while controversial initiatives such as the anti-slush campaign saw the BBC 
attempting to cultivate a more virile form of popular music at the expense of 
sentimental pieces, radio does not appear to have ever been used as a means of 
artificially suppressing the national mood. Indeed, George Muff best summarised the 
growing political consensus on concessions to light entertainment in wartime, 
FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW ³HYHQ LQ WKHVH FULWLFDO WLPHV ZKHQ \RX VZLWFK RQ WKHZLUHOHVV DQG
you hear something that may be termed light, it certainly has a tendency, not exactly 
WRH[KLODUDWH\RXEXWLWNHHSVZKDWLVZDQWHGLQWKHVHGD\VDQHYHQEDODQFH´40 
Radio Rhythm Club 
7KH LQFUHDVH LQ µOLJKW¶ PXVLF RQ WKH ZLUHOHVV KRZHYHU DOVR WUDQVFHQGHG VXFK
utilitarian wartime requirements as morale building. It came to serve a didactic 
function through Radio Rhythm Club, a dedicated jazz programme initiated by 
Charles Chilton and Leslie Perowne of the BBC Variety Department in June 1940. 
Having joined the BBC as a messenger boy in 1933, Chilton developed a passion for 
jazz whilst working as an assistant at the CorporatioQ¶V JUDPRSKRQH OLEUDU\ WZR
years later. Melody Maker QRWHG &KLOWRQ¶V LPSHFFDEOH VZLQJ FUHGHQWLDOV KDYLQJ
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attended meetings of the No. 1 Rhythm Club in London,41 ZKHUH KH ³ZDV VR
impressed by jazz that he actually got a swing outfit going in the sacred confines of 
WKH %%&´42 He subsequently assisted Perowne and Harman Grisewood, the 
Assistant Director of Programme Planning from 1939-41, on their swing 
SURJUDPPHVDQGDWVHYHQWHHQ\HDUVROGEHFDPH³SUREDEO\«WKH\RXQJHVWSHUVRQ
ever to have spoken about MD]]WRSLFVRQWKHDLU´DWWKH%%&43 Shortly after its first 
EURDGFDVW µ(DYHVGURSSHU¶GHVFULEHGRadio Rhythm Club WKDWPRQWKDV³RQHRI WKH
most interesting series of programmes for swing fans that the B.B.C. has ever 
XQGHUWDNHQ«7KH%%&5K\WKP&Oub is the final and ultimate gesture ± a sort 
of non-DJJUHVVLRQSDFWEHWZHHQ6ZLQJDQGRIILFLDOGRPDQGHYHU\ERG\LVKDSS\´ 
+RZHYHU WKH SURJUDPPH¶V VHPL-educational approach ensured that it not only 
catered to the jazz audience, but also expanded it. Just a month after the programme 
started, the same Bolton nightclub owner who had told Mass Observation about the 
unpopularity of war-WKHPHG MD]] VRQJV QRWLFHG DQ LQFUHDVH LQ KLV FOLHQWHOH¶V
appreciation of µauthentic¶, American-style jazz: 
7KHZDUGRHVQ¶WVHHP WRKDYHVWRSSHGPXVLFFRPLQJ WKURXJK IURP$PHULFD «$QGD IHZPRUH
people are being educated in modern jazz standards because the BBC seems to be putting on more 
short programmes of jazz. They have short record recitals, with a short commentary on the artists and 
the history of jazz, and that sort of thing.44 
Indeed, Chilton summarised the goal of Radio Rhythm Club DV ³WUHDWLQJ MD]]
VHULRXVO\ WKH ZD\ WKDW WKH\ >WKH %%&@ WUHDWHG FKDPEHU PXVLF VHULRXVO\´45 This 
raises interesting parallels with Hans HinkHO¶VFRPPHQWVXSRQWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKH
'782ZKLFKZDVFRQFHLYHGDVD µOLJKW¶FRXQWHUSDUW WR WKH%HUOLQ3KLOKDUPRQLF46 
The new programme replaced Kings of Jazz, another Chilton/Perowne collaboration 
which had presented musical illustrations of the careers of legendary American jazz 
musicians, focussing on a different artist each week,47 and thus could hope to build 
on the achievements of its predecessor. It was targeted at existing and would-be jazz 
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aficionados, and in May 1940 Melody Maker reported that the forthcoming 
SURJUDPPH ZRXOG KDYH WKH ³SULPDU\ LQWHQW « WR H[SODLQ MD]]´ IHDWXULQJ
³FRQWUDVWLQJ VW\OHV DQG FRPELQDWLRQV ZKLWH DQG FRORXUHG MD]] HWF´ DQG ZRXOG
replicate the proceedings of a Rhythm Club, with Chilton as the host and 
³>P@HPEHUVKLSRIWKHFOXE«H[WHQGHGWRDOOZKROLVWHQ´.48 &KLOWRQUHFDOOVWKDW³,
used to give record recitals and so on [at Rhythm Clubs], but on the whole I avoided 
WKHPLI,FRXOGµFRVWKH\ZHUHRYHU-HQWKXVLDVWLF´49 DQGLQVLVWVWKDWWKHSURJUDPPH¶V
name did not GLFWDWH LWV VWUXFWXUH RU FKDUDFWHU ³, WKRXJKW LW ZDV D JRRG WLWOH´ KH
DVVHUWV ³DQG WKHQ , SXW DQ\WKLQJ « >LQ WKH SURJUDPPH@ WKDW ZDV WRSLFDO >DQG@
EHORQJLQJWRMD]]´50 
The inaugural edition of Radio Rhythm Club was broadcast over the Forces 
Programme at 10.20 p.m. on 8th June 1940. Indeed, while the unassuming Chilton 
GHQLHV DQ\ XOWHULRU PRWLYH IRU KLV SURJUDPPH VWDWLQJ WKDW ³, GLGQ¶W WKLQN , ZDV
DLGLQJ PRUDOH , ZDV MXVW SOD\LQJ ZKDW , OLNHG´51 the significance of its potential 
popularity with the Forces would certainly have been clear to the BBC in accordance 
ZLWK2JLOYLH¶V ILQGLQJVRQKLVYLVLW WR WKH%() LQ -DQXDU\RI WKDW \HDU%HVLGHV LWV
popular appeal, the programme was also a critical success, with Bill Elliott, the 
founder of the No. 1 Rhythm Club, writing at the end of 1940: 
In my opinion, 1940 has been one of the best years for rhythm fans since the jazz bug first bit this 
country way back in 1919. 
«,WLVWUXHWKDWZHKDYHQRWKDGDQ\VWDU$PHULFDQEDQGVRUPXVLFLDQVRYHUKHUHLQSHUVRQbut the 
B.B.C on the air have more than made up for that[.] 
«>7@KH5DGLR5K\WKP&OXEKDV IHDWXUHG«SURJUDPPHVRI VSHFLDO UHFRUGVQRW WREHREWDLQHG
over here that would in the normal course of events never be heard by the average rhythm fan.52 
As of October 1940, moreover, Radio Rhythm Club had its own house band, the 
Radio Rhythm Club Sextet, which was led by Harry Parry and featured the Cardiff-
ERUQJXLWDULVW -RH'HQL] DOVRRI.HQ -RKQVRQ¶V:HVW ,QGLDQ'DQFH2UFKHVWUD DV
well as a young and exceptionally talented blind pianist named George Shearing, 
who would achieve post-war fame in the United States. The group had been spotted 
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by Chilton during a residency at the St. Regis Hotel in Cork Street, London, 
following which they would perform afterhours at the Coconut Grove bottle party, 
with Parry sometimes sleeping at the club after doors closed at 5 a.m. to avoid the 
perilous journey home through the blackout.53 Of the decision to employ them, 
Chilton recalls: 
I at once knew this band was almost exactly what I was looking for. Its music was fresh and the 
players were keen and of an exceptional high standard. Most of their enthusiasm came as a result of a 
smiling Welsh clarinet player whose arrangements, especially regarding the handling of riffs «
gave me great pleasure.54 
The St. Regis Quintet were subsequently broadcast on the BBC, where they were 
well-received by the listening public, and Parry then converted his band into the 
Radio Rhythm Club Sextet, with extra credibility lent by the fact that he was 
managed by Bill Elliott.55 Even The Times was impressed; although it complained in 
WKDWWKHJURXS³SOXQJH>V@LQWRGLVSOD\VRIYLUWXRVLW\LQZKLFKWKH\DUHOLDEOHWR
ORVHWKHPVHOYHV´56 DODWHUUHYLHZLQWKHVDPHSDJHVIRXQGWKDW3DUU\³FRQGucts his 
5DGLR 5K\WKP &OXE 6H[WHW ZLWK VW\OH DQG HQHUJ\´.57 The group was increasingly 
afforded the kind of public adulation that was unprecedented on British shores, 
UHFHLYLQJD³YHU\ORQJDQGORXGRYDWLRQDVVRRQDVWKHVLJQDWXUHWXQHZDVKHDUG´DW
the London Palladium on 8th September 1941.58 ³0DQ\ KXQGUHGV RI SHRSOH´ ZHUH
WXUQHG DZD\ IURP :DWIRUG 5K\WKP &OXE¶V %DOO LQ -DQXDU\ 59 and record-
breaking crowds attending their Variety tour the same year.60 Indeed, it is testament 
to their success that the baQG¶V OLQH-up changes were deemed newsworthy by 
$PHULFD¶V DownBeat ZKLFK GXO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG WKHP DV ³%ULWDLQ¶V PRVW SRSXODU
MD]]FRPER´61 
Chilton was called up for service in the RAF in January 1941, where he joined the 
jazz and dance musicians who were recruited ³LQ WKHLU KXQGUHGV´62 by Wing 
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&RPPDQGHU 2¶'RQQHOO WKH 5$)¶V 'LUHFWRU RI 0XVLF 7KHVH DPDWHXU JURXSV
supplemented more ambitious Services projects, most notably the RAF Dance 
2UFKHVWUD DND WKH 6TXDGURQDLUHV D ³FUDFN GDQFH EDQG´ ZKLFK IHDWXUHG UHFHntly 
drafted members of various famous groups such as those of Bert Ambrose, Eddie 
Carroll, Jack Harris, Brian Lawrance and Oscar Rabin,63 although other high-profile 
combinations included The Blue Rockets (Royal Army Ordinance Corps), The Blue 
Mariners (Royal Navy) and The Skyrockets (RAF Balloon Command).64 The 
Squadronaires had been intended to entertain the BEF on the continent, but 
following the fall of France they instead found themselves stranded in Uxbridge with 
abundant time to rehearse and experiment, although their music remained in the 
*OHQQ0LOOHUPRXOGDQGWKHJURXS¶VJXLWDULVW6LG&ROLQLVH[DJJHUDWLQJZKHQKHFDOOV
WKHP³ZLWKRXW DGRXEW WKH ILQHVW VZLQJEDQGHYHU WREHKHDUGRXWVLGH$PHULFD´65 
7KH%OXH0DULQHUV¶PXVLFZDV³HPSKDWLFDOO\«HQWLrely secondary to their Naval 
GXWLHV´66 EXWRIILFLDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLU³JUHDWPRUDO-UDLVLQJ>VLF@SRZHUV´67 led to 
repeated Forces concerts, and the band was sent to Normandy shortly after the D-
Day landings to entertain the same invasion Forces whom the RMVP had been 
attempting to intimidate with a prolonged and consolidated jazz propaganda 
campaign from 1942 onwards.68 Moreover, such bands could also be coordinated 
with and integrated into MoI operations. For example, the Blue Rockets and other 
smaller Army formations under the musical direction of bandleader Miff Ferrie (who 
had also played at the El Morocco µbottle party¶) were featured in a forty-minute 
short film entitled Swinging into the Attack, which was to be shown in the USA and 
Britain and emphasised the military training of musicians.69 The film was produced 
by the Strand Film Co. under direction of MoI, and Melody Maker reported that it 
ZDVWRFRQVWLWXWH³DQLPPHQVHVOLFHRISURSDJDQGDIRURXUILQH$UP\´70 
The role of Services bands was not to educate but to entertain and provide the Forces 
ZLWK ZKDW -RH /RVV GHVFULEHG DV WKH ³friendliness from hearing the tunes that he 
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NQRZVDQGORYHVVRZHOO´71 or, LQ*OHQQ0LOOHU¶VZRUGV³DPXFK-needed touch of 
KRPH´72 The more challenging and didactic Radio Rhythm Club continued in 
&KLOWRQ¶V DEVHQFH ZLWK +DUU\ 3DUU\ WDNLQJ RYHU DV SUHVHQWHU DQG KLV 6H[WHW QRZ
making bi-monthly appearances on the air. The popularity of the programme (which 
earned the approval of a remarkable 92% of Forces listeners)73 and 3DUU\¶V
DFFHVVLEOH DUUDQJHPHQWV OHG WR DEHODWHG µ%ULWLVK VZLQJFUD]H¶RIZKLFK VDZ
even successful dance band leaders such as Geraldo jumping on the swing 
bandwagon74 and created a corresponding degree of disenfranchisement among 
aficionados.75 Nonetheless, the programme retained the support of Melody Maker, 
and Charles Chilton points out that by involving journalists such as Spike Hughes, 
Ray Sonin and Edgar Jackson in the programmes as expert commentators, he 
succeeded in neutralising at least some of the potential criticism from the journal, 
VWDWLQJWKDW³RQFH«,LQYLWHGWKHPWRWDNHSDUWLQWKHMD]]SURJUDPPHVWKHMelody 
Maker were very sympathetic to the BBC, and certainly to the [Radio] Rhythm 
&OXE´76 Indeed, Chilton admits in retrospect that WKH MRXUQDO¶V SUDLVH RI 3DUU\¶V
JURXSZDV³DELW «RYHU WKH WRS´ZLWK*HRUJH6KHDULQJ¶VSUHVHQFH LQ WKHJURXS
EHLQJLQKLVRSLQLRQWKHNH\WRWKHJURXS¶VVXFFHVV77 
In December 1942, Parry was asked by the BBC to step down and Chilton returned 
to the heOP7KHUHDVRQIRU3DUU\¶VGLVPLVVDOZDVRVWHQVLEO\WKDW&KLOWRQ¶VQHZSRVW
as an RAF radio communication instructor allowed him the time to return to 
presenting and producing the programme,78 although his heavy drinking and 
attendant unreliability were also factors in his removal from the programme.79 The 
5$)EDQGRI%XGG\)HDWKHUVWRQKDXJK³SURQRXQFHG)DQ-VKDZ´80 UHSODFHG3DUU\¶V
group as the new Radio Rhythm Club Sextet,81 and by late 1943 Chilton had rejected 
the live jam session format and the increasingly mainstream swing idiom in favour 
of record recitals focussing primarily on Golden Age jazz and other historical 
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material. Christina Baade notes that dance bands and Services orchestras such as the 
Squadronaires had integrated swing idioms into their music, while swing stars such 
as Parry and Stephane Grappelli had made live broadcasts for other BBC 
programmes, and thus the success of Radio Rhythm Club in popularising small-band 
swing had jeopardised its own distinctiveness.82 &\ULO%ODNH¶V-LJ¶V&OXE%DQG the 
West Indian group resident at the eponymous West End bottle party, provided 
musical illustrations,83 thus further entrenching the products of bottle party culture 
on British airwaves. The shift towards jazz history was reminiscent of the 
SURJUDPPH¶VSUedecessor Kings of JazzDQGE\VKXQQLQJWKHµ%ULWLVK6ZLQJ&UD]H¶
which it had helped to initiate, the programme reasserted its leading role within the 
British jazz scene. It had become a common cause for the journalists, broadcasters 
and fans alike, and Melody Maker protested vociferously in 1943 when it was taken 
off the air for two months.84 Radio Rhythm Club was, as Peter W. G. Powell 
UHPHPEHUV³FRPSXOVRU\OLVWHQLQJ´85 
Jazz as Propaganda 
As noted above, the semi-didactic nature of Radio Rhythm Club was an exception to 
WKH UXOH RI WKH %%&¶V OLJKW EURDGFDVWLQJ ZKLFK ZDV ODUJHO\ FKDQQHOOHG WRZDUGV
XWLOLWDULDQSURJUDPPLQJVXFKDVWKHXSEHDWµ0XVLF:KLOH<RX:RUN¶HQYLVDJHGDV
background music for factory workers to increase productivity and reduce the sense 
of monotony in the workplace.86 Indeed, there was an increasing awareness in 
government circles that light entertainment could be deployed to actively stimulate 
certain desired responses from an audience. Mass Observation, whose relationship 
with the government came under scrutiny in Parliament87 and which served in an 
irregular advisory capacity to MoI,88 was commissioned to advise the Ministry of 
Supply on the potential effectiveness of integrating musical entertainment with a 
political moral, and the VXPPDU\ RI LWV ILQGLQJV GHOLYHUHG WR WKH 0LQLVWU\¶V &KLHI
Public Relations Officer on 13th June 1940 made a strong case for the procedure:  
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I think dance music, jazz lyrics are the most potent form of unconscious influencing. So far any of 
these lyrics which have touched on your problems have tended to have an effect [which is] the reverse 
RIWKHRQH\RXDLPDW)RULQVWDQFH/DXUHQFH:ULJKWDQG$QQHWWH0LOOV¶WXQH³3OHDVHOHDYHP\EXWWHU
DORQH´$QQHWWH0LOOVZURWHWKLVEHFDXVHDSKUDVHMXVWKDSSHQHGWRcome up at a party she was at. She 
could just as well have written it the other way around, from a pro-margarine angle. She is a typical 
example of a first-class jazz writer (Boomps a Daisy, Hitler, etc) and cabaret star who feels 
dissatisfied with the content of jazz words and is anxious to tie this up with something of general use 
and topicality.89 
7KLVH[WHQVLYHUHSRUWDUJXHGWKDWµMD]]¶ZRXOGEHWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHYHKLFOHIRUVXFK
PHVVDJHV DOWKRXJK WKH GRFXPHQW¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH JHQUH ODFNV QXDQFH and 
appears to be synonymous for modern popular music in general. Annette Mills, 
whose role in British (and inadvertently also German)90 wartime propaganda has 
been completely ignored by prior scholarship, would act in an advisory capacity to 
Mass Observation in this respect from 1941. The concerns for British governmental 
use of music as propaganda were very different from those in Germany, where 
musicians were obliged to operate within the state-defined confines of the RMK; 
Mills pointed out in a memorandum to Harrisson that British bands, to varying 
degrees depending on their integrity, tended to accept bribes from music publishers 
WRµSOXJ¶VRQJVDWWKHLUFRQFHUWVLQRUGHUWRSRSXODULVHWKHP91 Propaganda songs, on 
the other hand, were unpopular with songwriters and publishers alike. Because they 
would be listened to or sung but not purchased, they represented at best popular 
morale-boosting entertainment and not sales. Musicians were even more reluctant to 
play such numbers and, according to Mills, charged a fee of £5 per plug, as opposed 
to the £3 they demanded for standard commercial songs.92 
Mills advocated forming a small, government-sponsored song-writing department 
³VSHFLDOLVLQJLQWKHSV\FKRORJ\RIDGYHUWLVLQJLQVRQJ´,93 although this proposal was 
never adopted. ,W LV LQWHUHVWLQJ WR QRWH WKDW 0LOOV¶ progressive approach towards 
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H[SORLWLQJWKHFRPPHUFLDOVHFWRU¶VH[SHULHQFHLQWKHSV\FKRORJical manipulation of 
consumers (µSURSDJDQGD¶LQWKH%HUQD\VLDQVHQVH)94 was in itself far more reflective 
of the American approach towards psychological warfare, which held that 
SURSDJDQGDZDV³VLPLODULQPDQ\ZD\VWRPRGHUQDGYHUWLVLQJ´95 
,WVKRXOG«EHD*RYHUQPHQWFRQFHUQWRVXSSRUWDVRQJZLWKDWRSLFDODSSHDOVRPHWKLQg to cheer 
people up at a critical moment, to get over an unpleasant and vital bit of information in a palatable 
form, to give courage, in fact to use the easiest and quickest way into the hearts and minds of the 
people, that of music [and] song.96 
The depaUWPHQW¶V UHPLW VKH VXJJHVWHG VKRXOG EH ³WR ZULWH TXLFNO\ DQG ZHOO DQ\
ideas the government wants to put over, or to submit ideas themselves, using the 
HPRWLRQDO DSSHDO DW WKH PRPHQW QHHGHG DQG GLVJXLVHG DV HQWHUWDLQPHQW´97 This 
should be done in conjunction with a publisher or publishers to enable maximum 
publicity and exploitation of the songs, with permission granted to the BBC to use 
the songs as the occasion demanded. 
0LOOV¶ DVVHUWLRQ WKDW VXFK D VFKHPH ³ZRXOGDPD]H WKHDXWKRULWLHVZLWK LWV FRORVVDO
VXFFHVV´ZDVRYHUO\RSWLPLVWLF98 not least because it failed to take into account what 
DFRQWHPSRUDU\$PHULFDQVRFLDOZRUNHUFDOOHG³>WKHLQWDQJLELOLW\RI@WKHJXLGDQFHRI
WKH SXEOLF PLQG´99 as is demonstrated at various points in the thesis, it was 
extremely difficult to accumulate accurate empirical data regarding the ways in 
which propaganda was processed by and acted upon its audience. However, an 
earlier Mass Observation report, published in November 1939, had observed that the 
potential for hugely popular combinations of jazz and propaganda was evident from 
WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI WKH ZDU FLWLQJ -LPP\ .HQQHG\ DQG 0LFKDHO &DUU¶V 
FRPSRVLWLRQµ7KH:DVKLQJRQWKH6LHJIULHG/LQH¶100 as evidence. Indeed, published 
at a time when British foreign policy statements vis-à-vis Germany were still 
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³H[FHHGLQJO\ SROLWH ORJLFDO DQG XQ-EHOOLFRVH´101 the song satisfied the wishes of 
RUGLQDU\ SHRSOH ZKR ZLVKHG WR HVFDODWH WKH WRQH WRZDUGV *HUPDQ\ DQG ³JHW D ELW
URXJKHU´102 0DVV2EVHUYDWLRQVXJJHVWHG WKDW ³WKHGLIIHUHQFHRI WKe jazz sentiment 
and a speech by Halifax was about the same as the difference between the street 
pamphlets and the daily press. In each case the former represented the stronger 




WKHJUHDWVDWLVIDFWLRQRIWKHFLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQ´104 The bond between the Forces and 
the home front ZDVDFFHQWXDWHGE\WKHVRQJ¶VXVHRIWKHILUVW-person plural instead of 
the singular, thus by implication including the listener and allaying any potential 
feelings of civilian inferiority to the young soldier-protagonist writing home. As 
observed by Joe Loss with regard to his visit to the BEF in France, music functioned 
as a means of binding the national community at a time when military engagement 
with the enemy remained absent. 
A handwritten appendix also notes the perceived distinctions between British and 
German propaganda songs: 
[The Engel-Land Lied] has a stirring line and is continually being broadcast, usually as sung by a 
male chorus. It is definitely a mass song & HDV\ WR VLQJEXWZDVSXWRXWE\*RHEEHOV¶0LQLVWU\RI
Propaganda. It is played immediately after German news bulletins ± there is no corresponding song 
that could be sung after the English news. Jazz has its patriotic songs but they are of another world 
from that of the BBC announcer.105 
Angus Calder and Martin Doherty have drawn attention to the inaccuracies of the 
SHUFHSWLRQ RI %ULWDLQ¶V +RPH )URQW DV VRFLDOO\ DQG SROLWLFDOO\ FRKHVLYH ZKLFK LV
LQKHUHQWLQWKHµ3HRSOH¶V:DU¶GLVFRXUVH106 and the RMVP could hope (as discussed 
above in Chapter Two) to exploit very real dissonances within British society. 
Nonetheless, an idea of British exceptionalism was conveyed through contemporary 
PHGLD DQG WKH )RUFHV¶ SURSHQVLW\ IRU IULYRORXV SRSXODU VRQJV ZDV XWLOLVHG Wo 
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promote the idea of a uniquely British relationship between music and morale which 
persists today;107 the BBC magazine The Listener summed up this sentiment on 4th 
-XO\E\ FODLPLQJ WKDW ³WKH %ULWLVK$UPLHV PDUFKHG WRYLFWRU\ LQ WKH ODVWZDU
singing noWµ5XOH%ULWDQQLD¶RUµ/DQGRI+RSHDQG*ORU\¶EXWµ7LSSHUDU\¶RUµ:KR¶V
\RXU ODG\ IULHQG"¶´108 However, as Timothy Garton Ash has noted, British 
KLVWRULRJUDSK\ LV QRW DORQH LQ HPSKDVLVLQJ µH[FHSWLRQDO¶ QDWLRQDO WUDLWV DV GHILQHG
against those of supposedly more homogenous neighbours,109 and the German 
)RUFHV¶ SHQFKDQW IRU FUXGH DOWHUHG YHUVLRQV RI SRSXODU VRQJV (as exploited by 
'HOPHU¶VSoldatensender) as well as sentimental or homesick numbers such as µLili 
Marleen¶ and µEs geht alles vorüber¶, contradict such simplified theses regarding the 
exceptionality of British tastes. Moreover, as the thesis repeatedly highlights, a 
predilection for jazz and dance music transcended questions of nationality and was 
evident not just among British, German and American Forces, but permeated popular 
taste from fascist Italy110 to the furthest-flung Soviet Republics.111 
The novelist J. B. Priestley set the tone for juxtaposing exceptional Britain with 
monolithic Germany by claiming over the BBC that the Germans would never have 
made the blunders that led to the Dunkirk fiasco, but nor would they have achieved 
WKHWULXPSKLQDGYHUVLW\ZLWKWKHUHVXOWDQWKDVWLO\LPSURYLVHGHYDFXDWLRQ³7KDWYDVW
PDFKLQHRIWKHLUVFDQ¶WFUHDWHDJOLPPHURIWKDWSRHWU\RIDFWLRQZKLFKGLVWLQJXLVKHV
ZDUIURPPDVVPXUGHU´KHDUJXHGRQth June 1940³,W¶VDPDFKLQH± and therefore 
KDV QR VRXO´112 6LU 5REHUW 9DQVLWWDUW WKHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V QRPLQDO &KLHI
Diplomatic Advisor,113 launched a series of chauvinistic anti-German broadcasts and 
pamphlets in which he traced the history of German barbarism back almost two 
milennia to Armenius (Hermann).114 This rhetoric also surfaced in a more subtle 
IDVKLRQLQWKH%%&¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQRILWVUHRULHQWDWLRQWRZDUGVµOLJKWHU¶PXVLFDOIDUH
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with the CoUSRUDWLRQ¶V PDJD]LQe The Listener VWDWLQJ RI WKH µ(QJOLVK¶ [sic.]115 
approach to song: 
When an Englishman rises to an occasion, he does not make a song about it; he makes a song about a 
young lady from Armentiéres or some other subject of the same nature. He has no objection to 
sentimentality; in fact he wallows in it. But the object of his sentimentality is never his country, as the 
)UHQFKPDQ¶V LV la Patrie DQG WKH *HUPDQ¶V das Vaterland « 6WLOO ZKHQ WKH (Qglishman stops 
singing or enjoying frivolous nonsense, we may indeed fear for England ± for Englishmen will no 
longer be Englishmen.116 
However, this allegedly unique British taste for frivolity was certainly not reflected 
in the bulk of the leading music puEOLVKHUV¶ HDUO\ RXWSXW RI PDUWLDO-spirited war 
VRQJV ZLWK 0DVV 2EVHUYDWLRQ QRWLQJ WZR PRQWKV LQWR WKH ZDU WKDW ³>W@KH
JORULILFDWLRQ RI WKH VROGLHU ZKLFK RFFXUV LQ DOPRVW HYHU\ >%ULWLVK@ ZDU WXQH «
seems to have gone over-IDU´117 Indeed, far from being a simple procedure of 
SURYLGLQJ WKH)RUFHVZLWK³IULYRORXVQRQVHQVH´ WKHDFWRIGLVFHUQLQJZKDW%ULWRQV
wanted to hear was in fact a commercially-driven process of trial and error on the 
part of the music publishers, and subject to enquiries through the nascent art of 
listener research on the part of the BBC (see Chapter Two) and public opinion 
monitors such as Mass Observation. The reasonably new broadcast medium meant 
that songs could be produced and disseminated en masse, and thus their genesis and 
function differed from the songs of World War I, which, according to the Great War 
YHWHUDQDQGVRQJFKURQLFOHU-RKQ%URSK\³DUHWKHVRQJVRIKRPHOHVVPHQHYRNHG
by exceptional or distressing circumstances; the songs of an itinerant community, 
continually altHULQJZLWKLQLWVHOIXQGHUWKHLQFLGHQFHRIGHDWKDQGPXWLODWLRQ´118 
In World War II this itinerant community was catered to by the wireless. As such, it 
ZDV SURYLGHG ZLWK µUHDG\-PDGH¶ ZDU VRQJV DOWKRXJK DV the thesis demonstrates, 
such texts could of course be altered, parodied or corrupted by either official 
propaganda apparatuses or the public mind. As in the USA from December 1941, the 
British publishing companies that published and promoted war songs were 
concerned above all with anticipated profit, with patriotic causes of secondary 
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importance.119 7KLVµ7LQ3DQ$OOH\¶DSSURDFKWRZDUVRQJV120 was often out of step 
ZLWKOLVWHQHUV¶GHPDQGVDQGWKHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWDOUHDG\RQH\HDULQWRWKHZDU
the public was tiring of songs which explicitly dealt with it, with such songs 
constituting a high percentage of early British wartime output. Mass Observation 
noted in November 1939 that the seven leading music publishers had produced 
twenty-five war songs between them, constituting 43% of their overall ³FXUUHQW
UHOHDVHV´.121 49% of the remaining published songs ZHUH³SODLQ ORYHVRQJV´PDQ\
written or released before the war), 2% were ballads (with no war references) and 
5% were comic (with no war references). Of the war songs, approximately half were 
humorous and dealt exclusively with troops in France, and approximately half were 
serious.122 However, EHVLGHV WKH HVFDSLVW RU µQRUPDOLVLQJ¶ YDOXH RI VRQJV ZKLFK
ignored the conflict (³We like to tune in on light programs as we see enough war 
without having to hear about LWHYHU\WLPHZHWXUQRQWKHUDGLR´ZURWHDQ$PHULFDQ
soldier later in the war),123 British music publishers also quickly discovered war 
songs had a tendency to become quickly outdated due to the military situation. In 
July 1940 the manager of a local dance hall in Bolton told Mass Observation: 
The popular tunes are certainly NOT connected with the war. We have had to scrap one or two ± 
WKLQJV OLNH µ7KH 6LHJIULHG /LQH¶ DQG µ6RPHZKHUH LQ )UDQFH ZLWK \RX¶ ,W¶V QRW PXFK JRRG VLQJLQJ
about Somewhere in France QRZ«:HGRQ¶WERWKHUZLWKWXQHVOLNHµ7KHUH¶OO$OZD\V>VLF@EHDQ
(QJODQG¶:HIHHO LW LVEHWWHU WKDW WKH\>WKHFXVWRPHUV@VKRXOGEHFKHHUIXOZLWK WXQHVZLWKURPDQFH
and love [:] moon, June stuff like that. They were there before Hitler and they will be there after him. 
«1RZKHQWKH\FRPHKHUHWKH\GRQ¶WZDQWWRVLQJDORWRIYLFWRUy songs, England for ever songs, 
and that sort of thing. They just want to relax. We are doing our little bit towards the stability of the 
world in general. We are giving them relief so that they can face their duties again.124 
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The problematic relationship between the content of war songs and the military 
realities were also commented upon by the journalist Mike Levin in DownBeat in 
June 1942ZKRFRPSODLQHGRI³V\UXS\´$PHULFDQZDUVRQJVRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWWKH
ZDUZDV³VRYDVWLQH[WHQWWKDWZKHQWKHDYHUDJHJX\VLQJVJohnny Doughboy Found 
a Rose in Ireland - and then hears twenty thousand men were killed that day in 
Russia - he feels like a VLOO\DVV´125 Nonetheless, the Daily Telegraph reported on 6th 
October 1939 that tKH ³LQFRUULJLEOH IOLSSDQF\´ RI µSiegfried Line¶ had at least 
succeeded in greatly offending the German government, as evidenced by the 
indignant references to the song over GHUPDQZLUHOHVVEURDGFDVWVLQ(QJOLVK³7KLV
LVQRWDVROGLHUV>VLF@VRQJ´VWDWHG/RUG+DZ-+DZ³EHFDXVHVROGLHUVGRQRWEUDJ,W
ZDVQRWZULWWHQLQWKHVROGLHUV¶FDPSVEXWE\WKH-HZLVKVFULEHVRIWKH%%&´126 The 
5093¶VUHVSRQVHZDVWREURDGFDVWDSDURG\of the song on Haw-+DZ¶VSURJUDPPH
performed in English and mocking BriWDLQ¶VVKRUWDJHRIIUHVKILVK 
:H¶UHJRQQDFU\RXWVWLQNLQJILVKXQWLOWKHHQGRIWLPH 
Have you any fish, Britannia dear?  
:H¶UHJRQQDFU\RXWVWLQNLQJILVKXQWLOWKHHQGRIWLPH 
Because the hot-air war is here 
Whether the aroma is bad or fine 
:H¶ll advertise all without a care 
:H¶UHJRQQDFU\RXWVWLQking fish until the end of time 
If fresh fish still remains too dear.127 
Broadcast before the end of October 1939, this version pre-dates by at least a month 
WKHHDUOLHVW*HUPDQSDURG\RIWKHVRQJDFNQRZOHGJHGLQ5DLQHU/RW]¶VGLVFRJUDSK\
which was recorded on 29th November and featured anti-Semitic lyrics.128 It offers 
WKHPRVWFRQFUHWHHDUO\HYLGHQFHWRVXSSRUW.DWHU¶VFODLPZKLFKSURYLGHG the idea 
for the comparative approach of the thesis, that the Germans initially began to 
employ jazz music as propaganda in order to pay the British back in kind.129 
0RUHRYHULWLQLWLDWHGWKH5093¶VRZQFDPSDLJQRIµSURSDJDQGDMD]]¶ZKLFKZRXOG
test the veUDFLW\RI0DVV2EVHUYDWLRQ¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW MD]]³ZLWK LWV LQWHUQDWLRQDO
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message and easily-organised subtle impacts, is a potent weapon, and one which we 
SRVVHVVDQG*HUPDQ\GRHVQRW´130 
Germany 
Charlie and his Orchestra 
In January 1940, the intermittent musical propaganda content of the Lord Haw-Haw 
broadcasts took on a formalised structure with the addition of a house jazz band 
under the leadership of the saxophonist Lutz Templin. The precise nature of the 
RUFKHVWUD¶VJHQHVLVLVWKHVXEMHFWRIVRPHFRQIXVLRQDQGLWUHPDLQVXQFOHDUZKHWKHU
the orchestra evolved organically or was commissioned by the RMVP. Trumpet 
player Charly Tabor recalls WKDW ³WKH LGHDcame first and foremost from Goebbels: 
µWKH\ KDYH WR SOD\ MD]]¶´,131 a claim which is seconded by the drummer Fritz 
Brocksieper,132 although this is somewhat FRQWUDGLFWHGE\WKHPXVLFLDQV¶DVVHUWLRQV
WKDW WKH JURXS H[LVWHG SULRU WR 7HPSOLQ¶V DUULYDO. Nonetheless, according to 
Brocksieper, the German members of the band were invited to attend a screening of 
&KDSOLQ¶VThe Great Dictator DW*RHEEHOV¶SULYDWHFLQHPD.133 Indeed, together with 
their DTUO colleagues, they were familiar enough with his presence to privately 
nickname the club-IRRWHG3URSDJDQGD0LQLVWHU µKDOI-SDVW VL[¶ halb Sieben) due to 
the way in which he dragged one leg as he walked.134 
.DWHUZULWHVWKDWLWZDVIRU³UHDVRQVQRW\HWFOHDU>WKDW@WKHWKLUW\-eight-year-old Lutz 
Templin, a relatively minor saxophonist originally from Dusseldorf, who had been 
playing with his own small group in and around Berlin for years and who was not 
even a party member, was commissioned to build up a versatile jazz band that could 
KDQGOHWKHPRVWGHPDQGLQJWDVNV´135 In fact7HPSOLQ¶VDSSRLQWPHQWZDVPXFKOHVV
VXUSULVLQJWKDQ.DWHUVXJJHVWVQRW OHDVWEHFDXVH*RHEEHOV¶2FWREHUUHVKXIIOH
of the RRG136 saw him offering senior positions to experts unfettered by either Party 
ties or ideological constraints; while the singHU (YHO\Q .QQHNH¶V UHPDUN WKDW WKH
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RUFKHVWUD FRQVLVWHG RI ³QRW H[DFWO\ WKH VRUW RI SHRSOH WKH 1D]LV XVXDOO\ ZDQWHG WR
SOD\ FDUGV ZLWK´137 PD\ EH VWULFWO\ DFFXUDWH LQ DQ LGHRORJLFDO VHQVH 7HPSOLQ¶V
appointment can be taken as an indication that by early 1940 the RRG (with or 
ZLWKRXW*RHEEHOV¶ LQWHUYHQWLRQZDVDOUHDG\SODFLQJDSUHPLXPRQH[SHULHQFHDQG
capability rather than Party loyalty. Moreover, the suggestion that Templin was 
commissioned to build up an orchestra is highly debatable, and Brocksieper recalls 
that the musicians elected the ³LQFUHGLEO\VZHHW´ Templin themselves.138 Indeed, the 
two conflicting stories related by former band members involve both Templin 
assuming the leadership of pre-existing groups,139 originally led by either Rudy 
Arendt or Arnd Robert, although it is possible given the similarity of the accounts, 
each of which involves Templin taking over from an untalented nephew of a well-
placed official, and the similarity of the names that the same bandleader is implied. 
They are nonetheless consistent with one another insofar as Templin was chosen by 
the musicians, and in each account the bandleader he replaced (Arendt or Robert) 
was described as the untalented nephew of a well-placed official. 
The accounts of the size of the group inherited by Templin vary,140 but it expanded 
rapidly to include at least twenty musicians at any one time.141 German musicians in 
the band initially received a UK-Stellung µUHVHUYHG RFFXSDWLRQ¶ status) declaring 
their work indispensable to the war effort, but the majority were eventually drafted 
and replaced by foreigners,142 predominantly Dutch, Belgians and Italians, who were 
working of their own free will and handsomely paid.143 Much like the nomination of 
Templin as bandleader, the musicians belonged to a tightly-knit clique on both social 
and professional levels, and would recommend one another for jobs such as the 
Templin group, the DTUO and the radio dance orchestra of Willi Stech. The 
PXVLFLDQVZRUNHG³FHDVHOHVVO\´144 and Brocksieper describes a schedule consisting 
of making four programmes daily with Templin before working with Stech in the 
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HYHQLQJ DQG RQ 6XQGD\V WKH ³ZKROH 7HPSOLQ FOLTXH´ ZRXOG UHFRUG ZLWK WKH
orchestra of Willy Berking or synchronise music for UFA films with Theo 
Mackeben.145 Moreover, just as London jazz musicians would follow up their regular 
employment in respectable hotels or restaurants with late-night jam sessions in the 
disreputable µbottle parties¶, so too the musicians of Templin and the DTUO would 
move from their official paid employment to work in the bohemian environs of 
afterhours bars such as the Groschenkeller RQ %HUOLQ¶V .DQWVWUDH RU WKH Insel in 
Schöneberg, where Brocksieper had first discovered the talented Primo Angeli for 
the RRG.146 
A comparison of the wartime jazz nightlife in the English and German capitals offers 
interesting parallels in spite of the very different political and cultural realities. As in 
/RQGRQ¶V 6RKR WKH QRFWXUQDO ODQGVFDSH RI %HUOLQ¶V RZQ :HVW (QG ZDV VFDWWHUHG
with speakeasy-style establishments which provided a relaxed and permissive 
musical and social environment that fostered freedom of expression. The 
Groschenkeller used a porter and a bell system to alert the musicians to the arrival of 
RMK agents searching for evidence of incriminating musical material, for example 
numbers by Jewish or African-American composers, which could result in arrest by 
the Gestapo,147 DQG WKHYLROLQLVW+HOPXW=DFKDULDV UHPHPEHUV WKDW³LWZDV VXFKDQ
adventure, it seemed to us like being an actor in a FULPHWKULOOHU´148 However, unlike 
the London bottle parties and jam sessions, which would reach the BBC airwaves on 
Radio Rhythm Club, the Berlin jazz demi-monde, although also heavily frequented 
by Party members in civilian attire,149 remained clandestine by necessity. It must 
remain a matter of conjecture whether or not WKLV µKRW¶ PXVLF, played by first-rate 
jazz musicians, might have been more effectively utilised for recordings and 
broadcasts by the RMVP. 
Nonetheless, as a group strictly catering to foreign audiences in neutral or enemy 
territory, Charlie and his Orchestra recorded the latest Anglo-American numbers and 
³ZDV VXSSRVHG WR SOD\ YHU\ PRGHUQ $PHULFDQ-VW\OH´ PXVLF150 Conversely, the 
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musicians were thrilled that their broadcasts would be heard abroad, and Charly 
7DERUDVVHUWVWKDW³LWZDVWKHJUHDWHVWWKLQJIRUXV>NQRZLQJ@WKDWZHZRXOGEHKHDUG
LQWKH86$´151 Various accounts of the ways in which the music was collected exist; 
according to Norman Baillie-Stewart, Schwedler travelled to neutral and occupied 
FRXQWULHV WR JDWKHU ³WKH ODWHVW (QJOLVK >VLF@ GDQFH PXVLF´152 while both the 
Czechoslovak accordionist/arranger Karel BČhounek and bass player Otto Tittmann 
DVVHUW WKDW 7HPSOLQ UHFRUGHG $PHULFDQ UDGLR SURJUDPPHV ³VWUDLJKW RII WKH DLU´153 
onto flexible Decelith acetate, and individual pieces were selected by the arrangers 
themselves. BČhounek¶VGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWRIWKHFRPSOH[WUDQVFULSWLRQSURFHVVOHQGV
his version of events credibility, with the arranger recalling WKDW ³OLVWHQLQJ WR WKH
[DFHWDWH@VKHHWVZDVQ¶WDVHDV\DVLWORRNHGDWILUVW7KH\ZHUe recorded off short- or 
medium wave. Many parts were barely audible due to atmospheric disturbances or 
IDGLQJ %XW D ELW RI LPDJLQDWLRQ KHOSHG ZLWK WKH WDVN«´154 Friedrich Meyer, who 
arranged for the orchestra with Franz Mück before taking over at Soldatensender 
Belgrad in 1942, notes that the orchestra was exempt from the ideological guidelines 
which constrained domestic broadcasts and live performances, and thus there was 
³QRTXHVWLRQRI-HZLVKLQIOXHQFH´.155 
A previously unpublished memorandum in the BBC Written Archives sheds new 
light on the extent to which the RMVP utilised this process. It cites an account 
provided by an acquaintance of the Consul General in Zurich, and passed on to the 
British authorities, which offers a detailed example of how jazz material could be 
collected by the RMVP. Contrary to an assertion by Templin bass player Otto 
TitWPDQQ WKDW ³ZH ZHUH WKH RQO\ EDQG LQ WKH ZKROH RI WKH >*HUPDQ@ UDGLR GRLQJ
WKLV´156 the memorandum, dated 10th July 1942, indicates that the practice was more 
widespread: 
>7KH &RQVXO *HQHUDO¶V DFTXDLQWDQFH@ RIIHUHG OXQFK RQ WKH 7UHOOHERUJ - Sassnitz ferry to two half-
starved and penniless Germans returning from Norway after having apparently blown their last penny 
on a farewell beano in Oslo. Grateful for the meal, they related that they were musicians and members 
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of the Foreign Detachment of the German Propaganda Service. Their duties comprised listening in to 
British broadcasts and copying down our latest jazz and other tunes on records, from which the music 
was then written out for German bands who were trained and rehearsed to reproduce this music as 
faithfully as possible. German stations then sent out this music, interspersed with English news, also 
copied from the reports of our agencies or broadcasts, but this news was doctored by being interlarded 
with a couple of lines here and there of genuine German poisonous stuff, in the hope that the 
differences between the one and the other would escape the notice of the listener. These musicians 
KDYHEHHQSOD\LQJWRWKH*HUPDQWURRSVLQ1RUZD\RQ³(QVD´157 [sic.] lines.158 
Given the comparatively excellent pay received by members of Charlie and his 
Orchestra,159 and the different propaganda methodology described here, it is unlikely 
that these penniless arrangers were working for Templin. Indeed, their plight 
suggests that musicians of lesser status than the likes of Templin, BČhounek and 
0H\HUZHUHDOVRLQWKHHPSOR\RIWKH5093DQGJUDQWHGµOLVWHQLQJ-LQSHUPLWV¶, and 
thus the practice of recording and recreating Anglo-American compositions may 
have been more widely spread than has previously been assumed. Moreover, the use 
of jazz music to attract listeners to news broadcasts laced with ³poisonous´160 
distortions waV DQ LGHQWLFDO SURFHVV WR WKDW XVHG E\ 6HIWRQ 'HOPHU¶V counterfeit 
Soldatensender 7KH IDFW WKDW WKH EURDGFDVWV LQ TXHVWLRQ ZHUH FOHDUO\ µEODFN¶ RU
µJUH\¶FDQEHVXUPLVHGGXHWRWKHPXVLFLDQV¶GHVFULSWLRQRIWKHGRFWRULQJRI%ULWLVK
news stories with the express purpose of misinformation. Because they were targeted 
DW%ULWDLQ WKHLUPRVW OLNHO\RXWOHWZRXOGKDYHEHHQ WKH5093¶V µfreedom station¶ 
1%%6 ZKLFK DV QRWHG LQ &KDSWHU 7ZR SXUYH\HG ³*HUPDQ SURSDJDQGD RI D
PLVFKLHYRXV NLQG´161 and involved such enterWDLQPHQW IHDWXUHV DV WKH µ2II-Duty 
3URJUDPPH¶FRPELQLQJPRGHUQPXVLFDQGKHDY\-handed political humour.162 
We can ascertain, therefore, that the process of copying and reproducing jazz 
broadcasts was not restricted to the Templin band and extended to the RMV3¶V
µEODFN¶YHQWXUHV&KDUOLHDQGKLV2UFKHVWUDRQWKHRWKHUKDQGZDVDµZKLWH¶SURMHFW
which was designed to combine musical carbon-copies of Anglo-American hits with 
satirical political content. While, as noted above, Lord Haw-+DZ¶VEURDGFDVWVKDG
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included musical parodies since October 1939, these were soon established as a 
UHJXODU µ3ROLWLFDO&DEDUHW¶ IHDWXUHRQ WKHSURJUDPPHSUHVHQWHGE\DQHPSOR\HH LQ
WKH )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWU\¶V EURDGFDVW GHSDUWPHQW µ.XOWXU-5¶ QDPHG .DUO 6FKZHGOHU
DND µ&KDUOLH¶163 The cabaret consisted of English comedy sketches intermingled 
with live jazz band broadcasts, and Brocksieper asserts that as political programming 
to Britain it fell under the remit of the shortZDYH VWDWLRQ¶V Oberspielleiter 
(production manager) Werner BHUJROG³DJUHDWJX\DQGDQDQWL-1D]LDVZHOO´164 Of 
WKHSURJUDPPH¶VVWUXFWXUH%URFNVLHSHUUHPHPEHUV 
[T]he whole thing began at the beginning of 1940. Eventually we were working every day apart from 
Sunday for the KWS [Kurzwellensender]. Charley [sic.] was given his lyrics. The lyrics were 
SURGXFHG E\ VSHFLDOLVWV DW WKH 3URPL >5093@ « >:H SOD\HG RQ@ OLYH EURDGFDVWV ZKLFK ZHUH
UHFRUGHGDOVRE\WKH%ULWLVK WKDW¶VZKHUHWKHUHFRUGVZKLFKZHQRZKDYHFRPHIURP,WZDVFDOOHG
³*HUPDQ\ &DOOLQJ´ )LUVW ZH SOD\HG D IHZ QXPEHUV DQG WKHQ FDPH WKH DQQRXQFHPHQW µ*HUPDQ\
&DOOLQJ¶165  
µ&KDUOLH¶WKHUHIRUHSUHFHGHG:LOOLDP-R\FH¶VRZQVHJPHQWDQGPXVWKDYHDSSHDUHG
roughly at the point that the main BBC evening news ended; as noted above in 
Chapter Two, this was a deliberate RMVP strategy to win inquisitive listeners 
ZDQWLQJWRKHDUµWKHRWKHUVLGHRIWKHVWRU\¶DQGWKH+DPEXUJ frequency was very 
close to that of the BBC Home Service, making it an easy switch. 
The general methodology of the songs was for Schwedler to deliver the lyrics of the 
original composition for a verse or two, before making a satirical announcement to 
KHUDOG WKH SURSDJDQGD WDUJHW RI WKH SLHFH LH ³+HUH LV :LQVWRQ &KXUFKLOO¶V ODWHVW
tear-MHUNHU´166 after which the original lyrics would be replaced with political 
SDURG\2FFDVLRQDOO\KRZHYHUWKHVRQJZRXOGEHSOD\HGHQWLUHO\µVWUDLJKW¶ZLWKQR
political message, which the German jazz expert Wolfgang Muth plausibly suggests 
ZDV D SV\FKRORJLFDO WULFN WR FUHDWH ³GHOLEHUDWH FRQIXVLRQ´ DPRQJVW OLVteners by 
varying the lyrical methodology.167 Inconsistency and unpredictability, indeed, were 
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his team had no qualms over the fact that this latest idea would be thoroughly out of 
character for a well-aligned [German radio] network which had been lauded abroad, 
IURP&DSH7RZQWR9DQFRXYHUIRULWVUHMHFWLRQRIWKHXQLYHUVDOµMD]]IDG¶´168 it was 
LQIDFWHQWLUHO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH3URSDJDQGD0LQLVWHU¶V0DFKLDYHOOLDQSKLORVRShy 
of foreign propaganda. Large amounts of money were set aside for expert personnel, 
first-rate instruments and production,169 DQG WKH RUFKHVWUD¶V LPSRUWDQFH FDQ EH
gauged by the fact that it was to complement the high-profile Haw-Haw broadcasts, 
which GoebEHOVFRQVLGHUHG³IDEXORXV´170 and had already been singled out for praise 
from Hitler.171 This faith in the project can be attributed to the fact that the 
Propaganda Minister, whilst grappling with the problem of the popularity of swing 
and jazz with German civilian and Forces listeners, was well aware that these 
µGHJHQHUDWH¶DUWIRUPVZHUHHTXDOO\LIQRWPRUHSRSXODUDEURDG172 and assumed that 
they would be well-received by British (and later American) audiences. 
7KHWLPLQJRIWKHRUFKHVWUD¶VIRUPDWLRQLVDOVR significant. For all of the bravado and 
confidence displayed in his diary, during the summer of 1940 Goebbels repeatedly 
returned to the question of whether Britain would hold out against German air 
raids.173 :KLOVW UHFRUGLQJ ³VXEWOH VLJQV RI LQQHU GLVLQWHJUDWLRQ´174 ³VWURQJ
GLVFRUG´175 DQG D ³VLJQLILFDQW SV\FKRORJLFDO LPSDFW´176 of air raids on the British 
populace,177 KH FRQFOXGHG WKDW ³>O@RVW VOHHS ZRQ¶W EULQJ D SHRSOH GRZQ
'HPRUDOLVDWLRQ RFFXUV RQO\ DIWHU GHVWUXFWLRQ DQG IHDU´178 Although Goebbels was 
delighted ZLWK:LOOLDP-R\FH¶VZRUN179 it was clear that Lord Haw-+DZ³H[SODLQLQJ
WKH VLWXDWLRQ WR WKH (QJOLVK´180 alone was not having the desired effect on British 
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gloom and misery HYHU\ZKHUH´181 Goebbels sought to assist this perceived 
disintegration through the medium of entertainment; the initial recordings targeted at 
Britain, whilst playing on the same anti-Churchill and anti-Semitic themes, almost 
invariably referred to the perceived (or desired) psychological impact of German air 
raids on the British populace. Mass Observation diaries kept during the Blitz offer 
evidence of the manifold ways in which the bombing raids could impact upon the 
public mind, with the Maida Vale correspondent reporting on October 14th 1940 that 
³,GUHDPWWKDW>GLDULVW¶VIULHQG@0UV%ZDVVWDQGLQJE\PHDQGVKDNLQJPHYLROHQWO\
DZDNHUHSHDWLQJWKHZRUGµEDQJ¶RYHUDQGRYHU,ZRNHXSZLWKDIHDUIXOVWDUWP\
lips actually forming the word bang, I think), then, a split second after waking, I 
KHDUG WKH DFWXDO ERPE LPSDFW´182 On 8th November, a foreign shipping 
correspondent in Glasgow reported that a joke about the likelihood of bombing raids 
WKDW QLJKW KDG ³WKURZQ KDOI RI WKH ZRPHQ LQ WKH RIILFH LQ WR >Vic.] the depths of 
GHVSDLU´GXHWR WKHLUKDWUHGRI WKHVRXQGRIWKHDLU-UDLGVLUHQ³,DPVXUHWKDW WKHVH
SHRSOH SURMHFW WKHLU RZQ IHHOLQJV RQ WR >VLF@ WKLV TXLWH LQDQLPDWH REMHFW´ VKH
concluded.183 
$QH[DPLQDWLRQRI WKH O\ULFDO FRQWHQWRI WKHVH HDUO\ µ&KDUOLH¶EURDGFDVWV UHYHDOV D
coherent dual strategy for the psychological manipulation of British listeners, in 
which Schwedler would remind them of their immediate suffering due to air raids, 
and then place the blame for the situation on Churchill, whose coalition government 
KDG UHIXVHG+LWOHU¶V µSHDFHRIIHU¶ LQ -XO\ /RUG+DZ-+DZ¶VGLDWULEHV DJDLQVW
µ6LHJIULHG/LQH¶LQ2FWREHUDQGVXEVHTXHQWPXVLFDOSDURG\RIWKHVRQJLQGLFDWH
that William Joyce, who wrote his own scripts, had played an active role in the 
5093¶V HDUO\ IRUD\V LQWR SURSDJDQGD MD]] DQG LW LV KLJKO\ OLNHO\ WKDW KH ZDV WKH
PRYLQJ VSLULW EHKLQG WKH SURMHFW¶V O\ULFV an assertion which is supported by his 
GDXJKWHU+HDWKHU3LHUFH\¶VUHFROOHFWLRQWKDW³he would sing all sorts of songs [to me 
DV D FKLOG@ « $OVR VRPH ,ULVK UHEHO VRQJV EXW KH UDWKHU SDURGLHG WKHP´184 
Nonetheless, due to lack of evidence the question of authorship will remain a matter 
of conjecture. As observed above in Chapter Two with regard to Haw-Haw, the 
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lyrics also attempted to appeal to various existing sentiments among Britons such as 
anti-6HPLWLVPDQGVRFLDOLVWUHVHQWPHQWRIµSOXWRFUDWV¶DQ)&&PRQLWRUVWDWHGODWHULQ
WKHZDUWKDW³*HUPDQUDGLRKDPPHUVDZD\DWSROLWLFDOGHVVHQVLRQ>VLF.] in England 
and uses practicaOO\HYHU\SRVVLEOHPHDQVWRGLVFUHGLW&KXUFKLOO¶VOHDGHUVKLS´185 and 
&KDUOLHDQGKLV2UFKHVWUDZDVKHDYLO\XWLOLVHG LQ WKLV UHVSHFW)RUH[DPSOH µ:KHQ
'D\ LV 'RQH¶ DXWXPQ  DWWHPSWV WR GHSUHVV WKH %ULWLVK LQWR GHIHDWLVP RQ WKH
one hand, and create active resentment against the Prime Minister on the other: 
7KLVKRSHOHVVZDULV&KXUFKLOO¶VZDU 
,W¶VQRW WRRODWHZH¶OOJHWULGRIKLP 
Day and night we have alarms 
Big fires all over town 
London life has lost its charm 
These air raids get us down.186 
Likewise, µ%ODFN-2XW%OXHV¶6W/RXLV%OXHVLQZKDW%HUJPHLHUDQG/RW]QRWHLVD
UDUHFDVHRI1D]LSURSDJDQGDSHUVRQLI\LQJDUDFLVWVWHUHRW\SHGHSLFWV³DQHJURIURP
WKH/RQGRQGRFNV´187 suffering due to the Blitz and blaming his plight on Churchill. 
Moreover, BerJPHLHU DQG /RW] SODXVLEO\ VXJJHVW WKDW WKH VRQJ¶V O\ULF ³IHHOLQJ
WRPRUURZOLNH, IHHO WRGD\´LVDUHIHUHQFHWR WKH/XIWZDIIH¶Vsixty-five consecutive 
nightly air-raids on London from 7th September 1940; again the intended effect is to 
remind civilians of tKHLUVXIIHULQJDQGWRDWWULEXWHLWWR³&KXUFKLOO¶VEORRG\ZDU´188 
&RQYHUVHO\µ7KH6KHLNKRI$UDE\¶ODWHLVVXQJIURP&KXUFKLOO¶VSHUVSHFWLYH
ZLWK WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU ODPHQWLQJ ³0\ FKDUPLQJ ZDU LV D WUDJHG\ ± ,¶P DW WKH
PHUF\RI*HUPDQ\´189 This device, in which the song is sung from the perspective 
of a major political figure, personality or even a personified nation, was used 
frequently and served the dual function of providing an intermediary on whom the 
German animosity could be focussed, thus avoiding a direct attack on the listener 
(which could have led to greater resistance to the message), whilst also attempting to 
turn the audience against the figure or nation lampooned in the song. Goebbels 
explicitly stated this policy at his daily conference on 7th July 1940, at which he 
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³HPSKDVLVHG \HW DJDLQ WKH QHFHVVLW\ RI DOZD\V RQO\ DWWDFNLQJ &KXUFKLOO DQG KLV
plutocratic clique, but never the English people as such. Churchill himself has 
burned all of his bridges, so that some sort of agreement with England is out of the 
TXHVWLRQZKLOHKHLVVWLOODWWKHKHOP´190 
The integration of music and propaganda also allowed entertainment and 
commentary to be combined in a single feature. This had already been attempted 
with the Political Cabaret, and would later be used by the Off-Duty Programme on 
NBBS and Station Debunk to the USA, but arguably music stood greater chances of 
VXFFHVVDVDSURSDJDQGDYHKLFOHWKDQ³ZHDNMRNHVZLWKDSROLWLFDOPRUDO´191 and this 
approach avoided wasting usable propaganda aiUWLPH RQ µVWUDLJKW¶ PXVLF DORQH LQ
RUGHU WR KROG DQ DXGLHQFH $PHULFD¶V OWI would later note that features such as 
messages from POWs in news programmes were very good at attracting listeners, 
but had the adverse effect of reducing the time available for the news and 
propaganda content of the programme.192 Integrating the political message into the 
PXVLFDO FRQWHQW RIIHUHG D ZD\ RXW RI WKLV SURSDJDQGLVW¶V LPSDVVH DQG DOO LQ D
musical style that was demonstrably popular with its target audience. 
Nonetheless, the sheer lack of evidence of the reception of Charlie and his Orchestra 
recordings is problematic. Although connected to Haw-+DZ¶V KLJK-profile 
programme,193 the recordings simply attracted little if any media or political attention 
in Britain and the USA at the time they were produced. 1HLWKHUWKH%%&¶VUHVLGHQW
wartime jazz expert Charles Chilton nor his wife Penny, herself a BBC Italian 
Service employee at the time, or the London-based aficionado Peter Powell were 
DZDUHRIWKHEDQG¶VH[LVWHQFHZKHQDVNHGabout it, and this itself is a clear indication 
RI WKH SURMHFW¶V ODFN RI LPSDFW DV WKH QRYHOW\ YDOXH DORQH ZRXOG KDYH PDGH LW D
talking point in broadcasting and jazz circles alike. Moreover, a great amount of 
official and media attention was devoted in BULWDLQ WR WKH GDQJHURXV µQRYHOW\¶ 
broadcasts of Lord Haw-Haw, which allegedly featured the songs, and the BBC (as 
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noted above in Chapter Two) encouraged public parodies and mockery of Haw-Haw 
as a means of neutralising their threat. No such evidence exists in the case of 
µ&KDUOLH¶ZKRVHFRORXUIXODWWHPSWVWRGHPRUDOLVHWKH%ULWLVKwith jazz music would 
surely also have been an appealing target for the media and the public alike. Nor 
does the Mass Observation archive contain a single reference to the orchestra, 
although Lord Haw-Haw is mentioned no fewer than 418 times,194 and MO diarist 
Denis Argent, himself a jazz fan, fails to make a single reference to them. The same 
LVWUXHRIWKH%ULWLVKPRQLWRUVDQGWKH$PHULFDQ)&&¶VZHHNO\UHSRUWVRQ(QJOLVK-
language propaganda from Hamburg, which otherwise offer thorough analyses of 
German psychological warfare efforts. In researching the thesis I have been unable 
to reconcile the overwhelming evidence that Charlie and his Orchestra were featured 
on Haw-+DZ¶V SURJUDPPe and the near-complete lack of any evidence of their 
reception.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that Kater and Bergmeier/Lotz have placed undue emphasis 
RQWKHVRXUFHVZKLFKSURYLGHµHYLGHQFH¶RI%ULWLVKIHHGEDFN%HUJPHLHUFLWHVDDaily 
Express article from September 1944 which praises the musical contents of the Lord 
Haw-Haw broadcasts as being (or having been)195 ³H[FHOOHQW´DQGLQWHUSUHWs this as 
evidence of the positive reception in Britain of Charlie and his Orchestra; however, it 
is highly unlikely that the article was referring to this project. On the one hand, by 
September 1944 the group had relocated to Stuttgart without vocalist Charlie 
6FKZHGOHUDQGVLQFHWKHRUFKHVWUD¶VVRQJVZHUHHVVHQWLDOO\LURQLFµFRPPHQWDU\¶RQ
current affairs (and the last known propaganda recording was made over one year 
earlier, in mid-1943), it is doubtful they would have been re-aired by the RMVP in 
September 1944. On the other hand, even had an earlier broadcast been replayed, it 
is similarly implausible that a serious British newspaper would publicly laud German 
jazz numbers laced with increasingly obsolete Nazi propagandistic bravado. 
Unreliable, too, is the account given by Kater of British POWs being played the 
UHFRUGVDQGEUHDNLQJ WKHPWRSLHFHV³DIWHUD fair examination on German-provided 
JUDPRSKRQHV´196 the only source of which is anecdotal evidence traced back to 
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:ROIJDQJ0XWKZKRRIIHUVQR LQIRUPDWLRQDV WR WKHVWRU\¶VRULJLQV197 it is highly 
unlikely that the RMVP would have wasted time and resources seeking to 
demoralise individual POWs, whose morale once captured was of negligible value or 
LQWHUHVW 1RU GRHV .DWHU SURYLGH DQ\ RWKHU HYLGHQFH RI WKH UHFRUGV¶ UHFHSWLRQ E\
Allied listeners beyond qualitative assessments of the propaganda itself.198 The only 
VRXUFH,KDYHIRXQGWKDWVHHPVWRSHUWDLQGLUHFWO\ WRDOLVWHQHU¶VRSLQLRQRI&KDUOLH
and his Orchestra is an account related by the arranger Friedrich Meyer of a 
conversation with a Jewish-$PHULFDQ6HUJHDQWLQ%UHPHQLQ6HSWHPEHU³>+@H
told me that he listened to the Europa-Sender [sic.] before the advance on Paris 
EHFDXVHRI WKHZRQGHUIXO MD]]PXVLF´ UHFDOOV0H\HU ³DQG WKHUHZDVDOZD\VVRPH
LGLRWLQWHUUXSWLQJZLWKSURSDJDQGDO\ULFV7KDWZDVWKH7HPSOLQEDQG´199 
Hans Hinkel 
Although Charlie and his Orchestra may appear an outlandish project within the 
racist and anti-modernist scheme of the Nazi ideology, it was in fact merely 
symptomatic of the broader international wartime cultural discourse in which the 
boundaries between propaganda and entertainment were blurred beyond recognition. 
It was precisely the same methodology which had been outlined in Mass 
2EVHUYDWLRQ¶V proposals for a combination of jazz and propaganda, even on more 
apparently banal issues such as encouraging the consumption of margarine. In 
Germany, utilisation of jazz music as a vehicle for propaganda was a policy that was 
FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK *RHEEHOV¶ GLVUHJDUG RI LGHRORJLFDO FRQWUDGLFWLRQV LQ PDWHULDO IRU
foreign audiences. His adjutant Hans Hinkel, on the other hand, has been depicted by 
previous historiography as a rigid and uncultured ideologist, and thus the reasons for 
KLVOHDGLQJUROHLQWKH7KLUG5HLFK¶VFXOWXUDODSSDUDWXVGXULQJWKHZDUKDYHQRWEHHQ
satisfactorily explained. However, findings made during the process of research for 
the thesis have cast new light on this important RMVP bureaucrat which necessitates 
an extensive reappraisal of prior academic analyses of his character and capabilities. 
Prior scholarship of Nazi cultural propaganda has invariably cast Hinkel as a 
reactionary figure. Bergmeier, for example, cites his ideas as a counterweight to 
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+LWOHU¶V VWDWHPHQWRQth April 1942 that propaganda broadcasts to Britain should 
³LQFOXGHDORt of musical material of a kind that appeals to the British, so as to get 
them more and more accustomed to tuning in to our stations if they cannot get what 
WKH\ZDQWRQWKHLURZQVWDWLRQV´200 Hinkel is cited as saying twelve days later at a 
broadcasting planning meeting: 
On no account should the stations in question be allowed to frame any political news bulletins 
targeting a particular country with music that is representative of that country. For example, imitating 
distinctively English and American music LV LQ KLV >+LQNHO¶V@ RSLQLRQ XQGHVLUDEOH DQG RQ WKH
contrary, he is firmly of the view that this kind of broadcast must be framed with really good German 
music.201 
While superficially this idea places Hinkel at odds with the pragmatic methodology 
of Goebbels, and appears closer to the völkisch cultural ideas of Alfred Rosenberg202 
in terms of the primacy of German musical achievements in European culture, it in 
IDFW FRQVWLWXWHG DQ DGYRFDF\ IRU XWLOLVLQJ µDXWKHQWLF¶ DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ UHVSHFWHG
German cultural products as opposed to replicating those of the target country since 
German jazz musicians could not reasonably be expected to compete with the 
genuine article; indeed, it is an identical case to that advocated by Andrew MacLaren 
MP in the House of Commons with regard to favouring British music over jazz on 
the airwaves.203 0RUHRYHU +LQNHO¶V DUJXPHQW LV XWWHUO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 0DVV
2EVHUYDWLRQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQZKLFK,KDYHUHIXWHGDERYHLQWKLVFKDSWHUWKDW*HUPDQ\
possessed no indigenous jazz capabilities. This same sentiment was echoed by the 
outstanding Austrian trumpet player Charly Tabor of Charlie and his Orchestra, who 
DGPLWWHGWKDW³DWKHDUW,WKLQN9LHQQHVHZDOW]HVZRXOGKDYHEHHQEHWWHU>WRWUDQVPLW
DEURDG@ %HFDXVH WKH\¶YH JRW EHWWHU MD]] PXVLF RYHr there than the way we were 
playing it. We played it really well. But the Americans would hardly have tuned in 
DQGVDLGµ2KWKHUH¶VD*HUPDQMD]]RUFKHVWUD¶´204 
+LQNHO¶Vcurriculum vitae offers plenty of evidence of pragmatic inclinations. Born 
in Worms in 1901, he joined the NSDAP on 10th September 1920 and was a veteran 
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of the Beer Hall Putsch of 9th November 1923.205 In 1929 he founded the Berlin 
VHFWLRQDQGODWHUOHGWKH3UXVVLDQVHFWLRQRI$OIUHG5RVHQEHUJ¶Vvölkisch politico-
cultural advocacy group, the Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur µ&RPEDW/HDJXH IRU
*HUPDQ &XOWXUH¶ DQG HGLWHG WKHLU QHZVSDSHU Deutsche Kulturwacht µ*HUPDQ
Culture :DWFK¶IURP206 DWWKHVDPHWLPHPDQDJLQJ*RHEEHOV¶RZQSDSHUDer 
Angriff207 µ$WWDFN¶DQGFR-founding the Kampfverlag µ&RPEDW3XEOLVKLQJ+RXVH¶
ZLWK 2WWR DQG *UHJRU 6WUDVVHU RI WKH 16'$3¶V VR-FDOOHG µOHIW ZLQJ¶208 Michael 
Balfour observes that, in working with three rival factions within the Party, Hinkel 
GLVSOD\HG ³VXIILFLHQW LGHRORJLFDO IOH[LELOLW\ QRW WR PHQWLRQ HQHUJ\´209 and this 
approach allowed him to align himself increasingly with Goebbels, whose Party 
career was in the ascendancy, as opposed to the increasingly obsolete Rosenberg and 
the black-listed Strassers. On 6th May 1935, Goebbels promoted the violently anti-
Semitic210 SS-Sturmbannführer Hinkel to Secretary-General of the Reich Chamber 
of Culture (RKK). On 1st March 1942 the Propaganda Minister bestowed upon him 
WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH 55*¶V HQWLUH HQWHUWDLQPHQW DQG DUtistic programme,211 to 
which was added the role of Reich Film Intendant in 1944.212 
:KLOH+LQNHO¶VVXFFHVVIXOFDUHHULQWKHSUH-war NSDAP apparatus can be attributed 
to his bureaucratic ability, work ethic and ideological zeal, his increasing influence 
over cultural affairs over the course of the war has proved less easy to explain. 
Having left university without a degree and, unlike Goebbels and Hitler, 
demonstrating no particular interest in culture or the arts,213 it is certainly strange that 
a reactionary such as Hinkel should be delegated so much power over Nazi wartime 
cultural policy by Goebbels. Alan E. Steinweis notes: 
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Hinkel established himself as a leading NSDAP spokesman on artistic and cultural matters. Yet he 
possessed no artistic training or speciDOH[SHULHQFHLQFXOWXUDODIIDLUV:KHWKHUKHZDVD³SKLOLVWLQH´
as [Willi Boelcke] has alleged, is a matter of interpretation, but there was certainly little in his 
experience to qualify him for the decisive role he would be called upon to play in German artistic and 
cultural life after 30th January 1933.214 
Moreover, while he proved himself to have been an efficient administrator in his 
multiple peacetime tasks,215 IRU H[DPSOH RYHUVHHLQJ ³WKH FXOWXUDO DQG LQWHOOHFWXDO
JKHWWRL]DWLRQ´216 of Jewish life in the Third Reich, wartime conditions called for the 
very different talents of pragmatism and a capacity for compromise. Hinkel wrote to 
Goebbels as early as June 1933 that, alongside its task of entertaining and informing 
WKH OLVWHQHU UDGLR VKRXOG VHUYH ³above all a state-building and cultural-political 
IXQFWLRQ´217 and his many essays and speeches delivered during the course of the 
war testify that he never abandoned this position. Instead, he argued that cultural 
support (kulturelle Betreuung) for the military wDV³LQWKHWUXHVWVHQVHWKHUHDOLVDWLRQ
RIRXU*HUPDQVRFLDOLVP«7KHXQLRQRIWKHVZRUGDQGWKHO\UH- as embodied in 
the cultural support for our soldiers ± is the most glorious symbol of the German 
victory over the antagonistic, outdated, plutocratic ZRUOG´218 
Goebbels, on the other hand, had always emphasised that radio should provide 
entertainment rather than serve a culturally didactic role.219 As has been shown 
above in this chapter, he was willing to place extensive funds and resources at the 
GLVSRVDORIDMD]]EDQGWREHDPµGHJHQHUDWH¶PXVLFWRHQHP\DQGQHXWUDOFRXQWULHV
DQGKHZDVVLPLODUO\DZDUHWKDWPRVWOLVWHQHUVGLGQRWZDQW³1DWLRQDOSocialism set 
WRPXVLF´220 striving to find a middle ground that was acceptable to Nazi ideologists 
DQG \HW SRSXODU ZLWK WKH *HUPDQ SXEOLF 7KH HYLGHQFH FHUWDLQO\ VXSSRUWV .DWHU¶V
DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³GXULQJ WKH ZDU \HDUV >*RHEEHOV@ KDG WR PDNH DOORZDQFHV LQ WKe 
LQWHUHVWRIKLJKSROLF\SHUKDSVWRWKHGHWULPHQWRIKLVSULYDWHSUHIHUHQFHV´221 but in 
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fact this wartime policy was, in terms of broadcasting philosophy, essentially an 
H[WHQVLRQRIWKH3URSDJDQGD0LQLVWHU¶VSUDJPDWLFSUH-war approach. 
Unpublished excerpWV IURP 0LFKDHO + .DWHU¶V LQWHUYLHZV ZLWK )ULW] %URFNVLHSHU
DQG '782 EDQGOHDGHU *HRUJ +DHQW]VFKHO SURYLGH HYLGHQFH RI +LQNHO¶V SULYDWH
ideas, as well as his dealings with jazz musicians, which necessitates a considerable 
re-evaluation of his character and opinions.222 Brocksieper recalls that Hinkel 
accompanied many of the jazz musicians from Charlie and his Orchestra on the 
Wehrmacht tours in France in their guise as Tobis223 Starkasten µ7RELV %R[ RI
6WDUV¶ZKLFKWKH\ZHUHREOLJHGWRXQGertake approximately three weeks per year as 
an extension of their shortwave work.224 He remembers Hinkel as a good-looking, 
LQWHOOLJHQW DQG YHU\ SOHDVDQW PDQ DOEHLW ³D WHUULEOH 1D]L´225 while Haentzschel 
UHFDOOV WKDWKHZDV³DELJVWDWHO\PDQ>@ «+HDOVRKDGDSURQRXQFHGly diverse 
education [einer ausgesprochen nicht einseitigen Bildung]. He was multi-IDFHWHG´226 
0RUHRYHU LQ +DHQW]VFKHO¶V HVWLPDWLRQ ³)RU XV >MD]] PXVLFLDQV@ +LQNHO¶V DUULYDO
ZDVDYHU\SRVLWLYHWKLQJ´227 
Furthermore, Brocksieper alleges that during a conversation on a bus journey to the 
Front with a different formation, which included former Scala228 director Otto 
Stenzel and the singer Marika Rökk, Hinkel took him into his confidence on a 
number of issues. Firstly, he told Brocksieper that he believed Goebbels should 
establish a record label specifically for American jazz recordings, including those of 
Louis Armstrong. He also admitted that, in the classical music realm, great soloists 
were now rare in Germany; he claimed to have invited the famous Polish-Jewish 
pianist Arthur Rubenstein to visit the Third Reich, and even extended an offer to 
³$U\DQLVH´KLPERWKRIZKLFK5XEHQVWHLQGHFOLQHG+HKDGDOVRLQYLWHGWKH\RXQJ
Jewish-American violinist Yehudi Menuhin to visit Germany, but Menuhin had 
similarly UHIXVHG &RQWUDU\ WR :LOOL %RHOFNH¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW +LQNHO ZDV D
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philistine,229 %URFNVLHSHUIRXQGKLPWREH³LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\YHUVHGLQWKHDUWV´230 and 
felt that it was apparent how much he wanted to attract great soloists to Nazi 
Germany.231 The alleged invitDWLRQRI-HZLVKPXVLFLDQVLVLURQLFLQYLHZRI+LQNHO¶V
key role in the removal of Jews from German life throughout the 1930s,232 but would 
be consistent with 6WHLQZHLV¶ DVVHUWLRQ WKDW +LQNHO ZDV FDSDEOH RI ³H[KLELW>LQJ@ a 
surprising degree of respect towards individual members of the German-Jewish 
FRPPXQLW\´233 
It is possible that the close contact with the Forces which Hinkel experienced as 
manager of such variety tours led him to revise previously held positions and 
consider a more pragmatic approach. Brocksieper recalls a concert in the winter of 
1940-41, moderated by the celebrity sports commentator Rolf Wernicke, in which 
the members of Tobis Starkasten played in thick winter coats in a basic wooden shed 
in front of over one hundred soldiers.234 After approximately one hour of Horst 
Winter performing strictly German numbers, the crowd became unruly and began 
FDOOLQJRXWIRUWKHPWR³SOD\DUHDOMD]]WXQH´6SLHOPDOµQHQDQVWändigen Jazz), and 
requesting forbidden numbers by African-American and Jewish composers such as 
µTiger Rag¶, µSt. Louis Blues¶ and µBei Mir Bist Du Schön¶. Positioned at the side of 
the stage, Hinkel began waving away the requests, which were increasing in volume. 
Finally he took to the stage and used the primitive PA system to inform the crowd 
WKDW WKHEDQGZDVQRW DOORZHG WRSOD\ ³(QJOLVKRU -HZLVK´QXPEHUV DQG WKDW WKH\
should leave the musicians in peace. Oranges and apples began flying at the stage, at 
which point Hinkel told the musicians to play what the crowd wanted and promptly 
fled the scene.235 
+LQNHO¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDW³UHDOO\JRRG*HUPDQPXVLF´236 would lead to superior results 
with foreign audiences is as questionable as KLVYDJXHSUHVFULSWLRQRID³XQLRQRIWKH
VZRUGDQGWKHO\UH´IRUWKH:HKUPDFKW237 ,I%URFNVLHSHU¶Vassertions are correct, it 
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is entirely possible that Hinkel would have preferred to broadcast µstraight¶ 
$PHULFDQMD]]PXVLFUDWKHUWKDQLQIHULRUFRSLHV+RZHYHUZKLOH%URFNVLHSHU¶VDQG
+DHQW]VFKHO¶V UHFROOHFWLRQV indicate that, in private, Hinkel adopted a more 
pragmatic stance towards musical policy than his public statements suggest, there is 
no record of him ever voicing or publishing such ideas. With his personal experience 
of the jazz predilections of the German Forces,238 Hinkel would certainly have 
understood that their British counterparts had similar inclinations. Indeed, while 
:DJQHU ZDV SRSXODU ZLWK ³DERXW RQH LQ VHYHQ´239 British respondents to a BBC 
/LVWHQHU5HVHDUFKVXUYH\LQLWIRXQGWKDW³GDQFHPXVLFZDVWKHSUHIHUHQFHRI
tKHPDMRULW\IRUWKHEHJLQQLQJDQGWKHHQGRIWKHGD\´.240 3DWULF6WHYHQVRQ¶V August 
1941 article for Musical Times, whilst lamenting the fact that many British soldiers 
would simply turn off the wireless if offered anything other than jazz and light 
entertainment, provided a graphic illustration of listening culture in the barracks: 
What was profoundly disturbing was the repulsion evoked by the mention of such names as Mozart, 
Borodin or Walton. Before a bar of the music could be heard, some ignoramus would leap to his feet 
DQGWZLGGOHWKHFRQWUROWLOODWUDQVPLVVLRQRIµVZLQJ¶RUµYDULHW\¶FRXOGEHREWDLQHG,IQRWKLQJRIWKLV
type was available the set would be turned off with an oath about the rottenness of the programmes. 
«2QH IXUWKHU VFUDSRI conversation may be recorded. The [BBC] Forces [Programme] fare had 
EHHQRQFRQWLQXRXVO\DOO WKHHYHQLQJDQGZKHQHYHU\RQHZDV LQEHG WKHDQQRXQFHUVWDWHG WKDW µZH
now came to a programme of chamber music - a Schubert work played by the Catt..¶EXWZHKHard no 
PRUH EHFDXVH D PRDQ ZHQW XS µ&KDPEHU 0XVLF" %OLPH\ QR $¶P QRW ¶DYLQ¶ DQ\ RI WKDW E±±± 
VWXII¶ DQG DQ HPLVVDU\ ZDV KDVWLO\ VHQW WR UHWXQH WKH UHFHLYHU 6R LQVWHDG RI 6FKXEHUW , KDG PRUH
µVZLQJ¶241 
6WHYHQVRQDOVRTXRWHV ³D OHWWHU IURPD IULHQG « confined to a [hospital] ward in 
(LUH´242 who reported that ³,GRQ
WNQRZZKRZDVLQFKDUJHRIWKH>UDGLR@VHWEXWLW
was a firm-minded person who dealt in a summary fashion with anything that 
WKUHDWHQHG WR EHDU D GLP UHVHPEODQFH WR µFODVVLFDO¶ PXVLF´243 These accounts are 
VXSSRUWHGE\WKH%%&¶VRZQUHVHDUFKRIWKH)RUFHV¶PXVLFDOSUHIHUHQFHVGLVFXVVHG
in Chapter Two, and it is therefore highly unlikely, in this sort of group listening 
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environment ruled by majority tastes, that the Nazi propaganda offensive would have 
benefited from reliance on German classical music.  
%URFNVLHSHU ³FDQ¶W UHPHPEHU´244 if Hinkel was ever among the many Nazis who 
FDPH ZLWK WKHLU JLUOIULHQGV RU LQ JURXSV WR WKH OLYHO\ MD]] EDUV DURXQG %HUOLQ¶V
Kantstraße early in the war.245 Nonetheless, the sympathetic impression the SS-
Sturmbannführer DQG µ2OG )LJKWHU¶ PDGH XSRQ WKH WZR SURPLQHQW *HUPDQ MD]]
musicians offers sufficient clues as to why he was chosen to enact the progressive 
reforms between October 1941 and February 1942, regardless of the fact that he was 
neither an expert in popular muVLF QRU ³XQREVWUXFWHG E\ WKH EOLQNHUV RI 1D]L
LGHRORJ\´246 7KH GLVSDULW\ EHWZHHQ WKH YLHZV H[SUHVVHG LQ +LQNHO¶V UHDFWLRQDU\
writings and speeches and the benevolent pragmatist remembered by Brocksieper 
and Haentzschel reveals a contradictory personality, more multi-faceted and complex 
than is conventionally supposed, and yet one that is thoroughly consistent with the 
³LGHRORJLFDOIOH[LELOLW\´247 displayed by this hard-line Nazi throughout his long and 
varied career. 
 New German Entertainment Music: Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag 
The difficulty of finding the appropriate music with which to woo enemy listeners 
was matched by the problems the RMVP and the RRG had in providing suitably 
upbeat but ideologically acceptable programming for German Forces, which were 
exacerbated by the fact that the British were well aware of the German predilection 
for jazz. A BBC report on the German audiences for British programming dated 25th 
August 1942 quotes an American journalist who had recently departed Berlin as 
VD\LQJ WKDW ³\RXng people, even fanatical Nazis, would go to considerable lengths 
«WROLVWHQWRRXUOLJKWPXVLFDOSURJUDPPHVSDUWLFXODUO\MD]]´248 and the wartime 
aficionado Hans BlWKQHU¶V ODWHU DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³DQ\ERG\ ZKR OLNHG MD]] FRXOGQ¶W
KDYHEHHQD1D]L´249 simply does not stand up to the evidence. The most prominent 
example of this was the leading German pianist and bandleader Willi Stech, who 
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combined a successful swing career with an ideological commitment to the NSDAP, 
of which he was also a member, and allegedly remained a convinced Nazi even after 
1945.250 Moreover, Primo Angeli of Charlie and his Orchestra describes officers and 
SS functionaries at a party in a hotel at the Nazi resort of Berchtesgaden dancing 
enthusiastically to his jazz band and states WKDW ³WKH\ RQO\ ZDQWHG KRW PXVLF´251 
while trumpeter Charly Tabor remembers that soldiers at the barracks in Smolensk 
³DOZD\VZDQWHG WR OLVWHQ WR MD]] >schräge Musik], [as well as] a few Heimat songs 
«7KHRIILFHUVDLGµMD]]¶VRZHSOD\HGLW7KHSLORWV were the best, they were even 
PRUHPRGHUQ7KH\NQHZDOORIWKHQXPEHUV´252 
Goebbels, of course, was well aware of the problem. In June 1941, the same month 
DV *HUPDQ\¶V LQYDVLRQ RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ KH SXEOLVKHG DQ HVVD\ LQ Das Reich 
HQWLWOHG µ7KH 5HOD[DWLRQ RI 5DGLR 6FKHGXOLQJ GXULQJ :DUWLPH¶253 in which he 
argued, as paraphrased in the protocol of the RMVP evening press conference on 
15th -XQH WKDW ³>V@RPH OLVWHQHUV RQO\ ZDQW WR OLVWHQ WR RSHUDV VRPH ZDQW
symphonies, and some want marches or dance music etc. The front ± and that is of 
course the most important thing ± needs relaxation, it wants to listen to light, lively 
PXVLF´254 ,QGHHGDVXUYH\RIDFWLYH*HUPDQ)RUFHV¶PXVLFDOSUHIHUHQFHVIRU
the Soldatensender confirmed this.255 In the Crimea 70% requested modern dance 
and entertainment music, while in the Ukraine those with a rank of battalion 
commander and lower said they preferred modern rhythmic music. The Luftwaffe 
emphasised that programmes on Soldatensender Central ³FRXOGQRWEHKRWHQRXJK´
wKLOHµLQIUHTXHQWOLVWHQHUV¶DVNHGDOPRVWZLWKRXWH[FHSWLRQIRUMD]]PXVLF³WROLYHQ
WKHPVHOYHVXS´,Q/DSODQGDOPRVWDOOUHVSRQGHQWVGHPDQGHGSOHQW\RIOLJKWPXVLF
DGGLQJ³7KHFUD]LHU WKHEHWWHU´256 The situation was exacerbated as the Nazi war 
effort deteriorated, leading to a progressive increase in the demand for robust jazz 
music during the course of the war. A memo from Hans Hinkel to Goebbels in 
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February 1944 admitted that Soldatensender Belgrad was popular because it played 
³WKH KRWWHVW GDQFH PXVLF´257 and there was a steady rise in complaints about 
SURJUDPPHVWKDWZHUHFRQVLGHUHG³VFKPDOW]\´DQG³XQPDQO\´258 
As will be discussed in Chapter Five, asserting control over the Soldatensender was 
hugely problematic for the RMVP, and the degree of de facto independence they 
enjoyed allowed them to ignore domestic guidelines regarding the playing of jazz. 
Meanwhile, the centrally-controlled Reichsender were to cater to the growing jazz 
demand within an ideologically acceptable framework. New programme guidelines 
issued on 26th September 1941 stated that between 10.15 p.m. and midnight on 
Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday German radio was to broadcast 50% 
entertainment music and 50% modern dance music. On Monday, Tuesday, Thursday 
and Friday the mix was to be 60% entertainment music and 40% modern dance 
music.259 The guidelines emphasiseG WKDW WKH HYHQLQJ SURJUDPPH VKRXOG EH ³as 
lively, as varied and as colourful as possible. In individual cases I ask for the 
emphasis to be on swinging pieces, and to place a tune with a particularly exciting 
effect at the beginning and end of each programme.´260 However, the attention paid 
E\ WKH 5903 DQG WKH 55* WR )RUFHV¶ WDVWHV ZDV QRW D QHZ SKHQRPHQRQ 7KH
hugely successful command performance Wunschkonzert für die Wehrmacht, which 
was broadcast from Haus des Rundfunks in Berlin between 1st October 1939 and 25th 
May 1941, was structured around live performances of musical requests sent in from 
soldiers,261 and took place in front of an invited audience of soldiers and medics. 
Indeed, Hans-Jörg Koch notes that the command performance format ZDV³DOPRVWDV
ROG DV >*HUPDQ@ EURDGFDVWLQJ LWVHOI´262 and this popular programme consciously 
VHUYHGDVDERQGEHWZHHQWKH)RUFHVDQGWKH+RPH)URQW³)RUWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKH
SURJUDPPH´REVHUYHV.RFK³WKHDXGLHQFHLQ the auditorium, the listeners at home 
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and the faraway soldiers became a community congregated in an imaginary 
SODFH´263 
However, Goebbels also believed that the variety format could serve not just as a 
jukebox entertainment for the strengthening of the national community, but also 
fulfil a progressive function as an arena in which the type of music which the Forces 
desired could be honed and developed. To this end, in January 1941 he initiated a 
programme called Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag µ+DSS\+RXU LQ WKH $IWHUQRRQ¶
which was to serve the express purpose of developing New German Entertainment 
Music. This nebulous concept essentially implied a form of jazz music which was 
VXIILFLHQWO\SXUJHGRIµQRQ-$U\DQ¶HOHPHQWVWREHDFFHSWDEOHWRWKHLGHRORJLVWVDQG 
yet exciting and uplifting enough to keep the Forces tuned to German wavelengths. It 
was a state initiative which utterly lacked a theoretical or popular base, as was made 
clear by an attempt to define it in an essay for the journal Unterhaltungsmusik by the 
head of the Lower Saxony RMK Wolfgang Helmuth Koch in 1942: 
If one considers the music performed in bars, coffee houses and other such leisure venues from the 
SHUVSHFWLYHRIWKH1DWLRQDO6RFLDOLVWZRUOGYLHZ>«@RQHLVIRUFHGWRUHDOLVHWKDWPRVWRIZKat is on 
offer in these places has little or absolutely nothing to do with culture; it instead gives the impression 
WKDW-HZLVKDQG%ROVKHYLVWLFDUWLVWLFIRUPVDUHVWLOOWU\LQJWRDFKLHYHYDOLGLW\>«@%XWWKHUHLVDQRWKHU
form of art which wants nothing more than to exist, to rejoice in its pure form, its happy sound, its 
carelessness and rest in itself as a static art that follows only the laws of beauty and therefore serves 
UHOD[DWLRQ>«@LW LV WKHDUW WKDWDOPRVWFRPHVIURPLWVHOI WRWKHOLVWHQHUSOD\Iully and entertainingly 
taking him from everyday life to a place where freedom and happiness make their home.264 
The vagueness of this esoteric terminology, utilised by a senior RMK official, 
highlights the emptiness of the concept, and throughout the war attempts to nurture a 
New German Entertainment Music were largely based on imposing restrictions upon 
existing dance bands. Frohe Stunde was to be no exception to this rule. The first 
broadcast was planned for 10th April 1941, but did not in fact take place until 9th 
July, perhaps due to disagreement on the precise purpose of the programme. There 
was some initial confusion as to whom it should be aimed at, and the minutes of a 
radio department listening session five days after the first broadcast noted that the 
ILUVWPHHWLQJRQWKHVXEMHFW³JDYHWKH impression that Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag 
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is above all for the entertainment of the German housewiIH « /DWHU PHHWLQJV
particularly in June, decided that Frohe Stunde should primarily serve the 
SURSDJDWLRQRIQHZ*HUPDQHQWHUWDLQPHQWPXVLF´265 On 28th June it was agreed that 
the propagandistic purpose of the programme was the development of good German 
HQWHUWDLQPHQWPXVLFZLWKWKH³SURSDJDQGLVWLFVHFRQGDU\DLP´EHLQJWRFDWHUWR³WKH
*HUPDQ KRXVHZLIH´266 Since it can be assumed that tamer fare would have been 
generally targeted at the latter, it is representative of the broader problems of the 
RMVP anG 55* ZLWK FUHDWLQJ D µ1HZ *HUPDQ (QWHUWDLQPHQW 0XVLF¶ WKDW WKH\
failed to see how mismatched these two goals were if they were attempting to 
replace jazz with something exciting enough to be acceptable to the soldiers at the 
Front. There is also an evident lapse in bureaucratic communications, since it had 
already been expressed on 21st February that cultivating entertainment music in 
DFFRUGDQFHZLWK*RHEEHOV¶ZLVKHVZDVWKHSURJUDPPH¶VUDLVRQG¶rWUH267 
A variety programme similar to Frohe Stunde was timed to coincide with the 
publication in Das Reich RI*RHEEHOV¶HVVD\µ5DGLRLQ:DUWLPH¶DQGLWVVXEVHTXHQW
broadcast on all German radio stations at 8 p.m. that evening, as a practical 
LOOXVWUDWLRQRI*RHEEHOV¶DUJXPHQW$UHDGLQJRIWKHHVVD\ZDVWREHIROORZHGE\³D
particularly rich and colourful entertainment programme which will have something 
for everyone, from the most beautiful melodies of our great masters to the upbeat 
offerings of film and variety artists and the exciting rhythms of our best dance 
RUFKHVWUDV´268 indeed, the emphasis on the rhythmic element of the dance music as 
opposed to the melodic qualities is significant, and the programme included 
Barnabás von Géczy and the accordion virtuoso Albert Vossen, both of whom were 
well-versed in the swing idiom and would later be involved with the DTUO. This 
was evidently in the spirit of wartime cultural compromises advocated by Goebbels 
LQKLVHVVD\JLYHQWKDWWKH1D]LV¶UHMHFWLRQRIMD]]IURPDPXVLFDOVWDQGSRLQWFHQWUHG
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in no small part on the use of the syncope269 and the emphasis on rhythm over 
melody.270 
The first edition of Frohe Stunde took place on 9th July 1941 to much fanfare. 
,QWHQVLYH³SURSDJDQGD´IRUWKHHYHQWZDV³RIGHFLVLYHLPSRUWDQFH´271 and alongside 
the posters and distribution of the schedule in factories and businesses, there were 
also announcements made in the national press, indicating the degree of priority that 
the RMVP attached to this venture. The event took place in six bars and cafés in 
%HUOLQ DQG IHDWXUHG³SRSXODUPLlitary- and entertainment bands, as well as soloists 
IURP WKHZRUOGRIPXVLF GDQFH DQG DFUREDWLFV´272 It was not a success, however, 
DQG WKH UDGLR WDVNIRUFH PHHWLQJ ILYH GD\V ODWHU FRPSODLQHG WKDW ³PDWHULDOV DQG
methods used in the Berlin bars and in particular the second-rate bands offered 
*HUPDQUDGLRQRRSSRUWXQLW\WRFRRSHUDWH´273 This might have been foreseen, since 
five days earlier the Radio Executive had written to the RMVP that the 
propagandistic goals could only be achieved if the fluidity of such a public event 
could also be experienced by the listener.274 It is certainly remarkable that a 
programme which Goebbels had expressly stated275 was primarily for the 
development of German entertainment music, and was intended to be broadcast 
nationally, should include so many visual acts which obviously could not be 
integrated into a radio programme. 
Judging by the in-house communication relating to this short-lived radio venture, the 
last mention of which is dated 21st October 1941,276 things did not improve a great 
deal. It was plagued by the technical difficulties of integrating the performances into 
an effective radio broadcast, not to mention the artistic shortcomings. A listening 
session on 5th 6HSWHPEHU  GHFLGHG WKDW ³>D@ FROOHFWLYH OLVWHQLQJ WR the wax 
UHFRUGLQJVRIWKHODVWµ+DSS\+RXULQWKH$IWHUQRRQ¶RQth $XJXVW«UHVXOWHGLQ
the decision that a broadcast of these recordings from the event would only give the 
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LPSUHVVLRQRIDFHUWDLQODFNRITXDOLW\´277 Indeed, it is unclear how the prograPPH¶V
secondary audience, the German housewife, received this awkward combination of 
circus, operetta and social dance groups, but it is certain that the programme failed to 
fulfil its primary propagandistic function - the development of German entertainment 
music. An in-house memo sent two months later, after a quality control check of the 
ODWHVW*HUPDQGDQFHEDQGVUHYHDOV*RHEEHOV¶YLHZVRQWKHDUWZKLFKFrohe Stunde 
had supposedly fostered: 
The Minister did not at all agree with this demonstration for the following reasons: 
1.) because bad bands were chosen, 
2.) because the male and female singers were even worse.278 
Moreover, because the attempts to develop New German Entertainment Music were 
more prohibitive than prescriptive in nature, the bands which came closest to 
GHOLYHULQJ WKH µKRW¶PXVLFGHVLUHGE\ ODUJHVHFWLRQVRI WKH)RUFHVZHUH WKH IRUHLJQ
orchestras active within the Reich. These orchestras made live broadcasts for the 
RRG in front of Forces audiences in Berlin, which were popular with their target 
audience but proved controversial and attracted the attention of the Gestapo. An SD 
UHSRUW UHJDUGLQJ WUDQVPLVVLRQV RI D SHUIRUPDQFH E\ (UQVW YDQ ¶W +RII DW %HUOLQ¶V
Delphi-Palast in late March 1941 was poorly received in Saxony according to the 
observers. It noted: 
The objection is made that the arrhythmic was consciously accentuated by the orchestra. The 
otherwise popular hit µDo you hear my secret call¶ [Hörst du mein heimliches rufen] was turned into 
³DUHDOQLJJHUGDQFH´ WKURXJKSeculiar syncopated accompaniment. Feedback from Westphalia says 
that most of the numbers played by the star attraction orchestra [Attraktionsorchester@RI(UQVWYDQ¶W
Hoff consisted of jazz music that sounded ³DVLI WKH\FDPHVWUDLJKWRXWRIWKHMXQJOH´ ³2QHFDQQRW
LPDJLQH WKDW VROGLHUVZHUHSUHVHQWDW WKH µ'HOSKL¶ZKRKDG IDFHG WKHHQHP\RWKHUZLVH WKH\ZRXOG
KDYHEHDWHQWKHRUFKHVWUDRXWRIWKHFRQFHUWKDOO´IRUH[DPSOH>DQRSLQLRQIURP@0QVWHU279 
7KLV DGGV ZHLJKW WR *RHEEHOV¶ DUJXPHQW WKDW 6' UHSRUWV were biased against his 
pragmatic wartime programming measures,280 particularly given the fact that, in spite 
of the resentment they provoked in some quarters, such broadcasts were 
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demonstrably popular with the Forces. Significantly, while these live broadcasts 
represented an example of the Propaganda Minister successfully implementing 
PXVLFDOFRQFHVVLRQVWRWKH)RUFHV¶GHPDQGVUHDFWLRQDU\RSLQLRQVVXFKDVWKRVHFLWHG
by the SD continued to dictate the cultural discourse in the Third Reich, and in 
practice the Gestapo could veto RMVP, RMK or RRG measures if they were 
deemed to contradict to the Nazi Weltanschauung. Although, unlike jazz aficionados 
VXFKDV+DQV%OWKQHU9DQ¶W+RII¶VFULWLFVDSSHDUWRKDYHPLVVHGWKHIDFWWKDWKLV
signature theme at the Delphi, Alles wird gut µ(YHU\WKLQJ ZLOO EH ILQH¶ D WXQH
DGRSWHG DV D V\PERO E\ WKH GLVVLGHQW +DPEXUJ µ6ZLQJ <RXWK¶281 because it was 
EDVHGRQWKHILUVWIRXUQRWHVRI%HHWKRYHQ¶V)LIWK6\PSKRQ\ZKLFKERUHVLPLODULWLHV
WRWKH0RUVHFRGHµ9¶XVHGE\WKH%%&DV its calling signal to Germany,282 by 1942 
WKHRUFKHVWUDKDGIROGHGXQGHU*HVWDSRSUHVVXUHRYHUWKHLUµKRW¶DQGµ-HZLVK¶VW\OHLQ
spite of RMK protests that the group enjoyed great popularity.283 9DQ ¶W+RIIZDV
arrested before relocating to the RMVP-controlled Radio Hilversum (which also 
employed the popular swing band Het Ramblers) and forming a new orchestra, 
working there from May 1942 until March 1944 until musical transgressions led to 
his being rearrested and losing his contract.284 Nonetheless, it is testament to the 
failure of New German Entertainment Music that these Dutch swing groups were 
resident at a station which Hans Hinkel had declared upon its opening was to present 
³VSHFLDO*HUPDQDUWLVWLFDFKLHYHPHQWV´285 
The futility of the struggle to define aQG QXUWXUH WKHVH µ*HUPDQ DUWLVWLF
DFKLHYHPHQWV¶ LV VWULNLQJO\ HPERGLHG E\ Frohe Stunde, and it is therefore strange 
that this particular project of Joseph Goebbels has been utterly overlooked by 
historians. Moreover, the last mentions of the programme in the German archives 
(21st October 1941) broadly coincide with the first reference to the DTUO (29th 
September 1941);286 the latter project is rightly afforded a great deal of attention by 
                                                 
281
 Kater, Different Drummers, pp.168-.DWHUPLVWDNHQO\FODLPVWKDWLWZDVEDVHGRQ%HHWKRYHQ¶V
Eroica (Third Symphony). 
282
 JZD Hans Blüthner papers. Blüthner to Jonathan Feldman, 24th September 1987. 
283
 Bergmeier/Lotz, +LWOHU¶V$LUZDYHV, p.161. 
284
 Ibid, p.245. 
285
 %$5,0LFURILFKHµ=XU(U|IIQXQJ6ROGDWHQVHQGXQJHQ+LOYHUVXPV¶Undated transcript, 
presumably ca. 1942 as Van ¶t Hoff was broadcasting on the station by May 1942 (Bergmeier/Lotz, 
+LWOHU¶V$LUZDYHV, p.245). 
286
 BA R56I/34 Gutterer an Hinkel, 29th September 1941. 
 131 
 
Kater and Bergmeier/Lotz287 DV*RHEEHOV¶VLQJOHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWDWWHPSWto appease 
German soldiers and civilians with jazz-OLNHPXVLFDQGDµ6WDWH-D]]2UFKHVWUD¶DORQJ
the lines of those in the Soviet Union, and yet both projects shared the same goal: the 
development of a New German Entertainment Music as an alternative to jazz.288 




from the mistakes of Frohe Stunde would have implications for his subsequent, high-
SURILOH DWWHPSW WR IRVWHU LQGLJHQRXV GDQFH PXVLF WKURXJK D GH IDFWR µOLJKW¶
counterpart to the Berlin Philharmonic. 
Conclusion 
The parallels between the increasing awareness on the part of the British and 
German propaganda apparatuses of the role that jazz could have in matters of 
morale-building and propaganda are manifold. While Chapter Two illustrated the 
impact of German broadcasting on the initiation of the BBC Forces Programme, this 
FKDSWHU KDV GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW *HUPDQ DQJHU DW WKH µ6LHJIULHG /LQH¶ VRQJ ZDV WKH
direct cause of the previously unmentioned October 1939 RMVP parody version 
DERXW ³VWLQNLQJ ILVK´ ZKLFK ZDV EURDGFDVW RQ /RUG +DZ-+DZ¶V SURJUDPPH
Together these support the central argument of the thesis that the use of jazz music 
as propaganda did not emerge in a vacuum, but was an evolving relationship 
between various national policies. Moreover, through its focus on Mass Observation 
reports, this chapter has provided the first scholarly analysis of the early attempts, 
together with songwriter Annette Mills, to create a theoretical framework for 
µSURSDJDQGD MD]]¶ WKDW ZDV JURXQGHG LQ DGvertising psychology, which, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, heavily influenced American propaganda methodology. 
By documenting British struggles with the concepts of propaganda and public 
opinion surveys, and refuting notions of British exceptionalism as expressed through 
PXVLFWKLVFKDSWHUKDVDOVRFKDOOHQJHGWKHQDWLRQDOLVWµ3HRSOH¶V:DU¶GLVFRXUVH 
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In addition to making these new contributions to the study of wartime cultural 
propaganda, this chapter has also utilised unused evidence to reappraise areas which 
have already been the subject of academic attention. I have analysed the 
methodology of Charlie and his Orchestra and drawn similarities between the 
JURXS¶VO\ULFDOFRQWHQWDQGWKHZRUNRI/RUG+DZ-Haw (see Chapter Two), which, 
together with Haw-+DZ¶VGLUHFWLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHHDUOLHVW5093PXVLFDOSDURGLHV
in October 1939, make a strong case for his involvement in the subsequent project. 
The chapter has also demonstrated that the lyrical substance of these recordings was 
designed to reflect existing areas of public opinion in Britain, and that the 
psychological tensions during the Battle of Britain may indeed have been more 
fruitfully exploited than transpired to be the case. However, the international focus of 
the thesis has allowed me to ascertain the dearth of British and American sources 
regarding Charlie and his Orchestra, and thus conclude that the extent of the 
SURMHFW¶VUHDFKDQGQRWRULHW\DUHRYHUVWDWHGE\.DWHUDQG%HUJPHLHU/RW]ZKRUHO\
on inconclusive or anecdotal sources)XUWKHUPRUHLWDSSHDUVWKDWWKHJURXS¶VIDLOXUH
ZDV LQHYLWDEOH GXH WR WKH WDUJHW DXGLHQFH¶V LQH[SOLFDEOH ODFN RI DZDUHQHVV RI WKH
SURMHFW UDWKHU WKDQ D UHVXOW RI UHVLVWDQFH RQ WKH ODWWHU¶V SDUW WR WKH SURSDJDQGD
messages or the insufficient musical standard. Thus it is important not to make, as 
Kater does, value-based judgements regarding the inevitability of the failure of the 
project which implicitly and erroneously accept the idea that sections of the British 
audience were immune to arguments of an anti-Semitic or anti-capitalist nature.289  
:KHWKHURUQRWWKH5093¶VFRPELQDWLRQRIMD]]DQGSROLWLFDOFDEDUHWZDVDV.DWHU
VRPHZKDWFRQWUDGLFWRULO\FODLPV³LQJHQLRXV´290 is more debatable, and this chapter 
KDV GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW WKH µ*HUPDQLF¶ DOWHUQDWLYH Ddvocated by Hinkel stood little 
FKDQFH RI VXFFHVV ZLWK %ULWLVK DXGLHQFHV +RZHYHU E\ UHDSSUDLVLQJ +LQNHO¶V
character in the light of the unused Fritz Brocksieper and Georg Haentzschel 
interviews, I have also presented new evidence which refutes the prevailing view of 
this important bureaucrat as an ideologically rigid reactionary. By contrast, the well-
documented pragmatism of Goebbels has been re-evaluated through the previously 
overlooked Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag, which preceded the more ambitious 
DTUO and was to serve the same purpose of nurturing an indigenous New German 
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(QWHUWDLQPHQW 0XVLF 6LJQLILFDQWO\ +LQNHO¶V DOOHJHG GHVLUH WR GLVWULEXWH $PHULFDQ
jazz via a state-controlled German record label, whilst ideologically irreconcilable 
with NSDAP cultural policy, may have been a more effective and financially viable 
alternative. No such plan was ever implemented, however, and when the homeland 
of jazz entered the war, it was to have not only dramatic military but also 
propagandistic implications. Chapter Four will focus on the period between the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor and German defeat at Stalingrad, and elucidate key aspects 






Turning the Psychological Tide:  
December 1941 ± February 1943 
³7KH YDOXH RI SV\FKRORJLFDO ZDUIDUH DQG SURSDJDQGD KDV EHHQ UHFRJQL]HG HYHU
since the first cave man let out a yell to scare his enemy before he swung at him with 
a stone axe. The methods have EHHQVRPHZKDWUHILQHGVLQFHWKHQ´.1  
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³1R VRRQHU GLG WKH -DSDQHVH DWWDFN 3HDUO +DUERU´ QRWHG Melody Maker on 17th 
-DQXDU\³WKDQDVFUDPEOHHQVXHGDPRQJSXEOLVKHUV0LOOV0XVLFZHUHWKHILUVW
WR UHJLVWHU WKH WLWOH µ:H¶OO $OZD\V 5HPHPEHU 3HDUO +DUERU¶ 6DPP\ .D\H LV DOVR
publishing a song of the same title, and yet another song to see the light of day is 
FDOOHG µ5HPHPEHU 3HDUO\ +DUERU¶´2 The USA declared war on Japan on 8th 
December 1941, and Goebbels observed in his diary the same day that Germany was 
QRZHQJDJHG LQ D³:RUOG:DU LQ WKH WUXHVW VHQVHRI WKHZRUG´3 Three days later, 
Germany and Italy reciprocally declared war on the USA in accordance with the 
Tripartite Pact. Besides the military implications of a powerful new belligerent 
HQWHULQJWKHFRQIOLFWWKH$OOLHVQRZKDG$PHULFD¶VLPPHQVHUHVRXUFHVLQWKHILHOGRI
popular culture at their disposal. Indeed, 7LQ 3DQ $OOH\¶V UXVK WR FRS\ULJKW
sentimental song titles presaged the significant role that music was to play in the 
Anglo-American war effort. 
Nonetheless, there exists negligible prior scholarship which takes into account the 
international context of tKH 86$¶V XVHV RI PXVLF IRU ERWK GRPHVWLF PRUDOH DQG
propaganda to the enemy. This chapter will make a number of contributions to 
historiography of the period by drawing on previously uncited American archive 
materials, shedding light not only on American activities but also on German efforts 
to manipulate public opinion in the USA via the medium of entertainment. Firstly, it 
ZLOO XVH )&& PRQLWRUV¶ UHSRUWV DQG 5093 GLUHFWLYHV WR H[DPLQH LQLWLDO *HUPDQ
propaganda lines to the USA following the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The FCC 
reports will then be used to facilitate a reappraisal of the English-language 
propaganda programme Station Debunk, which takes into account for the first time 
its jazz content and offers a valuable insight into the broader machinations of RMVP 
policy during 1942. This will be followed by the discussion of a hitherto 
XQPHQWLRQHG5093MD]]SURJUDPPHLQ(QJOLVKHQWLWOHGµ%LOODQG0DU\± the jolly 
DQQRXQFHUV¶ ZKLFK ZLOO XVH D UHYLHZ RI WKH SURJUDPPH LQ :HUQHU 'DQLHOV¶
Musikalische Feldpost, held at the Michael H. Kater fonds, to reveal a previously 
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unexplored propaganda jazz methodology. The DTUO will also be reconsidered 
within the international context using both interview material from the Kater fonds 
and the Bundesarchiv documents relating WRWKHRUFKHVWUD¶VJHQHVLV 
By drawing on the OWI files at the National Archives and Records Administration 
in College Park, Maryland, the chapter will seek to rectify the relative lack of 
scholarship on the work of OWI and Elmer Davis. While Christof Mauch has 
explored the propaganda operations of SSD,4 the role of OWI and its relationship 
with its British counterparts has been largely overlooked by scholars of American 
SURSDJDQGD 2:,¶V DSSDUHQWO\ VORZ UHDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH YDOXH RI PXVLF IRU WKH
entertainmHQW RI LWV RZQ WURRSV ZLOO EH GLVFXVVHG DQG FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK WKH %%&¶V
WKHRUHWLFDO SULRULWLVDWLRQRI µOLJKW¶PXVLF IRU )RUFHV DQG FLYLOLDQV+RZHYHUE\ UH-
HYDOXDWLQJ WKH &RUSRUDWLRQ¶V EDQV RQ VOXVK DQG µMD]]LQJ WKH FODVVLFV¶ , ZLOO
demonstrate that the B%&¶VFRQWLQXHGGLIILFXOWLHVZLWK MD]] DQGGDQFHPXVLFZHUH
largely of its own making. In this context I will also cross-reference an important but 
previously overlooked German commentary on British dance music policy by Wolf 
Mittler of the RRG. By comparatively assessing German, American and British 
problems in the field of jazz music, the chapter will establish that, in each case, the 
difficulties were often the avoidable results of the respective cultural and political 
contexts. 
Germany 
The German government received no prior notice from the Japanese about the attack 
on Pearl Harbor. However, %HUJPHLHU¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW EHFDXVH %HUOLQ ZDV FDXJKW
off-JXDUGE\$PHULFD¶VVXGGHQHQWU\LQWRWKHZDUWKH1D]LV¶SV\FKRORJLFDOZDUIDUH
strategy vis-à-vis the United States was hastily improvised,5 LVUHIXWHGE\*RHEEHOV¶
diary entry of 7th December 1941. The Propaganda Minister noted in the hours 
preceding the attack that ³USA-Japan relations are still in limbo, but the situation is 
escalating on a daily basis. If it has not yet come to the outbreak of the crisis, this is 
probably due to the fact that neither party has had the courage to push things to the 
extreme.´6 Concluding that Japan was merely delaying its attack to see how the 
military situation develops, Goebbels nonetheless clearly expected it to come. He 
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assessed 5RRVHYHOW¶VRZQSODQVIRUZKLOVWDOVRDGPLWWLQJWKDW American public 
RSLQLRQLV³UDWKHUXQDQLPRXVO\´XQLWHGEHKLQGWKH3UHVLGHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHLPSHQGLQJ
conflict with Japan.7 The following day, Goebbels optimistically stated WKDW ³,
assume that the Japanese still have a fair bit [militarily] in reserve, because they 
generally practice very cautious, tradition-bound conservative politics; they would 
QRWMHRSDUGLVHWKHLU(PSLUHVRHDVLO\´8 +HGHVFULEHGWKHDWPRVSKHUHRI³SXUHMR\´DW
the Führer Hauptquartier ZKLFKKDGJUHHWHGWKHQHZVRIWKHDWWDFN³,IZHZLQWKLV
URXQG´he ZURWH³QRWKLQJHOVHZLOOVWDQGLQWKHZD\RIWKHUHDOLVDWLRQRI*HUPDQ\¶V
dream of world power. The chances have never been as good as they are today. So 
ZHKDYHWRXVHWKHP´9 
Moreover, Goebbels claimed that, although the German people were resigned to a 
long war, the domestic atmosphere was extremely positive;10 a highly debatable 
assertion in the light of available evidence. An anonymous American informant 
stationed in Germany painted a very different picture of the German state of mind at 
the time, citing casualties in Russia, loss of at least one relative per family and the 
bombing of German cities as contributing factors to a demoralising sense of déjà vu, 
and FODLPLQJWKDW³WKHPLQGVRIWKH*HUPDQSHRSOHKDYHEHFRPHILOOHGZLWKSLFWXUHV
RIWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHODVWZDU´11 With Operation Barbarossa entering its first winter, 
Goebbels at least conceded WKDW³RQHZRUULHVDORWIRURXUWURRSVLQWKH(DVWDERYH
DOOGXHWR WKHVXGGHQRXWEUHDNRILF\ZHDWKHU´DQGacknowledged that there was a 
rapid increase in scarcity of supplies, above all potatoes and coal, on the home 
front.12 
With the USA also having entered the war*RHEEHOV¶ optimism already appeared to 
EHPRUHRIDEHOLHI LQ*HUPDQ\¶VDELOLW\ WR WULXPSKRYHUDGYHUVLW\DVZDV evident 
from his insistence that the mounting difficulties would be overcome based on his 
experiences in the pre-1933 16'$3 ³Also in the old days in the Party I always 
worked best in a crisis,´KHDVVHUWHG ³and it is the same today. I will try more and 
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more to adapt the inner attitude of the German people to the situation; so I will do all 
that I can to ensure that, the tougher the storms shall be roaring overhead, the 
tougher the nation will be that stands to oppose them.´13 The lapse into bombastic 
metaphor that accompanies this defiant statement is an indicator of the future 
direction of Nazi propaganda, which increasingly came to rely on mythology to fill 
the void left by the increasing absence of good news.14 This shift occurred most 
notably from December 1941, and *RHEEHOV¶ VWDWHG JRDO KHUH RI ³DGDSW>LQJ@ WKH
LQQHU DWWLWXGH RI WKH *HUPDQ SHRSOH WR WKH VLWXDWLRQ´ KLQWV DW D VKLIW LQ WKH
3URSDJDQGD0LQLVWHU¶V PHWKRGRORJ\ WRZDUG WKHSULPDF\RI HPRWLRQRYHU UHDVRQ15 
The joyous stoicism evident in this diary entry, written on the day the USA declared 
war on Japan, appears to be a harbinger for the nihilistic rhetoric of the impending 
µWRWDOZDU¶. 
Initial Nazi Propaganda Themes to the USA 
However, wKLOH*RHEEHOV¶GLDU\HQWULHVVXJJHVWWKDWKHZDVexpecting and welcomed 
WKH86$¶V entry into the war,16 his initial propagandistic response was cautious. The 
PLQXWHVRIWKH3URSDJDQGD0LQLVWHU¶VPRUQLQJFRQIHUHQFHRQth December 1941,17 
in which he set out this new framework for psychological operations regarding the 
new belligerent, suggest a degree of anxiety about the USA¶Vcultural resources: 
The Minister demands the following propagandistic measures against the USA: 
1. The production of writings based on German intelligence that objectively prove that the USA 
possesses almost no culture of its own, and that their cultural creations are largely derived 
from European achievements. Within this context, disputes with American films should also 
take place. 
 
2. Alongside this, popular writings should be distributed which are aimed at the broad masses 
in Germany, but above all the youth, which illustrate that the uncritical acceptance of certain 
American measures, for example jazz music etc., demonstrates a lack of culture. Here, 
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amongst others, attention should be drawn to the grotesque misrepresentations which are 
IRXQGIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHWUDQVIRUPLQJRI%DFK¶VPXVLFLQWRMD]]PXVLF18 
Goebbels subsequently asserted that enough anti-American sentiment existed in 
Germany at that time, and therefore these materials should be held in store for such a 
WLPH DV ³WKH ZDYH >RI DQWL-American hostility] ebbs and a friendlier honouring of 
American culture takes its place, as has been periodically visible in relation to 
(QJODQGGXULQJ WKHZDU´19 Nonetheless, this reluctance to attack American culture 
was consistent with Germany¶V relatively respectful tone towards the USA in the 
first month of 1942,20 itself indicative of the degree to which the RMVP was slow in 
adjusting to the new situation. Moreover, the focus on immunising Germans (and 
predominantly German youth) against the potential appeal of American jazz music 
and films indicates this was also a pre-emptive defensive measure against WKH86$¶V
SRWHQWLDOµFXOWXUDOSRZHU¶. In both of these readings, Nazi policy reveals itself to be 
respectful, overcautious and indecisive. 
The FCC, on the other hand, appears to have overestimated the RMVP¶s ability to 
DGDSW WR WKHQHZVLWXDWLRQ ³1RZ WKDW*HUPDQ\DQG WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDUH DWZDU´
wrote a monitor on 12th 'HFHPEHU³FHUWDLQFKDQJHVLQWKHVWUDWHJ\RI*HUPDQ
shortwave propaganda to this country may be expected as well as continued 
HPSKDVLV RQ PDQ\ RI WKH ROG SURSDJDQGD OLQHV´21 The same report noted that the 
QHZVLWXDWLRQKDG³DWOHDVWDWHPSRUDU\HIIHFWRQ%%&SURSDJDQGDVWUDWHJ\´,22 with 
appeals to fear and requests for the USA to participate in the war giving way to a 
WKLUG PDMRU WKHPH RI ³VWUHVV RQ $PHULFDQ DWWLWXGHV´23 However, the PRQLWRU¶V
prophesy regarding Nazi propaganda proved to be incorrect. An FCC report dated 
31st January 1942 noted that German broadcasts, whilst increasingly confident, still 
primarily reserved their wrath for Britain and the British Empire: 
With current success [in Libya and the Battle of the Atlantic] and with the apparent strengthening of 
*HUPDQ OLQHV LQ 5XVVLD %HUOLQ¶V UDGLR SURSDJDQGD UHYHDOV LQFUHDVLQJ FRQILGHQFH « ,Q VSLWH RI
submarine victories against the United States, however, Berlin still does not carry out any vigorous 
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and well-defined propaganda campaign against the United States. Britain and the British Empire, 
particularly Australia, continue to occupy the centre of attention in ideological warfare.24 
The report coQFOXGHV WKDW ³>L@t is remarkable that more attention is not given in 
German broadcasts to the American [political] scene. Indirectly, Berlin shows 
considerable respect for American strength, and still does not display much 
hostility.´25 Nonetheless, WKH 5093 SHUVLVWHG ZLWK DWWDFNV RQ ³Slutocrats and 
-HZV´26 and by February a new pattern was emerging in the broadcasts of high-
profile American Nazi broadcasters such as Fred Kaltenbach and Douglas 
Chandler.27 Indeed, ideology coloured their programmes to such an increasing 
degree that a monitor GHVFULEHG*HUPDQ\¶VLVRODWLRQLVWDSSHDOVWRKDYHWXUQHGLQWR ³a 
full-blown Fascist creed for America: it is true Americanism to stay at home, to fight 
and overthrow the Jews and politicians now in power, whose ultimate objective is 
the establishment of Communist rule in the United States and the purge of native, 
Christian elements.´28 
&KDQGOHU EURDGFDVW XQGHU WKH SVHXGRQ\P µ3DXO 5HYHUH¶, and this symbolic 
appropriation of a hero of the Revolutionary War was indicative of the new RMVP 
line to the USA, which an FCC monitor summarised as an attempt to create a 
proactive patriotic resistance, as opposed to a PR campaign for the Third Reich or 
the Nazi war effort ³German propaganda´ QRWHG WKH PRQLWRU ³is primarily 
attempting to promote [a fascist] mentality in America rather than to whitewash Nazi 
Germany. If successful to any degree, this strategy will create dissension and 
consequent weakness within the United States. If completely successful, it would, of 
course, result in American acceptance of the Axis world scheme.´29 Meanwhile, 
continued anti-British propaganda sought to create a rift between the USA and 
Britain. Earlier that month, the FCC had observed: 
Items dealing with discord between the United States and Britain are noticeably increased this week. 
German broadcasts play on the old theme that the United States is absorbing Britain while at the same 
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At the same time a tremendous British debt is being piled up in the United States; vast sums of money 
from the U.S. Navy budget are being used to repair British ships in American Navy yards. Berlin 
warns Americans that just as in the last war, American taxpayers will have to take over these debts. 
The landing of American troops in Ireland is seized upon this week by Berlin to support the familiar 
FKDUJH WKDW WKH %ULWLVK DUH JHWWLQJ WKH $PHULFDQV WR GR WKHLU ILJKWLQJ IRU WKHP ³7KH %ULWLVK DUH
SHUIHFWO\ZLOOLQJDVDOZD\VWRILJKWWRWKHODVWGURSRI,RZDEORRG«´«) Appeals of this nature are 
W\SLFDOO\GLUHFWHGWRWKH³UHDO$PHULFDQVRIWKH0LGGOH:HVW´UDWKHUWKDQWRWKH³GUXJVWRUHFRZER\V
RI1HZ<RUN¶VVXLWDQGJDUPHQWLQGXVWU\´30 
Two weeks later, a monitor observed that the anti-British propaganda line reached its 
climax with an attempt to exploit American psychological reactions to British 
failures. Berlin warned Americans not to jeopardise their own safety by intervening 
in the conflict,31 and employed WKH ³IDPLOLDU VWUDWHJ\´ RI DWWHPSWLQJ WR VPHDU WKH
Roosevelt administration with claims of Jewish, plutocratic and Bolshevist influence 
in order to exacerbate domestic political rifts.32 The large numbers of radio owners in 
the USA meant that the RMVP had a potential audience of approximately seventy-
five million Americans for these efforts to encourage isolationist sentiment and 
nurture domestic dissent.33 Given the isolationist tendencies among portions of the 
American population, most notably in the Midwestern United States,34 as well as the 
existence of Nazi and fascist sympathisers in sections of the European immigrant 
communities, Goebbels could expect DWOHDVWVRPHGHJUHHRIµIULHQGO\¶OLVWHQHUV 
Jazz Propaganda to the USA 
As with its broadcasts for British audiences, the RMVP utilised entertainment as a 
means of gaining listeners for its English-language propaganda to the USA. In an 
attempt to stoke isolationist feelings, Charlie and his Orchestra had already attacked 
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the interventionist Roosevelt in 1941 as a puppet of the Soviet Union, Wall Street 
DQG³WKH-HZ´LHDOOHJHG-HZLVKEXVLQess or political interests) in a parody of µ,¶YH
Got A Pocketful of Dreams¶.35 This approach was maintained in subsequent 
recordings,36 LQ NHHSLQJ ZLWK *RHEEHOV¶ GLFWXP WKDW RQO\ WKH OHDGHUV RI an enemy 
state, and not its citizens, should be attacked in propaganda broadcasts, which in turn 
SDUDOOHOHG&KDPEHUODLQ¶VIDPRXVDVVHUWLRQWKDW³ZHKDYHQRTXDUUHOZLWKWKH*HUPDQ
SHRSOH´37 In this way, the Propaganda Minister was also keeping options open 
regarding possible peace agreements with a different US administration, an approach 
which he had also taken with regard to Britain in the first year of the war. 
A variant of this methodology was employed in the popular broadcasts of Mildred 
Gillars, nicknamed µ$[LV6DOO\¶, who was accompanied in her programmes by a live 
orchestra playing jazz and swing numbers, and used WKHSRSXODUµ/LOL0DUOHHQ¶DVKHU
theme song.38 A flamboyant Midwesterner, *LOODUV¶ SHDN PRQWKO\ income of three 
thousand Reichsmark reflects the importance attributed to her work by the RMVP. 
She would express sympathy ZLWK³WKHER\VLQWKHLURGLRXVWDVNRIKDYLQJWRFDUU\
RXW WKH RUGHUV RI 5RRVHYHOW &KXUFKLOO DQG WKH -HZLVK JDQJVWHUV´ ZKLOVW WDXQWLQJ
them about the whereabouts of their wives and girlfriends back at home.39 Although 
Henry Mitgang, the wartime editor of the GI magazine Stars & Stripes (Oran-
Casablanca and Sicily editions), recalls WKDW ³>W@KRVH of us in the Army in North 
Africa who listened to µAxis Sally¶ « OLNHG WKH IDPLOLDU MD]] UHFRUGLQJV EXW
laughed at her phony blandishments´40 the perceived comedy value of such Nazi 
broadcasts led to repeated listening, which was at the heart of Goebbels¶SURSDJDQGD
technique. Moreover, it is also highly plausible that $[LV6DOO\¶VPHVVDJHVDSSHDOs to 
base instincts such as jealousy and self-preservation resonated at some level with 
sections of her listenership.41 
As far as can be ascertained, Bergmeier/Lotz 1997 contains the only previous 
scholarly mention of RQH RI WKH 5093¶V PRVW DPELWLRXV SURMHFWV WR WKH 86$
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Station Debunk.42 Surprisingly, given their general emphasis on jazz music, the brief 
sketch they provide RIWKHSURJUDPPH¶VDFWLYLWLHVPDNHVQRPHQWLRQRI its musical 
content, beyond its VLJQDWXUH WXQH µ&DUU\ Me Back to Old Virginny¶.43 However, 
both the choice of jazz as a means of attracting a Midwestern target audience and the 
trial-and-error approach which is evident in Debunk¶V HYROXWLRQ IURP WKH )&&
PRQLWRUV¶ UHSRUWV DUHKLJKO\ VLJQLILFDQW. Precisely because it so clearly adhered to 
the Nazi propaganda line, a study of Debunk offers an insight into the flawed 
methodology of Nazi propaganda to the USA in early 1942. 
Purporting to be an American dissident enterprise, Debunk was first noted by the 
FCC on 23rd March 1942, and featured a mix of anti-Roosevelt, anti-British, anti-
Semitic and isolationist propaganda.44 A monitor recorded the standard format as 
follows: 
:KLOH WKHSURJUDPFRQVLVWV ODUJHO\RID WDONE\ ³-RH6FDQORQ´ LW LQWURGXFHVD IHZYDULHW\ IHDWXUHV
Each of the four programs heard so far has begun with intermittent phrases from the Star Spangled 
Banner, has been interrupted near the middle by PRUHRU OHVV³KRW´ MD]]DQGKDVHQGHGZLWKHLWKHU
³0\&RXQWU\µ7LV>VLF.@RI7KHH´RU³7KH6WDU6SDQJOHG%DQQHU´$QHDV\LQIRUPDOLW\LVPDLQWDLQHG
by a dialogue procedure: the program is introduced E\ ³0DF´, ZKR WXUQV LW RYHU WR ³-RH´ DQG
interrupts him with exactly the right question when the monologue gets lengthy. Slang, 
colloquialisms, and invective are used, and occasionally mild profanity. Several signs indicate that the 
program is aimed at relatively unsophisticated groups: there are direct references to farmers; and 
many of the colloquialisms are distinctly rural. The middle west [sic.] appears to be the geographical 
area towards which the broadcasts are primarily directed.45 
µ-RH6FDQORQ¶ZDV in fact a former US Embassy employee named Dr. Herbert John 
Burgman.46 The targeting of the Midwest in his broadcasts is consistent with the 
PRQLWRU¶VREVHUYDWLRQ LQHDUO\)HEUXDU\ WKDW1D]LSURSDJDQGD to the US was 
trying to create a division between WKH LQODQG SRSXODWLRQ DQG WKH ³GUXJVWRUH
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FRZER\V´ RI 1HZ <RUN47 Evangelical language was heavily utilised, with New 
York and Washington, D.C. UHIHUUHG WR DV ³6RGRP DQG *RPRUUDK´ respectively, 
while the programme also declared that MidwHVWHUQIDUPHUV¶ER\Vwere sacrificed at 
WKH ³$OWDU RI 0DPPRQ´48 By attempting to foment opposition to the war in a 
traditional stronghold of isolationism,49 the RMVP was following the same approach 
as its µEODFN¶ VWDWLRQV WR %ULWDLQ; wartime BBC employee George Orwell observed 
that ³HDFKVWUDLQRI*HUPDQSURSDJDQGD>WR%ULWDLQ@FRUUHVSRQGVWRRQHH[LVWLQJRU
DW DQ\ UDWH SRWHQWLDO GHIHDWLVW IDFWLRQ´.50 $ PRQLWRU¶V FRPSDUDWLYH DQDO\VLV RI WKH
propaganda lines taken by Debunk and official German broadcasts, moreover, 
showed that Debunk was part of and entirely consistent with RMVP policy at that 
time: 
Station DEBUNK follows the current propaganda line almost word for word. In fact, it is so patently 
German propaganda that one gets the impression no serious attempt is being made to conceal its 
source. Perhaps German propagandists hope that publicized speculation about its source will call 
attention to the existence of this station and build an audience for it.51 
The attempt to use jazz and dance music as a means of attracting listeners was also in 
keeping with prior RMVP methodology. However, on 11th April 1942, the FCC 
suggested that Debunk¶Vpoor musical resources betrayed its Nazi origins: 
Seeking to win its way into American hearts, Station Debunk, early in its broadcast, regularly plays an 
$PHULFDQ GDQFH UHFRUG LQ DGGLWLRQ WR WKH ³7KH 6WDU 6SDQJOHG %DQQHU´ 7KLV GHYLFH LV QRW WRR
HIIHFWLYH KRZHYHU VLQFH OLNH 'HEXQN¶V VODQJ WKH UHFRUGV DUH VRPHZKDW GDWHG 7KH\ LQFOXGH VXFK
QXPEHUVDV³)ODW)RRW)ORRJLHZLWKWKH)OR\)OR\´³+ROG7LJKW´DQG³:KLVWOH:KLOH<RX:RUN´,Q
IDFW RQH RI WKH FRPPHQWDWRUV FRQIHVVHV ³0DF KDV EHHQ ILGGOLQJ DURXQG KHUH ZLWK KLV KDOI-dozen 
UHFRUGVDVWKRXJKKHRZQHGDJUHDWVHOHFWLRQRIWKHODWHVWGDQFHKLWV´7KLVZRXOGWHQGWRFRQILUPWKH
impression noted in a previous Analysis, that debunk is not taking serious pains to conceal its 
sponsorship from discriminating listeners.52 
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Indeed, due to the programme¶VDGKHUHQFHWRWKH5093OLQHWKHPRQLWRUV¶UHSRUWV
on Debunk are a particularly valuable source because they reveal the weaknesses of 
broader German policy. Debunk was a project in a continual state of flux, with a 
visibly shifting geographical target audience and musical content. Nonetheless, the 
monitor observed in April 1942 that it pursued a coherent short-term objective of 
disrupting the war effort and discrediting the Roosevelt administration, with a 
concomitant long-term goal of providing a basis for anti-democratic arguments.53 It 
also reflected a general trend in German propaganda, which ³has been shifting from 
mere opinion persuasion to direct suggestions for mild forms of action: form groups, 
listen to the radio, get certain books from liEUDULHVRUZULWHWR&RQJUHVVPHQ´.54 This 
clear propagandistic aim was to be achieved, as with Lord Haw-HDZ¶VEURDGFDVWVWR
Britain, by using entertainment as a means of gaining a regular audience. Henry and 
Ruth Durant had observed with regard to Lord Haw-+DZWKDWSHRSOH³tuned in µto 
have a good laugh,¶ but then, having acquired the habit, some began to think µthere 
may be something in what he says¶´55 and it was clearly intended that the banter of 
µ-RH¶DQGµ0DF¶VKRXOGVHUYHWKHVDPHIXQFWLRQ 
Debunk was clearly hampered, however, by the contradiction between the target 
audience and the musical selections which were supposed to induce them to repeated 
listening. This difficulty is unsurprising, because the large rural population of the 
Midwest constituted an unlikely market for hot jazz. Conversely, in July 1941 
DownBeat KDGQRWHG³WUHPHQGRXVGHPDQG´LQWKHregion for polkas and Bohemian 
music,56 perhaps reflecting the European origins of many Midwestern residents.57 
The RMVP displayed considerable cultural naivety in targeting a predominantly 
urban musical form at a largely rural audience; appearing to belatedly realise this, 
those behind Debunk changed its musical policy at the end of June 1942. The FCC 
monitor reported: 
'HEXQN EURDGFDVWV DUH QR ORQJHU LQWURGXFHG E\ 0DF¶V PHUU\ FKDWWHU DQG VHOHFWLRQV RI VKRS-worn 
GDQFH PXVLF ,QVWHDG ZLWKRQO\ ³&DUU\ PHEDFN WR2OG 9LUJLQLD´ DV D WXQLQJ-in signal, the station 
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QRZ UHJXODUO\ VHUYHVXS ³FKRLFH QHZV LWHPVRI WKHGD\´ DW WKHEeginning of each broadcast, in the 
IRUP RI ³IODVKHV´ IURP +RERNHQ :DVKLQJWRQ $OH[DQGULD DQG RWKHU SRLQWV )XUWKHU UHIHUHQFHV WR
current events now also appear frequently in the main body of the broadcast.58 
7KLVDOWHUDWLRQRIWKHVWDWLRQ¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGthe introduction of µQHZVIODVKHV¶, which 
had been pioneered in the broadcasts of Fred Kaltenbach in 1940,59 presaged a 
geographical shift in terms of the target audience. Evidently the RMVP was 
dissatisfied with Debunk and felt that it was failing to achieve its goals. Therefore, 
by July 1942, Debunk¶VIRFXVPRYHGIURPWKHMidwest to the Southern States, and 
WKHFRQWHQWRIWKHLQIRUPDOGLDORJXHEHWZHHQµ0DF¶DQGµ-RH¶ZDVPRGLILHGWR appeal 




7KH « &LYLO :DU UHIHUHQFH DOVR ILWV LQWR WKH SUR-southern pattern which has lately appeared on 
Debunk, hitherto primarily middle-western in appeal²a shift which may indicate that, in the opinion 
of the Station, as the war proceeds pre-December 7th isolationist arguments are becoming less fruitful 
than agitation among the draftees. We have already noted the adoption of the theme-VRQJ³&DUU\0H
Back to Old Virginy [sic.]´60 
The RMVP¶s uncertainty in ascertaining an appropriate target audience for its 
divisive agitprop, and the abandonment of the dated American jazz and dance 
records, make it possible to trace the formulation and revising of policy through the 
activities of Debunk. It appears from the FCC report dated 4th July 1942 that the 
musical sections of the programme were dropped, and that no attempt was made to 
appeal to southern musical tastes. However, OLNH LWV ³VKRS-ZRUQ GDQFH PXVLF´, 
Debunk¶V political message was becoming outdated. As the monitor notes in the 
above citation, with the USA now actively involved in the war, isolationist appeals 
were fast becoming obsolete, and the programme increasingly shifted towards 
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attempts to decrease )RUFHV¶ morale and desire to fight, rather than persuading 
Americans WR³IRUPJURXSV«RUZULWHWRFRQJUHVVPHQ´61 
At the beginning of September 1942, Werner Daniels, a jazz fan serving in the 
Wehrmacht, picked up another Nazi jazz propaganda programme targeted at Allied 
Forces, entitled Bill and Mary, the Jolly Announcers. He mockingly reported the 
contents of this in his bi-monthly jazz newsletter, Musikalische Feldpost, which was 
to be copied and passed around jazz fans in the German Forces.62 This programme 
has been overlooked by previous scholarship, and yet, like Debunk, it serves as a 
valuable indicator of both RMVP methodology and the limitations imposed by the 
poor access to Anglo-American cultural resources. Interestingly, however, this 
programme appears to have shunned all Anglo-American music on principle and is 
therefore dependent on muVLFRISUHGRPLQDQWO\*HUPDQRULJLQ'DQLHOV¶XQIODWWHULQJ
review of the programme stated: 
The station is called Sender Calais >6WDWLRQ &DODLV@ EXW LW¶V QRW DFWXDOO\ LQ &DODLV ,W¶V RQH RI WKH
German European Stations which are situated where their effect has the best chances of success with 
the intended audience. It seems to be broadcast from Berlin or somewhere else centrally-located. 
The MCs make a particularly authentic impression. One listens to their announcements: There are no 
dry grammatical constructions, no, their knowledge of the language and the people seem to be drawn 
from experience. At least they act as if this is so. After each record the announcer breaks into huge 
cheers: Gaspar Cassadó has just played a solo (more accurately, the turntable [has just played the 
solo]). Visibly (or audibly) moved, the announcer seems to have tears of emotion in his eyes. He 
exclaims emotionally: ³Well, well, and well and so, so, so! That was pretty fine! O.k., Gaspar!´ 
$ERYHDOOWKHJRRGPDQGRHVQ¶WVHHPWRKave looked properly in his dictionary. He describes every 
single track as ³a very fine selection´HYHQWKRXJKD³VHOHFWLRQ´ is more of a potpourri or an extract. 
%XWWKDWGRHVQ¶WPDNHDQ\GLIIHUHQFHWRKLP$OOWUDFNVDUH ³very fine selections´: [for example, the 
songs] Morning Newspapers (Morgenblätter) and ³Is your little Heart still free, Baby"´E\ZKLFKKH
GRXEWOHVVPHDQV³,FDQ¶WJLYH\RXDQ\WKLQJEXW/RYH%DE\´%XWZKDWZRXOGQ¶WRQHGRWR*HUPDQLVH
RQH¶VDXGLHQFH>E\DOWHULQJWKHQDPHRIWKHRULJLnal American composition]? 
>«@$ERYH DOO WKH\ KDYHGLIILFXOW\ ZLWKSURJUDPPHGHVLJQ2QSULQFLSOH WKH\GRQ¶W ZDQW WRSOD\
MD]]PXVLF7KHPLOLWDU\OLVWHQHUVZRQ¶WJRIRUFKDPEHUPXVLFVRHDVLO\:KDWWRGR"Very simple! A 
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little bluff! Successively we hear: Barnabas Geczy and his BR\V (PPDQXHO 5DPERXU ³DQG KLV
5K\WKP)HOORZV´ :LOIULHG.UGHU³DQGKLV6ZLQJ.LQJV´ 
+RZDERXW:LOOLDP)XUWZDQJOHU³DQGKLV+RW6KRWV´"Make so weiter, Station Calais!63 
While it is noteworthy that Daniels was demonstrating a degree of audacity given the 
heavy penalties he could have faced had the newsletters been discovered by the 
authorities, this account is primarily of value to the thesis because it highlights a 
previously unexplored RMVP methodology with regard to the use of jazz music as 
propaganda. It provides evidence that Nazi propaganda broadcasts also rechristened 
German dance orchestras with Anglophone names in the hope that this would hold 
more appeal to enemy listeners in search of jazz and swing. This practice had its 
origins in the stunted growth of German jazz music in the Weimar Republic, when 
salon orchestras reEUDQGHGWKHPVHOYHVDVµMD]]EDQGV¶ZLWKRXWDOWHULQJWKHLUPXVLFDO
style or content.64 Nonetheless, the reliance on German material is surprising, 
because 'DQLHOV¶ DVVHUWLRQ WKDW MD]] ZDV DYRLGHG RQ SULQFLSOH ZDV LQFRUUHFW 7KH
RMVP readily utilised jazz in projects for foreign audiences, such as Charlie and his 
Orchestra and Debunk, and it is thus unclear why it resorted to such an unconvincing 
ruse in this instance. 
New German Entertainment Music: The DTUO 
7KH LQWHQVLI\LQJ RI *HUPDQ\¶V SURSDJDQGD RQVODXJKW WR WKH 86$ DOVR VDZ Nazi 
broadcasts occasionally adopting a shriller tone, which the FCC commented 
³FRQWUDVWVPDUNHGO\ZLWKWKHUHVWUDLQWDQGFDOPVXSHULRULW\WKDW*HUPDQSURSDJDQGD
KDV DIIHFWHG LQ WKH SDVW´65 In late May 1942, American Nazi propagandist Robert 
%HVWDWWDFNHG$OOLHG³SURSDJDQGDNLNHV´DQGWKHFUHDWLRQRID³-HZ-QLWHG6WDWHV´66 
DQG WKH IROORZLQJ ³FKLOGLVK WDXQWV´67 were picked up by the FCC on an official 
broadcast from Germany:  
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Come on, Churchill! Come on, Kikes! Come on, Jewed-up bums! Come on, whoever wishes to attack 
European civilization! Germany is ready to talk to you in your own language of bombs until you cry 
quite as Churchill has already had to do twice.68 
7KLV QHZ DJJUHVVLYH OLQH FRPLQJ IURP %HUOLQ ZDV WKH PRQLWRU VXJJHVWHG ³OHVV
convincing as propaganda than it is revealing as an expression of the Nazi emotional 
FRQGLWLRQ´,69 DOWKRXJK%HVW¶VEURDGFDVWVZHUHRIOLPLWHGXVHIXOQHVVDVDOLWPXVWHVWRI
KLV HPSOR\HUV¶ YLHZV Bergmeier notes that Best often clashed with Nazi censors 
who sought to tone down his coarse delivery, and a disclaimer was added before at 
least one of his broadcasts to distance German radio from the contents of his 
programmes.70 
Nonetheless, the PRQLWRU¶V observation that the Nazi propaganda apparatus was on 
the defensive was broadly correct. On 21st $SULO$UFKLEDOG0DF/HLVK¶V2IILFH
of Fact and Figures (OFF) noted a broadcast by the American radio commentator 
Morgan Beatty, in which Beatty claimed to detect a change in tone coming from 
Berlin and Tokyo. Hitler, in a radio appeal for the German Red Cross, had claimed 
that *HUPDQ\¶VGHIHDWDWWKHKDQGVRI³DEDUEDULFHQHP\«ZRXOGPHDQWKHHQGRI
HYHU\WKLQJ´71 %HDWW\ SLFNHG XS RQ WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH SKUDVH ³WKH HQG RI
HYHU\WKLQJ´ DQG VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH UHDVRQ ZK\ *HUPDQ\ DQG -DSDQ ZHUH LVsuing 
claims of victory and broadcasting exaggerated statistics of Allied losses was 
EHFDXVH ³REYLRXVO\ WKH\¶UH IXOO\ FRQVFLRXV RI WKH WXUQLQJ RI WKH SV\FKRORJLFDO
WLGH´72 0RUHRYHU +LWOHU¶s apocalyptic language anticipated WKH 5093¶V VWUHQJWK-
through-fear methodology, which was to become a leitmotiv in Nazi propaganda 
following defeat at Stalingrad.73 
Inevitably, the unexpectedly prolonged war and the increasing odds mounting 
against Germany were also taking a psychological WROORQWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRSXODWLRQ 
On 17th July 1942, the Swedish newspaper Truts repeated a joke which had been 
heard in Berlin by a Swedish businessman. Mocking the attempts of Nazi 
propaganda to cast the drawn-out hostilities and increasingly bleak situation in a 
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positive light, locals ZHUH KHDUG WR DQQRXQFH WR RQH DQRWKHU ³'XH WR LWV JUHDW
VXFFHVVWKHZDUZLOOEHH[WHQGHG´74 Welch has observed that political jokes were a 
popular vehicle for criticism of the Nazi regime,75 and this particular example 
indicates public acknowledgement of the growing chasm between the claims of Nazi 
propaganda and the military and political reality. Furthermore, it encapsulates the 
changing mood within the Reich regarding the war, which was brought home to 
Germans not only through Allied bombings of their cities and towns, but also 
through its increasing presence in everyday life. The Berlin street scene had changed 
GUDPDWLFDOO\ VLQFH WKH HDUO\ GD\V RI WKH ZDU DQG D 6ZLVV FRUUHVSRQGHQW¶V UHSRUW
published in the summer of 1942 highlighted the visibility of the physical impact of 
the war in the German capital: 
The many groups of young war invalids whom one meets frequently prove that the Eastern campaign 
was something quite different from the Blitz victory over Poland and internally weakened France. The 
number of blind and one-eyeds [sic.] that one sees is striking.  
« 7R WKH QHZ %HUOLQ SLFWXUH EHORQJ DOVR QXPHURXV EXLOGLQJV XQGHU FRQVWUXFWLRQ E\ ZRUNPHQ
wearing striped prison clothes. The shortage of workers forced the authorities to utilize the prisoners, 
who are said to be mostly political prisoners and are every evening transported back to the prison in 
big police vans.76 
To reflect the new sombre mood, bans on social dancing were in place several days a 
week, and on 12th November 1942 the Rheinische Landeszeitung went so far as to 
question the need for culture given the increasingly difficult situation. ³The German 
heart needs culture (Kultur ist dem deutschen Menschen Herzensbedürfnis)´
suggested the newspaper. ³Yet some people ask, quite correctly, in these days when 
spiritual burdens increase rather than decrease, whether all the cultural efforts are 
really needed. Especially in badly bombed towns such doubts are comprehensible.´77 
However, as the thesis has consistently demonstrated, wartime conditions greatly 
increased rather than decreased the demand for culture and entertainment, 
                                                 
74
 NARA RG 208 Box 203 Conditions ± Morale ± Germany ± Bureau of Overseas Intelligence 
Central Files. German Guidance Notes, 20th July 1942, p.4. 
75
 Welch, The Third Reich, p.149. 
76
 Cited in NARA RG 208 Box 203 Conditions ± Morale ± Germany ± Bureau of Overseas 
Intelligence Central Files. German Intelligence Notes, German Internal Conditions, 3rd August 1942, 
p.4. The newspaper in which the article originally appeared is not stated. 
77
 NARA RG 208 Box 203 ± Conditions ± Morale ± Germany ± Bureau of Overseas Intelligence 
Central Files. German Intelligence Notes (German Internal Conditions ± Is Culture Necessary?). 
Article dated 23rd October 1942, cited 12th November 1942. 
 151 
 
particularly at times of intense stress. With regard to jazz, this was extremely 
problematic for the RMVP and RRG. Unwilling and unable to play genuine Anglo-
American jazz music to the German fighting forces, and given the failure of prior 
attempts to foster a New German Entertainment Music such as Frohe Stunde am 
Nachmittag, Goebbels attempted to conclusively resolve the issue by commissioning 
the DTUO. As noted above in Chapter Three, the genesis of the orchestra broadly 
coincided with the demise of Frohe Stunde, and the latter had also been 
commissioned by the Propaganda Minister with the express purpose of nurturing 
quality German dance music.78 Thus it is probable that there was a causal 
relationship between the two projects. 
The fact that the orchestra represents Goebbels¶PRVWDPELWLRXVDWWHPSWWRVHWWOHWKH
problem of entertainment music once and for all can be traced to the disappointing 
progress of New German Entertainment music through the course of 1941. A 
PHVVDJH IURP/HRSROG*XWWHUHU*RHEEHOV¶6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH WR+DQV+LQNHODQG
his colleagues dated 29th September 1941 announced: 
We have equipped the [Berlin] Philharmonic Orchestra with sufficient supplies and at the same time 
GRQHSUHFLRXVOLWWOHIRUFXOWLYDWLQJHQWHUWDLQPHQWPXVLF« 
It cannot be ignored that the cultivation of first-class entertainment music and with it a first-class 
orchestra is a duty of the Reich.79 
Franz Grothe was personally selected by Goebbels to be the artistic director, and was 
WR ³SOD\ URXJKO\ WKH VDPH UROH DV >%HUOLQ 3KLOKDUPRQLF 2UFKHVWUD¶V FRQGXFWRU
:LOKHOP@ )XUWZlQJOHU´80 Given the freedom to choose a second director of the 
orchestra, Grothe opted for his friend Georg Haentzschel, a founder member of the 
leading pre-war jazz band Die Goldene Sieben µ7KH*ROGHQ6HYHQ¶ who had been 
working predominantly with film scores since the start of the war.81 Reflecting its 
position as a Reichsorchester, the DTUO was to have the same status and wages as 
the Berlin Philharmonic; Haentzschel recalls that this was to be kept confidential so 
as not to make )XUWZlQJOHU¶V musicians jealous, which suggests that, among German 
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musicians, a dichotomy existed that was similar to the jazz/classical divide in 
Britain. Grothe and Haentzschel were clearly considered important enough to 
become well-acquainted with Goebbels, whom Haentzschel remembers as extremely 
highbrowZLWK³QRHDUIRUMD]]%XWKHKDGDFDVXDOPDQQHU´82  
The Propaganda Minister established the DTUO with the aim of conclusively 
resolving the issue of New German Entertainment Music by making concessions to 
)RUFHV¶ WDVWHV E\ marked contrast with Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag, which had 
FRQFRPLWDQWO\SXUVXHGD³SURSDJDQGLVWLFVHFRQGDU\DLP´ of catering to ³WKH*HUPDQ
KRXVHZLIH´.83 Reflecting *RHEEHOV¶GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKWKHTXDOLW\RI*HUPDQdance 
musicians,84 the orchestra¶V SHUVRQQHO ZDV to be exclusively first-rate, and its 
broadcasts were also intended to fulfil a didactic function. Initially the DTUO 
broadcast every fourth Saturday evening, and soon Wednesday afternoon repeats 
were implemented in order to give other professional musicians an opportunity to 
study the superior arrangements and technique, and thus keep abreast of 
contemporary music developments.85 Moreover, Haentzschel claims that Goebbels 
DOVRZDQWHG³WRKDYHWKHSUHVWLJHWKDWWKH(QJOLVKKDGZLWKWKHLURUFKHVWUDV´. It was 
often said, he asserts, that the DTUO was expected to EH³WKHEHVWGLSORPDWIRUXV
abroad, better than any ambassador´ following the German Endsieg.86 
The immediate raison d'être, however, was to help maintain *HUPDQ )RUFHV¶
morale.87 Although the dance music proclivities of a considerable portion of the 
German Forces were well-documented, the Luftwaffe was notorious in this respect.88 
Accordingly, Kater points out that Luftwaffe pilots were particularly susceptible to 
British propaganda, GXH WR WKHLU FRQWDFW ZLWK WKH HQHP\ DQG ³EHFDXVH RI WKHLU
urbanity, their knowledge of English, and their legendary penchant for swing 
PXVLF´.89 Haentzschel claims that the BBC news broadcasts were of much less 
interest to the pilots than the swing music, although KHDOVRVXJJHVWVWKDW³WKH\ were 
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pilots, >DQG@HVVHQWLDOO\QRW1D]LV´, and this alleged apathy of many Luftwaffe pilots 
to the National Socialist doctrine may therefore have rendered them more susceptible 
WRWKH%%&¶VKDELWRI³GHEDWLQJZLWKWKH1D]LVRYHUWKHHWKHU´90  
While Haentzschel is surely accurate in claiming that deterring the Luftwaffe from 
OLVWHQLQJ³SHUPDQHQWO\´WRWKH%%&ZDVDSULPHPRWLYDWLRQIRUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI
the DTUO,91 the precise nature of its genesis remains a matter of dispute. Kater 
cautiously relates the ³RIWHQ-WROG VWRU\´ of Luftwaffe ace Werner Mölders meeting 
Franz Grothe in a ski lodge in the Austrian Alps in the winter of 1940-41, during 
which Mölders confided WR *URWKH WKDW ³if only the German stations were 
broadcasting decent music in the American style, then Luftwaffe pilots could stop 
WXQLQJLQWRWKH%%&´92 According to this account, Grothe declared that musicians 
were available in the Reich who would be capable of such a task, and the two men 
subsequently plotted to convince Goebbels to create an orchestra for this purpose. 
7KH JURXS¶V WURPERQLVW Walter Dobschinski offers a similar but less detailed 
account, recalling that pilots and U-Boat crews only listened to English [sic.] 
stations, and Hinkel, Goebbels and Goering were well aware of the fact. Thus 
³*HUPDQ RIILFHUV FRPSODLQHG WR WKH 1D]L ELJZLJV WKH\ >VDLG WKH\@ GLGQ¶W ZDQW
µVDSS\¶ µROG-IDVKLRQHG¶ *HUPDQ GDQFH PXVLF EXW µPRGHUQ EHDXWLIXO PXVLF¶ à la 
England. The DTUO was founded as a result´93 
However, while figures such as Mölders and Grothe may indeed have been in 
positions to influence the Propaganda Minister,94 it is most likely that pressure from 
military quarters was only part of the reason for the instigation of the orchestra. 
Significantly, the establishment of the DTUO is utterly consistent with the general 
pragmatic evolution of RRG policy. This culminateG LQ +LQNHO¶V 1942 reforms in 
ZKLFKWKH³FRUUXSW´95 old guard were removed in favour of non-Party experts such as 
Haentzschel and Grothe, but was in fact preceded by a number of measures initiated 
                                                 
90
 As lamented by Delmer (Delmer, Black Boomerang, p.61). 
91
 Haentzschel interview 1988. 
92
 Kater, Different Drummers, pp.126-127. 
93
 Dobschinski interview 1987. Here Dobschinski also claims that Grothe led an orchestra for 
Truppenbetreuung prior to joining the DTUO. 
94
 Haentzschel remembers that Grothe got on well with both Goebbels and Hinkel and was in a 
SRVLWLRQWRLQIOXHQFHWKHP³Franz hatte ein geneigtes Ohr bei Hinkel und bei Goebbels´+DHQW]VFKHO
LQWHUYLHZ.DWHUGUDZV DWWHQWLRQ WR*RHEEHOV¶ IDVFLQDWLRQ ZLWK WKH /XIWZDIIH DQG UHVSHFW IRU
individual pilots, of whom Mölders was the best-known (Kater, Different Drummers, p.126). 
95
 +DHQW]VFKHO UHFDOOV WKDW ³PDQ\ROG IDFHV ZHUH VWLOO ZRUNLQJ IRU WKH UDGLR WKHUH ZDV DGHJUHHRI
corruption [einem gewissen Filz@WKHUH´+DHQW]VFKHOLQWHUYLHZ 
 154 
 
by Goebbels throughout the course of 1941. Frohe Stunde am Nachmittag was 
expressly described on 21st February 1941 as an attempt to improve the quality of 
German dance music in accordance with WKH3URSDJDQGD0LQLVWHU¶V wishes,96 and the 
55*¶V LQFUHDVH LQ HYHQLQJ GDQFH PXVLF RXWSXW LQ 6HSWHPEHU  ZDV WLPHG WR
IROORZWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIKLVSUDJPDWLFHVVD\µ7KH5Hlaxation of Radio Scheduling 
'XULQJ :DUWLPH¶ LQ Das Reich.97 Haentzschel was himself in charge of sixteen 
different RRG stations broadcasting dance music after the 1942 reforms, and 
GHVFULEHV WKH '782 DV JRLQJ ³KDQG-in-KDQG ZLWK *HUPDQ UDGLR´98 The evidence 
suggests that the DTUO is best understood as the most ambitious project of a 
broader wartime trend towards liberalisation of broadcast entertainment, in 
consultation with the military, as had already occurred in Britain with the foundation 
of the BBC Forces Programme in January 1940. 
The preconditions were promising. A list was compiled of the first-rate musicians 
required for the project, in spite of the fact that many of them were under contract to 
various entertainment venues and film studios in the Berlin area. Talented musicians 
were now extremely scarce because most German nationals had now been drafted, 
and the DTUO candidates were given a UK-Stellung on the grounds of their 
indispensability to the war effort. The guitarist Hans Korseck, who by the accounts 
of his contemporaries was one of the few innovators of genius in German jazz, was 
also recalled from his work as a field doctor on the Eastern Front to join the DTUO, 
but was killed on the night before his return. His widow recalls that he had once 
performed for Goebbels aboard a boat on the Wannsee in Berlin, and afterwards 
EHFDPHVR³H[WUDRUGLQDULO\H[FLWHG´DERXWPLVVLQJWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRDVVDVVLQDWH the 
Propaganda Minister that she worried he may attempt to do so in the future.99 The 
anecdote RIIHUV IXUWKHU LQGLFDWLRQV RI ERWK *RHEEHOV¶ SUR[LPLW\ WR MD]] PXVLFLDQV
and the moral complexities that could be involved in individual cases of musical 
collaboration with the RMVP. 
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Those selected for the orchestra were informed that they were released with 
immediate effect from their existing contracts, often to the indignation of their 
current employers. The director of the Theater des Volkes protested in a letter to the 
RMVP on the 9th April 1942 that, without the two musicians who were leaving for 
the orchestra, he would have to close the theatre down.100 However, as Goebbels 
wrote in a note to Hinkel on 10th March 1942: 
I have acknowledged the foundation, upon my orders, of the German Dance- and Entertainment 
Orchestra. I ask you ensure that the musicians chosen for this orchestra are available without 
exception by 1st April of this year. Insofar as their existing employments exceed the 1st April deadline, 
I request that you approach their managers asking for them to be released for this date. In this you 
VKRXOGSRLQWRXWWKHRUFKHVWUD¶VREOLJDWRU\VSHFLDOFXOWXUDOSURSDJDQGLVWLFDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWDVNV101 
When the managers continued to complain to Hinkel, the Propaganda Minister 
intervened personally. In the words of the pro forma letter sent by the RKK to the 
PXVLFLDQV¶HPSOR\HUVWKHRUFKHVWUD¶VJRDOV³can only be achieved if all positions are 
occupied by the strongest talents. When compared with the needs of the German 
Dance- and Entertainment Orchestra, other interests must be subordinated to the task 
at hand and, above all, to the wishes of [Dr. Goebbels].´102 
Nonetheless, unlike the BBC Forces Programme, the DTUO was not a success with 
its target audience. The reasons for this FDQEHIRXQGLQ+DHQW]VFKHO¶VFRQWUDGLFWRU\
DQDO\VLVRIWKH'782¶VDFKLHYHPHQWV 
With the [DTUO] we swung, we really swung. And yet ultimately we were almost only allowed to 
play German numbers because of the ban [on playing compositions from belligerent countries].  
«7KHVW\OHZDVDOVRPLVVLQJZHZHUHQ¶WDOORZHGWRKDYHDQ\FKRUXVUHIUDLQVQRWHYHQIRUUDGLR
recordings, because the people back at home said, oh, if there are still vocal recordings over there then 
they would be better off fighting at the Front. 
Here the German and British attitudes toward vocalists, perceiving them as shirkers 
who were superfluous to the war effort, appear to coincide. The Musical Times wrote 
in 1942 that male and female crooners in Britain must have been physically unfit, 
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³EHFDXVH LW LV LQFRQFHLYDEOH WKDW WKHLU µYRFDO¶ RFFXSations are of the reserved 
type´,103 and such prejudices were also implicit in tKH%%&¶VKDQGOLQJRI WKHVOXVK 
debate. The DTUO was hampered by such counterproductive RMVP guidelines 
from the outset, which appear to have been more to placate civilian critics than 
Forces listeners. In deference to the Nazi criticism of a perceived rhythmic emphasis 
in jazz, moreover, the rules stipulated that the violins in the orchestra carry the 
melody.104 Genuine jazz fans in Germany were inevitably left unimpressed with the 
results.105 
The combination of musical quality and artistic compromise, however, appeared to 
please nobody. A memoraQGXPVLJQHGE\WKH5093¶V:DOWHU7LHler³*RHEEHOV¶
go-between to the Führerhauptquartier´106 on 30th January 1943 relayed an SD 
UHSRUW ZKLFK VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH RUFKHVWUD¶V OLYHO\ XSEHDW RIIHULQJV ZHUH GHHPHG
LQDSSURSULDWHE\WKH*HUPDQSHRSOHFRQWUDGLFWLQJ*RHEEHOV¶UHSRUWVRIWKH'782¶V
popularity with its target audience: 
The SD has pointed out that the music of the Entertainment- DQG 'DQFH 2UFKHVWUD >VLF@ GRHVQ¶W
reflect the current mood of the populace. 
Dr Goebbels ordered Party Member Gutterer to inform the SD that they were quite alone in this view. 
Only yesterday the commodore of a pilot squadron again explained to him how the troops welcome 
the music that is played on the radio.107 
7KH%ULWLVKDQG*HUPDQVRXUFHVUHJDUGLQJ'HOPHU¶VSoldatensender indicate that the 
orcheVWUD¶VDUUDQJHPHQWVZHUHin fact insufficiently exciting to deter German Forces 
from tuning into superior enemy musical broadcasts. Nonetheless, the domestic 
opponents of jazz complained bitterly about µGHJHQHUDWH¶PXVLF on the airwaves. In a 
letter to the RKK dated 10th July 1943, a Dresden office manager named Bruno 
Veith attacked the ³Jewish-niggerised music that is being offered to radio listeners 
on a daily basis by the so-called Dance- and Entertainment Orchestra [which] is 
FRPSDUDEOH WR WKH ZRUVW H[FHVVHV RI WKH :HLPDU 5HSXEOLF « ,W FRUUXSWV WKH
German spirit and poisons above all our youth, who today only know dance music in 
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the form of these miserable efforts that breathe the Jewish spirit.108 In reality, a few 
smuggled elements of genuine jazz notwithstanding,109 the ³ZRUVW H[FHVVHV´RI WKH
Weimar Republic were never approached. The DTUO was, to paraphrase S. 
)UHGHULFN6WDUU¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI WKHVLPLODUO\KDPVWUXQJ6WDWH-D]]2UFKHVWUDRI WKH
8665³VDIHWRWKHSRLQWRIWHGLXP´110 
There was some limited crossover between musicians of the DTUO and Charlie and 
his Orchestra. However, DGLFKRWRP\H[LVWHGEHWZHHQWKH5093¶VWZROHDGLQJMD]]
EDQGV LQ ZKLFK 7HPSOLQ¶V RUFKHVWUD ZDV FRQVLGHUHG WR KDYH JUHDWHU FDSDFLW\ IRU
individual expression and stronger jazz credentials. Notably, Haentzschel asserts that 
Fritz Brocksieper declined to perform with the DTUO because he felt it would 
damage his jazz credibility.111 7KLVLVFRQILUPHGE\%URFNVLHSHU¶VRZQDFFRXQWZLWK
the drummer claiming that he refused because the DTUO played inferior and overly 
commercial jazz.112 ³:HLQWKH>'782@ZHUHDOZD\VHTXDOVDPRQJHTXDOV´UHFDOOV 
Haentzschel ³DQG D VWDU OLNH )UHGGLH ZRXOGQ¶W KDYH ILW LQ VR ZHOO´113 This 
egalitarian regime at the DTUO was alleged by its business manager Sergius 
Safronow to have contributed to the increasing lack of discipline in the orchestra 
throughout 1943. A memorandum signed by Wilhelm Stuckart on 1st April 1943 
cited Safronow DV VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW *URWKH DQG +DHQW]VFKHO¶V LQIRUPDO DQG IDPLOLDU
approach with the musicians, with many of whom they had had longstanding 
working relationships, may have diminished their authority and encouraged 
dissent.114 Stuckart ruefully observed that only one Party member was to be found in 
the orchestra, and declared that such a great number of musicians in one place 
SUHVHQWHG³DSROLWLFDOGDQJHUVSRW´115 
The orchestra was removed to Prague in autumn 1943 after the bombing of the 
concert hall of the Reich Chamber of Theatre (RTK).116 Haentzschel and Grothe 
were finally sacked in January 1944 for musical transgressions, which culminated at 
the time of their dismissal with a programme being withdrawn from broadcast at the 
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last moment because it FRQWDLQHG ³IRUELGGHQ '782 UHFRUGLQJV´117 Their 
replacements were the classically-trained Hungarian bandleader Barnabás von Géczy 
and the pianist Willi Stech, and von GéF]\¶Vexisting orchestra was integrated into 
WKH'782EXWUHPDLQHG³DVHSDUDWHERG\´118 However, Kater notes that von Géczy 
had also been behind catastrophic official attempts in 1935-36 to cultivate an 
acceptably German alternative to jazz, and his ³VFKPDOW]\´ DSSURDFK dance music 
had won plaudits from the Nazi cultural elite.119 The employment of two 
comparatively reactionary bandleaders with close links to the regime was a marked 
volte-face from the progressive RRG reforms undertaken by Hinkel in 1941-42, 
which had seen the ascension of Grothe and Haentzschel. Moreover, while the 
orchestra was soon playing within the prescribed boundaries under the new directors, 
the disciplinary problems persisted to the extent that an RKK memo on 20th April 
1944 threatened unruly musicians with ³WKH KDUVKHVW FRQVHTXHQFHV´ VKRXOG WKH\
reoffend.120 As the war effort deteriorated and increasing numbers of musicians were 
drafted, the RKK criticised the dismay expressed by those orchestra members who 
had received their call-up papers. SXFKEHKDYLRXUFRQWUDGLFWHGWKH5..¶VFODLPWKDW
³RQH VKRXOG DFWXDOO\ H[SHFW WKDW DQ\ VDQH *HUPDQ PDQ ZKR FDQQRW JHW WR
LPPHGLDWHO\SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHZDUHIIRUWUHJUHWVWKLVIDFWWRWKHKLJKHVWGHJUHH´121 
It is interesting to compare these recordings to those of the post-war Radio Berlin 
Tanzorchester (RBTO), formed in the Eastern Occupied Zone in 1946, which was 
led by the DTUO stalwarts Haentzschel and Horst Kudritzki and contained many of 
the same musicians as the band put together by Goebbels.122 Their lively recording 
RI :DOWHU -HQVRQ¶V FRPSRVLWLRQ µ$PLJD 6ZLQJ¶ indicates that the personnel were 
capable of competently derivative American-style swing music,123 although the GDR 
jazz aficionado Wolfgang Muth rightly observed in 1963 that, although the 
UHFRUGLQJV ZHUH ³HQOLYHQHG E\ D IHZ JUHDW VRORLVWV´ WKH\ ZHUH largely stencilled 
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from the American arrangements and suffered from inferior recording conditions.124 
Nonetheless, the results offer audible proof that *RHEEHOV¶PXVLFLDQVZHUHbroadly 
capable of playing jazz, and indicate that the DTUO may have proven more 
successful in preventing Forces and civilians from tuning into foreign stations had it 
not been hampered by guidelines and restrictions. Ironically, the RBTO would itself 
fall victim to reactionary Soviet cultural policy in 1950, as American jazz once again 
became musica non grata in East Berlin with the onset of the Cold War. 
USA 
Elmer Davis and OWI 
As has been noted above in Chapter One, the RMVP had no direct American 
counterpart. Intelligence and information were originally both under the office of the 
Coordinator of Information (COI) headed by William Donovan, but upon British 
advice, on 14th June 1942 &2,¶VGXWLHV (excluding its Foreign Intelligence Service) 
were assigned to the new Office for Strategic Services (OSS), also directed by 
Donovan.125 Directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its deliberately bland name 
nonetheless reflected the American philosophy that propaganda was an auxiliary to 
military operations. A White House statement announced that it would continue 
CO,¶VZRUNRI³FROOHFWLQJVHFUHWDQGVWUDWHJLFLQIRUPDWLRQLQIRUHLJQFRXQWULHVDQG
performing general and miscellaneous and [sic.] strategic services abroad except the 
disseminaWLRQRI LQIRUPDWLRQE\UDGLR OHDIOHWVHWF´ ,QIRUPDWLRQZDVWREHKDQGOHG
and disseminated by the Office of War Information (OWI), which was split into two 
divisions, responsible for the USA and all other countries (except Latin America) 
respectively.126 OWI consolidated the functions of a number of predecessor 
agencies,127 and while the Secretaries of State for War and the Navy devised basic 
policies and plans for war information, the director of OWI retained the final 
decision on all matters. The Times of London described OWI on 15th -XQHDV ³WKH
$PHULFDQµ0LQLVWU\RI,QIRUPDWLRQ¶´128 
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OWI¶V ILUVW GLUHFWRU was Elmer Davis, a well-known author, journalist and 
broadcaster who had spent the first two and a half years of the war reporting from 
Europe for CBS.129 ³2EYLRXVO\KLVSRZHUVDUHVZHHSLQJ´UHSRUWHGThe Times³EXW
the general consensus of opinion is that Mr. Davis LV WKH PDQ IRU WKH MRE´130 
Nonetheless, as in Britain, the USA proved resistant to the idea of such public 
control of information by the state. Davis had to convince the public of the value of 
OWI, and described %HQMDPLQ )UDQNOLQ¶V SURSDJDQGD ZRUN IURP 3DULV GXULQJ WKH
$PHULFDQ :DU RI ,QGHSHQGHQFH DV WKH ILQHVW H[DPSOH RI WKH DUW IRUP ³<RX FDQ¶W
turn up a Franklin every time you need one, but we are trying to do the same job he 
GLG´ KH WROG D MRXUQDOLVW LQ September 1942,131 in an apparent attempt to 
destigmatise propaganda in the minds of both the public and the budget allocators in 
Congress by connecting it to $PHULFD¶VVHOI-liberation from colonial rule. It is also 
noteworthy that the RVMP explicitly attempted to invoke the spirit of liberation 
IURP %ULWLVK UXOH LQ WKH µ3DXO 5HYHUH¶ EURDGFDVWV RI Douglas Chandler. However, 
both 'DYLV¶ personal history of partisan war reportage from Europe, and his public 
and his private utterances as Director of OWI, suggest that he was an idealist who 
sincerely believed in the practical value of its work, much in the manner of Sefton 
Delmer at PWE.132  
In private, 'DYLV¶IDYRXULWHWRDVWZDV ³FRQIXVLRQWRWKH enemy´,133 but he could also 
EH VXUSULVLQJO\ FDQGLG DERXW 2:,¶V UHPLW LQ SXEOLF On 28th October 1942, for 
example, he told an audience in New York:  
We are in a sense an auxiliary to the armed forces, so far as our overseas operations are concerned²
an organization whose work can help clear the way for them, and make their success easier.  
« >(@YHU\ERG\ NQRZV WKDW WKH YLFWRULHV RI +LWOHU¶V DUPLHV ZHUH PDGH IDU HDVLHU SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ
France, by the psychological preparation which softened up not only a good part of the French people, 
but a still larger part of their government. Hitler has been using those same techniques on us, though 
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happily without much effect, and we would be fools if we did not use them on him and his allies as 
well.134 
This acknowledgemeQW RI WKH 86$¶V employment of thH ³VDPH WHFKQLTXHV´ DV
Germany was phrased in more palatable language to the American media. On 16th 
August 1942, The New York Times Magazine published an interview in which Davis 
asserted:  
Democracies have a good story to tell and they ought to tell it. OWI is telling it, and they will tell it in 
increasing volume as our foreign service expands. 
>«@ To enemy countries we broadcast news of the war, American production etc. - again the truth, 
with only such omissions as actual military security may demand: but that news, in direction and 
emphasis, is adjusted to the particular interests of enemy peoples so as to produce the psychological 
effect most conducive to our victory.135 
Initially, OWI was responsible for providing both news and entertainment to the 
WURRSVVWDWLRQHGRYHUVHDV+RZHYHULWVRRQEHFDPHFOHDUDV'DYLVSXWLWWKDW³>WKH@
real objective [of music and entertainment for the army] was morale building. This, 
LQ >2:,¶V@ MXGJHPHQW ZDV QRW WKH SUHURJDWLYH RI 2:, but rather that of the 
DUP\´136 Broadcast entertainment was thus delegated to the Special Services 
'LYLVLRQ66'WKHDUP\¶VRZQHQWHUWDLQPHQWVHUYLFHIRXQGHGLQ,Q2FWREHU
 66'¶V 'LUHFWRU %ULJDGLHU-General Frederick Osborn, announced that it had 
been agreed that OWI would control all short- and medium wave news programmes 
to the Forces, while SSD should take over short- and medium wave entertainment 
broadcasts, albeit under the condition of an OWI veto when the programmes came to 
broadcast.137 66'DOVRKDGSHUPLVVLRQWR³RULJLQDWHZULWHDQGSURGXFHLQIRUPDWLRQ
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The matter of the news content of these programmes was complicated by the fact 
that, due to limited shortwave broadcasting capabilities to the rest of the world, 
SURJUDPPHVWDUJHWHGDW86WURRSVVWDWLRQHGRYHUVHDV³PXVWDOVREHGHSOR\HGWRWKH
maximum of usefulness for psychological warfare purposHV´139 The logic of this 
was that the enemy would take seriously any information contained in any 
broadcasts in English to American troops, and as such the content could not only be 
used to lift the spirits of American GIs, but also simultaneously serve covert 
operational aims in foreign countries. This dual functionality brought with it the 
SUREOHP DV SRLQWHG RXW E\ 2VERUQ WKDW ³WKHUH PXVW EH PDQ\ FDVHV ZKHUH WKH
information Mr [Robert] Sherwood wishes to impart to foreign countries would be in 
content or in the manner of presentation undesirable from the point of view of [the] 
PRUDOHRIRXUWURRSV´140 
66'¶VHQWHUWDLQPHQWSURJUDPPLQJZDVDOVRDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWHGE\WKH3HWULOOR%DQ
which halted the production of new commercial music for radio stations and juke 
boxes from August 1942 until November 1944.141 James P. Petrillo, President of the 
American Federation of Musicians, claimed that the increasing use of recorded 
music was limiting job opportunities for American musicians, and for the next two 
years and three months, the only records produced were for the Forces, government 
transcriptions and non-commercial patriotic programmes. On 17th September 1942, 
Elmer Davis testified as first witness in front of a Senate Interstate Commerce 
Subcommittee, arguing thaW WKH EDQ ³KDV KDG WKH SUDFWLFDO HIIHFW RI VWRSSLQJ DOO
UHFRUGPDNLQJ´+HVWDWHGWKDW2:I 
KDVDGLUHFWDQGYLWDOFRQFHUQZLWKWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHUDGLRFRYHUDJHLQWKHFRXQWU\«,WLVRQH
of the most important media for the conveyance of war information in general to the people, and may 
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become of still greater importance when there is occasion for an emergency message from the 
national leadership. 
A policy which threatens the continued existence of many of these [commercial radio] stations is 
injurious to the national system of communication. 
«7KHGLUHFWRURIWKLVRIILFHLVQRWSHUVRQDOO\DQDGGLFWRIWKHMXNHER[EXWKHQRWHVWKDWLWVHHPVWR
be highly popular among soldiers, sailors and marines in army posts at home, and among factory 
workers as well. While at our outposts overseas recorded music is a vital necessity for the 
entertainment of our troops.142 
1XPHURXVFRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFDOFDUWRRQVGHSLFWHG3HWULOORDV³WKH%RVVRI0XVLF´
ZKR IRUFHG WKH QDWLRQ WR ³SOD\ KLV WXQH´143 although the reality was more 
complicated. Petrillo had widespread support from other unions, including an 
explicit endorsement from the American Federation of Labour (AFL), and could also 
SODXVLEO\FODLP WKDW WKH%ULWLVK0XVLFLDQV¶8QLRQZDV IROORZLQJ WKHVLWXDWLRQZLWK
great interest.144 1RQHWKHOHVVVLQFHFRQWHPSRUDU\PXVLFZDVRQHRIWKH86$¶VPRVW
powerful cultural weapons, it is remarkable that an industrial dispute could cease its 
production for over two years during a World War. The complexities of the ban are 
beyond the remit of the thesis and have been explored extensively elsewhere,145 but 
it is noteworthy that the remarkable situation in the USA broadly paralleled the 
problems of the RMVP in Germany and the BBC in Britain vis-à-vis popular music. 
In each country, the difficulties were to a degree self-inflicted by the nature of the 
respective cultural and political conditions and subject to some degree to the whims 
of individual personalities such as Goebbels, Bliss and Petrillo³The crippling of the 
popular music industry at the onset of a long and arduous war seemed to many to be 
DFUXHOEORZWRSXEOLFPRUDOH´QRWHVWKHKLVWRULDQ6FRWW'H9HDX[³SDUWLFXODUO\DIWHU
DQHDUOLHU3HWULOORSOHGJH«QRWWRFDOOVWULNHVµIRUWKHGXUDWLRQ>RIWKHZDU@¶´146 
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2QHRI66'¶V most popular features was the variety show Command Performance, a 
programme with a similar format to Wunschkonzert für die Wehrmacht.147 Produced 
specifically for overseas Forces, it featured an array of stars, including jazz vocal 
acts such as Frank Sinatra and the Andrews Sisters, performing requests sent in by 
soldiers. As with the success of the BBC Forces Programme in Britain, the fact that 
WKHOLYHO\EURDGFDVWZDVWDLORUHGWRWKHQHHGVRI$PHULFD¶VForces meant that, when 
it was finally also broadcast on all four major domestic networks on Christmas Eve 
1942, it was a great success.148 Moreover, in January 1943, Davis suggested that the 
utilisation of such a show on American civilian airwaves was valuable because it 
IRUPHG ³D GLUHFW ERQG EHWZHHQ WKH ILJKWLQJ IURQW DQG WKH KRPH IURQW´,149 which 
mirrored similar assertions by Joe Loss in Britain and Hans Hinkel in Germany. 
Additional jazz-oriented musical shows targeted at the army included G.I. Jive, Yank 
Swing Session and Downbeat.150 
However, just three months before he had advocated broadcasting Command 
Performance domestically, Davis had intimated at another New York public 
appearance WKDW PXVLF ZRXOG EH RI PLQLPDO YDOXH LQ 2:,¶V ZRUN ³7R WKH WURRSV
RYHUVHDV´KHVWDWHG³ZHVHQGHQWHUWDLQPHQWSURJUDPVDVZHOOEXW WKHEXONRIRXU
service to them is news; and our other audiences have no appetite for entertainment. 
About four-fifths of our foreign broadcast programs are straight news, hard factual 
news[.]´151 Although elsewhere he acknowledged the importance of music for 
GIs,152 it is no less remarkable that Davis underestimated its significance WR³RWKHr 
DXGLHQFHV´, given his wartime experience in Europe. Indeed, although Anglo-
American cooperation on propaganda and information issues preceded the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor, it also suggests a lack of communication between OWI and its 
British colleagues on this significant issue, since the evidence from both British and 
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German sources conclusively demonstrates that musical entertainment was a priority 
not only for the Forces but also for home front listeners. 
By the time the USA entered the war, a number of connections had already been 
forged between British and American intelligence agencies. British Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) was in consultation with :LOOLDP 'RQRYDQ¶V IRUHLJQ
broadcasting service (FIS), which was integrated into OWI in the reorganisation of 
14th June 1942,153 and 3:(¶V'DYLG*DUQHWWODWHUUHIHUUHGWR'RQRYDQ¶VRUJDQLVDtion 
DV 62(¶V RSSRVLWH QXPEHU ³LQVRIDU DV >%ULWLVK@ 6>SHFLDO@ 2>SHUDWLRQV@ ZHUH
FRPSDWLEOHZLWK86QHXWUDOLW\´154 Moreover, the renowned dramatist and Roosevelt 
speechwriter Robert Sherwood arrived in Britain in early September 1941, together 
ZLWK D UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI WKH )&&¶V %URDGFDVW 'LYLVLRQ WR PHHW ZLWK 3:(
representatives, including Robert Lockhart, and to ³UHSRUWWR'RQRYDQRQDOO%ULWLVK
Radio Broadcasting, overt and convert [sic.] as far as [the British] may wish to 
LQIRUPKLP>@´155 Here ideas were exchanged on the development of propaganda in 
DUHDV VXFK DV EURDGFDVWLQJ µEODFN¶ VWDWLRQV SRVWDO V\VWHPV Dnd fabricated news 
items. *DUQHWW QRWHV WKDW ³>W@KH PRVW LPSRUWDQW ILHOG IRU cooperation was that of 
LQWHOOLJHQFH &RORQHO 'RQRYDQ FRXOG PRELOLVH WHFKQLFDO VNLOO LQ µ0DUNHW 5HVHDUFK¶
for PWE purposes, by training trade representatives and tourists going to Europe in 
methods of information gathering and could collect and tabulate information 
collected from persons arriving from Europe and could station intelligence officers at 
LPSRUWDQWSRLQWVLQ(XURSHXQGHUVXLWDEOHFRYHU´156 
:KHQ 2:,¶V 'HSXW\ 'LUHFWRU $UFKLbald MacLeish travelled to England in the 
summer of 1942, his liaison partners were PWE as opposed to MoI. On 31st July 
1942 it was agreed that PWE and OWI officials would meet in London on a weekly 
basis to discuss policy,157 which effectively formalised the cooperation between the 
two organisations. In October 1942, Dick Crossman, WKH +HDG RI 3:(¶V *HUPDQ
Section,158 requested a thousand-word maximum weekly report on US propaganda to 
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Japan. He also suggested that OWI station somebody with PWE in London, with 
2:,¶VDQDO\VLVJURXSLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFRWDNLQJLQD3:(HPSOR\HHLQUHWXUQ,159 and 
from November 1943 an eighteen-VWURQJ %ULWLVK µ3ROLWLFDO :DUIDUH 0LVVLRQ¶ ZDV
stationed on American soil.160 
$OLQHZDVGUDZQKRZHYHUDWWKHVKDULQJRIµEODFN¶LQIRUPDWLRQ7KHminutes of the 
initial meeting between OWI and PWE recorded Brigadier Brooks as saying that ³LQ
general we had no secrets from the American Services and the same must apply to 
SODQVLPSDUWHGWR2:,E\3:(6RIDUDVµEODFN¶DFWLYLWLHVZHUHFRQFHUQHG the 
British Services Department took the view that knowledge of these activities should 
be restricted to such people as required to know about them for operational reasons, 
DQG KH WKRXJKW WKLV UXOH PLJKW UHDVRQDEO\ DSSO\ WR WKH $PHULFDQ 6HUYLFHV´161 
TherefoUHZKLOH%ULWLVKµEODFN¶RSHUDWLRQVLQDOOODQJXDJHVDQGboth radio and print 
formats were carefully coordinated,162 %ULWLVK DQG $PHULFDQ µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD
remained largely independent of one another due to this policy of restricting the 
sharing of information on subversive operations. This explains the fact that the FCC 
monitors in the United States had no knowledge of the origins of the popular British 
µEODFN¶VWDWLRQGustav Siegfried Eins (GS1), and analysed its broadcasts on a regular 
basis on the assumption that it was a rogue German station.163 
Britain 
Sefton Delmer and Gustav Siegfried Eins 
Early British µEODFN¶ VWDWLRQV ZHUH KHDYLO\ FULWLFLVHG E\ 6HIWRQ 'HOPHU $ SULPH
example was the authentic communist agitprop produced by the Sender der 
Europäischen Revolution (µStation of the European Revolution), which the misled 
)&&GHVFULEHGDV³DWUDQVPLWWHURIXQNQRZQVSRQVRUVKLSDQGORFDWLRQ>«@EHOLHYHG
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WR KDYH EHJXQ RSHUDWLRQV LQ WKH VXPPHU RI ´164 7KH VWDWLRQ¶V DSSDUHQW
independence was reinforced by itVFULWLFLVPRI³UHDFWLRQDU\´%ULWLVKFRORQLDOSROLF\
in the Far East.165 It is unclear whether the anti-British sentiment was a deliberate 
camouflage (in the same way that the 1D]L µEODFN¶ VWDWLRQ :RUNHUV¶ &KDOOHQJH 
attempted to disguise its GermaQRULJLQE\UDLOLQJDJDLQVW³WKHPHQDFHRI1D]LVP´
DQG ³WKH KRUURUV RI WKH *HVWDSR´,166 or simply the opinion of the German 
communist exiles who ran the station largely unfettered by British control. However, 
Delmer claimed that it was ineffective as a means of psychological warfare: 
[It was a] straightforward opposition [radio station], appealing to the German people to rise against 
Hitler, denouncing the war, vaunting the strength of the allies, and generally behaving like an enemy 
propaganda broadcast, H[FHSWWKDWZKHUHWKH%%&VDLGµ\RX*HUPDQV¶WKH\VDLGµZH*HUPDQV¶«
,GHFLGHGWKDWDQHZDSSURDFKZDVQHHGHG« 
³, WKLQN ZH VKRXOG WU\ RXW D QHZ W\SH RI µ%ODFN 5DGLR¶ RQ WKH *HUPDQV´ , VXJJHVWHG WR /HRQDUG
>,QJUDPV@«³RQHWKDWXQGHUPLQHV+LWOer, not by opposing him, but by pretending to be all for him 
DQGKLVZDU«:HPXVWDSSHDOWRWKHµLQQHUSLJGRJ¶LQVLGHHYHU\*HUPDQLQWKHQDPHRIKLVKLJKHVW
SDWULRWLFLGHDOV>@´167  
Although the European Revolution appears to have failed to produce tangible results 
within Germany, its ruse at least succeeded in misleading WKH)&&¶VDQDO\VWVLQWKHLU
reading of the international situation. On 13th June 1942, over six months since the 
USA had entered the war, it was suggestHG WKDW ³European Revolution, continuing 
« LWV DSSHDOV IRU *HUPDQ UHYROW KRSHIXOO\ SRLQWV WR SROLWLFDO VFKLVPV LQVLGH
Germany.´168 The FCC was similarly misled by Delmer¶VHDUO\ VWDWLRQV, noting on 
19th September 1942: 
Clandestine transmitters, like Gustav-Siegfried-Eins and Army Transmitter North [Wehrmachtsender 
1RUG@ KDYH XVHG WKH WKHPH ³KDUGVKLSV RI 8-ERDW FUHZV´ DV ZHOO DV WKHLU LQVXIILFLHQW WUDLQLQJ LQ
order to undermine the morale of U-boat crews and their relatives. Apparently the men operating 
these clandestine stations (or the groups behind them) are of the opinion that stories and rumors of 
this kind utilize an opening which Nazi morale offers to anti-Nazi propaganda. The effectiveness of 
this propaganda may perhaps be inferred from the fact that Radio Berlin, in official broadcasts, denies 
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³UXPRUV´UHJDUGLQJ WKH LQVXIILFLHQW WUDLQLQJRI8-boat crews. (This is an unprecedented propaganda 
technique. In previous cases, Nazi propagandists avoided answering clandestine stations, preferring to 
wait until the anti-Nazi rumor appeared on an official enemy radio, and then denying it.).169 
The short-lived Nord ZDVVLJQLILFDQWEHFDXVHLWUHSUHVHQWHG'HOPHU¶VILUVWDWWHPSWDW
creating an authentic-sounding Soldatensender. A British Foreign Office monitor 
described it as ³>F@OHYHUO\ YHLOHG DQWL-1D]L SURSDJDQGD´ ZKLFK RIIHUHG D ³>P@L[HG
SURJUDPPHRIKRPHDQGIRUHLJQQHZVPXVLFDOLWHPVJUHHWLQJVWRVROGLHUVHWF´170 
Although no evidence is available of the exact nature of Nord¶V musical content, Rex 
Leeper noted that it included German music in order to replicate the content of an 
authentic German Soldatensender. Its successor stations, Deutsche Kurzwellensender 
Atlantik and Soldatensender Calais, also copied the lively format of genuine stations 
such as Soldatensender Belgrad,171 and the fact that jazz and dance music formed a 
central component of these latter PWE projects indicates that it was also a significant 
feature of Nord. +RZHYHU GXH WR WKH IDFW WKDW DW WKLV SRLQW %ULWLVK µEODFN¶
operations were only able to issue pre-recorded broadcasts, Delmer concluded that 
Nord ODFNHGDXWKHQWLFLW\QRWLQJ WKDW³>IRU UDGLRQHZV@ WREHQHZVDQGVRXQG OLNH
QHZV « >LW@PXVWEHEURDGFDVW OLYH ,WPXVWEHXS WR WKHPLQXWHFKDQJLQJ IURP
EXOOHWLQ WR EXOOHWLQ´172 The fledgling venture was subsequently abandoned after 
several weeks of experimentation. 
GS1 was successful as a pre-recorded broadcast until, due to an accidental repeat 
play by a non-German-speaking transmitter engineer, its protagonist ZDVµPXUGHUHG¶
on-air twice by Nazis during his final, dramatic broadcast.173 The protagonist in 
question was Der Chef µ7KH&KLHI¶SOD\HGE\ DGerman political émigré named 
Peter Seckelmann,174 who broadcast polemics against the Parteikommune,175 a 
hybrid RI µ3DUW\¶ DQG µ&RPPXQH¶ GHVLJQHG to imply Bolshevik infiltration of the 
NSDAP, but never Hitler himself. The FCC monitors were kept guessing as to the 
station¶s sponsors, noting that  
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[a]lthough this station is represented as a genuine µunderground¶ transmitter, internal evidence from 
content analysis suggests that it might operate with the approval of the Nazi government if not under 
LWVDFWXDOFRQWURO7KHVWDWLRQ¶VFRQVLVWHQWOLQH± pro-Army and anti-Nazi bureaucracy ± presumably 
expresses the feelings of a considerable German group, and the station may be officially used both as 
D VDIHW\ YDOYH IRU KRVWLOLW\ DQG DV D PDQLSXODWRU RI WKH JURXS¶V DWWLWXGHV « $W DQ\ UDWH WKH
VXVSLFLRQ RI WKH VWDWLRQ¶V OHJLWLPDF\ LV VWURQJ HQRXJK WR ZDUUDQW D WRQJXH-in-cheek reading of its 
broadcasts.176 
Far from being a safety valve for anti-Nazi tendencies, however, the station caused 
great concern in Germany, with a British informant reporting in December 1942 that 
LWZDVEHLQJGLVFXVVHGLQ³YHU\KLJKDUP\FLUFOHV´177 GS1 combined truths and half-
truths in a manner designed to cause maximum damage to the German war effort, 
DSSHDOLQJ WR VROGLHUV¶ LQVWLQFWV IRU VHOI-preservation and attempting to turn them 
against the NSDAP. The FCC, for example, recorded Der Chef¶V defence of his 
GHFLVLRQ WR ³>QRWLI\@ London propagandists of the alleged Typhus epidemic on the 
5XVVLDQIURQW´178 It went unnoticed by the monitor that this Typhus epidemic, like 
Der Chef himself, was in fact the product of those same British propagandists to 
whom he was supposed to have betrayed this secret. Nonetheless, on 1st August 
1942, the FCC did comment upon the apparent co-ordination of the themes treated 
by Nord and GS1 ZLWK WKH PRQLWRU DGPLWWLQJ WKDW ³Lt is difficult to determine 
whether this merely means that A.T.N [Wehrmachtsender Nord] listens to the Chief 
or rather that the two clandestine stations are operated by the same group.´179 The 
experience gained by Delmer and his staff in the trial-and-error development of GS1 
and Nord would subsequently be put to use in the counterfeit jazz-oriented 
Soldatensender ZKLFK ZHUH WR EHFRPH VRPH RI WKH PRVW VXFFHVVIXO µEODFN¶
operations of World War II. 
The BBC Ban on Slush DQGµ-D]]LQJWKH&ODVVLFV¶ 
With his Soldatensender, Delmer was able to exploit dissatisfaction among German 
Forces with the musical broadcasts of the RRG. However, Germany was not alone in 
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imposing counterproductive guidelines on its musical output; in Britain, the question 
of suitably virile music for the Forces led to the BBC FRQWURYHUVLDOO\EDQQLQJµVOXVK¶
DQG WKHSUDFWLFHRI µMD]]LQJ WKHFODVVLFV¶ IURP WKHDLUZDYHV Frederick Ogilvie had 
resigned as Director-General in January 1942, to be replaced by the co-Directors 
General Sir Cecil Graves and Robert Foot. While Foot concentrated on the 
CRUSRUDWLRQ¶VILQDnces, Graves focussed on reorganising programming in the wake 
of listener research feedback, which showed a slump in public approval for the 
%%&¶VRXWSXW180 The genesis of the ban was, as stated to band leaders, a desire on 
WKH SDUW RI WKH SXEOLF )RUFHV OLVWHQHUV DQG IDFWRU\ ZRUNHUV IRU ³D PRUH YLULOH DQG
robust music in our programmes generally, with special reference to dance 
PXVLF´181 In fact, as Christina Baade has demonstrated, it was the result of a BBC-
driven initiative to offer a more robust output for Forces listeners, in particular in the 
wake of a series of British surrenders in Asia which were interpreted as showing a 
lack of fighting spirit.182 
Accordingly, on 21st July 1942, the Corporation sent a letter to music publishers, 
dance band leaders and vocalists which detailed the new guidelines for dance music 
in Britain.183 The guidelines, which were printed in the British press the following 
day and detailed in an article in the Radio Times one week later, were summarised by 
WKH%%&¶V$VVLVWDQW&RQWUROOHURIProgrammes, Richard J. F. Howgill, as follows:184 
(a) to exclude any form of anaemic or debilitated vocal performance by male singers.  
(b) to control performance by women singing to the extent that an insincere or over-sentimental style 
will not be allowed,  
(c) to exclude numbers which are slushy in sentiment, or contain innuendo or other matter considered 
to be offensive from the point of view of good taste or religious or allied susceptibilities, e.g. [racist 
WHUPVVXFKDV@³<RJL´³&KLQN´HWF 
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(d) to exclude numbers based on tunes borrowed from standard classical works usually found in 
concert hall or opera house programmes, either with or without lyrics.185 
A key problem of the slush ban was the fact that the criteria were inevitably abstract 
and highly subjective. Howgill himself noted in his 21st July memorandum that, 
EHFDXVH ³VLQFHUHO\ VHQWLPHQWDO VRQJV´ ZLOO VWLOO EH SHUPLWWHG ³LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
EHFRPHV RI WKH XWPRVW LPSRUWDQFH´186 The task of interpretation, Howgill wrote, 
would go to the programme producers, who were to make on-the-spot decisions at 
the rehearsal stage whether or not a proposed vocal performance violated the 
guidelines.187 Godfrey Adams, the Director of Programme Planning, coined an 
informal maxim WR³HUURQ WKHVLGHRI0DUFKHV´ LQcase of doubt, and this advice 
was passed on to continuity announcers to assist with the selection of appropriate 
³ILOOXSUHFRUGV´.188 It is therefore unsurprising that, within four weeks of the ban, the 
number of letters opposing it outnumbered those in support of it by four to one.189  
In an interview in early August 1942 with Melody Maker¶V µ'HWHFWRU¶ Edgar 
Jackson), the BBC explained that censorship decisions would be made by a 
committee of seven.190 -DFNVRQ¶VRZQDFFRXQWUHFRUGVWKHIROORZLQJFRQYHUVDWLRQ 
³%XW´ , UHWRUWHG ³WKDW LV DOO WRR YDJXH :KDW exactly, as far as this matter is concerned, is one to 
DVVXPHLVPHDQWE\µDQDHPLF¶µGHELOLWDWHG¶µLQVLQFHUH¶µRYHU-VHQWLPHQWDO¶RUµVOXVK\¶"6XUHO\LWPXVW
to a great extent depend on the outlook of the individual, how he or she reacts to a song and/or 
SHUIRUPDQFH"´ 
³2K\HV´DQVZHUHGWKH%%&³:HDJUHHLWLVJUHDWO\DPDWWHURISHUVRQDOWDVWH´ 
³,QWKDWFDVH´VDLG,³,ZDQWWRNQRZD lot more about the Committe [sic.] and its tastes. 
³,ZDQW WREHDVVXUHG WKDW LWKDVQ¶WFUDQN WDVWHV ,ZDQW WRNQRZWKDW LWZLOO IDLUO\UHIOHFW WKHSXEOLF
taste; that it will not use its powers, against which there is, apparently, no appeal, to foist its own 
tastes on the public; that it will be sufficiently tolerant and broad-PLQGHG´191 
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,Q VSLWH RI WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V alleged refusal to name all of the panel members, 
Jackson proceeds to publish them, which indicates actual or eventual BBC 
permission. The Dance Music Policy Committee consisted of Arthur Bliss (Director 
of Music), John Watt (Director of Variety), Richard J. F. Howgill (Assistant 
Controller of Programmes), Robert Macdermot (Programme Organiser), Cecil 
Madden (Director of Entertainments in the Empire and North American Service), 
Kenneth Wright (Director of Overseas Programming) and Douglas Lawrence 
(responsible for dance music at the Variety Department).192 -DFNVRQ¶VFRQFHUQ WKDW
these senior BBC figures PLJKW³WU\WRIRLVWWKHLUWDVWHVRQWKHSXEOLF´appears to be 
justified, given the CRUSRUDWLRQ¶VGLGDFWLFDQGSDWHUQDOLVWLFDSSURDFKWRWKHQDWLRQ¶V
musical tastes. This had been expressed in the Music Policy document that was 
circulated internally at the BBC just four months earlier, which showed that the BBC 
LQGHHGVDZLWVHOIDV³>WKH@JXDUGLDQRI>%ULWLVK@FXOWXUDOYDOXHV>DQG@PXVWDFFHSWWKH
GXW\RIHGXFDWLQJWKHSXEOLF´193 
$WD³YHU\DUGXRXV´PHHWLQJRQst July 1942, around one fifth of the approximately 
one hundred pieces of music examined were rejected.194 A meeting took place 
between the Music Publishers Association (MPA) and the BBC on 27th August, 
which resulted in the Corporation agreeing to an appeals process,195 although Gordon 
Crier of the Variety Department was to be the ³ILQDO voice´ on the matter of 
µVOXVK¶196 Crier was given a four-week special assignment by John Watt to focus on 
Variety programmes, ³ZLWK D VSHFLDO VODQW RQ WKH SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI µDQWL-VOXVK¶
numbers in whatever programme they occur in accordance with the stated Dance 
%DQG3ROLF\´197 It is significant that this attempt to provide practical illustrations of 
WKH %%&¶V LGHD RI VXLWDEO\ YLULOH PXVLF PLUURUHG *RHEEHOV¶ LQWHQWLRQs with the 
DTUO. The orchestra was to serve a didactic and exemplary function for all German 
musicians, delivering first-rate musicianship within the RMVP guidelines,198 and 
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&ULHU¶V UHPLW ZDV VLPLODUO\ WR set a musical benchmark within the confines of the 
%%&¶VQHZFULWHULD. $ZHHNO\ µKLW¶SHULRGZDV DOVR FRQFHLYHGRI LQ0D\  LQ
which new music would be presented on alternate weeks by the bands of Jack Payne 
and Geraldo. Dance Music Policy was to be enforced more stringently for this 
programme than it was possible to do consistently elsewhere, with the intention that 
publishers would be forced to produce music that complied with the dictates of the 
Corporation in order to have their compositions featured on the prime time event.199  
7KH EDQ RQ ³QXPEHUV EDVHG RQ WXQHV ERUURZHG IURP VWDQGDUG FODVVLFDO ZRUNV´200 
FRPPRQO\NQRZQDVµMD]]LQJWKHFODVVLFV¶, was theoretically easier to enforce. This 
was less subject to the whims of individual censors, although Graves described the 
SROLF\ DV ³D PDWWHU IRU DUELWUDU\ GHFLVLRQV DQG DV VXFK LW bristles with 
GLIILFXOWLHV´201 Accordingly, borderline cases were to be ruled upon by the 
&RUSRUDWLRQ¶V 'LUHFWRU RI 0XVLF WKH FRPSRVHU DQG FRQGXFWRU $UWKXU %OLVV ³,W LV
LPSRVVLEOH WR GHILQH H[DFWO\ ZKDW D µFODVVLFDO FRPSRVLWLRQ¶ LV´ VWDWHG D
memorandum to the leaders of light music bands dated 27th 1RYHPEHU³EXWWKH
SKUDVH LV ZHOO HQRXJK XQGHUVWRRG WR IRUP WKH EDVLV RI D ZRUNLQJ DJUHHPHQW´202 
Indeed, this was to include other material such as folk melodies, which were 
generally not considered part of WKHµFODVVLFDO¶UHSHUWRLUH7KHJLYHQMXVWLILFDWLRQIRU
the restriction was that WKH &RUSRUDWLRQ ³wants to avoid bringing established 
compositions into disrepute by allowing them to be parodied, arranged unsuitably, or 
given extravagant or inadequate perfRUPDQFH « $ FODVVLFDO ZRUN PXVW QRW EH
arranged in a way that is incongruous to its essential nature.´203 
+RZHYHUXQOLNHWKHµVOXVK¶EDQLWZDVQRWDSROLF\ZLWKFRQFUHWHJRDOVLQWKHUHDOP
of morale. Moreover, it was so poorly enforced that, as late as 13th April 1945, 
+RZJLOO FRXOGFRPSODLQRIDEURDGFDVWZKLFK LQFOXGHG*HUDOGR¶VGDQFHYHUVLRQRI
'HEXVV\¶Vµ&ODLUHGX/XQH¶DQGDVNWKH'LUHFWRUVRI9DULHW\DQG0XVLFWR³FRQVLGHU
[the] question of dance bands playing music which is outside their sphere and try and 
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HYROYHVRPHPDFKLQHU\IRUSUHYHQWLQJLW´204 This is a remarkable request given that 
SRLQW G LQ +RZJLOO¶V st July memorandum almost two years earlier had been 
intended to create precisely such machinery.205 Indeed, this request for further action 
from a senior BBC figure, less than one month from the end of the war, provides 
conclusive evidence that morale was not a factor in the ban. Rather, it was a means 
of musical segregation which was informed by the BB&¶V VHOI-perception as the 
JXDUGLDQRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VFXOWXUDOYDOXHV+HUHDJDLQBlisV¶ personality as Director of 
Music was an important factor, and the decree was strictly implemented until he left 
the position in 1944, even as increasing concessions were made elsewhere with 
UHJDUGWRWKHµVOXVK¶EDQ206 
7KH LQVLVWHQFH WKDWGDQFHEDQGVVWD\ LQVLGH WKHLUPXVLFDO µVSKHUH¶VXSSRUWV&KDUOHV
&KLOWRQ¶VODWHUDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHMD]]-FODVVLFDOGLYLGHZDV³DOPRVWDUDFLDOWKLQJ´LQ
Britain during the war,207 and the ban effectively enshrined this anti-jazz cultural 
prejudice in BBC regulation. 7KH &RUSRUDWLRQ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH ZDV VHW RXW LQ D draft 
Music Policy document dated 6th March 1942ZKLFKVWDWHGWKDWWKH%%&¶VZDUWLPH
DLPVLQFOXGHG³>W@KH best possible broadcast performance of all worthy music´DQG
³>V@ecuring by all worthy means the maximum appreciation of such broadcasts by 
winning the largest possible audience, thereby continually raising public taste.´208 It 
is noteworthy that tKH %%&¶V VWDWHG µ&UHDWLYH 3ULQFLSOH¶ ³0XVLF LV DQ HQQREOLQJ
VSLULWXDO IRUFH ZKLFK VKRXOG LQIOXHQFH WKH OLIH RI HYHU\ OLVWHQHU´209 is used as a 
constant point of reference and the guiding idea behind BBC wartime policy. This 
vague and abstract concept is reminiscent of the esoteric terminology of the RMK in 
its attempts to cultivate a New German Dance Music, and was clearly at odds with 
the utilitarian priorities of broadcasting during the war. The document states: 
If the Creative Principle is to be accepted, there follows the responsibility for broadcasting the 
maximum amount of fine music to all who need it. This maximum must in practice be determined by 
the competing claims of other types of programme; but the Creative Principle carries its own 
justification of programme time and expenditure. 
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There follows from it also the responsibility for spreading the appreciation of music as widely as 
possible. The B.B.C., in addition to its obligation as guardian of cultural values, must accept the duty 
of educating the public. It must therefore plan continually by worthy means to add to the number of 
those capable of enjoying fine music.210 
The passage asserts the theoretical primacy of didactic obligations over practical 
considerations of morale and entertainment, and, while popular taste is apparently 
acknowledged LQ WKH UHIHUHQFH WR ³FRPSHWLQJ FODLPV RI RWKHU W\SHV RI
SURJUDPPH´211 these are clearly seen as being in opposition tRWKH%%&¶V&UHDWLYH
Principle. 
This attitude can be traced back to Bliss. Baade¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDW%liss viewed dance 
PXVLF DV ³DW EHVW GLYHUWLQJ DQG DW ZRUVW PRUDOO\ VXVSHFW´212 is supported by his 
GHVFULSWLRQ RI D MD]] UHQGLWLRQ RI D ZRUN E\ 7FKDLNRYVN\ DV ³YDQGDOLVP´ ³,Q WKLV
SDUWLFXODUFDVH´ZURWH%OLVV³LWLVQRWRQO\DTXHVWLRQRIRIIHQGLQJDODUJe body of 
PXVLF ORYHUV6XUHO\ LW LV LQVXOWLQJ WR WKH5XVVLDQSHRSOH"´213 7KLV LV IDU IURP³WKH
%%&¶V >ZDUWLPH@ HPEUDFH RI PRUDOH-EXLOGLQJ SRSXODU PXVLF´214 as described by 
Baade, who argues that the pre-ZDU %%& ³regarded popular music as ancillary to 
classical music, the promotion of which was central to its mission of cultural uplift. 
During the war, however, it recognised the value of popular music.´215 The Dance 
Music Policy document clearly shows that Bliss had not shifted from this pre-war 
understanGLQJRIWKH%%&¶VPLVVLRQ, and it appears to only refer to µVHULRXV¶PXVLF
as opposed to dance music. When it issues a call for political expediency, it argues 
that it would be in the long-term British interest to broadcast quality operas from 
Milan or performances of Wagner, rather than to indulge in a form of musical 
isolationism that excluded the cultural achievements of enemy countries. Neither 
GDQFH PXVLF QRU WKH ZDU LV PHQWLRQHG LQ WKH GRFXPHQW 7KH EDQ RQ µMD]]LQJ WKH
FODVVLFV¶GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW, while popular taste was catered to by the Corporation, it 
was to be subverted wherever possible in the name of promoting and spreading 
appreciation of the so-FDOOHGµVHULRXV¶PXVLF 
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It is important to recognise that the BBC was not a homogenous entity, and more 
pragmatic opinions were expressed internally, for example by Howgill216 and 
Crier.217 However, a strong culturally conservative influence is apparent, for 
example LQ 'LUHFWRU RI 2YHUVHDV 3URJUDPPLQJ .HQQHWK :ULJKW¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW, 
ZLWKUHJDUGWR³TXRWLQJ´SDVVDJHVIURPFODVVLFDOPXVLFLQGDQFHQXPEHUV³>WKH%%&
takes] as serious a view of this as of the basing of a dance tune itself on an accepted 
FODVVLF´218 And yet a great deal of time and effort were expended on the prevention 
of WKLVDOOHJHG³EULQJLQJ>RI@HVWDEOLVKHGFRPSRVLWLRQVLQWRGLVUHSXWH´,219 which was 
merely a matter of enforcing personal prejudice. The potential significance of such 
numbers to the war effort appears not to have been considered. 
The situation was further complicated by inter-departmental rivalry and 
territorialism, and indeed the ban can be understood as part of Arthur BlisV¶ attempt 
to assert control over Variety Department matters, which had previously been 
beyond his remit.220 Moreover, while BlisV¶ Music Department attempted to prevent 
dance bands affiliated with the Light Music Department from straying into their 
µVHULRXV¶ UHSHUWRLUH the evidence suggests that transgressions were committed by 
both sides.221 Crier reported at the end of his four-week special assignment that 
³>W@he situation is very difficult where we [Variety Department] are restraining 
Payne, Geraldo etc. from playing legitimately Light Music Department material, 
while Music Department are apparently not restraining their lighter combinations 
from playing PD\QH DQG *HUDOGR¶V PDWHULDO LH WKH FXUUHQW µSRSV¶ RI WKH GD\´222 
This led to territorial disputes between musicians, with Howgill reporting on another 
occasion that Payne, who was also Director of Dance Music, ³stated that if he is not 
allowed to play µMusic Department¶ music their bands should not be allowed to play 
his kind of stuff, and made the appropriate comment about geese and ganders. «
>,@GR IHHO WKHUH LV D FHUWDLQ DPRXQWRI MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU3D\QH¶V FRPSODLQW WKRXJK
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obviously it is partly retaliation.´223 This distracting inter-departmental rivalry was a 
product of the cultural snobbery that dominated the issue RI µMD]]LQJ WKH FODVVLFV¶
Banning the practice served no obvious purpose in terms of morale, and spending 
BBC time and resources policing the guidelines was detrimental to the effective 
wartime functioning of the Corporation. 
A German Commentary on BBC Dance Music Policy 
The %%&¶V EDWWOH ZLWK µVOXVK¶ DQG µMD]]LQJ WKH FODVVLFV¶ was also being followed 
with interest in Germany. This is evidenced by a transcription of an English-
language broadcast from Zeesen to South and East Asia on 6th August 1942, which 
was presented in the form of an opinion-piece by Wolf Mittler, the Anglophile 
German journalist who may have been the broadcaster who inspired the name µ/RUG
Haw-+DZ¶224 This source has been overlooked by previous scholarship, and yet is 
H[WUHPHO\ YDOXDEOH WR RXU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH %%&¶V XVH RI PXVLF WR PDLQWDLQ
domestic morale, because it provides a contemporar\ *HUPDQ H[SHUW¶V YLHZ RQ
British light entertainment policy. Mittler had impeccable light entertainment 
credentials, being himself a jazz fanatic who worked as head of KWS (shortwave) 
broadcasts to the enemy in the Mediterranean and North Africa. This document is 
worth quoting at length, because it offers an excellent example of the advantages of 
the comparative nature of the thesis, considering the German and British problems 
with musical entertainment not as mutually exclusive issues, but as part of a broader 
wartime discourse. Having summarised the new BBC guidelines, Mittler states that 
there is no doubt that some of these points are very reasonable indeed. But the important thing is that 
this ban practically marks a very fundamental change in the policy of the BBC with regard to popular 
music. It means that the majority of BBC listeners, especially the Forces listeners, will from now on 
have to get along without the kind of music they like the most. I think it is safe to say that this change 
has not come about because people complained about music being slushy or anaemic. Certainly there 
is a fraction of listeners who will welcome the change in policy, but as a whole, the ban probably does 
not represent the will of the ± if I may say so ± ³OLVWHQHURQWKHVWUHHW´LQFRQWUDVWZLWKDQHTXDOO\IDU-
reaching change which the German home radio underwent a couple of months ago when after a long 
pause dance music was again introduced into the programme. 
                                                 
223
 BBC WAC R27/73/1 Crier to Director of Variety [Watt], 23rd September 1942. 
224
 This is suggested by James Clark, who also broadcast news in English for the RVMP early in the 
war, in an interview broadcast in Denys Blakeway (presenter), Germany Calling: The Voice of the 
Nazi. BBC Radio 4 (online), 16th May 1991. Norman Baillie-Stewart (to whom the name may also 
initially have been applied) also asserts this in his autobiography, as cited by Blakeway. 
 178 
 
I remember quite well a trip to the Channel coast which I made with one of the highest German radio 
RIILFLDOV LQ 6HSWHPEHU  « >$OO@ WKH VROGLHUV UHFRJQLVHG KLP DQG WKH\ VDLG ³/RRN KHUH ZH
ZDQWPRUHGDQFHPXVLF´« And everywhere we heard the same comment. But for a long time, the 
German radio did not change its attitude. Significantly enough the concession to listeners was made at 
a time when the fighting was more bitter than ever before. And most of the people like it, certainly all 
the soldiers. 
I have mentioned this because there is in my view a parallel to the recent BBC change of policy. In 
both cases we have an absolutely fundamental change of programme policy. And obviously such a 
FKDQJHDOORZVLQWHUHVWLQJGHGXFWLRQV,QWKHFDVHRIWKH%%&,¶PFRQYLQFHGWKDWWKHQHZDWWLWXGHLV
QRWSRSXODUZLWKWKHDYHUDJHOLVWHQHU«0RVWOLNHO\WKH%%&DQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWUHDOLVHWKDWWKH
British people still fail to be fully awake to the seriousness of their position. Certainly the British have 
PDGHVRPHSURJUHVVDQG,GRQ¶WZDQW\RXWRWKLQNWKDW,DPPLQLPDOL]LQJWKHILJKWLQJTXDOLWLHVDQG
spirit of the British soldier. But doubtless, the English songs and the English character have 
something in common.  « >7@he BBC has now banned many of these, doubtless because 
responsible quarters wanted to « make it clear to each and every one that this is not the time to 
think about kissing in the black-out, or that happy week-end, that there is no sense in dreaming about 
those bluebirds over the Dover cliffs.  
«Well, after all, this is an internal affair of the British wireless and of the British listener, and as 
long as they like the sort of stuff that FRPHVRXWRI WKHLU ORXGVSHDNHUV LW¶V2.ZLWKPH%XW ,¶P
DIUDLGWKH\ZRQ¶W,¶PDIUDLGWKH\¶OODJUHHZLWKPHDQGVD\³1RWPXFKIXQOLVWHQLQJWRWKH%%&WKHVH
GD\V´225 
This critique of BBC policy is unusual for Nazi English-language propaganda, firstly 
because it is genuinely witty in places, and secondly because it contains informed 
constructive criticism which mirrors contemporary internal debates at the BBC. 
0RUHRYHU 0LWWOHU¶V RSLQLRQ RQ %ULWLVK OLJKW HQWHUWDLQPHQW KDV DGGHG DXWKRULW\
because his own light entertainment programme for New Zealand and Australian 
Forces, Anzac Tattoo, was a great success with its target audience.226 It was 
presented by Mildred Gillars, and its emphasis on music over propaganda, perhaps 
DOVRUHIOHFWLQJ0LWWOHU¶VGLVWDVWHfor political work,227 appears to have been the key to 
WKHSURJUDPPH¶VSRSXODULW\. This is consistent with Stars and Stripes editor Henry 
0LWJDQJ¶VDVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH WURRSVHQMR\HG WKH0LOODUV¶EURDGFDVWV IRU WKH familiar 
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jazz music, whilst simultaneously laughing at her contrived innuendo.228 Mittler later 
asserted that Karl Schwedler, vocalist of Charlie and his Orchestra, was in charge of 
dictating Anzac Tattoo¶VPXVLFDOFRQWHQW229 
Propagandistic elements are present here, most notably the reference to U-boats 
³GRLQJWKH%%&DWXUQ´E\VLQNLQJ$PHULFDQVKLSVERXQGIRU%ULWDLQFRQWDLQLQJWKH
newly-banned records,230 thus eliminating the supply end of the chain. The talk also 
alludes WR %ULWDLQ¶V alleged military predicament, although this is somewhat 
PLWLJDWHGE\DGPLVVLRQVRI*HUPDQ\¶VRZQQHHGIRUXSOLIWLQJPXVLFDVZHOODVWKH
fact that the outlook for Britain was markedly less bleak in mid-1942 than it had 
been at any point since the start of the war.231 To what degree it constitutes deliberate 
propaganda and to what degree it represents a genuine commentary is a matter of 
FRQMHFWXUH EXW WKH WRQH DQG WKH FRQWHQW RI 0LWWOHU¶V WDON VXJJHVW WKDW LW LV
predominantly the latter. 0LWWOHU¶V VXEVHTXHQW transgressions, escape and arrest by 
the Gestapo further strengthen the argument that this eccentric and individualistic 
broadcaster was broadly acting upon his own initiative.232 The German-Jewish guitar 
player +HLQ] µCoco¶ Schumann remembers WKDW ³>0LWWOHU@ ZDV « GRLQJ
propaganda broadcasts for abroaGWKRXJKKHZDVQ¶WHYHQD1D]L+HZDVLQWRPXVLF
DQGKLVMREZDVJHWWLQJLWDFURVVWRWKHRWKHUVLGH´233 This professionally-interested 
FULWLTXHRI%ULWLVKSROLF\VXSSRUWV6FKXPDQQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQDQG is therefore of even 
greater value for the comparative purposes of the thesis. 
Conclusion 
The entry of the USA into the wDU QRW RQO\ H[SRVHG WKH OLPLWDWLRQV RI *RHEEHOV¶
propaganda apparatus, but also revealed a striking naivety and ignorance in the 
5093¶V WUHDWPHQWRI WKHQHZEHOOLJHUHQW1D]L µEODFN¶SURSDJDQGD¶VXWLOLVDWLRQRI
jazz music, as represented by the shifting target audiences of Station Debunk, or the 
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rebranded German dance orchestUDV EURDGFDVW E\ µ%LOO DQG 0DU\¶, lacked both 
resources and cultural understanding. The apparent perception of the United States as 
a culturally homogenous entity, consistent with the Nazi worldview, led to jazz 
records being broadcast to Midwestern listeners in an attempt to stoke isolationist 
sentiment, and the abandonment of this musical policy after only several months is 
an indication of its failure. As will be shown below in Chapter Five, the British 
counterfeit Soldatensender which would appear on the airwaves over the course of 
1943 were far more psychologically effective and possessed greater awareness of the 
tastes and demands of their German audience, whose predilection for upbeat jazz 
music remained unsated by the comparatively WDPHRIIHULQJVRI*RHEEHOV¶'782 
However, both 2:,¶VRZQ LQLWLDO LJQRUDQFHRI WKHYDOXHRI musical entertainment 
for the Forces and 66'¶V LQVXIILFLHQW attempts to cater to these demands left US 
soldiers vulnerable to enemy propaganda offerings, such as the broadcasts of 
0LOGUHG *LOODUV IURP %HUOLQ RU 7RN\R¶V Zero Hour. The latter programme, 
prophesied 2:,¶V'LUHFWRURI3DFLILF Operations Owen Lattimore, ZRXOG³SODJXHXV
>WKH86$@XQWLOWKHHQGRIWKHZDU´234 7KH%%&WRRLQLWVFDPSDLJQDJDLQVWµVOXVK¶
DQG µMD]]LQJ WKH FODVVLFV¶, revealed considerable institutional prejudice against 
British popular taste, as well as a continued dedication to the CRUSRUDWLRQ¶V pre-war 
goal of encouraging national cultural uplift. This jeopardised the wartime priority of 
maintaining morale and keeping British Forces and civilians alike tuned in to the 
%%&¶VRIIHULQJV, as was noted in :ROI0LWWOHU¶V lucid commentary for the RMVP. 
Indeed, this chapter has highlighted the difficulties that each nation had in coming to 
terms with music as a weapon of psychological warfare. Chapter Five will explore 
the SHULRGIURP*RHEEHOV¶SURFODPDWLRQRf µWRWDOZDU¶ at the Berlin Sportpalast on 
18th February 1943 until the German surrender on 8th May 1945. As will be 
demonstrated below, 6HIWRQ 'HOPHU¶V SUH-HPSWLYHO\ FRLQHG SKUDVH µ7RWDO 5DGLR
:DU¶ ZRXOG EHFRPH Dn appropriate epithet for the final phase of World War II 
propaganda. 
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µ7RWDO5DGLR:DUfare¶: February 1943 ± May 1945 
³7KHVLPSOHVWDQGPRVWHIIHFWLYHRIDOOµEODFN¶RSHUDWLRQVLVWRVSLWLQDPDQ¶VVRXS
DQGFU\µ+HLO+LWOHU¶´ 
        (Sefton Delmer, PWE)1 
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On the night of 3rd February 1943, Goebbels met with Hinkel and Fritzsche to 
GLVFXVV KRZ WR EUHDN WKH ³GXH´ QHZV RI 6WDOLQJUDG WR WKH SRSXODFH 7KH VSHFLDO
DQQRXQFHPHQWZDVWREH³YHU\UHDOLVWLFYHU\VREHUDQGTXLWH ODFNLQJLQSDWKRV´LQ
order to reflect what the Propaganda Minister felt to be the current mood of the 
German people.2 Nonetheless, the SD reported that the information FDXVHG³DIDLUO\
H[WHQVLYH VKRFN WR >*HUPDQ@ SXEOLF RSLQLRQ´3 Goebbels had already planned to 
FDQFHO UDGLR HQWHUWDLQPHQW IRU DQ XQVSHFLILHG SHULRG RI WLPH FODLPLQJ WKDW ³WKH
SRSXODFHGRHVQ¶WZDQWOLJKWHQWHUWDLQPHQWWRGD\LWZDQWVJUDYLW\DQGSUDFWLFDOLW\´,4 
and at his press conference the same morning he had GHFUHHGWKDW³immediately after 
the announcement of the termination of the fighting in Stalingrad, a national 
remembrance lasting three times 24 hours will be performed. During this time, all 
places of entertainment, including theatres and cinemas will EHFORVHG´5 
The decision of Field Marshall von Paulus to be taken alive as a prisoner of war 
created a serious problem for Goebbels in his attempts to forge a sense of post-
6WDOLQJUDGQDWLRQDOXQLW\%\LJQRULQJ+LWOHU¶VRUGHUVWRFRPPLWVXLFLGHYRQ3DXOXV
KDG GHILHG WKH UHJLPH¶V LQFUHDVLQJO\ QLKLOLVWLF GHPDQGV IRU WKH ³KDUVKHVW SHUVRQDO
VDFULILFH´LQWKHVHUYLFHRIWKH1D]LZDUHIIRUW6 and Goebbels reflected in his diary 
WKDW LW UHSUHVHQWHG ³D VHULRXV PRUDO GHIHDW IRU WKH DUP\ One cannot overlook the 
potential psychological complications that will result [from this].´7 This was 
exacerbated by Soviet propaganda, which the Propaganda Minister noted on the 
QLJKWRIWKHPHHWLQJZLWK+LQNHODQG)ULW]VFKHZDV³making every effort to make it 
clear to the German soldiers and also the German people that the generals are being 
taken prisoner while the soldiers must die. This is of course a very unpleasant and 
not very gratifying slogan which we must urgently counter. But right now I have no 
handle on this, since I do not know whether or not this message corresponds to the 
facts. The Bolsheviks certainly will not help us to check their veracity. Together with 
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the British, they are announcing that the fall of Stalingrad was the largest defeat in 
German military history. Numerically speaking, this may be true.´8 
This chapter will focus on the period from February 1943 until May 1945, and will 
elucidate important aspects of propaganda in the final phase of the war in a number 
RI ZD\V %\ H[SORULQJ WKH 5093¶V DWWHPSWV WR PDQLSXODWH WKH SXEOLF PRRG DQG
maintain FRUFHV¶ PRUDOH GXULQJ µWRWDO ZDU¶, it will demonstrate that Goebbels was 
insufficiently pragmatic with regard to music for the German forces and civilians; his 
continued problems with jazz and popular music exposed his limitations as a 
propagandist. This will include an analysis of the German Soldatensender Belgrad9 
as a model of decentralised, successful Nazi entertainment broadcasting; the 
problems these caused for the RMVP will support my argument that GoebbelV¶ 
desire for control over cultural output was detrimental to the German war effort. 
With regard to WKH86$,ZLOOGLVFXVVPHGLDWUHDWPHQWRIWKHµ=RRW6XLW5LRWV¶
which involved a jazz-oriented youth subculture and exposed broader political and 
race-related unrest in the USA. This will be combined ZLWKWKHILUVWVWXG\RI2:,¶V
attempts to disseminate information nationally and internationally that reflected 
favourably on minority participation in the war. Furthermore, it will focus in depth 
on the highly unusual, self-reflexive entertainment propagDQGD RI -DSDQ¶V Zero 
Hour, which broadcast to Allied Forces in the South Pacific and became hugely 
SRSXODU ZLWK *,V WKXV UHYHDOLQJ VKRUWFRPLQJV LQ WKH 86$¶V RZQ )RUFHV¶
programming through SSD. Anglo-American collaboration under the auspices of 
PWD/SHAEF, and the coordination of military intelligence and psychological 
warfare, will be considered in the cRQWH[WRI6HIWRQ'HOPHU¶VZRUN 
'HOPHU¶V pre-emptive declaration of µ7RWDO 5DGLR :DU¶ RQ Germany will be 
considered with particular reference to his counterfeit Soldatensender. Using both 
British and German archive material, I will measure the significance, reception and 
LPSDFW RI WKHVH µEODFN¶ or µJUH\¶ SURMHFWV10 By tracing the cessation of 
PWD/SHAEF¶V µEODFN¶ RSHUDWLRQV LQ (XURSH DQG GLVFXVVLQJ WKH $QJOR-American 




 I am using the German plural Soldatensender to refer to such stations in general. Individual stations 
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institutional transition from psychological warfare to peacetime propaganda, I will 
both reflect on the successes of Allied µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD DQG VHW WKH FRQWH[W IRU
MD]]¶V UROH LQ WKH QDVFent Cold War. It will contrast the culturally nuanced and 
VXEYHUVLYH %ULWLVK µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD WRZDUGV *HUPDQ\ DV ZHOO DV WKe fruitful 
Anglo-American PWD/SHAEF SURSDJDQGD FROODERUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH 5093¶V
increasing retreat into mythology. In doing so, I will prove that GoebbelV¶ µWRWDOZDU¶ 
was limited in a propagandistic sense by his continued adherence to increasingly 
FRXQWHUSURGXFWLYHFHQVRUVKLSRI)RUFHV¶PXVLFDOWDVWHVDVZHOODVWKHGHVLUHWRDVVHUW
centralised RMVP control over the Soldatensender, 7KH FKDSWHU¶V FRQFOXVLRQ ZLOO
summarise the main findings of the thesis, and argue that they demonstrate that 
Goebbels was insufficiently empathetic and pragmatic regarding popular music. 
Indeed, he ceded an important propagandistic advantage to the Allies by failing to 
deal adequately with jazz for German and enemy consumption. 
Germany 
Radio Entertainment in µTotal War¶ 
In spite of the temporary post-Stalingrad closure of domestic entertainment venues, 
Truppenbetreuung remained a priority for the RMVP. In January 1943, the tenth 
anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power was used by Hans Hinkel as occasion to 
UHIOHFWRQWKH16'$3¶VµFXOWXUDODFKLHYHPHQWV¶LQWKHSUHFHGLQJGHFDGHLQDVHULHV
of talks and essays. That month, Hinkel directly addressed German artists regarding 
their role in the Nazi war effort: 
As acting director of Truppenbetreuung office of the RMVP and the Reich Chamber of Culture, on 
the 10th anniversary of the National Socialist seizure of power I refer all members of the Reich 
Chamber of Culture as the community of German cultural workers to the call which Dr. Goebbels, the 
custodian of German cultural workers, directed to you at the beginniQJ RI WRGD\¶V VWUXJJOH IRU
*HUPDQ\¶VH[LVWHQFH  
³, H[SHFW WKDW every German artist to whom the call has been made for help will make 
himself available joyfully and willingly for this great work. Whosoever tries to shirk his 
duties is not worthy of living in this historical period and partaking of its blessings´ 
With satisfaction we ascertain that the vast majority of German artists have followed this call of the 
President of the Reich Chamber of Culture and placed all of their skills in the service of 
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Truppenbetreuung and the Home Front. For the difficult and decisive year ahead the slogan is: 
Artists, take your positions! [Künstler, seid zur Stelle!]11 
In his role as director of Truupenbetreuung, Hinkel was an outspoken defender of 
DUWLVWV¶UROHLQWKHwar effort. However, Goebbels also expressed evident frustration 
ZLWKWKH6'¶VUHSRUWVRID dissatisfied populace, which contradicted his own view of 
his work, and the Propaganda Minister complained in his diary on 4th February 1943 
WKDW³>W@KH6'UHSRUW VWDWHV WKDW WKH UDGLR VFKHGXOH LV FRQVLGHUHGVRPHZKDWRXW-of-
date. But I have already adapted entertainment programming to the new situation via 
P\ QHZ JXLGHOLQHV´12 An additional complication in musical broadcasts for the 
home front was highlighted in a memorandum signed by Tießler on 25th March 
1943, who warned against the use thematically inappropriate musical material for 
areas targeted by Allied bombing. TKH SUHYLRXV GD\¶V 5093 PHHWLQJ KDG
highlighted ³the difference between the atmosphere in the radio programming and 
that in areas affected by bombing raids «) [For example] that songs such as Ich 
tanze mit Dir in den Himmel hinein [µI Dance into Heaven with You¶] or Und wieder 
geht ein schöner Tag zu Ende [µAnd another lovely day comes to an end¶] are 
inappropriate.´13 Indeed, although the RMVP was attempting to forge a unified 
national front through broadcasting, intensified Allied air attacks created the need to 
show consideration to those living in the areas targeted, although this risked 
disenfranchising listeners in unaffected areas. Hans Hinkel, accordingly, had banned 
µI Dance into Heaven with You¶ so as not to offend audiences in towns which had 
suffered DLUUDLGVRQO\WRUHFHLYH³FRXQWOHVV´OHWWHUVH[SUHVVLQJDPD]HPHQW³WKDWZH
[the RMVP] are taking the song off the air and becoming affected by the general 
GHSUHVVLRQ´14 
Notwithstanding the temporary removal of light entertainment from the air in the 
wake of Stalingrad,15 the question of jazz music continued to preoccupy the RMVP. 
A note written to Karl Cerff of the N6'$3¶V Reichspropagandaleitung relayed 
damning criticism of the perceived jazz emphasis on German radio from the 
                                                 
11
 %$ 5, 0LFURILFKH  +LQNHO µ.QVWOHU VHLG ]XU 6WHOOH¶ Transcript of speech on tenth 
anniversary of the Nazi Machtergreifung (January 1943). 
12
 Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels 2.7, p.259. 
13
 BA R18/328 Tießler, betr. Rundfunksendungen nach Fliegerangriffen, 25th March 1943. 
14
 Ibid. See also Welch, The Third Reich, pp.145-146. 
15
 As discussed in the introduction to this chapter. 
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Gauleitung of Württemberg-Hohenzollern dated 24th February 1943, and asserted 
that this was supported by reports from the other districts:16 
-D]]PXVLFLVLQWKHIRUHJURXQGRISXEOLFFULWLFLVPRIWKHEURDGFDVWLQJSURJUDPPH«WKHGHPDQG
for light music is unusually great, but this cannot lead to one particular musical taste being granted 
H[FHVVLYHFRQFHVVLRQV«In general, jazz music is considered a remnant of American barbarism. It 
is incomprehensible [to the public] that Americanism has been eradicated in all areas of culture, while 
still concessions are made to the field of music. Especial objection was taken to the fact that, in the 
main, only jazz music is offered on Saturday evenings when the broad mass of the population listens 
to the radio. Since the loss of Stalingrad, a change has taken place in the broadcasting programme in 
this respect. Since then, citizens uniformly describe musical transmissions as good, and it is widely 
expected that the programme will continue along this line.17 
Nonetheless, although Kater asserts that the banishment of dance music from 
German DLUZDYHV ODVWHG URXJKO\ ³IURP -DQXDU\ WR HDUO\ VXPPHU  ZKHQ
VLJQLILFDQWO\ >6HIWRQ 'HOPHU¶V@ .XU]ZHOOHQVHQGHU $WODQWLN KDG EHJXQ WR
EURDGFDVW´18 it appears that the ban was not as substantive as this. Moreover, Kater 
claims that the traumatic memory of Stalingrad was fading by October 1943, but as 
early as 5th February 1943 Goebbels optimistically referred in his diary to SD reports 
suggesting that ³the VKRFNRI6WDOLQJUDG´KDGDOUHDG\SDUWLDOO\EHHQRYHUFRPHDQG
that German morale had been strengthened and consolidated as a result of the 
capitulation.19 On 18th February 1943, the day that the Propaganda Minister 
announced µWRWDO ZDU¶ in front of a carefully rehearsed audience at the Berlin 
Sportpalast, he cited an SD report in his diary which indicated that the German 
SHRSOHZHUH³HVVHQWLDOO\UHDVVXUHG´ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHPLOLWDU\VLWXDWLRQLQWKH(DVW.20 
Accordingly, there is evidence that the moratorium on light music was beginning to 
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 BA R18/334 Abschrift: Bericht der Gauleitung Württemberg-Hohenzollern, 24th February 1943. 
18
 Kater, Different Drummers, p.174. 
19
 Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels 2.7, p.266. 
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+LQNHO¶VSUDJPDWLFUHIRUPVRIWKH55*were followed by an attempt to separate the 
necessarily upbeat broadcasting to the Forces from more conservative domestic 
programming. It was decreed that the Deutschlandsender become the Deutschland-
Soldaten-Sender, and on 1st October 1943 he justified the move by arguing that: 
There is an urgent need for a transmission group which in the general tendency of its programming is 
directed predominantly at our soldiers. A more militant attitude is expected of them, as well as of all 
workers (particularly in the areas affected by air raids and those which could be). Tens of thousands 
of such workers are quartered on a daily basis as they must remain in their workplaces in the 
destroyed areas. 1LQHW\ RXW RI RQH KXQGUHG RI WKHVH OLVWHQHUV ZKRVH ³GHVLUHV´ PXVW EH KLJKO\
respected, demand a relaxed programme, usually of an entertaining sort. They require fresh, happy, 
life-affirming, battle-affirming announcements, and even the occasional coarse ± though of course not 
smutty ± joke. Now and then they also want more rhythmic music, from dance music to modern 
marches. 
«7KHHQWLUHFXUUHQW Deutschlandsender schedule could then be sent over all Reich ± i.e. local - 
transmitters. So [it would be] a partially highest-quality, serious entertainment programme. These 
Reich - and local transmitters could then drop the livelier, more modern, more rhythmic popular 
music, and the humourless µEHKDYLRXUSROLFH¶ (Haltungspastoren) [such as] Mutschmann, Raabe and 
associates could then be satisfied with regard to the alleged playing of jazz [on the 
Deutschlandsender]. The Deutschland-Soldaten-Sender transmitter would then take care of the 
digestible desires of the soldiers or the similar desires of the martial workers. The Reich- or local 
transmitter could then ± more than before ± play reflective organ music (Besinnung orgeln), shape the 
>*HUPDQ+RPH)URQW¶V@KRXUVRIUHOD[DWLRQmeet the well-known wishes of fellow countrymen [die 
bekannten landsmannschaftlichen Wünsche erfüllen] etc.22 
The move paved the way for the production of more boisterous programming for 
soldiers and war workers over the rechristened Deutschland-Soldaten-Sender. 
Meanwhile, domestic programming could occupy Reich- and regional transmitters 
and be toned down to meet the more mediocre tastes of the home front, thus 
VDWLVI\LQJ FULWLFV VXFK DV 6D[RQ\¶V Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann, who issued the 
Saxony jazz ban in July 1943,23 and the equally conservative RMK President Peter 
Raabe. +LQNHO¶V UHIHUHQFHhere to the two men as ³humourless µbehaviour police¶´ 
lends weight to the assertion of the thesis that he possessed pragmatic qualities 
                                                 
22
 BA R56I/41 Neuordnung der Sendegruppen zum 1. Oktober [1943]. 
23
 BA R56I/141 Typed excerpt from the Zschopauer Tagblattµ9HUERWGHU-D]]XQGlKQOLFKHQWDUWHter 
0XVLN¶th July 1943. 
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which have been overlooked by previous scholarship. The evident frustration at 
0XWVFKPDQQDQG5DDEH¶VFXOWXUDOFRQVHUYDWLVPVXSSRUWV the claims of Haentzschel 
and Brocksieper that Hinkel was a benevolent figure for German jazz musicians, and 
it becomes easier to understand why the man generally depicted by historians as 
either a philistine or an opportunist was elevated to such heights by Goebbels. 
It is also probable that move was intended to bring the Soldatensender within the 
jurisdiction of the RMVP and RRG, and on 26th January 1944 Hinkel was again 
insisting that the Soldatensender obey the entertainment guidelines which applied to 
greater German Radio.24 Indeed, it is one of the ironies of *RHEEHOV¶ H[tensive 
struggles with popular music that one of the most successful music-based ventures of 
the war, Soldatensender Belgrad, was geographically and politically largely beyond 
the RMVP¶V FRQWURO. Bergmeier has extensively documented the ³farcical´ 
propaganda rivalry between Goebbels and Ribbentrop of the Foreign Ministry,25 and 
Belgrad represented a remarkable coup for Ribbentrop in terms of control over 
information and entertainment. Ribbentrop engineered the purchasing of Radio 
Belgrade and its medium wave transmitter under the auspices of the Foreign 
0LQLVWU\¶VInterradio agency26 on 24th May 1941, thus effectively seizing control of 
the station.27 The surprise move placed the newly-acquired Soldatensender and its 
propaganda output ZLWKLQ WKH )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWU\¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ WKXV effectively 
denying the RMVP any influence over the station¶V FRQWHQWV. This is significant 
given its subsequent popularity with both Axis and Allied listeners, which 
considerably surpassed *RHEEHOV¶ expensive showcase entertainment projects such 
as the DTUO and Charlie and his Orchestra. 
Broadcasting via a mediocre-strength transmitter situated at Makis in the Belgrade 
suburbs, Belgrad nonetheless profited from favourable ground conditions in the 
marshland between the Danube and the Sava, and could therefore be heard across 
Europe and North Africa.28 The jazz arranger Friedrich Meyer, who worked as a 
musical director at Belgrade from 1942 onward, asserts in retrospect that it was a 
favourite with Luftwaffe pilots, which was undoubtedly true given the ubiquity of its 
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UHFHSWLRQDQGWKH/XIWZDIIH¶VZHOO-documented predilection for jazz. The station had 
a distinctive calling signal played on two trumpets, and the actress and swing singer 
Margot Hielscher, active in film and Truppenbetreuung during the war, recalls that 
³>Belgrad¶VPXVLFZDV@UHDOO\DUHOLHILn this difficult time. One was always thrilled 
WRKHDU>LWV@FDOOLQJVLJQDO´29 
However, Belgrad¶V EHJLQQLQJV ZHUH LQDXVSLFLRXV DQG WKH UHDVRQ IRU LWV LQLWLDO
popularity was fortuitous. The station originally had only approximately sixty 
gramophone records in its library, and in the search for more musical material led to 
the acquisition of banned records. Heinz Rudolf Fritsche, the programme planner, 
recalled: 
Our job was to entertain the troops (Truppenbetreuung) but we were lacking « records. We 
FRXOGQ¶W NHHS SOD\LQJ WKH VDPH UHFRUGV RYHU DJDLQ VR ZH VHQW D FRPUDGH WR 9LHQQD WR WKH
Reichssender $ FUDWH OD\ LQ WKH FHOODU DQG LQ WKLV FUDWH ZDV PXVLF WKDW FRXOGQ¶W EH SOD\HG RQ WKH
Reichsrundfunk. That was music by Jewish composers, Emmerich Kálmán or something like that, and 
other things that nobody wanted to have. We took the crate back to Belgrade and we broadcast the 
PDWHULDOLQLWVHQWLUHW\LHZHGLGQ¶WVWLFNWRWKHEDQVDQGZHVWXPEOHGXSRQDUHFRUGZLWKWKHWLWOH
µLied eines jungen Wachpostens¶µ6RQJRID<RXQJ6HQWU\¶). «>:@HWKRXJKWZH¶OOJLYHLWDSOD\
and we liked it and we played it a lot, almost too much, so we told ourselves we should give it a bit of 
a rest and put it away for a while. Then something happened that FRXOGQ¶WKDYHEHHQH[SHFWHGWKHUH
was a sort of mass protest from the Front; there were masses of letters from soldiers, also from home, 
>DVNLQJ@µZK\GRQ¶W\RXSOD\WKLVVRQJDQ\PRUH"«:HZDQWWRKHDUWKHVRQJDQGWKHYRLFH¶:H
VDLGWRRXUVHOYHVµLI LW¶VOLNHWKDWWKHQZH¶OOPDNHDSURJUDPPHIHDWXUHRXWRILW¶30 
Due to its regular broadcasts on Belgrad, µSong of a Young Sentry¶, popularly 
NQRZQDVµ/LOL0DUOHHQ¶31 became an international hit. Written by Norbert Schultze, 
a prolific composer of propaganda songs such as µBomben auf Engeland¶ >VLF@, it 
was subsequently broadcast at three minutes before 10 p.m. every evening as the 
VWDWLRQ¶VVLJQLQJ-off tune, and followed the reading out of letters to the Front from 
their families in Germany. However, Andersen was banned from public appearances 
in mid-1942 following a series of intrigues apparently engineered by Hinkel,32 and 
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 Hielscher/Meyer interview 1988. 
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 Fritsche interview. 
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 Henceforth referred to as µ/LOL0DUOHHQ¶ 
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 .DWHU FLWHV HYLGHQFH WKDW +LQNHO ³VLQJOH-handedly planned every step of the campaign against 
>$QGHUVHQ@´DQGVXJJHVWV WKDW WKLVPD\KDYHEHHQSHUVRQDOO\PRWLYDWHGEHFDXVH+LQNHO¶VPLVWUHVV
WKH VLQJHU$QLWD6SDGDZDV MHDORXVRI$QGHUVHQ¶V VXFFHVV7KHRIILFLDOSUHWH[W IRUKHUEODFNOLVWLQJ
was a letter from Andersen to the Jewish theatre director and dramaturge Kurt Hirschfeld in 
Switzerland, which was intercepted by the Gestapo (Kater, Different Drummers, pp.186-187). 
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Fritsche QRWHV *RHEEHOV¶ vociferous dislike RI WKH VRQJ¶V ³GHIHDWLVW FKLUSLQJ´ DQG
³FDGDYHURXV VPHOO´33 Accordingly, although jurisdiction of the station had been 
usurped by the Foreign Ministry, the RMVP attempted to intervene. Fritsche recalls: 
I think it was at the end of 1943 that a wire arrived in Belgrade from the Propaganda Ministry with the 
lapidary message: ³Lili Marleen sung by Lale Andersen forbidden with immediate effect´. Of course 
that was a difficult situation for us. In itself the Propaganda Ministry had no say in the Soldatensender 
but still we tried to find a sort of way out. We quickly recorded [an orchestral version] and broadcast 
it that evening without Lale Andersen. Then there were a few other records where other female 




The song was a hit with both Axis and Allied listeners, and therefore was also of 
value as bait to attract enemy soldiers to German broadcasts. Belgrad took a 
damaged and unused shortwave transmitter based at Zemlin and used it to broadcast 
µLili Marleen¶ in English to the British 8th Army in North Africa, and by the end of 
the war the song existed in at least seventy different languages.35 A German-
language parody featuring the exiled Jewish singer Lucie Mannheim was produced 
in Britain and broadcast over the BBC¶V*HUPDQ6HUYLFH, with lyrics that sought to 
GULYHKRPHWKHVHQVHOHVVQHVVRI+LWOHU¶VZDUDQGHQGHGZLWKDQDSSHDOWROLVWHQHUVWR
hang the Führer IURP /LOL0DUOHHQ¶V ODPSSRVW Andersen also recorded an English 
version, without propaganda lyrics, together with /XW] 7HPSOLQ¶V RUFKHVWUD DND
&KDUOLH DQG KLV 2UFKHVWUD IRU WKH 5093¶V RZQ Klarinette & Mandoline label, 
which had been established specifically to issue musical propaganda, on 2nd June 
1942.36 µLili Marleen¶ was an international success, and was used as Belgrad¶VVLJQ-
off song on nightly basis until its final broadcast.37 
The station signed in each day in another problematically popular VRQJHQWLWOHGµEs 
geht alles vorüber¶µ7KLVWRRZLOOSDVV¶, composed by Fred Raymonds with lyrics 
by Kurt Feltz and Max Wallner. In his recent VWXG\ RI WKH VRQJ¶V LPSDFW WKH
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 Bergmeier/Lotz, +LWOHU¶V$LUZDYHV, p.268. 
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historian Eckhardt John classifies it as a Durchhalteschlager µSHUVHUYHUDQFH KLW¶, 
GHVLJQHG WR NHHS XS OLVWHQHUV¶ VSLULWV ZLWK D SURPLVH RI DQ HQG WR WKH ZDU DQG D
reunion with their loved ones. Also significant, however, was its undertone of 
wartime fidelity, which was a popular target for propaganda broadcasts targeted at 
enemy morale. Belgrad WKHVRQJ¶Voriginal distributor, invented and publicised the 
myth that the song was written by a soldier on the Eastern Front. While the song 
itself, with its tale of a young sentry dreaming of his faithful girlfriend waiting back 
home, was designed by Feltz and Wallner to forge a psychological and emotional 
bond between the Forces and the home front, the myth of its genesis was intended to 
authenticate it. As has been shown above, Lord Haw-+DZ¶VDWWHPSWWRGLVFUHGLWWKH
µ6LHJIULHG/LQH¶VRQJWR%ULWLVKOLVWHQHUVKDGEHHQEDVHGRQKLVDVVHUWLRQWKDWGXHWR
its bragging nature, it must have been written not by soldiers but by the ³Jewish 
scribes of the BBC´38 In spite of the ruse, a number of letters from the Eastern Front 
demonstrate that the song achieved its desired effect. Describing the bitter wintery 
conditions in Russia in late 1942, a young soldier named Private Weber wrote to his 
family that ³this too will pass, this too will be over. Every December is followed by a 
May. That is my only consolation.´39 
The BBC sought to mitigate such morale-boosting potential by creating its own 
version of the song in June 1944, again featuring Lucie Mannheim, which was 
intended to produce the opposite effect. In the British parody, the young sentry 
writes home to his giUOIULHQG WKDW KH¶V ³DOUHDG\ KDG HQRXJK RI WKH war/no one 
EHOLHYHV LQ YLFWRU\ DQ\PRUH´ ZKLOH WKH UHIUDLQ SURPLVHV WKDW ³HYHU\ 'HFHPEHU LV
followed by a May/Then it¶OOEHRYHUIRU+LWOHUDQGKLVELJ-shots/Germany will be 
IUHHRIDOOWKDWUDEEOH´40 In spite of the fact that they lacked subtlety as propaganda, 
the deterioration of the Nazi war effort lent the Mannheim parodies a credibility 
which the RMVP increasingly lacked. As had been noted by Mass Observation in 
Britain and DownBeat in the USA, war songs could rapidly become outdated due to 
changing military fortunes, and, set against the backdrop of mounting casualties and 
defeats, the optimistic message of µEs geht alles vorüber¶ began to appear 
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grotesquely inappropriate. 7KHVRQJ¶VFKRUXVbecame a vehicle for numerous popular 
parodies, from vulgar jokes ³P\KXVEDQGLVLQ5XVVLDWKHUH¶VRQHEHGVWLOOIUHH´WR
RYHUWO\SROLWLFDOVWDWHPHQWV³ILUVWWKH)KUHUZLOOJRWKHQWKH3DUW\´41 By the end 
of 1944, the song had become corrupted to the extent that the journalist Rudolf 
Walter Leonardt has plausibly described it as ³DQ DQWL-QDWLRQDO DQWKHP´42 with 
public performances of parody versions in some cases resulting in the death penalty, 
as in the case of the popular actress Hanne Mertens.43 However, while the RMVP 
attempted to ban the song from domestic airwaves in January 1943, and measures 
were taken over the course of the following two years to remove it from the various 
Soldatensender, a blanket ban on the song was never effectively implemented. It 
remained popular with the Forces, and thus could not be eradicated from the 
decentralised military transmitters.44 $V.DWHUKDVREVHUYHG³>W@KHZRUVWSRVVLELOLW\
feared by the soldiers was a switchover to regular Reich programming, which 
*RHEEHOVZLVKHGWRVHHPRUHRI«LQWKHLQWHUHVWRIFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQGFRQIRUPLW\
Such a measure was agreed upon in theory by the Wehrmacht, but chronically 
ignored in practice, for the generals knew full well that anything but what the 
soldiers really wanted to hear would be an imposition for the fighting man and bad 
IRUWKHPRUDOH´45 
Indeed, JHRJUDSKLFDOO\ DQG SROLWLFDOO\ UHPRYHG IURP %HUOLQ¶V FRQWURO the 
Soldatensender were perennially problematic for WKH5093+DQV+LQNHO¶VSURSRVDO
at a broadcasting conference on 1st November 1944 that the content of radio 
VFKHGXOHV EH UHOD[HG ZLWKRXW ³IDOOLQJ LQWR WKH H[WUHPHV RI WKH Soldatensender´
illustrates the lack of influence that the Ministry had over the VWDWLRQV¶ output.46 
6ROGLHUV¶UHTXLUHPHQWVVKDSHGWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHSURJUDPPHVDQGZKHQWKLVFODVKHG
with orders from Berlin, the XWLOLWDULDQ GHPDQGV RI WKH VWDWLRQV¶ OLVWHQHUV ZHUH
prioritised. Nonetheless, even from Berlin the RMVP was able to ensure that some 
transgressions had consequences, such as when Friedrich Meyer, who regularly 
played American compositions rechristened with German titles, was caught playing 
material from µShall We Dance/Broadway Melody¶ on a programme called Bunte 
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Träume µ&RORXUIXO 'UHDPV¶ LQ 0D\  )ROORZLQJ D ³PDVVLYH H[FKDQJH RI
OHWWHUV´ EHWZHHQ +DQV +LQNHO DQG 0DMRU 3DVVDYHQW 0H\HU¶V VXSHULRU LQ %HUOLQ
Meyer was banned from the microphone for German civilian broadcasts, although it 
is notable that this ban did not apply to military programmes.47 More serious 
consequences could also be suffered, such as when the popular bandleader Heinz 
Wehner was sent into a punitive battalion on the Eastern Front for overstepping the 
jazz boundaries in the comparatively safe environs of Soldatensender Oslo, and did 
not return from the war.48 An additional problem associated with the comparative 
freedom of the Soldatensender to play foreign and banned records was the jealousy 
this caused in other entertainment departments; Georg Haentzschel of the DTUO 
recalls protesting in vain to Goebbels that if the Soldatensender were able to play 
foreign numbers, the orchestra wanted to be allowed to do the same.49 
1RUGLGWKH1D]LUDFLDOODZVDSSO\ZKHQLWFDPHWRWKHVWDWLRQ¶VFKRLFHRIHPSOR\HHV
When Meyer arrived in Belgrade in July 1942, he was commissioned to put together 
³DQRUFKHVWUDRIP\FKRLFH´WKHTanzorchester des Soldatensender Belgrads, which 
was originally a large string orchestra. Meyer claims that he used this to save the 
OLYHVRIWKUHHµ*ypsy¶ concertmasters, two violinists and a cellist, and the orchestra 
featured not only local Serbian but also µ*ypsy¶ musicians. The band had a gifted 
µ*\SV\¶ guitarist named Gospodin Petkovic with a playing style that was allegedly 
reminiscent of the famous Django Reinhardt.50 
The Belgrad orchestra featured a string section, four saxophones and two trombones. 
Unlike the DTUO, it could draw on an international repertoire51 and played in local 
public spaces to an enthusiastic youthful audience. Meyer recalls: 
7KHEUDVVVHFWLRQZDVQ¶WJUHDWWKHVD[RSKRQHVZHUHJRRG%XW the Serbian youth were thrilled. 
«>:KHQWKH\SOD\HG WKHLUVLJQ-RIIVRQJ+DUU\-DPHV¶Vµ%DFNEHDW%RRJLH¶@LWEURXJKWWKHKRXVH
GRZQ2IFRXUVH WKH5HLFK&KDPEHURI&XOWXUHZDVQ¶WDOORZHGWRILQGRXW$QG WKH\GLGQ¶WNQRZ
Our Nazis [in Belgrade] wanted to keep [local] youths off the street and I exploited that. It was a 
beautiful time. Because the only thing that still mattered was the music.52 
                                                 
47
 Hielscher/Meyer interview 1988. 
48
 Kater, Different Drummers, p.176. 
49
 Haentzschel interview 1988. 
50
 Hielscher/Meyer interview 1988. 
51
 Kater, Different Drummers, p.176. 
52
 Hielscher/Meyer interview 1988. 
 194 
 
It is ironic and highly significant that the main reason for Belgrad¶VVXFFHVVwas its 
relative independence from the RMVP and the RRG. On numerous occasions Hans 
Hinkel sought in vain to remind the Berlin representatives of the Wehrmacht 
Supreme Command (Oberkommando Wehrmacht/OKW), Major von Passavant and 
Major von Wehlen, that the stations were subject to the same regulations as domestic 
broadcasts within the Reich, and that music which was banned on German airwaves 
was also out of bounds for the Soldatensender.53 However, in early 1944 the 
VLWXDWLRQZDVVWLOORXWRIWKH5093¶VFRQWURODQGDUHYHDOLQJOHWWHUIURP+LQNHOWR
*RHEEHOVYLD*XWWHUHUGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHIXWLOLW\RIWKH0LQLVWU\¶VSRVLWLRQ 
While for several months I have had to eradicate or prevent what I felt was too maudlin, corny and 
unmanly on German domestic radio schedule, in most cases the Soldatensender are blithely 
broadcasting such records and tape recordings. In addition, the majority of these, without inhibition or 
restraint, send so-called Wunschkonzerte [command performances] and especially cabaret shows with 
humorous announcements etc. into the ether at all sorts of hours. (...) With the tougher development 
of the whole war situation, negative remarks about those Soldatensender are intensifying. 
« $OWKRXJK , FOHDUO\ LQIRUPHG WKH High Command of the Armed Forces months ago that the 
tendencies that I issue on behalf of the Minister for the domestic German radio schedule must also be 
most precisely followed by the Wehrmacht stations, only in very few cases do the responsible soldiers 
and special managers [Sonderführer] keep to them. Completely unconcerned and with countless 
extended announcements, they make the most colourful programmes of the sort which could no 
longer be used in our domestic programming [even] before Stalingrad, which is also one of the key 
causes of the so-called popularity of Belgrade station, which employs both ³WKHhottest dance music´
and colourful cabaret-style public broadcasts or - like the other Soldatensender ± lots of material from 
our stocks or [music] industry records which are no longer desirable for intra-German broadcasts.54 
This acknowledgement that Belgrad was popular because it ignored RMVP 
guidelines is indicative of the way in which Goebbels was willing to ignore FRUFHV¶
tastes for the sake of ideology and consistency with domestic broadcasting. That 
VXFK VWDWLRQV¶ IDUH UHVHPEOHG WKH GLVFRQWLQXHG Wunschkonzert für die Wehrmacht, 
which the SD had QRWHG LQ  ZDV SRSXODU IRU LWV ³IUHVKQHVV DQG YDULHW\´55 is 
significant; in the absence of programming that PHW)RUFHV¶QHHGV, they were using 
the relative freedom of the Soldatensender create it themselves. Hinkel noted that the 
³QHJDWLYH UHPDUNV´ DERXW the stations came especially from commanders and the 
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Waffen-SS, but this very fact renders them of little practical use to the RMVP, except 
as rhetorical ammunition in the quest to bring the military stations in line with 
domestic programming. In the same letter, Hinkel recommended that Soldatensender 
also be used periodically on domestic wavelengths to pool artistic and technical 
resources. The idea was not implemented, but would have had the effect of bringing 
the cultural output of the military stations FORVHUWRWKH5093¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ 
There is a marked parallel EHWZHHQWKH5093¶VSUREOHPVZLWKWKHSoldatensender 
and the BBC¶V µVOXVK¶ EDQ ,Q %ULWDLQ WRR WKH DXWKRULWLHV VWUXJJOHG WR suppress 
popular music that was considered psychologically inappropriate, and +LQNHO¶VEDWWOH
to ban ³PDXGOLQ FRUQ\ DQG XQPDQO\´56 recordings ZDV PLUURUHG E\ WKH %%&¶V
attempt to weed out male and female vocalists whose delivery it considered 
³DQDHPLF DQG GHELOLWDWLQJ´ RU ³LQVLQFHUH DQG over-VHQWLPHQWDO´57 Nonetheless, the 
µVOXVK¶ GHEDWH QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKH %%& )RUFHV 3URJUDPPH UHFKULVWHQHG WKH
General Forces Programme on 27th February 1944 to reflect its new simultaneous 
VWDWXV DV WKH VHFRQG µ+RPH 6HUYLFH¶)58 was free to broadcast the lively jazz and 
dance music demanded by the Forces, and could draw on American musical and 
technical resources. The RMVP, on the other hand, was hampered by ideological 
prejudice, banning Anglo-American compositions and artists who had fallen from 
political favour such as Lale Andersen. +LQNHO¶V DWWHPSWV WR VHW ³WHQGHQFLHV´59 for 
German broadcasting in order to reflect the increasingly bleak military situation also 
GLUHFWO\FRQWUDGLFWHG)RUFHV¶FXOWXUDOGHPDQGV.  
:ROI0LWWOHU¶VEURDGFDVWWR%ULWLVKForces in East Asia on 19th August 1942 rightly 
drew a comparison between the British and German GLIILFXOWLHV ZLWK )RUFHV¶
entertainment.60 +RZHYHU 0LWWOHU¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW +LQNHO¶V restructuring of the 
RRG in February 194261 had successfully aligned German radio wLWK)RUFHV¶WDVWHV, 
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and that this met with universal approval from its target audience, was incorrect. It is 
belied by the fact that the reforms were not substantive enough and remained 
obstructed by guidelines and regulations, and the large numbers of Germans who 
SUHIHUUHGWKHPXVLFRI$OOLHGµZKLWH¶DQGµEODFN¶ broadcasts was further testament to 
WKH 55*¶V IDLOXUH. The increasing concessions to the sensibilities of the civilian 
population, for example in areas affected by air raids, and the continuing ideological 
constrictions regarding jazz meant that the Forces¶ PXVLFDO GHPDQGV UHPDLQHG
unsated by German radio. The Soldatensender were broadly representative of 
German Forces¶ tastes, and persistent RMVP attempts to bring them into line with 
domestic prRJUDPPLQJ LQGLFDWH WKDW HYHQ LQ µWRWDO ZDU¶ *RHEEHOV SULRULWLVHG
ideological concerns over utilitarian pragmatism. 
USA 
µZoot Suit Riots¶, OWI and Domestic Political Problems 
While Goebbels worked to cultivate an atmosphere of national mourning in the wake 
of Stalingrad, his American counterparts at OWI were faced with very different 
domestic difficulties. Wartime demographic upheavals exacerbated existing racial 
tensions, which culminated in the so-FDOOHGµ=RRW6XLW5LRWV¶of July 1943. The riots 
were a series of public disturbances between members of the US 1DY\ DQG µ]RRW 
VXLWHUV¶ MD]]-oriented groups of predominantly, though not exclusively, African- or 
Mexican-American youths whose extravagant dress sense rendered them highly 
visible and provocative fHDWXUHV RQ $PHULFD¶V ZDUWLPH XUEDQ ODQGVFDSH. The zoot 
suiterV¶RYHU-sized clothing was an overt rejection of WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VPHVVDJHRI
wartime thrift, and by frequenting dances and music halls, this leisure-oriented 
subculture became inextricably associated with swing and jazz music scenes. When 
Navy personnel were stationed in areas of Los Angeles which had a high proportion 
of Mexican-American residents, the close proximity created resentments between the 
groups, which spilled over into large-scale public disorder in July 1943.  
While the riots largely involved gangs of sailors attacking Mexican-American zoot 
suiters,62 WKH ORFDO PHGLD ODUJHO\ SRUWUD\HG WKH HYHQWV DV ZKLWH $PHULFDQV¶ VHOI-
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defence against a criminal youth element. Carey McWilliams of the Los Angeles 
&KDSWHU RI WKH 1DWLRQDO /DZ\HUV¶ *XLOG ZURWH WR WKH $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO )UDQFLV
Biddle, to warn that 
[e]vidence indicates that week-end violence represents logical culmination of provocative and 
discriminatory policies pursued by local police officials toward the Mexican section of the community 
during the last eighteen months. Characterization of riots in [the US@ SUHVV DV ³LQGLJQDWLRQ RI
American service men [sic.] against 0H[LFDQ JDQJVWHUV´ LV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ DW YDULDQFH ZLWK
background factual situation. Continued repetition of such incidents constitutes direct interference 
with war effort, disrupts national unity, and jeopardizes [the] 3UHVLGHQW¶V*RRG1HLJKERU3ROLF\63 
Indeed, the biased and racist reportage describing the riots as the defensive reaction 
RI VHUYLFHPHQ WR ³0H[LFDQ JDQJVWHUV´ H[DFHUEDWHG WKH FRQIOLFW DQG DWWUDFWHG QHZ
SDUWLFLSDQWV $ *UDQG -XU\ VWDWHPHQW UHJDUGLQJ ³UHFHQW GLVWXUEDQFHV EHWZHHQ
members of the uniformed services and juvenile zoot suit wearers, which have 
resulted in much unfavorable publiciW\ IRU WKLV FRXQWU\´ FRQFOXGHG WKDW ³the so-
called Zoot Suit problem is merely one manifestation of a disturbed time in our 
national life. The Jury is of the opinion that it is but a passing fad that will disappear 
within a comparatively short time, and that there is no inherent connection between 
wearing a zoot suit and juvenile delinquency or crime. Unfortunately however, zoot 
suits have become temporarily emblematic of crime in the eyes of the public.´64 The 
report failed to take into account the social and political context as elucidated by 
Carey McWilliams, finding ³QR HYLGHQFH WKDW WKHVH >]RRW@ DFWLYLWLHV ZHUH LQ DQ\
sense due to or incited by race prejudice or anti-0H[LFDQIHHOLQJ´65 In fact, as the 
historian Luis Alvarez has recently demonstrated at length, the zoot suiters 
represented not a passing fad but a complex social phenomenon rooted in American 
racial politics.66 This was acknowledged at the time by Walter White of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), who noted that 
³>P@DQ\]RRWVXLWHUVZHDUVXFKFORWKLQJWRFRPSHQVDWHDVHQVHRIEHLQJUHMHFWHGE\
society. The wearers are almost invariably the victims of poverty, proscription, and 
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VHJUHJDWLRQ´67 As Alvarez DUJXHV³zoot suiters carved social space for themselves 
DQG«HYHQDWDWLPHZKHQWKHLURSLQLRQVZHUHRIWHQH[FOXGHGIURPPRUHIRUPDO
channels of public discourse, they articulated their own ethnic, gender, sexual, and 
class identities. With their wide-brimmed hats, flowing coats, and draped pants, they 
literally and figuratively claimed space by flaunting and celebrating the cultural 
difference and privileging of leisure that prevailing [wartime] social norms so often 
condemned.´68 
Zoot suiters could be found in towns and cities across the United States, but they 
were most numerous and prominent in the respective centres of East Coast and West 
Coast jazz, Harlem in New York and the Central Avenue district of Los Angeles, 
which both had sizeable African-American communities. They congregated in jazz 
music or dance venues, and jazz stars such as Cab Calloway also adopted a zoot 
aesthetic, thus publically cementing the links between jazz and zoot fashion.69 
Nonetheless, in their attention-seeking clothing and emphasis on leisure and dancing, 
they were comparable to another jazz-oriented subaltern culture in Nazi Germany, 
the Swing Youth, who used jazz and fashion to assert their own suppressed social 
and cultural identities in a hugely different context.70 
Like the Grand Jury, the Los Angeles Police Department dismissed the idea that the 
riots were racially motivated. A letter from the Los Angeles Chief of Police, C. B. 
+RUUDOOWRWKHFLW\¶V0D\RU)OHWFKHU%RZURQdated 21st July 1943, concluded that 
³LWPXVWEHVDLGWKDWWKRVHZKRLQVLVWWKDWWKHµ]RRWVXLW¶SUREOHPLVDUDFLDODIIDLUDQG
that it has international implications, do so either through ignorance or because of 
VRPH XOWHULRU PRWLYH´71 Horrall¶V RZQ ulterior motive here may have been to 
discredit liberal critics of police racism such as Carey McWilliams, and Elmer Davis 
ZDV³NHHQO\LQWHUHVWHG´72 in the implications of the riots for good reason. On 3rd July 
KHUHVSRQGHGWR%RZURQ¶VSURWHVWDW2:,LQWervHQWLRQLQWKHFLW\¶VDIIDLUVE\
H[SODLQLQJWKDWIRUWKHSUHYLRXVILYHGD\V2:,LQ:DVKLQJWRQDQGHOVHZKHUH³was 
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bombarded with petitions, protests, suggestions and requests apropos the 
disturbances in Los Angeles. It was urged that I go on the air, or advise the President 
to go on the air, or advise the Attorney General to act, or ask the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to investigate.´73 OWI had sent Allen Cranston, a former Los Angeles 
MRXUQDOLVW WR WKH FLW\ WR IDFLOLWDWH ³D PRUH VREHU DQG UHVSRQVLEOH IOow of 
LQIRUPDWLRQ´74 which drew criticism from the city authorities due to the perceived 
federal interference in local matters.75 However, as noted by McWilliams, the rioting 
was exacerbated by the attitude in the local and national press, and vigilantes had 
been drawn to participate often in the view that they were intervening defensively 
against gang violence. The unbalanced reporting, described by Bowron himself as 
³JDUEOHGKLJKO\FRORUHGZKROO\PLVOHDGLQJDQGGHWULPHQWDOQHZVDFFRXQWV´,76 had 
not only fXUWKHUVSUHDGWR³VHQVDWLRQDOWUHDWPHQW´77 in areas of the national press, but 
also escalated the question from one of local importance to a looming international 
diplomatic crisis. Racially biassed media reports were relayed to neighbouring 
American republics, and Bowron concluded that WKH µ=RRW 6XLW 5LRWV¶ had caused 
³LUUHSDUDEOHGDPDJHWRWKH&LW\RI/RV$QJHOHV´78 
Axis exploitation of the rioting was inevitable, as had already been proven in 
California with regard to the controversial aftermath of the Sleepy Lagoon murder in 
November 1942. The twenty-four Mexican-American defendants were forced to 
stand trial in their zoot suits, thus associating them in the eyes of the jury with 
prevalent negative media reports, and the trial was conducted in a hostile, prejudicial 
and racially-charged atmosphere.79 Cranston noted at the time of the trial WKDW³$[LV
propaganda was giving Los Angeles a black eye the world over by exploitation of 
WKHORFDO0H[LFDQVLWXDWLRQ´80 with Rome, Berlin and Tokyo suggesting, particularly 
in broadcasts to Latin America, that the Mexican-American zoot suiterV¶ plight 
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represented ³RSHQ UHEHOOLRQ DJDLQVW YLROHQW $QJOR-6D[RQ SHUVHFXWLRQ´81 This was 
consistent with general Axis radio policy, which was quick to make use of racial 
incidents in the USA in order to emphasise and exacerbate signs of internal 
disunity.82 Indeed, while RMVP projects targeted at the USA in 1942 had appealed 
to isolationist sentiment in the American heartlands, Axis propaganda could now 
DWWDFNWKH86ZDUHIIRUW¶VYHU\raison d'être. As the NAACP pointed out in 1943, if 
the war was about defending universal human rights, why were large numbers of 
American citizens denied these on their own soil?83 
However, the rioting can also be attributed in part to white resentment towards the 
rising status of other ethnic groups, which was a direct repercussion of the war effort. 
$ PHPRUDQGXP VHQW WR 5RRVHYHOW¶V $GPLQLVWUDWLYH $VVLVWDQW -RQDWKRQ 'DQLHOV
dated 7th August 1943 and signed by Philleo Nash, 2:,¶V$VVLVWDQW WR WKH'HSXW\
Director, indicates not only WKHSURJUHVVLYHWHQGHQFLHVRI2:,¶VOHDGHUVKLS, but also 
highlights the impact of the war on the integration of minorities into American 
working life: 
Segregation is a pattern of inter-racial accommodation which presupposes limited minority 
participation in community life by minority members. As the war progresses this demand for 
manpower means that this limited participation is extended. As employment and wage levels begin to 
approach prevailing levels for whites, Negro participation in community life increases to the point 
where segregation as a pattern is threatened. 
«:KDWHYHUDFWLRQSURJUDPVDUHXQGHUWDNHQVKRXOGEHSXEOLFL]HGLQVXFKDZD\DVWRHQFRXUage a 
more favorable attitude to minority participation in the war; and to bring home the war issues more 
clearly to minority members.84 
Nash advocated the controlled use of information ³to reduce hostility on the part of 
whites and lower militancy on the pDUWRIQHJURHV´85 2:,¶VWDVNZDVWRHQFRXUDJH
WKH$PHULFDQPHGLDWRSUHVHQWWKH86$¶VHWKQLFPLQRULWLHVLQDIDYRXUDEOHOLJKWDQG
thus integrate them more successfully into the war effort. As has been discussed 
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above in Chapter Two with relation to the irreversible nature of the advances of 
popular culture on the BBC in World War II, this enfranchisement of minority 
groups implied by definition a greater and lasting integration into mainstream 
American society as a whole. This was in keeping with the progressive leanings of 
leading figures at OWI, but there was a broader recognition of the necessity to utilise 
the media constructively in this respect. Los Angeles County Grand Jury, indeed, 
IRXQGLQWKHZDNHRIWKH]RRWVXLWULRWVWKDW³>U@DLVLQJWKHVRFLDl and economic levels 
and promoting the full community integration of this [Mexican-American] minority 
is no longer a reformist or humanitarian movement, but a war-LPSRVHGQHFHVVLW\´86 
7KHWUXWKRIWKLVDVVHUWLRQZDVGHPRQVWUDWHGLQ-XQHZKHQµUDFHULRWV¶RFFXUUHG
in Detroit, an important industrial centre. The majority of the thirty-six people killed 
in the incident were African-American, and approximately six hundred citizens were 
injured. The National Federation for Constitutional Liberties (NFCL) noting that, 
DORQJVLGH WKH ORVV RI OLIH ³'HWURLW¶V YLWDO ZDU SURGXFWLRQ SURJUDP KDV ORVW RQH
PLOOLRQDQGDTXDUWHUPDQKRXUV´. The NFCL pointed out that similar incidents were 
occurring in other industrial hubs across the country, and that the victims in some 
cases were Jews and Mexican-Americans.87 The NAACP circulated a petition urging 
WKDW³WKHUHVKDOOEHQRPRUH'HWURLWV,QWKLVKRXUZKHQRXU\RXQJPHQDUHILJKWLQJ
throughout the world in defense of their human rights, we cannot tolerate their denial 
WRDQ\VHFWLRQRIRXUSRSXODWLRQDWKRPH´88 and a radio talk given by Elmer Davis 
following the Detroit tragedy made clear that he shared this sentiment.89 The fact that 
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The increase in racial tensions was attributed by some senior figures to complacency 
regarding the progress of the war. Ulysses S. Grant III of the Office of Civilian 
Defense (OCD) suggested on 31st -XQHWKDW³UHFHQWDOOLHGVXFFHVVHVKDYHEHHQ
instrumental in lulling our citizens in a false sense of security,´91 although, as 2:,¶V
Philleo Nash had observed, the wartime economic and social empowerment of 
minority groups and the closer proximity of various groups due to war industry were 
also important factors. Moreover, social injustices against minorities could lead to 
violent retaliations from sections of the afflicted community. The problem extended 
to the Forces, and injustices experienced by African-American soldiers led to an 
allegedly premeditated street riot near Camp Stoneman involving two hundred 
African-American soldiers on 15th August 1943.92 Nash pointed out that racial 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\DWWKHKDQGVRIZKLWH0LOLWDU\3ROLFHPHQZDVD³PDMRU
sore-SRLQW´DPRQJ$IULFDQ-American soldiers, and recommended that future stricter 
enforcement of their rights should be well-publicised.93 
Roosevelt publicly addressed the issue on 20th July 1943, stating that outbreaks of 
race-UHODWHG YLROHQFH ³HQGDQJHU RXU QDWLRQDO XQLW\ DQG JLYH FRPIRUW WR RXU
HQHPLHV´94 ,WZDV2:,¶V WDVNWRPLWLJDWHVXFKGDQJHUVDQG Nash proposed ³VRPH
scattered individual action and publicity proposals which might improve the 
VLWXDWLRQ´95 Suggestions included a weekly fifteen-minute radio programme entitled 
8QFOH6DP¶V)DPLO\, which was to disseminate War Department material relating to 
members of minority groups performing feats of military heroism and excelling in 
wartime industrial production.96 This was to be accompanied by the planting of 
UHSRUWV LQ WKH PHGLD RI ³PHPEHUV RI IRUHLJQ ODQJXDJH DVVRFLDWLRQV DQG JURXSV´
performing public displays of support for the war effort, such as donations to the Red 
Cross blood banks. The latter recommendation originated in the aftermath of the Los 
$QJHOHV µ=RRW 6uit Riots¶ in Los Angeles, when 2:,¶V $OOHQ Cranston proposed 
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that a group of Mexican-American zoot suiters be photographed en route to donate 
blood.97  
The emphasis on linguistic minorities is also important, as through the multitude of 
domestic foreign-language stations there was the very real danger of expatriate 
communities issuing propaganda against the United States war effort on American 
soil. In June 1942, whilst proposing that OWI introduce a vetting system for all 
foreign-language radio broadcasters, Lee Falk of the Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM), an entity within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), 
ZURWHWR2:,¶V$VVLVWDnt Director Archibald MacLeish:  
Before Pearl Harbor, Nazi and Fascist Propagandists [sic.] were outspoken on many domestic foreign 
language radio stations. In fact, the domestic Italian programs were virtually a fascist monopoly. On 
December 8th [1941], the most obvious Nazi and Fascist propagandists were interned, but many of the 
more clever and less obvious sympathizers remained on the stations. 
Their tactics are subtle. By intonation and insinuation, by selection of news and program material, and 
by use of nationalist music, they preach negativism, defeatism, and in general, hamper the war effort. 
These tactics further confuse and alienate the foreign language groups.98 
)DONSURSRVHGUHFWLI\LQJWKHVLWXDWLRQZLWKWKHKHOSRIDµEODFNOLVW¶WRKHOSIRUHLJn-
language radio stations identify which broadcasters were considered unacceptable by 
the government and might jeopardise their license. Nonetheless, the problem of 
domestic Axis propagandists was not restricted to immigrant communities. The 
Office for EmeUJHQF\ 0DQDJHPHQW QRWHG WKH ³H[WUHPH´ VLWXDWLRQ LQ %RVWRQ, in 
ZKLFK LVRODWLRQLVWV DQGSUHVVXUH JURXSVZHUH DWWHPSWLQJ WR ³IRVWHU DQWL-British and 
anti-5XVVLDQIHHOLQJV´99 
7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GLIILFXOWLHV ZLWK GRPHVWLF H[WUHPH ULJKW-wing groups were 
exacerbated by the fact that the FBI was unable to act unless it felt a statute had been 
definitely violated. Moreover, the Office of Censorship could only block material 
WKDWPLJKWEHFRQVWUXHGDVJLYLQJ³DLGRUFRPIRUWWRWKHHQHP\´DQGWKH)&&KDGQR
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control over media personnel or censorship.100 Such constitutional restrictions made 
it impossible to censure extreme right-wing groups such as -RVHSK .DPS¶V
Constitutional Educational League, GLVPLVVHG E\ 2:, DV ³D RQH-man 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ´,101 and the American Defense Society, which both attacked OWI using 
.DPS¶V FODLP WKDW ILYH KXQGUHG³UHGV´ ZHUHRQ WKHRIILFH¶VSD\UROO These groups 
represented an outspoken but nonetheless dangerous undercurrent of extremist 
opinion in the United States, and could not be prevented from attempting to 
undermine the war effort by slandering government agencies and spreading divisive 
rhetoric. As Elmer Davis wrote to Senator Claude Pepper, from whom he had 
UHFHLYHGDZDUQLQJRI.DPS¶VDFWLYLW\ 
« ,Q0U.DPS¶V efforts to smear this agency and members of its staff, I find no cause for real 
concern. In a somewhat broader perspective, however, they are a cause of considerable concern in that 
they indicate very clearly that the fascist fifth column in this country, with its technique of fomenting 
dissension and racial and religious hatreds, is still an active menace to democracy.102 
It is ironic that WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D EURDGO\ µIUHH SUHVV¶ LQ WKH 86$ WKUHDWHQHG WR
undermine the American war effort, which was ostensibly being prosecuted in the 
name of freedom and democracy .DPS¶V ZULWLQJV ZHUH VXEPLWWHG WR WKH )%,¶V
Criminal Division of Justice which confirmed that they violated no laws; thus he was 
permitted to continue publishing slanderous material that risked damaging public 
trust in government agencies such as OWI, which was responsible for the 
maintenance of national coherence and morale. OWI could only petition the Special 
Defence Unit of the Department of Justice to take action against the worst 
transgressors, as Allen Cranston did in vain regarding two pro-Fascist Italian-
American newspapers,103 although the prejudicial coverage of the µ=oot Suit Riots¶ 
had proven that mainstream media could be equally problematic. Elmer Davis 
summed up the problem in a response to a request from the American Croatian 
Council to intervene in a dispute involving the right-wing author Ruth Comfort 
Mitchell, whom he pointed had DOVR ³IUHTXHQWO\ DQG YLJRXURXVO\´ DWWDFNHG 2:,. 
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³However,´KH FRQFOXGHG ³this is a free country and so long as she refrains from 
libel she has the right to speak her mind.´104 
Self-5HIOH[LYH3URSDJDQGD-DSDQ¶VZero Hour 
A different kind of threat to American morale was posed by the popularity of 
Japanese musical propaganda to Allied Forces in the South Pacific. The lack of 
entertainment programming picked up by Forces stationed outside the USA was 
highlighted by Lieutenant Sherwood M. Snyder in a letter to the FFC dated 29th May 
1943, which was subsequently forwarded to Owen Lattimore, 2:,¶V Director of 
Pacific Operations: 
I feel that I have a complaint to file with respect to the type of programs eminating [sic.] from the 
United States. 
« ,W LV QHFHVVDU\ WR OLVWHQ WR >VWDWLRQV@ RWKHU WKHQ >VLF@ $PHULFDQ VWDWLRQV LQ RUGHU WR ILQG WKH
entertainment sought when listening to the radio during free hours. We listen to news being broadcast 
over and over and then directly following the English version is a harangue in three or so different 
languages. Of course, we then move the dial elsewhere in the search of [sic.] something we can 
understand and something that will satisfy us during the short time we can be off duty. If London is 
on the air, we may find music, but most of the time we hear talk about the war and more war talk. «
So « we keep turning the dial until we hear something that makes us stop. The funny part of it is 
that it is usually the enemy that has such [musical] programs. However if we listen to nice music from 
the Axis we have to be subjected to propaganda in between the pieces similar to this: from Berlin ± 
The world is divided into two camps, civilization and bulshevism [sic.], why is America still in the 
wrong camp? ± or from Rome - Churchill is a bastard. 
«We like to tune in on light programs as we see enough war without having to hear about it every 
time we turn on the radio. The [US] short waves are being used mainly as a propaganda tool instead 
of at least equally or mainly as a means of entertainment for those desirous of hearing American 
things presented in an American way.105 
6Q\GHU¶V OHWWHU is an excellent example of the nature of the threat posed by Axis 
entertainment propaganda such as the music-oriented Zero Hour on Radio Tokyo, 
which was beamed daily to American forces in the South Pacific.106 Instigated by 
                                                 
104
 NARA RG 208 Box 9 Records of the Historian 1941-46 OWI Subversive Activities 1942-43. 
Davis to Kazlar, 1st November 1943. 
105
 NARA RG 208 Box 6 Records of the Director and Predecessor Agencies: Records of the Director 
1942-45. Programs ± 10 Radio 1943. Snyder to FCC (c/o AACS Radio Station, New York), 29th May 
1943. 
106
 Toguri FBI file 01, p.15. 
 206 
 
Major Tshigetsugu Tsumeishi,107 the man in charge of all foreign-language 
propaganda to neutral and enemy countries, Zero Hour was operated by a team of 
Allied POWs which consisted of the Australian Major Charles H. Cousens, a 
Filipino officer named Norman Reyes and Captain Wallace E. Ince of the US Army. 
A committee including members of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Information 
Board, the Navy and the Army decided that the new programme would broadcast to 
enemy forces in the South Pacific.108 7KLV ZDV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH ³FRPSOHWH
integrDWLRQ´ RI SV\FKRORJLFDO ZDUIDUH DQG PLOLWDU\ LQWHOOLJHQFH in the Political 
Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 
(PWD/SHAEF),109 and although ostensibly part of Radio Tokyo, Zero Hour was 
actually controlled by the Army.110  
Zero Hour appeared in March 1943 at the time of the Guadalcanal Campaign.111 
Charles H. Cousens, although he refused to speak at the microphone, was considered 
³WKHPRYLQJ VSLULW´RI WKHSURJUDPPH FRDFKLQJDQQRXQFHUV DQGZULWLQJ VFULSWV112 
Appropriate music was initially selected by Norman Reyes, and American citizen Iva 
7RJXUL '¶$TXLQR using the name µ2USKDQ $QQ¶ would provide entertainment 
between the records, with male newsreaders interspersed within the programmes. 
Collectively, the English-speaking women working for Japanese English-language 
SURJUDPPHVZHUHGXEEHGµ7RN\R5RVH¶E\WKHLU*,OLVWHQHUVKLS, but in her post-war 
trial the name was ascribed solely to Toguri.113 Wallace E. Ince told the FBI after the 
war that other American POWs in Japan had told him that an announcer nicknamed 
7RN\R5RVH³UHSHDWHGO\WDXQWHGWKH$PHULFDQIRUFHVLQWKH3DFLILFDUHDZLWKWKUHDWV
of specific bombing missions by Japanese planes, and other items of military import 
such as naming specific units or mentions of the movements of specific Allied 
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XQLWV´EXWWKDWQRVXFKFRPPHQWDU\ZDVIHDWXUHGLQ7RJXUL¶VZero Hour broadcasts 
during his time on the programme.114 
7RJXUL¶V)%,ILOHFRQWDLQVDQumber of such statements from former colleagues and 
acquaintances regarding her job and the nature of the broadcasts, which, taken 
together, provide an insight into Zero Hour¶VFRQWHQWVDQGGHVLUHGHIIHFWV 
>7@KH SURJUDP¶V REMHFWLYH ZDV WR DURXVH QRVWDOJLD and homesickness, and to do anything to make 
American soldiers in the tropics feel like going home. Her part was languid music and chit-chat to 
accentuate the sentimental side of the program. [Cousens] told her that this sort of music was banned 
among U.SILJKWLQJPHQ0LWVXVKLRKDYLQJEHHQWROGVRE\WKH,PSHULDO-DSDQHVH$UP\«,QYLHZ
of this report, [Toguri was told] that Radio Tokyo would, therefore, draw listeners and that she should 
keep in mind that her job was to show how foolish it was to be fighting a war. 
« 7KH SRLQW RI WKH SURJUDP ZDV WR HQWHUWDLQ DQG WR PDNH WKH OLVWHQHUV KRPHVLFN >&KDUOHV +@
Cousens did not believe in touching war subjects as this would be bad propaganda, would not keep 
the program pleasant, and would not drive the point home. 
«7RJXUL¶VMREZDVLQWURGXFLQJUHFRUGVLQDIULHQGO\DQGHQWHUWDLQLQJPDQQHU115 
7RJXUL¶VWDVNZDVWKHUHIRUHWRinspire sentimentality in her listeners, using precisely 
WKHNLQGRIµVOXVK¶ZKLFKWKH%%&ZDVVWUXJJOLQJWREDQIURP%ULWLVKDLUZDYHV. She 
was initially coached and had her programmes scripted by Cousens, who had 
recommended her for the role, but she began scripting the programmes and selecting 
the music herself after Cousens retired for health reasons in 1944.116 7KH )%,¶V
pURJUDPPHWUDQVFULSWLRQVRIIHUHYLGHQFHWKDW7RJXUL¶VWDONVZHUHdefined by wit and 
VDUFDVP DV ZHOO DV WKH XVDJH RI $PHULFDQ VODQJ VXFK DV ³GRSH PXVLF´ DQG
³VKXFNV´117 ³[W]DVQ¶W WKDWD ORXV\PXVLFDOSURJUDPZHKDG ODVWQLJKW"´VKHDVNHG
on 9th March 1944. ³,WZDVDOPRVWEDGHQRXJKWREHRQWKH%%&´.118 
The most interesting IHDWXUHRI7RJXUL¶VEURDGFDVWV, however, was their remarkable 
degree of self-reflexivity. She deliberately and repeatedly drew attention to the 
SURJUDPPH¶s propagandistic nature and function, warning in one programme that 
³ULJKWQRZ,¶POXOOLQJWKHLU>WKHOLVWHQHUV¶@VHQVHV>ZLWKPXVLF@EHIRUH,FUHHSXSDQG
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DQQLKLODWHWKHPZLWKP\QDLOILOH´119 This unorthodox methodology has received no 
prior scholarly attention, and yet it appears to be without parallel in World War II 
Axis entertainment propaganda. One characteristic broadcast, for example, opened 
with the address: 
+HOOR WKHUH HQHPLHV KRZ¶V WULFNV"7KLV LV $QQRI5DGLR 7RN\RDQG ZH¶UH MXVW JRLQJ WREHJLQRXU
UHJXODU SURJUDP RI PXVLF QHZV DQG WKH ]HUR KRXU IRU RXU IULHQGV« , PHDQ RXU HQHPLHV LQ




Another began even more conspicuously: 
Greetings everybody, how are my victims this evening? All ready for a vicious assault on your 
PRUDOH":HOO UHOD[QRZ WKLV LVQ¶WJRLQJ WRKXUW7KDW-DW¶V ULJKWTXLFN VLVWHU7he big forceps!... 
Good!... nRZWXUQRQWKHPXVLF« WKDW¶VULJKW6SOHQGLG121 
The humoURXV UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH SURJUDPPH¶V SURSDJDQGLVWLF QDWXUH DV ZHll as 
7RJXUL¶V IUHTXHQW KDELW RI DOWHUQDWLQJ WKH WHUP RI DGGUHVV IURP ³HQHPLHV´ WR
³IULHQGV´ a point raised by her defence in the post-war treason trial,122 are further 
H[HPSOLILHG E\ DQRWKHU LQWURGXFWLRQ LQ ZKLFK VKH UHIHUV WR KHUVHOI DV ³your little 
playmate, I mean your bitter enemy, Ann, with a program of dangerous and wicked 
propaganda for my victims in Australia and the South Pacific. Stand by! You 
unlucky creatures.´123 Subtle allusions to WKH SURJUDPPH¶V RULJLQV DUH PDGH LQ
occasional lines of pidgin-English such as ³<RXDUHOLNLQJSOHDVH"´,124 DQG7RJXUL¶V
assertion at her trial that she was joking with her Allied listeners in ways which the 
Japanese censors would not understand is plausible in the light of the available 
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transcripts.125 This explanation would also be consistent with the biographical and 
political details available relating to her time in Japan.126 
According to both Ince and Cousens, the Zero Hour personnel, including Toguri, 
were consciously trying to sabotage WKH SURJUDPPH &RXVHQV¶ testimony suggests 
that almost every aspect of the programme was constructed to bore and repel 
listeners: 
We ascertained that she [Toguri] knew nothing about broadcasting and had never been on the air. 
This, combined with her masculine style and deep aggressive voice, we felt would definitely preclude 
any possibility of her creating the homesick feeling which the Japanese Army were trying to foster.  
«7RPDNHTXLWHVXUHWKDWWKHSURJUDPIDLOHGLQLWVLQWHQGHGHIIHFW,VHOHFWHGWKHPXVLFDQGZURWH
the continuity for Miss Toguri to announce. Over a period we built up a small library of records, 
nearly all by English composers, which we felt would have a minimum appeal to American forces in 
the Pacific.127 
This is borne out to some degree by the musical selections noted in the FBI 
transcripts. Although regular airplay was given to George Gershwin and the self-
stylHGµ.LQJRI-D]]¶3DXO:KLWHPDQ, the programme featured not only a number of 
English dance bands but also Germanic popular music by the likes of Marek Weber 
and Dajos Béla, who had previously played with Georg Haentzschel and Franz 
Grothe of the DTUO respectively. The band of Barnabas von Géczy, who was in 
charge of the pre-war attempts to cultivate New German Entertainment Music, was 
also featured.128 The question as to whether this suggests a previously unknown 
cooperation between the RRG and Radio Tokyo in the procurement of dance music 
is beyond the scope of the thesis, but it certainly supports CousenV¶ testimony that 
the music was selected to have the opposite effect, not least because European salon 
orchestras were unlikely to induce homesickness in GIs. Nonetheless, in spite of the 
apparent efforts to sabotage the programme, Zero Hour was popular with its target 
audience, and featured FRPHG\VNHWFKHVDQGµQHZV¶IURPWKH$PHULFDQhome front, 
LQWHUPLWWHQWO\SUHVHQWHGE\ µ7HG¶ ,QFH. Airing at a peak listening time of 6 p.m.-
7.15 p.m. six days per week, Zero Hour¶V EOHQG RI news, music, messages and 
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commentary was regularly cited by American troops as an example of the sort of 
programming they wished from their own side. 
It is unclear what implications WKH SURJUDPPH¶V apparently inadvertent popularity 
had for American morale, which, as Toguri regularly reminded listeners, was Radio 
7RN\R¶VUHDOWDUJHW. Major Tshigetsugu told the FBI that, as an Army officer, he had 
VHHQ WKH HIIHFW WKDW 7RJXUL¶V ZRUN which was much-praised in Japan, had on the 
American side and on several occasions had offered her appreciation and 
encouragement.129 This impact is impossible to gauge with aQ\ FHUWDLQW\ 7RJXUL¶V
2006 obituary in The New York Times asserted that Zero Hour ³did nothing to dim 
American morale. The servicemen enjoyed the recordings of American popular 
music, and the United States Navy bestowed a satirical citation on Tokyo Rose at 
ZDU¶V HQG IRU KHU HQWHUWDLQPHQW YDOXH´.130 However, as noted with regard to Lord 
Haw-Haw in Chapter Two, laughter could lead to repeated listening and increased 
susceptibility to the message of propaganda broadcasts. This, too, was openly stated 




Toguri was convicted on the basis of one relatively innocuous comment in the 
absence of any evidence of treason,132 and the transcripts support the subsequent 
argument made by Cousens, Ince and Toguri that they were actively trying to limit 
thHSURJUDPPH¶VHIfectiveness as propaganda. AFFRUGLQJWR,QFH¶VFBI testimony,133 
it was the malicious broadcasts of other µ7RN\R 5RVHV¶ which made specific 
references to troop movements and bombing targets, which would have been enabled 
by the close cooperation between Japanese propaganda and military personnel.134 
This strategy was designed to convey an unsettling feeling of the omnipresence of 
the announcer and the sense that the listeners were being watched, and the 
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methodology was also employed WR JUHDW SV\FKRORJLFDO HIIHFW E\ 'HOPHU¶V
Soldatensender. Thus it would be erroneous to dismiss the potential threat of such 
programming based on post-war demonstrations of bravado such as the bestowal of 
satirical citations. As Asa Briggs noted with relDWLRQWR*HUPDQµEODFN¶propaganda 
to Britain: 
The varied German propaganda assault failed, although the interesting question must be asked 
whether the assault might have appeared in a quite different light if the Germans had actually invaded 
Britain and hDGDWWDFKHGµWKHUDGLRSLVWRQWRDFRPSOHWHZDUPDFKLQH¶DVWKH\KDGGRQHLQ)UDQFH7KH
0LQLVWU\RI,QIRUPDWLRQZDVFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHµPLVFKLHYRXV¶1%%6EURDGFDVWV>@135  
Indeed, the available American primary sources indicate considerable official 
concern at the popularity of 7RJXUL¶VZero Hour. On 30th August 1943, Elmer Davis 
forwarded a letter from an exasperated Naval Officer and swing fan serving in the 
South Pacific to Owen Lattimore:136 
:KDW>WKH66'¶VUDGLRSURJUDPPHV@RIIHULVJRRGEXWWKHWLPLQJ LVSRRU:HGRQ¶WJHWDFKDQFHWR
listen until about 7:30 in the evening. By then the programs from San Francisco are about over or else 
all you can listen to is a re-broadcast of a baseball game, the National Barn-Dance or some other clap-
trap. What we need out here is more straight news, more swing music and some intelligent 
SURSDJDQGD«$VPDWWHUVVWDQGQRZ5DGLR7RN\RRIIHUVEHWWHU$PHULFDQVZLQJDQGPRUHRILWDW
WKHKRXUVZKHQZHFDQOLVWHQWKDQDQ\866WDWLRQ7KHLU³=HUR+RXU´RQ5DGLR7Rkyo has a large 
DXGLHQFH 7KH SURSDJDQGD WKHPH WKH\ KDPPHU DZD\ DW HYHU\ QLJKW LV ³'RQ¶W \RX ZLVK \RX ZHUH
KRPHQRZ-XVWOLVWHQWRZKDW\RX¶UHPLVVLQJ<RXUZLYHVDQGJLUOVKDYHORVWLQWHUHVWLQ\RXDQGDUH
JRLQJRXWZLWKRWKHUV(WFHWF´137 
,Q /DWWLPRUH¶V UHSO\ WR 'DYLV KH VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH OHWWHU LV ³SUREDEO\ ILYH RU VL[
PRQWKVROG´ 
For that many months now we have had news on the hour, every hour, throughout our transmission 
periods. 
«7KH1DYDORIILFHUPXVWKDYHEHHQOLVWHQLQJWRWKHwrong station because when one of the stations 
JRHVLQWR)UHQFKWKHUHDUHWZRRWKHUVFDUU\LQJRQLQ(QJOLVKZLWKVZLQJQHZVHWF7KH7RN\R³=HUR
+RXU´LVOHVVWKDQIRUW\PLQXWHVRIROGVZLQJUHFRUGLQJV:HFDUU\VZLQJDWWKHVDPHKRXU%URDGZD\
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Band Box, G.I. Jive) for fifty-five minutes. KROJ carries only troop news and entertainment 
throughout the twenty-four hours of the day.138 
Nonetheless, two months later, Lattimore conceded in a letter to Milton S. 
Eisenhower: 
That Japanese Zero Hour is undoubtedly going to plague us until the end of the war. 
«*UDGXDOO\DFFXPXODWLQJHYLGHQFHWHQGVWRVKRZWKDW=HUR+RXULVVRPHWLPHVTXRWHGEDFNWRXV
mainly to rouse our competitive spirit. It would seem that sometimes the impression is given that Zero 
Hour is listened to continuously, when in fact it is only listened to intermittently.  
If I were on service in the Solomons, I should not be particularly thrilled by some of the material that 
is sent out by SSD; but this opinion is just between you and me and the gatepost.139 
The assertion here that Zero Hour ³KDPPHUHG DZD\ HYHU\ QLJKW´ DW WKH WKHPH RI
fidelity in an attempt to demoralise servicemen is not supported by the available FBI 
transcripts, and it possible that here the content of other Japanese programmes or 
brRDGFDVWVIHDWXULQJGLIIHUHQW µ7RN\R5RVHV¶ LVPLVWDNHQO\EHLQJDWWULEXWHGWRZero 
Hour. Moreover, the claim that Zero Hour LVFLWHG³PDLQO\WRURXVHRXUFRPSHWLWLYH
VSLULW´ IDLOV WR WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW WKDW LI WKLV ZDV WKH FDVH LW remained a clear 
indication of Forces¶GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK current SSD output. The fact that SSD and 
not OWI was responsible for troop news and entertainment parallels the German 
situation, in which the RMVP vainly attempted to assert its control over the various 
Soldatensender. However, Lattimore complained to Eisenhower that the Forces were 
XQDEOH WR GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ 66' DQG 2:, RXWSXW ZLWK ³QR DPRXQW RI
H[SODQDWLRQ´ VXFFHHGLQJ LQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ 66' DQG 2:,
broadcasts in the mind of the average GI.140 Moreover, DV 6Q\GHU¶V OHWWHU
demonstrates, because SSD used its shortwave frequencies for the dual purpose of 
entertaining the troops and broadcasting foreign-language propaganda, some 
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American listeners were compelled to tune in to Axis propaganda in search of 
entertainment. LattimRUH¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWZero Hour is ³frequently´ cited to SSD and 
OWI as an example of superior programming is evidence that 6Q\GHU¶V OHWWHU ZDV
representative of a widespread problem and not an isolated complaint. Significantly, 
(OPHU 'DYLV FRQFOXGHG WKDW ³ZH PLJKW SHUKDSV FRQVLGHU WKH UHODWLYH YDOXH RI
broadcasting to Indo-China at the best hours and of information to our armed forces. 




The formal propaganda cooperation between the USA and Britain was consolidated 
in November 1943 with the founding of the Political Warfare Division of the 
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). 
PWD/SHAEF involved delegations from Anglo-American propaganda agencies such 
as OWI, OSS and PWE working together under the leadership of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, and was the 
successor to the unprecedented Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Branch of 
the Allied Force Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ). This predecessor agency was created 
LQ 1RYHPEHU  DW (LVHQKRZHU¶V EHKHVW WR DVVLVW WKH $OOLHG ODQGLQJV LQ )UHQFK
North Africa. PWB/AFHQ was the result of a meeting between the US State 
Department and the British Foreign Office that set out long-term political policies, 
which were then translated into long-term propaganda policies. These in turn were 
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reflecting the ³PLOLWDU\ H[LJHQFLHV´ RI WKH
organisation.142 
American and British propaganda philosophies differed noticeably, and David 
Garnett RI3:(¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDW$PHULFDQVEHOLHYHGLQSV\FKRORJLFDOZDUIDUH³LI
RQO\ DV D YDULHW\ RI DGYHUWLVLQJ´143 is supported by an official US governmental 
retrospective on the work of PWD/SHAEF. Published in Naples in the American 
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Zone of Occupation in 1945, the document asserted that ³psychological warfare is in 
essence a vast task of publicity, similar in many ways to modern advertising, [and] 
its basic sales argument is the force of military might. And this, of course, requires 
hard evidence.´144 Accordingly, PWD/SHAEF initially restricted itself to 
broadcasting news to the German Forces which had been prepared in close liaison 
with the military. The aim was to gain the trust of its listeners, who would witness at 
first-hand the credibility gap between the increasingly fantastic RMVP claims and 
the assertions of the Allies. Just as Elmer Davis had iterated that OWI told the truth 
LQ D ZD\ WKDW ZDV ³adjusted to the particular interests of enemy peoples so as to 
produce the psychological effect most conducive WR RXU YLFWRU\´145 PWD/SHAEF 
made selective use of the facts but avoided the outright distortions on the principle 
WKDW³RYHUWSURSDJDQGDRIIDOVHKRRGVZKLFKFDQEHSURYHGIDOVHE\WKHHQHP\LVWKH
same as killing the goose that might eventually lay golden HJJV´146 
Significantly, the only British agency mentioned in the PWD/SHAEF document is 
5H[ /HHSHU¶V 3ROLWLFDO ,QWHOOLJHQFH 'HSDUWPHQW 3,' D GLYLVLRQ RI WKH )RUHLJQ
Office. There is not a single reference to Sefton Delmer and PWE, although the 
FRYHUWQDWXUHRI3:(¶VZRUNPDGHLWDYDOXDEOHDX[LOLDU\WRPWD/SHAEF. Because 
official channels such as the BBC European Service and Voice of America needed to 
UHWDLQ OLVWHQHUV¶ trust and goodwill, PWD/SHAEF could implement malicious or 
controversial directives through µEODFN¶ZLWKRXW ULVNLQJFRPSURPLVLQJ WKH LQWHJULW\
RI µZKLWH¶ VWDWLRQV147 'HOPHU¶V work was officially disowned by the British 
government, and thus he was free to operate DFFRUGLQJWR*RHEEHOV¶GLFWXPWKDW ³LQ
propaganda, as in love, all is SHUPLWWHG WKDW LV VXFFHVVIXO´.148 This was carefully 
coordinated with the work of PWD/SHAEF, and it is thus surprising that this post-
war document credits neither Delmer nor PWE, even when discussing projects 
originating from Delmer such as the daily newsletter Nachrichten für die Truppe.149 
Whatever the reasons for this, it set a precedent that has broadly persisted in 
historiography of World War II propaganda, namely WKH RYHUORRNLQJ RI 3:(¶V
SLYRWDOUROHLQLQQRYDWLYHµEODFN¶operations. 
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Indeed, PWE is also neglected by Christof Mauch, whose assertion in 1993 that ³WKH
[wartime] policy of sabotage and subversion was developed to perfection in 
Washington and not London´150 reflects his focus only on American sources. Mauch 
himself notes that in March 1941, William Donovan visited Hugh Dalton, the British 
Minister of Economic Warfare and the founder of SOE, ZKR³LQLWLDWHGKLPLQWRWKH
VHFUHWV RI %ULWDLQ¶V UDGLR ZDU DQG H[SODLQHG KLV >'DOWRQ¶V@ SROLF\ RI VXEYHUVLRQ
JXHUULOODZDUIDUHDQGSURSDJDQGD´151 However, while the socialist Dalton hoped to 
use propaganda and the deployment of agents to achieve a proletarian uprising 
against Nazism on the European mainland, it was in fact Delmer and PWE who 
pioneered Machiavellian subversion which was purely utilitarian in nature, and 
detached from any ideological aims besides the defeat of the Axis by any means 
necessary.  
Pre-HPSWLQJ*RHEEHOV¶SURQRXQFHPHQWRIµWRWDOZDU¶LQ'HOPHUKDGDWWHPSWHG
WRGHFODUH µWRWDO UDGLRZDUIDUH¶RQ*HUPDQ\ DV HDUO\ DVth September 1941. In a 
memorandum to his ³FKLHIDQWDJRQLVW´152 ,YRQH.LUNSDWULFNRIWKH%%&¶V(XURSHDQ
Service, he stated WKDW %ULWDLQ ³FDQQRW DSSHDVH WKHP >WKH*HUPDQV@RQ WKHDLU DQ\
more than we can on other fronts, and with the butting-in from Moscow and Berlin, 
total radio war has begun. Therefore we might as well show them what total radio 
war can really be. I am sure we can do it better than they.´153 At the National 
Archives at Kew, WKHUH DUH WHQ GRFXPHQWV UHODWLQJ WR µWRWDO UDGLR ZDU¶ ZKLFK DUH
unavailable to view until 2021, perhaps indicatLQJ WKHVHQVLWLYHQDWXUHRI'HOPHU¶V
proposals. The available files, however, show that both Ivone Kirkpatrick and Bruce 
/RFNKDUWWRZKRP.LUNSDWULFNIRUZDUGHG'HOPHU¶VSURSRVDODJUHHGWKDWWRWDOUDGLR
ZDU ZDV D ³PRVW LQJHQLRXV´ LGHD154 Nonetheless, when put to an Executive 
&RPPLWWHHLWZDVYHWRHGIRUWKHWLPHEHLQJRQWKHJURXQGVWKDW³ZHDUHQRWHQWLWOHG
WRLQGXOJHLQWRWDOUDGLRZDUIDUHXQWLOZHKDYHPRUHUDGLRJXQV´, indicating that PWE 
lacked the appropriate transmission capabilities. This would change following the 
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86$¶VHQWU\WRWKHZDU7KH5DGLR&RPSDQ\RI$PHULFa (RCA) specially designed a 
six hundred kilowatt medium wave transmitter named Aspidistra, remembered by 
'HOPHUDV³WKHELJJHVWDQGORXGHVWUDGLRLQ(XURSHDWWKHWLPH>DQG@LWZDVDOVRWKH
QLSSLHVW´155 $VSLGLVWUD¶VDJLOLW\DOORZHG LW WRVZLWFKIUHTXHQFLHV LQ OHVV WKDQKDOID
minute, as opposed the hours-long changeover time required by standard 
WUDQVPLWWHUVZKLFKDOORZHG$OOLHGEURDGFDVWVWRHYDGH³WKH*HUPDQMDPPHUVZKLFK
were now devoting more and more of their strength to howling down the 
Soldatensender´156 However, towards the end of the war it also came to serve ³DIDU
PRUH VLQLVWHU DQG DPELWLRXV GHVLJQ´ ZKLFK ZDV WR KLMDFN *HUPDQ VWDWLRQV IRU
minutes at a time in order to broadcast misinformation and subversive instructions to 
listeners.157 
(YHQ EHIRUH WKH DUULYDO RI $VSLGLVWUD 'HOPHU¶V no-holds-barred approach to 
propaganda can be described as a form of total radio warfare in terms of content. 
While Hans Hinkel had been careful to assert that programming for the Forces 
LQFOXGHMRNHVZKLFKZHUH³FRDUVH± WKRXJKRIFRXUVHQRWVPXWW\´Delmer was free 
to FDWHU WR KLV DXGLHQFH¶V EDVHVW instincts. Significantly, he later claimed that the 
crude language used in GS1KLVILUVW3:(SURMHFWZDVLQVSLUHGE\WKH1D]LµEODFN¶
station :RUNHU¶V &KDOOHQJH ZKLFK ³XVHG WKH IRXOHVW ODQJXDJH HYHU´ WR DWWUDFt 
listeners.158 Added authenticity was gained from the bugging of POW quarters and 
recreation areas, which provided a constant supply of up-to-GDWH )RUFHV¶ VODQJ DV
well as general gossip and complaints.159 'HOPHU¶Vcontroversial methodology made 
GS1 the most popular station in Germany according to some neutral sources,160 but 
also won him enemies in Britain. Sir Stafford Cripps of the War Office wrote to 
Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, on 12th June 1942 to complain that ³WKHPRVW
foul and filthy pRUQRJUDSK\´was being broadcast on GS1, and worried that the tone 
RIWKHEURDGFDVWV³FRXOGRQO\SOD\XSWRWKHPRVWIRXODQGILOWK\1D]LVZKRZHVKDOO
never catch ± I hope. The decent-minded liberals, Socialists, Catholics, Protestants 
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and other resistant VHFWLRQV ZLOO EH GLVJXVWHG´161 Robert Bruce Lockhart, the 
Director-General of PWE, pointed out in a letter to Eden dated 20th June 1942 that, 
although Cripps claimed to have asked somebody to listen to the station for him, the 
material he was referring to, a graphic report of a fabricated *HUPDQ$GPLUDO¶VRUJ\ 
had been broadcast six months earlier in December 1941. Therefore, he concluded, 
³there is obviously a cabal working in London against the country [Woburn Abbey, 
the main headquarters of PWE]´ which had been ³JHWWLQJ DW´ Cripps in order to 
discredit the work of PWE.162 
It is noteworthy that the apparently organised campaign against PWE paralleled the 
right-wing attacks on the integrity of Elmer Davis and OWI discussed above in this 
chapter. In both instances the public slander of government agencies threatened to 
compromise the war effort, and yet neither of the agencies in question was able to 
take direct action to prevent them. The chief antagonists in this case included a 
former PWE employee named Frederick Voigt, who had worked as Berlin 
correspondent for the Manchester Guardian,163 and Walter Loeb of the expatriate 
German socialist publishing house, think tank and pressure group µ)LJKW IRU
)UHHGRP¶164 Dick Crossman wrote to the PWE Executive on 9th February 1942 that 
for some months Voigt and Loeb had been agitating against PWE, and especially its 
German Section, ³LQ WKH 3UHVV DQG HYHQ PRUH LQ WKH FOXEV DQG OREELHV´,165 and 
Lockhart suggested in his letter to Eden that 9RLJW ZDV ³HGJHG RXW´ RI :REXUQ
Abbey and may be pursuing a vendetta against PWE from London.166 Voigt, claimed 
Crossman, had publicly circulated secret information gathered during his time at 
3:( DQG SXEOLVKHG ³D OLEHOORXV PHPRUDQGXP GLVFORVLQJ DOO LWV VHFUHWV´.167 Like 
OWI, PWE was unable to respond or take action to silence its critics, and Crossman 
complainHG WKDW LWZDV ³IRUELGGHQHYHQ WR HQVXUH WKDW WKH3UHVV FDUULHV UHDVRQDEO\
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well-informed accounts of our propaganda policy. Thus the field is left open for 
YLOLILFDWLRQDQGIDQWDVWLFUXPRXUV´168 
Moreover, the leaking of sensitive details to the Press risked undermining the 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD. This was evident in March 1942, when the 
conservative National Review publicly revealed GS1¶VBritish source and denounced 
WKH SRUQRJUDSKLF FRQWHQW RI RQH EURDGFDVW DV ³KRUULEOH DQG PRVW GDPDJLQJ WR RXU
>FRXQWU\¶V@JRRGQDPH´169 These efforts were supported by Baron Vansittart, whose 
publicly-stated Germanophobia extended to a distrust of the Germans working for 
PWE.170 Indeed, when the public attacks on GS1 came to the attention of the Nazis, 
Das Reich DFFRUGLQJO\ EURNH WKH VWRU\ RI WKH VWDWLRQ¶V %ULWLVK origins and quoted 
Vansittart as describing it as ³intolerable that German émigrés working for the 
British propaganda service should try to turn the German people not only against 
Hitler, but also against England ± even if only as camouflage´171 Both Crossman 
and Delmer concluded that such breaches of security threatened the very existence of 
PWE, and when Eden travelled to Woburn Abbey to discuss the matter raised by 
Cripps,172 it was initially unclear what repercussions the protest might have for 
PWE. Leeper wrote to Lockhart on 16th June 1942: 
If in the Secret Service we were to be too squeamish, the Secret Service could not operate. « This 
LVZDUZLWKWKHJORYHVRII« [and] if you want to fight you must fight all out. «Delmer is a rare 
artist and a good fellow, I want to back him in the good work he was doing. «,KRSHYHU\PXFK
WKDWKLV>&ULSSV¶@SURWHVWPHDQVZHVKDOOQRWORVH'HOPHU173 
However WKH VWRU\ RI WKH *HUPDQ $GPLUDO¶V RUJ\ ZDV 'HOPHU¶V UHVSRQVH WR D
specific request from the Admiralty in December 1941 to spread disaffection among 
U-boat crews. This strategic cooperation between the Admiralty and PWE would 
become formalised with the establishment of Kurzwellensender Atlantik, which saw 
Delmer working in close coordination with Naval Intelligence to achieve set military 
goals via broadcasts targeted specifically at U-boats. Accordingly, Eden responded 
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to Cripps that GS1¶V³VSHFLDOSXUSRVHLVQRWWRZLQ*HUPDQVWRRXUVLGHEXWWRWXUQ
Germans against Germans and thereby weaken the German war machine´,174 and 
refused to impose restrictions on Delmer. This top-level acknowledgement of the 
value of the work of Delmer and PWE, as well as the evidence in both the British 
and the German archives of his various VWDWLRQV¶ LPSDFW DQG LQIOXHQFH PDNH LW 
especially surprising that the most extensive work on the subject remains 'HOPHU¶s 
1962 autobiography. 
It was probably 'HOPHU¶VZRUNWKDW a German soldier named Sergeant Dolinsky was 
referring to in a document dated 27th October 1943, in which he complained of 
underhand enemy propaganda tactics. Compiled as a report for the Nachrichten-
Aufklärungs-Auswertestelle 2 µ1HZV (QOLJKWHQPHQW DQG $QDO\VLV 8QLW ¶, the 
paper is HQWLWOHGµ%URDGFDVWLQJDVD:HDSRQ¶ and argues: 
In the present war radio has a threefold use: 1.) as a medium for news, 2.) as a medium for 
enlightenment and 3.) as a weapon to weaken the resistance of the troops and above all the Home 
Front of the enemy. While both sides in the war have used broadcasting as a medium for news and 
enlightenment, it has been almost exclusively used as a weapon by our opponent. It is also 
conceivable that the use of such a weapon goes against the German character and the German view of 
war ethics. But in the struggle for existence in which we are now engaged, every measure is justified 
which can promise success. The unlimited use of this weapon by the enemy also gives us the moral 
right to use it against these opponents.175 
The document was also forwarded to Dr. Erich Hetzler of Redaktion II, responsible 
for secret stations broadcasting in English. 'ROLQVN\¶V remarkable assertion that the 
Allies alone had been engaged in psychological warfare until October 1943, to which 
an unspecified recipient has added incredulous handwritten markings in the margin, 
was obviously false. As Bergmeier points out, the RRG-financed Radio Stuttgart had 
EURDGFDVWµEODFN¶WR)UDQFHZLWKJUHDWVXFFHVVHDUO\LQWKHZDU0RUHRYHU from 16th 
December 1939, the geheime Sonderdienststelle µVHFUHW VSHFLDO DJHQF\¶ %XUHDX
Concordia was responsible for Nazi µblack¶ propaganda abroad,176 and the RMVP 
had in fact been active in this field as early as July 1934, when it backed a failed 
Austrian SS uprising in Vienna.177 7KHUHDVRQVIRU'ROLQVN\¶VLJQRUDQFHRUIHLJQHG
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ignorance) of German propaganda usage are unclear, but it is nonetheless remarkable 
that a report apparently commissioned by an official government information agency 
VKRXOGFODLPWREHXQDZDUHRIWKH5093¶VRZQ XVHVRIµEODFN¶DVODWHDVWKHDXWXPQ
of 1943. 
It is possible that the increasing success and popularity of PWE broadcasts to 
Germany caused Dolinsky to assume that no such projects had been undertaken by 
the RMVP, which simply had no Anglophone employee who was comparable to 
Delmer in terms of ability and awareness of his target audience. Indeed, in addition 
WRKLV³UDUHDUWLVWU\´178 'HOPHU¶VJUHDW VWUHQJWKDVDSURSDJDQGLVWZDVKLV LQWLPDWH
knowledge of the German language and culture. Having grown up in Berlin as a 
native German speaker before his family was expelled to Britain during World War 
I, he travelled as a Daily Express UHSRUWHUZLWK +LWOHU¶V HQWRXUDJHEHIRUH WKH 1D]L
Machtergreifung. Personally acquainted with Hitler, Goebbels, Hess, Himmler and 
numerous other leading Nazis, he later claimed WKDW ³, NQHZ WKH ZD\ WKHLU PLQGV
ZRUNHG´179 'HOPHU¶Vbackground led to him being placed under MI5 suspicion early 
in the war,180 until in July 1940 he was invited to work for the BBC German Service, 
with his first task being a colourful UHMHFWLRQRI+LWOHU¶VµSHDFHRIIHU¶.181 This appears 
to have caused enough offence in Germany for him to be placed on the 
Sonderfahndungsliste G.B., a list of those to be arrested immediately upon the 
successful invasion of Britain.182 He joined PWE in September of the same year, 
bringing D VXEYHUVLYH FUHDWLYLW\ WR 3:( WKDW KDG EHHQ ODFNLQJ LQ %ULWLVK µEODFN¶
propaganda in the early period of the war, and the nucleus of his talent was evident 
in the successful GS1. 
Goebbels did not underestimate the potential threat posed by Allied misinformation 
directed towards German Forces. On 21st September 1939 he sent a telegram to the 
top Reich authorities (Obersten Reichsbehörden) which decreed that foreign 
broadcasts were to be out of bounds for all but a selected few, noting: 
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The soldier, the mayor, the District Administrator, the president of a Reichspost DJHQF\ HWF GRQ¶W
have the opportunity [to check the veracity of reports from foreign media]. None of them can call the 
Wehrmacht Oberkommando and ask if, for example, the report from French or English radio about 
alleged French victories on the Western Front reflects the facts or not. He is without a means of 
defence against the effects of foreign broadcasts.183 
However, a PWE document on German listeners, authored by the historian John A. 
Hawgood, argued that the Nazi officials who themselves theoretically had ³means of 
defence´ against Allied propaganda were an extremely important target audience due 
to their potential influence. Some of them ³PD\ EH FRYHUWO\ RXW RI WXQH ZLWK WKH
regime,´ ZURWH +DZJRRG ³DQG DOO « ZRXOG EH DFFLGHQW SURQH IURP D SRLQW RI
YLHZRIPRUDOHVKRXOGWKLV>ZDU@EHJLQWRJREDGO\IRU*HUPDQ\´184 
Transgressions of the ban on listening to foreign broadcasts could result in draconian 
punishments or death sentences,185 which were defended by Roland Freisler, the 
State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Justice DQG3UHVLGHQWRIWKH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW
(Volksgerichtshof), DVDIRUPRIQDWLRQDO³ERGLO\K\JLHQH´186 )UHLVOHU¶VPHWDSKRURI
cleanliness was apt in relation to the work of Delmer, who referred to his PWE 
sWDWLRQV DV YHKLFOHV IRU ³FDUU\>LQJ@ WKH ILOWK´187 The medical analogy is also well-
VXLWHG WR LQWHUSUHWLQJ 'HOPHU¶V VXEWOH PHWKRGRORJ\ RI ³inject[ing] some item of 
QHZVLQWRKLV>WKHOLVWHQHU¶V@PLQG which will make him think, and if possible act, in 
DZD\WKDWLVFRQWUDU\WRWKHHIILFLHQWFRQGXFWRI+LWOHU¶VZDU´,188 as well as the Nazi 
attempts to forcibly immunise Germans DJDLQVW WKHVH VXEYHUVLYH PHVVDJHV µ7KH
3HQDO3URWHFWLRQRIWKH+RPH)URQW¶UHIlected the attempt to strengthen the German 
political immune system through fear of reprisals. Nonetheless, GS1 was considered 
so successful that Delmer recalls its methodology EHFDPHWKH³SUHVFULSWLRQ´IRUDOO
VXEVHTXHQW3:(µEODFN¶VWDWLRQV189 
On 26th June 1941 the SD in Klagenfurt, whilst observing that numerous citizens 
were complaining about the recent broadcasts of µjazz¶ on the radio, also noted that 
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listening to foreign broadcasts could be deeply ingrained in a community and 
therefore difficult to eradicate. ³Despite all dissuasive criminal penalties´ LW
FRQFOXGHG³the population is still not clear about the danger of listening to foreign 
broadcasts. It is established that foreign broadcasts are still listened to on a large 
scale. They've even coined two watchwords for this: One goes µGUHDPLQJ¶ or µWR
FRQVXOWWKHIDUPHU¶VDOPDQDF¶190 Indeed, a Gestapo report in late 1941 estimated that 
the BBC had a German audience of one million, and Balfour notes that this number 
certainly continued to rise as the credibility of German news sources deteriorated.191 
7KH PRUH LQVLGLRXV µEODFN¶ VWDWLRQV RI 'HOPHU PRUHRYHU ZHUH H[WUHPHO\ SRSXODU
due to their vulgarity and entertainment value. A source in Stockholm who was 
ignorant of GS1¶VRULJLQVZURWHWKDW reports from Germany indicated that the station 
was the most listened-WRLQWKH7KLUG5HLFK³Altogether one may say that the effect 
of this sender is simply enormous « LW GHVWUR\V IDLWK LQ WKH SUHVHQW UHJLPH
awakes the critical sense and affords it the QHFHVVDU\PDWHULDO « >,@W KDV D ODUJH
army of listeners behind it who will follow it.´192 
&UHDWHG LQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWK WKH$GPLUDOW\¶V Naval Intelligence Department (NID), 
'HOPHU¶V Kurzwellensender Atlantik was instigated to wage shortwave psychological 
warfare on U-boats from 5th February 1943. All of the PWE Soldatensender 
consciously replicated the format of real German Soldatensender, to the extent that 
³WKH PXVLF FRQVLVWV RI DFWXDO >*HUPDQ@ UHFRUGLQJV´193 but the fact that Atlantik, 
unlike the pre-recorded Nord, was broadcast live gave it a greater air of authenticity. 
The counterfeit Soldatensender represented a genuine threat to the German war 
effort due to their careful coordination with military intelligence and objectives. 
Besides the strategic military goals of the station, NID also passed on ostensibly 
trivial information such as the results of football matches between U-boat crews and 
decorations or promotions. Further material such as graphic air surveillance reports 
and detailed intelligence dispatches was passed on by OSS via the US Marine Corps, 
WKXVKHOSLQJ3:(¶VSoldatensender ³WRSXWFRQYLQFLQJFRORXU DQGGHWDLO LQWR WKHLU
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QHZV VWRULHV´194 A reputation for omniscience was, indeed, a main feature of the 
stations,195 not only because it led listeners to believe that they were constantly under 
observation by the enemy, but also because it rendered German POWs readier to talk 
to interrogators RQWKHJURXQGVWKDWWKH%ULWLVK³NQRZLWDOODQ\KRZ´196 Atlantik was 
joined on the air by Soldatensender Calais on 14th November 1943, with both 
stations now using the powerful medium wave Aspidistra transmitter and 
broadcasting from 6.30 p.m. and 8 p.m. respectively. Although the stations were 
coordinated to the extent that they were often introduced together by the announcer, 
a *HUPDQ PRQLWRU¶V FODLP RQ th November 1943 that the\ WKHUHIRUH ³PD\ EH
LGHQWLFDO´ ZDs incorrect.197 Both served different strategic purposes, but it is 
nonetheless of value to examine Atlantik and Calais as a single project,198 since not 
only the German monitors but also PWE treated them as such.199 
Atlantik was established ZLWK WKH LQWHQWLRQRIEHLQJ³DSURJUDPPHRIPXVLFQHZV
and subversive features of a kind we hope the U-boat crews will begin to like and 
their superiors will begin to increasingly dislike´,200 and this philosophy was 
maintained with Calais. A PWE report on µ5HVHDUFK 8QLWV¶ WKH FRYHU QDPH IRU
%ULWLVKµEODFN¶VWDWLRQVVWDWHVWKDWLWVSXUSRVHZDVWR 
undermine the morale of the German armed forces in Western Europe ± particularly of the U-boat 
crews operating in the Atlantic ± by creating alarm in their minds regarding conditions at home, by 
unsettling their faith in their arms and equipment and in their leaders, by rationalising bad discipline 
and performance of military duty, and wherever possibly by encouraging actual desertion. 
The general line is to win the confidence and interest of the German Services listener by presenting 
him with informative news of current events and with pleasant entertainment in the form of good 
dance music - such as he is no longer given by the Reich Radio.201 
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The observation that the RRG was leaving German Forces vulnerable to enemy 
broadcasts by failing to sufficiently cater to their musical needs supports the 
DUJXPHQWRIWKHWKHVLVWKDWJUHDWHUFXOWXUDOSUDJPDWLVPRQ*RHEEHOV¶SDUWPD\KDYH
decreased the German audiences for Allied broadcasts, although Balfour rightly 
VWDWHV WKDW ³>L@W ZDV QRW EDG PRUDOH ZKLFK OHG WR GHIHDW 7KRXJK WKH >*HUPDQ@
propaganda could certainly have been bettered, [the result of the war] hardly could 
KDYHEHHQ´202 The station, indeed, had formidable musical resources at its disposal. 
'HOPHU UHFDOOV WKDW DQ HQWLUH *HUPDQ IRUFHV¶ HQWHUWDLQPHQW EDQG OHG E\ WKH
accomplished musician Henry Zeisel, was captured by the British Eighth Army in 
Africa and sent to Britain, where, under the direction of an American radio producer 
QDPHG -RKQ .HEEH WKH\ ³>FDUULHG@ RQ WKHLU JRRG ZRUN RI HQWHUWDLQLQJ +LWOHU¶V
:HKUPDFKWRQWKH$WODQWLNVHQGHU´203 :LOOLDP'RQRYDQ¶V266, moreover, brought 
from the USA ³WKHODWHVWDQGEHVWGDQFHPXVLF´ZKilst arranging for exiled German 
celebrities such as Marlene Dietrich to record songs XQZLWWLQJO\LQ'LHWULFK¶VFDVH
for Atlantik broadcasts.204 A great deal of other original recorded music was 
provided by the Royal Marines band, recorded at the Albert Hall and featuring the 
émigré artist René Halkett, the son of a former Wehrmacht Chief of Staff, General 
von Fritzsch, on vocals. This formation recorded Atlantik¶V µVLJQLQJ-LQ¶ VRQJ D
crude version of the popular German dance number µEs war in Schöneberg im Monat 
Mai¶ µ,WZDVLQ6FK|QHEHUJLQWKH0RQWKRI0D\¶ZKLFK8-boat men were known 
to be fond of singing with bawdy alterations to the lyrics. Accordingly, the Halkett 
version played each night on Atlantik EHJDQ ³,W ZDV LQ D EURWKHO LQ 6DLQW
1D]DLUH«´205 
As part of Atlantik¶s ruse, the station pretended to link up with the authentic German 
Soldatensender Mittelmeer µ0HGLWHUUDQHDQ%DWWOH6WDWLRQ¶), located in the Balkans, 
between 4 a.m. and 7 a.m.206 It also received a regular supply of official German 
news through the Hellschreiber, a facsimile-based teleprinter on which the 
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB) transmitted news to the German press, which 
KDGEHHQOHIWE\WKH'1%¶V/RQGRQ&RUUHVSRQGHQWRQWKHRXWEUHDNRIZDUDQGZDV
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passed on to PWE by Reuters.207 Less inhibited than the Nazi-controlled media, the 
fact that Atlantik broadcast µOLYH¶through the night enabled it WRµVFRRS¶WKH55*RQ
a number of key military events, such as the bombing of Ploesti and the evacuation 
of Smolensk.208 3,'¶V Rex Leeper noted that the Hellschreiber allowed 'HOPHU¶V 
Soldatensender WRGHOLYHUWKHDFWXDOQHZVZLWKD³JORVVRQLWHYHU\QRZDQGWKHQDQG
with the insertion of a little fiction. It is thus very useful for [spreading] the 
RFFDVLRQDO UXPRXU´209 This also gave the station a veneer of authenticity, and 
Delmer asserts in retrospect that the Hellschreiber was an invaluable asset, without 
which PWE ³ZRXOGQHYHUKDYHEHHQDEOHWRIROORZWKHIRUPXODZKLFKHQDEOHGXVWR
put over the poison in our news bulletins without it sounding like enemy 
SURSDJDQGD´210 
The American 1945 PWD/SHAEF retrospective described ³the extreme importance 
of the complete integration of psychological warfare activities into the planning and 
operations of a military campaign. Without any knowledge of military plans and 
lacking a thorough appreciation of the day by day [sic.] changes in the pressures at 
the front, psychological warfare would have been a haphazard and almost useless 
addition to the intricacies of modern large scale [sic.] warfare´.211 This assertion 
overlooks the potential value of 'HOPHU¶V JHQHUDO DQG FRQVLVWHQW attempts to 
³XQGHUPLQHWKHPRUDOHRI WKH*HUPDQDUPHGIRUFHV «E\FUHDWLQJDODUPLQWKHLU
minds regarding conditions at home, by unsettling their faith in their arms and 
equipment and in their leaders, by rationalising bad discipline and performance of 
military duty, and wherever possible by encouraging actuaO GHVHUWLRQ´212 
Nonetheless, coordination with naval intelligence was central to Atlantik¶V
methodology. TKH$GPLUDOW\¶V1ID provided Atlantik with a daily feed of news and 
intelligence, and NID officers oversaw the handling of the material and advised 
3:( DV WR WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V RSHUDWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQWV ZLWK WKH 1DY\¶V /LHXWHQDQW
Commander McLachlan being seconded to PWE for the wDU¶VGXUDWLRQ Wo play the 
OHDGLQJUROHLQWKHPDUVKDOOLQJRILQIRUPDWLRQ1HZVZDVUHSRUWHGHLWKHUµVWUDLJKW¶DV
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FDPRXIODJHRUZLWKJORVVDQG³DOLWWOHILFWLRQ´LQVHUWHG213 with Karl Robson of the 
War Office sub-editing the news items for maximum subversive effect.214 
Authenticity, an elePHQW ZKLFK VR PXFK RI *RHEEHOV¶ English-ODQJXDJH µEODFN¶
propaganda lacked, was vital to Atlantik¶V UXVH. The station had a team of ten 
different announcers and six compères, usually presenting in the North German 
dialect to reflect its (fictional) geographical location, but with Bavarian and Austrian 
voices used in relevant special features. The German announcers were mainly POWs 
from U-boats, the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht, and the constant flow of POWs 
also provided, through interrogations or secret recordings, intelligence that could be 
fed into the broadcasts. All POW correspondence was also checked for intimate 
personal details such as birthdays, births and marriages, which could be included in 
broadcasts. These werHUHDGRYHUWKHDLUE\µ9LFN\¶a German-Jewish refugee artiste 
named Agnes Bernelle,215 who performed a similar function to ,YD7RJXUL'¶$TXLQR
RQ -DSDQ¶V Zero Hour and Mildred Gillars for the RMVP. Indeed, the malevolent 
µFRUFHV¶VZHHWKHDUW¶VHQGLQJKHUJUeetings and commiserations to the enemy was a 
ubiquitous archetype used by both sides during the war. 
7KH 3:( UHSRUW REVHUYHG WKDW ³WKH PRVW QRWHZRUWK\ IHDWXUH RI LWV WHFKQLTXH RI
presentation is that it plays recorded dance music continually, with short 
iQWHUUXSWLRQVIRUµIHDWXUHV¶DQGQHZVIODVKHVDQGORQJHURQHVODVWLQJ-20 minutes 
IRUIXOOQHZVEXOOHWLQV´216 and a British Chief Interrogating Officer interviewing two 
hundred *HUPDQ 32:V LQ $IULFD IRXQG WKDW ³>F@RQVLGHULQJ WKH VKRUW WLPH WKDW
Atlantik has been operating [by 1943], it seems to have acquired a surprisingly large 
DXGLHQFHLQWKH*HUPDQ$UP\DQGWRDOUHDG\EHH[HUWLQJFRQVLGHUDEOHLQIOXHQFH´217 
Its reception was strong across Europe and it could even be picked up five thousand 
miles away in El Salvador, and evidence of its success could be gleaned from the 
official refutations of its rumours in Germany. The DNB issued a long statement 
denying Atlantik¶V FODLPV WKDW WKH UDSLGO\ ULVLQJ GHDWK UDWHVZHUH FDXVLQJ ILQDQFLDO
difficulties for German insurance companies, and the new SA leader Wilhelm 
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Schepmann was forced to publicly deny Atlantik¶VDOOHJDWLRQVWKDWKHZDVSODQQLQJD
Waffen-SA to rival the Waffen-SS.218 Significantly, POWs frequently paid tribute to 
the quality and popularity of Atlantik¶VPXVLFDOSURJUDPPHV219 
The success of Atlantik led to the establishment of Soldatensender Calais in order to 
³VRIWHQ XS´ *HUPDQ )RUFHV in preparation for the Allied invasion of German-
occupied France.220 Appearing for the first time at 6 p.m. on 24th October 1943, the 
QHZVWDWLRQDUULYHGZLWK³DFUDVKRIGUXPVDQGDEODUHRIWUXPSHWV´GHFODULQJLWVHOf 
to be a sister venture of Atlantik DQG DQQRXQFLQJ ³:H EULQJ music and news for 
comrades in the command areas West and Norway. We shall now play dance 
PXVLF´221 In his autobiography, Delmer claims that the many German soldiers who 
KHDUG WKLV ILUVW EURDGFDVW ³DFFHSWHG WKH QHZ VWDWLRQ DW LWV IDFH YDOXH DV D *HUPDQ
statLRQDQGWKH\OLVWHQHGWRLWZLWKZRQGHUDQGZLWKSOHDVXUH´222 However, there is 
evidence that the station was received sceptically by at least some sections of its 
listenership from the beginning. Atlantik had already aroused the suspicions of many 
listeners,223 and this pre-existing station was mentioned in the Calais calling signal. 
Moreover, within a short time, the RMVP received a number of letters from soldiers 
asking whether it was permitted to listen to Calais.224 One such letter, received by 
the RMVP on 6th December 1943 from a German Lieutenant named Heinz Mende, 
offers a detailed FULWLFDODFFRXQWRIWKHVWDWLRQ¶VUHFHSWLRQZKLFKprovides an insight 
into the effectiveness of its ruse and methodology: 
During my time in the frontline troops I had heard several times about a Soldatensender Calais which 
broadcasts pronouncedly non-German (jazz-) music, interspersed with German news in foreign 
languages. Overall, it was claimed that the kind of music that this station plays, which significantly 
only a few soldiers liked, serve to lure foreign listeners who should be thus induced to listen to the 
German EURDGFDVWV« 
On 23.11.43 at around 8 p.m., and therefore at the time when Berlin was about to or already 
experiencing the second major terrorist attack [i.e. British air raid], by chance I tuned into the station 
with my Volksempfänger in Mittweida, Saxony. First came the aforementioned jazz, so that my wife 
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became fearful because she thought I had tuned into a foreign station, but shortly thereafter, the 
station reported DV ³Soldatensender Calais, connected to the German shortwave transmitter on 
waveband...´ The transmitter first announced that enemy aircraft were again situated ³over the 
German Heimat´, and the spokesman from Berlin SURFHHGHGWRUHSRUW« what had been hit in the 
first raid the previous day, how it looked in the city, how many people were homeless and various 
other details. This news seemed strange to me, because our own news reports generally do not specify 
such things. Then it occurred to my wife, a born Berliner who « worked at Siemens, that her 
comrades at the firm had talked repeatedly of a station that could be heard clearly during air raids, and 
reported news of this kind.  
« One could recognise the poison of enemy propaganda in almost all of the messages and 
announcements. «In addition to these messages, which are designed to bring unrest and discontent 
in the German people, finer points were present in which the poison was not so obvious. «These 
messages I regard as attempts to drive a wedge between the leadership and the people, or between 
officers or the SS and the people. In this manner there were other various messages in which the 
poison tip was even more difficult to see, but was visible to the sharp eye. 
(...) If Soldatensender Calais VKRXOG DFWXDOO\ EH D *HUPDQ WUDQVPLWWHU WKHQ , GRQ¶W XQGHUVWDQG WKH
German propaganda herein. --- Should it be an enemy station, then the populace and the troops must 
be urgently informed, because without doubt this station is « widely listened to, above all because 
LWGRHVQ¶WFORVHGRZQduring the air raids.225 
It can be assumed that not all listeners were as critical as Mende, although Kater¶V 
assertion that many soldiers may have mistaken it for an authentic but controversial 
Wehrmacht station along the lines of the lively Belgrad is likely to be an 
overstatement on the basis of the available evidence. However, the lack of 
centralised control over the authentic Soldatensender, which resulted in musical 
output which violated RMVP guidelines, as well as the use of unpredictable 
announcers (as criticised by Hinkel),226 undoubtedly lent 'HOPHU¶V HQWHUWDLQLQJ
stations an element of credibility and enabled Mende to believe that it was 
theoretically possible that Calais was a German station.  
UQGHU 3:(¶V RZQ JXLGHOLQHV Atlantik and Calais LQ IDFW FRQVWLWXWHG µJUH\¶
propaganda. Their camouflage as authentic German stations was not expected to fool 
many listeners, but provided a useful excuse should they be caught listening to 
IRUHLJQEURDGFDVWVDQGVHYHUDO32:V³H[SUHVVHGDGPLUDWLRQIRUWKHFOHYHUQHVVRILWV
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[Atlantik¶V@XVHRIFover, some saying that if an officer entered the room during an 
Atlantik news bulletin listeners were able to prove that they sincerely believed it to 
EHDQRUGLQDU\*HUPDQVWDWLRQ´227 3:(¶VGHILQLWLRQRIWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ
µEODFN¶ DQG JUH\¶ ZDV WKat µEODFN¶ VWDWLRQV ³depend as much on cover as upon 
content and technique to achieve their object. Their disguise, as to both location and 
FRQWURO PXVW EH VXIILFLHQWO\ SODXVLEOH WR GHFHLYH WKHLU DXGLHQFH « >µ*UH\¶
VWDWLRQV¶@ GLVJXLVH QHHG RQO\ H[WHQG to convincing their audience that they are not 
under British control. They depend entirely upon content and technique to achieve 
their object.´228 0HQGH¶VOHWWHUindicates that the unorthodox presentation of the news 
was enough to arouse suspicions, due to its inconsistencies with authentic German 
broadcasts and its unusual sources of information. The jazz fan Werner Daniels, 
editor of the Musikalische Feldpost UHFDOOV WKDW ³ZH GLG ZRQGHU ZKR ZDV EHKLQG
6HIWRQ'HOPHU¶VVWDWLRQV:HYLHZHGLWDVDVRUWRIZDU FDEDUHW´229 The evidence in 
ERWK WKH %ULWLVK DQG WKH *HUPDQ DUFKLYHV WHQGV WR VXSSRUW 0LFKDHO %DOIRXU¶V
assertion that, while the ruse of being German stations was probably not convincing 
for very long, it served as an important defence against accusations of tuning in 
deliberately to enemy broadcasts,230 WKXV KHOSLQJ OLVWHQHUV WR DYRLG )UHLVOHU¶V
SXQLWLYHµQDWLRQDOK\JLHQH¶PHDVXUHV 
Nonetheless, an unsigned PWE report noted that a surprising number of listeners 
were fooled: 
[Atlantik was] somewhat grey in LWVFRQFHSWLRQDVZHIHOW «ZHFRXOGQRWH[SHFWHYHQD*HUPDQ
listener to believe that [Atlantik] was actually operating as a clandestine transmitter. 15 transmissions 
of music and news, each slightly different to the other, and lasting half an hour, are not exactly 
FODQGHVWLQH« 
So we preferred to adopt the convention that it was of German origin on the lines of 
Wehrmachtsender (Forces Programmes) operating from places like Belgrade and Smolensk for the 
entertainment of the front-line troops, [Atlantik] having the special function of entertaining the U-boat 
comrades in the Atlantic during the night period when they came up to re-charge their batteries. 
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To our surprise and gratification a recent batch of U-boat prisoners confirmed that they had heard of 
[Atlantik] and that they understood it had the blessing of the commander of U-boats in Paris. Which is 
very surprising. For although [Atlantik] gives plenty of German news and has a good deal of German 
music in its programme, it does not pull its punches and broadcasts the latest American jazz (known 
to be attractive to U-boat listeners) and carries news items written from a German point of view but 
carrying the kind of message which would never be permitted by German censorship. It further 
broadcasts talks by U-boat comrades voicing complaints and attacking personalities such as the 
C[ommander]-in-C[hief] of U-boats would never dream of sponsoring.231 
5XPRXUV RI WKH VRUW EURDGFDVW SHUSHWXDOO\ E\ 'HOPHU¶V VWDWLRQV ZHUH VSUHDGLQJ LQ
Germany,232 and the Gestapo wDV ZHOO DZDUH WKDW ³LQ PDQ\ FDVHV WKH VRXUFH RI
UXPRXUV>LQ*HUPDQ\@LVIRUHLJQUDGLR´233 Himmler, too, had warned that he did not 
expect leniency for anyone caught listening to foreign broadcasts or spreading 
rumours gleaned from them,234 the reasoning for which was explained in a letter 
from the Düsseldorf Gestapo to other Gestapo offices in the region: 
The number of arrests due to the forbidden listening to foreign radio has risen considerably in the first 
half of 1943 compared to 1942, but we must reckon with the fact that only a section of these listeners 
have been caught. The bringing about of exemplary convictions is urgently necessary. Therefore all 
signs of forbidden listening must be quickly and thoroughly pursued in order to catch the culprits and 
thereby to close a source of rumours. 
«7KHMXGLFLDODXWKRULWLHVDUHRUGHUHGWRSDVVMXGJHPHQWTXLFNO\DQGVHYHUHO\,WLV LPSRUWDQWWKDW
some severe cases are published as soon as possible in the press. 
« $ERYH DOO LW LV DOVR LPSRUWDnt that listeners are caught from precisely the so-called educated 
classes, which in their degrading intellectualism and cowardly weakness contribute considerably to 
the spreading of rumours and cheap propaganda [Stimmungsmache].235 
The µQDWLRQDO K\JLHQH¶ measures appear to have been largely ineffective or even 
counter-productive. In December 1942, the British informant in the Wehrmacht 
FODLPHGWKDWWKH³YHU\KLJKDUP\FLUFOHV´IHOWWKDW it was a mistake to ban Germans 
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from listening to foreign broadcasts.236 While they concluded that Anglo-American 
propaganda was successful, they held that an outright ban merely exposed the 
poverty of GoebbelV¶ own efforts.237 Kater points out that in spite of the bans, 
increasing numbers of Germans were tuning into foreign broadcasts in order to find 
out information which the RMVP was withholding from them, and the concomitant 
rise in war-related nightshift work resulted in workers having less supervision and 
hence less chance of being caught. The British acquisition of the powerful Aspidistra 
transmitter also PHDQW WKDW DV +LPPOHU QRWHG HYHQ *HUPDQV ZLWK ³WKH EHVW RI
LQWHQWLRQV´ FRXOG HQG XS VWXPEOLQJ XSRQ RQH RI 'HOPHU¶V FUHations.238 Kater 
observes that radio listening was essential because air raid alarms were issued by 
regional stations.239 However, it is also highly significant that, XQOLNH WKH 55*¶V
WUDQVPLWWHUV %ULWLVK µEODFN¶ VWDWLRQV DOVR RSHUDWHG GXULQJ DLU UDLGV and it was 
therefore easy to tune into Atlantik or Calais with little risk of being caught.240 
On 1st September 1944, nearly three months after the successful Allied landings at 
Normandy, Calais changed its name and calling signal to Soldatensender West to 
reflect the new military situation.241 The station had now built up a large following 
and notoriety in Germany, which magnified its potential for subversive impact. 
Indeed, the great deal of attention it received in high-ranking military circles opened 
new opportunities. A PWE document noted: 
Deception and confusion in the German General Staff can be created because of the unique status of 
SOLDATENSENDER WEST, which is known by the enemy to be exceptionally well-informed and 
at the same time misleading. MoUHRYHU DV DQ XQRIILFLDO VWDWLRQ GLVRZQHG E\ +LV 0DMHVW\¶V
Government, it can make military and political statements the authenticity of which can be judged by 
the Germans only with great difficulty. For example, if our wireless programmes suggest that the 
Super-Fortress B.29 is to be used against Germany, German Intelligence has the choice of two 
interpretations: either there is no intention to use these aircraft against Germany and our propaganda 
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is bluffing; or it is intended to use them and our propaganda has been instructed to create preliminary 
anxiety in the German public. 
«62/'$7(16(1'(5:(67«EURDGFDVWVQLJKWO\IRUKRXUVDFRQWLQXRXVSURJUDPPHRI
news from the war fronts and from inside Germany, with talks and special news for the Services and 
records of jazz and light music. The programme goes out on the medium-wave transmitter 
ASPIDISTRA of exceptional power, and also on short-wave transmitters. It has a widespread and 
established audience among the German fighting services and among German civilians. Accurate and 
exclusive news, inside information based on intelligence, half truths [sic.] and fictions are used in 
combination to achieve subversive effect.242 
0RUHRYHU'RQRYDQ¶V266EURXJKWLWVIRUPLGDEOHPXVLFDODQGWHFKQLFDOUHVRXUFHVWR
West, as it had done with Atlantik during 1943. In a letter to Donovan dated 23rd 
$SULO  3:(¶V 'HSXW\ Director-General :LOOLDP +HQU\ $OH[DQGHU µ$OHF¶ 
%LVKRSDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHUROHRI266LQWKHVXFFHVVRI'HOPHU¶VSoldatensender: 
[E]veryone engaged on 3:(³%ODFN´KDVEHHQIXOORISUDLVHIRUDOOWKDW266GLGWRLPSURYHWKH
musical entertainment side of Soldatensender West. Evidence from prisoners of war and other 
listeners has shown the effectiveness of the Musak [sic.] discs with their attractive dance music and 
subversive lyrics, as well as of the special productions of your musical unit working in this country 
«7KHLQJHQXLW\WKLVWHDPGHYHORSHGLQGXEELQJ*HUPDQO\ULFVLQWRUHFRUGVSUHYLRXVO\EDUUHGIURP
use because they had only English vocals reached standards of perfection which no-one had 
anticipated when O.S.S. first diffidently asked whether anything so difficult as this could be 
contemplated.243 
As well as the production of German-language propaganda dance music, OSS 
contributed to West by providing graphic intelligence reports from the US Marine 
Corps which added invaluable colour and intimate detail. As noted above in this 
section, the seeming omniscience RI 'HOPHU¶V VWDWLRQV ZDV a major factor in 
impressing and psychologically intimidating listeners, whilst the accuracy of many 
of the reports lent the doctored or fabricated news items greater credibility.244 This 
impact was augmented by a large-scale PWD/SHAEF leaflet campaign entitled 
Nachrichten für die Truppe µ1HZVIRUWKH7URRSV¶,245 a major goal of which was to 
convince German soldiers in the West to surrender prematurely and thus avoid 
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higher Allied casualties. The Nachrichten were produced nightly between midnight 
and six a.m. and had a daily print run of approximately two million, which 
represented 80% RI %ULWDLQ¶V WRWDO RIIVHW SULQWLQJ FDSDFLW\.246 All material was 
adapted from talks and commentaries from 'HOPHU¶V West, ensuring complete 
thematic coordination between the two media,247 and the leaflets were dropped over 
Germany using an extremely accurate American-GHYHORSHG µOHDIOHW ERPE¶248 with 
the specific targets having been strategically chosen in conjunction with SHAEF. 
This overt indication that both the Nachrichten and West shared the same source 
IXUWKHU EHWUD\HG WKH $OOLHG RULJLQV RI 'HOPHU¶V Soldatensender, but the increasing 
deterioration of the German war effort and the loss of faith in Nazi news sources 
rendered this largely irrelevant. Jazz musician Emil Mangelsdorff, a member of the 
wartime Frankfurt Harlem Club, recalls an incident that occurred while he was 
working as a radio operator at a gun emplacement in April 1945. A young Lieutenant 
walked into the bunker and caught the operators listening to Soldatensender West, 




During the last months of the wDU$OOLHGµZKLWH¶SURSDJDQGDEDODQFHGDGXDOWDVNRI
emphasising to Germans the inevitability of unconditional surrender on the one 
hand, and catering to the ever-growing number of occupied areas of Germany on the 
other.250 On 10th September 1944, American forces captured Radio Luxembourg and 
found that the Germans had left an extensive music library and largely intact 
transmitting equipment. The journalist and American intelligence operative William 
Harlan Hale was placed in charge of the station, which was staffed by SHAEF 
personnel and began broadcasting both relays from New York and London. 
0RUHRYHU3:'¶V5DGLR3URJUDP3URGXFWLRQ8QLWth Army Group, was brought 
in to produce four daily fifteen-PLQXWH³WDFWLFDO´SURJUDPPHVDGGUHVVHGWR*HUPDQ
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troops and civilians in the immediate combat areas. These programmes were Story of 
the Day (based on frontline intelligence), Letter Bag (readings of captured German 
mail), Frontpost (featuring material taken from an eponymous American newsletter 
for German forces) and a programme which consisted of appeals to German Forces 
to surrender.251 
/X[HPERXUJ¶VµZKLWH¶RIIHQVLYH ZDVDXJPHQWHGE\DµEODFN¶FDPSDLJQRYHUVHHQE\
Delmer, which was intended to cause havoc within Nazi-held areas of western 
Germany, thus hastening their fall to the Allies. With the goal of driving people from 
the towns and cities, West carried the fabricated story that Eisenhower had declared 
VHYHQ µERPE-IUHH ]RQHV¶ LQ central and southern Germany, and WKH $OOLHG )RUFHV¶
Supreme Commander himself issued IDFWXDO VWDWHPHQWV RI HDFK QLJKW¶V ERPELQJ
WDUJHWVYLDµZKLWH¶EURDGFDVWVZKLFKZHUHFDUHIXOO\FRRUGLQDWHGWRJLYHFUHGHQFHWR
WKHPLVLQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGE\ µEODFN¶ reports. In this case, the task was given to 
Delmer because Eisenhower had originally announced on air that Germans should 
stay at home, but reversed this to accord with Churchill¶VLQVLVWHQFH that civilians be 
induced to crowd the roads and thus hamper German strategic communications, as 
the Germans had achieved with French civilians in 1940.252 %HFDXVHµZKLWH¶VRXUFHV
such as the BBC, VOA and Radio Luxembourg had already issued the original 
instructions and could not renege on these without losing credibility as a news 
VRXUFH 'HOPHU UHFDOOV WKDW WKH WDVN ZDV JLYHQ WR ³the ruffianV RI WKH µEODFN¶ WKH
GLVDYRZDEOH VFDOO\ZDJV ZKR GLG WKH GLUW\ ZRUN´253 +H FRQFHLYHG RI µ2SHUDWLRQ
6LHJIULHG¶ ZKLFK HQWDLOHG WKH XVH RI $VSLGLVWUD WR KLMDFN *HUPDQ UHJLRQDO
wavelengths and displace the official broadcasts, continuing with counterfeit version 
using PWE announcers, who would issue subversive instructions and information to 
the populace in the name of the respective Gauleiter.254 7KLV VXSSRUWV %DOIRXU¶V
FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW µEODFN¶ SOD\HG DQ LPSRUWDQW SDUW in preserving the integrity of the 
%%&ZKRRWKHUZLVHE\QHFHVVLW\ZRXOGKDYHEHHQ³FRPSHOOHGE\ WKH6HUYLFHV WR
lend themselves, unwittingly if not willingly, to such deception even more than they 
ZHUH«ZLWKPRUHGLUHFWGDPDJHWRWKHLUUHSXWDWLRQ´255 
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In late March 1945, the RRG warned listeners of Anglo-American broadcasts taking 
over well-known German wavelengths and, purporting to be German regional 
stations, issuing evacuation orders and misinformation. On 28th March, for example, 
WKH *HUPDQ +RPH 6HUYLFH ZDUQHG WKDW ³>D@n enemy wireless transmitter on the 
Frankfurt wavelength is spreading misleading news items. It is plain what the 
HQHP\¶V LQWHQWLRQVDUHZLWK WKHVHUHSRUWV+HZDQWV WRFUHDWHXQUHVWDQGFRQIXVLRQ
among the German civilian population and in the areas near the front.´256 These 
warnings proved counterproductive because they allowed the British counterfeit 
stations issuing identical warnings about faked broadcasts on regional wavelengths, 
and the conflicting claims by broadcasters added to the general chaos. Ultimately the 
RRG abandoned this method of issuing instructions, and only gave orders to the 
populace via the Drahtfunk, a wired diffusion network which the British could not 
hijack but which had a greatly limited range.257 
Nonetheless, with Allied victory inevitable, in mid-April 1945 the decision had 
already been made by PWE to shift its focus to the challenges posed by the post-war 
RFFXSDWLRQ RI *HUPDQ\ E\ FORVLQJ GRZQ µEODFN¶ RSHUDWLRQV DQG FRQFHQWUDWLQJ on 
µZKLWH¶.258 Accordingly, West and Nachrichten ERWK³FHDVHGILUH´RQth April, the 
day that Hitler committed suicide in Berlin.259 7KHFHVVDWLRQRIµEODFN¶SURPSWHGLWV
SURWDJRQLVWVWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHFHQWUDOLW\RI'HOPHUWR3:(¶VVXFFHVVZKLOVWDOVR
reflecting on the difficulties in assessing the precise impact of its work. Alec Bishop 
wrote to Delmer on the same day that, while the nature of his work made its precise 
impact impossible to measure, ³there is ample evidence from many sources that your 
labours have been of immense assistance to the Armed Forces of the Allies, and have 
made a great contribution towards the triumph of the principles for which we 
stand.´260 On 23rd May 1945, Bishop received a letter from Edmund Rushbrooke, 
Director of WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V 1ID, who emphasisHG WKDW ³VXFK VXFFHVV DV we 
[NID/PWE] may have had PXVWEHDVFULEHGSULPDULO\WR0U6HIWRQ'HOPHU´261 and 
Rushbrooke also ZURWH WR 6LU 5REHUW /RFNKDUW SUDLVLQJ 'HOPHU¶V ³RXWVWDQGLQJ
FRQWULEXWLRQ´ WR WKH ZDU HIIRUW, QRWLQJ WKDW ³HYLGHQFH LV UHDFKLQJ PH IURP YDULRXV
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quarters that his Black Stations were greatly feared and respected by the German 
DXWKRULWLHV´262 %LVKRS ZURWH RI WKH ³LQIRUPDO DQG SHUVRQDO UHODWLRQVKLS´ IRUJHG
between NID and PWE, especially with regard to the successful cooperation on 
Atlantik ZKLFK ³RSHQHG WKH ZD\ WR the intimate collaboration which we have 
enjoyed in the last two years with other Service Ministries and particularly with 
6+$()´263 
The institutional cooperation between British and American organisations was 
adjudged by its protagonists to have been a similar success, with Bishop writing to 
Donovan on 23rd April WKDW WKHUH ³FDQ KDYH EHHQ IHZ EHWWHU H[DPSOHV RI
wholehearted Anglo-$PHULFDQ FROODERUDWLRQ WKDQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI «
µ1DFKULFKWHQIUGLH7UXSSH¶´.264 It is interesting, therefore, that PWE was entirely 
left out of the 1945 American-authored PWD/SHAEF history and continues to be 
neglected by scholarship of the area. Bishop also praised the important role of the 
OSS in improving the musical content of West and Atlantik,265 a contribution that 
was also recognised by Sefton Delmer.266 Meanwhile, new Anglo-American 
collaborations were emerging. SHAEF officers seconded to Radio Luxembourg by 
the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) had already reported to their 
commanders in Paris and to the BBC German Service on the need to send well-
qualified individuals to work in the musical field in post-war Germany. Accordingly, 
during the last months of the war, representatives of the BBC German Service, the 
Foreign Office, PWD and Radio Luxembourg established the nucleus of what would 
become Allied Music Control in post-war Germany, with the task of rebuilding 
German musical life within a framework of high musical standards and democratic 
principles.267 
As the British SOE closed down in April 1945 according to an agreement with 
3:'6+$()WKHPDMRULW\RILWVµEODFN¶VWDIIZas assigned to new duties relating to 
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 237 
 
occupied Germany and Austria.268 However, the Allies had been making concrete 
plans for the reorganisation of German musical life since at least 1944, when the 
English actor Marius Goring (the husband of Lucie Mannheim, who had recorded 
WKH %%&¶V /DOH $QGHUVHQ SDURGLHV was appointed music specialist of the BBC 
German Service. Together with exiled German-Jewish composer Berthold 
Goldschmidt, Goring began drafting blueprints for post-war music broadcasting in 
*HUPDQ\ VWDWLQJ WKDW ³WKHUH LV DSXUSRVHEHKLQGDOO RI >WKHSODQQHGSURJUDPPHV@
but this purpose is of an indirect, rather than, [sic.] a direct propaganda value. I have 
also tried hard to assure that they should be of a high artistic standard ± this is in 
LWVHOIRILQGLUHFWSURSDJDQGDYDOXH´269 
Conclusion 
Goebbels died on 1st 0D\KDYLQJIDLOHGWRFUHDWHDFRQYLQFLQJµ*HUPDQ¶IRUP
of quality light music that would constitute effective cultural propaganda for the 
Nazi worldview. The DTUO, which represented the apex of the Propaganda 
0LQLVWHU¶VHIIRUWVLQWKLVarea, ended the war in Prague, its approximately three-year 
H[LVWHQFH FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ ³FRPSURPLVH DQG IDLOXUH´270 As DTUO members 
returned to Berlin from Czechoslovakia after the war, many found employment in 
+DHQW]VFKHODQG.XGULW]NL¶VQHZ5%72LQ WKH6RYLHW2FFXSLHG=one, where for a 
brief five-year period they were permitted to create lively swing recordings that 
LQGLFDWHWKH'782¶VXQIXOILOOHGMD]]SRWHQWLDO271 The remaining members of Charlie 
DQG KLV 2UFKHVWUD ZHUH HYDFXDWHG WR 6WXWWJDUW LQ  ZKHUH WKH\ ³PXGGOHG
DORQJ´272 making radio broadcasts twice daily, but with no further recordings and 
without vocalist Schwedler. Brocksieper ended the war in a farmhouse in nearby 
6LFNHQKDXVHQ OLVWHQLQJWRMD]]EURDGFDVWVRQWKH%%&DQG'HOPHU¶VAtlantik.273 In 
May 1945 he and other members of the orchestra found immediate and lucrative 
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employment entertaining GIs in US Army barracks.274 The headline on the US 
PLOLWDU\QHZVSDSHU6WDUVDQG6WULSHVUHDG³:H*RW*RHEEHOV¶%DQG´275 
Jazz came to be used by the US and Britain for a new, didactic purpose in post-war 
Germany. Under the auspices of the new Anglo-American Music Control, created by 
BBC, VOA, SHAEF and Radio Luxembourg officials, it was envisaged as an 
ambassador for the democratic values which were to be instilled in the younger 
generations of Germans socialised in the Third Reich.276 For those German jazz 
aficionados who survived war, however, this socialisation process had in many cases 
DOUHDG\RFFXUUHG$IWHUDQLURQLFµNazifarewellblues¶>VLF@SDUW\LQ/HLS]LJLQ$SULO
1945, the remaining members of the Leipzig Hot Club welcomed the advancing 
American forces as both political and cultural kindred spirits. Herbert Becke recalls 
*,V EHLQJ ³PRUH WKDQ DVWRQLVKHG´ DW KLV FRQVLGHUDEOH UHFRUG FROOHFWLRQ DQG WKH
³LQWHOOHFWXDOV DQG anti-1D]LV´ ZKR KDG EHHQ FRPPLVVLRQHG WR SXW WRJHWKHU D
makeshift radio schedule amidst the debris of the regional radio station were quick to 
DFFHSW%HFNH¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWKHSXWWRJHWKHUDMD]]SURJUDPPH277 Meanwhile Jutta 
Hipp, also of the Leipzig Hot Club, discovered that jazz fans, too, could be guilty of 
presuming a non-H[LVWHQW$PHULFDQFXOWXUDOKRPRJHQHLW\³:HZHUHYHU\KDSS\DW
WKHLUFRPLQJDQGEURXJKWRXWDOORXUMD]]UHFRUGVWRSOD\IRUWKHP´VKHUHPHPEHUHG
³1R UHVSRQVH :H ZHUH WHUULEO\ KXUW until we discovered what was wrong, which 
ZDVWKDWWKHVH*,¶VGLGQ¶WOLNHMD]]WKH\OLNHGKLOOELOO\PXVLF´278 Nonetheless, five 
days after the Americans entered Leipzig, both Hipp and Becke were comfortably 
installed in a jazz band at the local US Army barracks.279  
WKLOH WKH QRYHOW\ YDOXH RI &KDUOLH DQG KLV 2UFKHVWUD KDV OHG WR WKH SURMHFW¶V
notoriety being exaggerated in historiography of the area, this chapter has 
demonstrated that the combination of jazz music and propaganda was utilised with a 
great deal more skill and effectiveness by Sefton Delmer and PWE. As noted by the 
post-war Radio Free Europe journalist George Urban, an important facet of 
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SV\FKRORJLFDOZDUIDUH LVEHLQJDEOH WR WKLQNRXWVLGHRQH¶VRZQSROLWLFDOPRGHODQG
realms of experience, as well as the ability to imaginatively access the inner states of 
RQH¶VRSSRQHQWV280 Goebbels, too, had claimed thDW ³WKHSURSDJDQGLVWPXVWEH WKH
PDQZLWKWKHJUHDWHVWNQRZOHGJHRIVRXOV´,281 and it is therefore ironic that it was the 
Berlin-born Delmer who achieved such success with his German audience. It is also 
possible that the popularity RI 5DGLR 7RN\R¶V Zero Hour, in spite of the apparent 
best efforts of its protagonists to sabotage the programme, was at least partially due 
to 7RJXUL¶V witty and authenticDOO\ µ$PHULFDQ¶ banter. The unsuccessful and 
convoluted *HUPDQµEODFN¶SURMHFWVVXFKDV1%%6WR%ULWDLQDQGStation Debunk to 
the USA lacked such appeal to their listeners. Insight and empathy, like jazz music, 
were invaluable assets in wartime propaganda broadcasting which Goebbels, to the 
detriment of the Nazi war effort, was never able to adequately master.  
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The comparative methodology and international scope of the thesis have contributed 
a number of original innovations to the historiography of this important area of 
World War II propaganda. ,W KDV LOOXVWUDWHG DW OHQJWK WKDW LQ VSLWH RI *RHEEHOV¶
pragmatic rhetoric, the RMVP was never completely willing or able to escape the 
ideological straitjacket of pre-war Nazi cultural politics in its attempts to cater to 
wartime musical demand, thus creating a greater potential audience for Allied 
µZKLWH¶ DQG µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD ,Q IDLOLQJ WR FRPH WR WHUPV ZLWK MD]] WKH
Propaganda Minister ceded a powerful weapon to his enemies, which, as the thesis 
has demonstrated, was exploited adroitly by Allied propaganda agencies. 
By utilising and cross-referencing British, German and US sources it has been 
possible to compensate for the wartime and post-war destruction of many RMVP 
and PWE documents. Drawing on a wide range of archive material, the thesis has 
analysed WKHPHWKRGRORJLHVRI'HOPHU¶VSoldatensender and corroborated important 
aspects of his 1962 autobiography, which remains the main text on this hugely 
neglected aspect of British wartime propaganda. The international scope has made it 
possible to gauge WKHVWDWLRQV¶JUHDWVXFFHVVDQGSRSXODULW\WKURXJKWKHFRPSDUDWLYH
analysis of intelligence reports, POW feedback and German-language RMVP 
documents, thus refuting 0DXFK¶V erroneous DVVHUWLRQ WKDW µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD
against Hitler was primarily waged by OSS.1 
Similarly, the international research has been valuable in reconstructing *RHEEHOV¶
use of entertainment as propaganda to Britain and the USA. In Chapter Two, I have 
shown that the %%&¶V ZHDN HDUO\ ZDUWLPH RXWSXW DQG WKH µFXOWXUDO EODFNRXW¶
presented the RMVP with an excellent opportunity to fill the void with its own 
entertainment broadcasting to a British audience which was still interested in hearing 
German perspectives on the war.2 By utilising previously unpublished BBC internal 
memoranda and Listener Research data, I have also refuted the erroneous notion, 
which continues to appear in historiography of the period,3 that William Joyce was 
listened to for comedy value alone and presented little danger to the British war 
effort. Indeed, as has been emphasised above, the use of entertainment to encourage 
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µEODFN¶ SURSDJDQGD programme to Britain, NBBS, did not have a dedicated 
entertainment segment until 1942, by which point the BBC Forces Programme was 
already well-established. Moreover, b\ XWLOLVLQJ )&& PRQLWRUV¶ UHSRUWV of Station 
DebunkÜDQDPELWLRXV1D]LµEODFN¶SURJUDPPHWRWKH8SA which has been broadly 
neglected by prior historiography, I have scrutinised the considerable cultural 
naivety of the RMVP with regard to American audiences. The µWULDO-and-HUURU¶
approach which is evident through the SURJUDPPH¶Vshifting themes, musical content 
and geographical target audience stands in stark contrast to 'HOPHU¶Vhugely popular 
and culturally nuanced Soldatensender for German Forces, which were produced in 
close consultation with military and naval intelligence to cause maximum damage to 
the German war effort. 
The cross-referencing of previously unused international sources has facilitated the 
reappraisal of Hinkel, which not only sheds important new light on this influential 
and yet generally neglected Nazi cultural figure, but also opens the way for future 
VFKRODUVKLSWRUHDVVHVV+LQNHO¶VFKDUDFWHUDQGZRUNZKLFKLVFOHDUO\QHFHVVDU\EDVHG
on the findings of the thesis. Indeed, the thesis has highlighted a number of areas 
which are ripe for further study. With regard to Britain, I have demonstrated that a 
great deal of work remains to be done to correct the continued omission of the work 
of Delmer and PWE from the majority of historiographies of wartime propaganda. 
As has been noted above in this section, the post-war destruction of numerous PWE 
documents can be compensated for by international research, especially in the 
archives of the target countries. Moreover, by contrasting the quality and 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI 3:(¶V *HUPDQ-ODQJXDJH µEODFN¶ SURMHFWV ZLWK WKH 5093¶V RZQ
greatly inferior English-language stations to Britain and the USA (such as NBBS and 
Debunk), I have emphasised the need for further research and re-evaluations of 
*RHEEHOV¶ DELOLWLHV DV D SURSDJDQGLVW EDVHG RQ KLV FRQWLQXHG prioritisation of 
ideology at the expense of wartime pragmatism, as well as the general poor quality 
of RMVP English-language entertainment propaganda. 
Anglo-American collaboration, too, remains an important and potentially fruitful 
area which requires considerable academic attention, as indicated by the close 
cooperation between institutions such as PWE, OWI and OSS, as well as the joint 
psychological warfare activities under the auspices of PWD/SHAEF. Furthermore, 
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the work of OWI and Elmer Davis in attempting to mediate the flow of information 
within the USA during the zoot suit riots and nationwide racial disturbances remains 
D VLJQLILFDQW DQG \HW XQGHUH[SORUHG DVSHFW RI $PHULFD¶V ZDUWLPH KRPH IURQW. 
Similarly, tKH RULJLQDO UHVHDUFK LQWR µ+DUOHP /RQGRQ¶ KDV VKRZQ WKDW WKH µERWWOH
SDUW\¶ culture remains a fascinating aspect of overlooked British social history 
which, due to the wartime circumstances, became of enhanced political and cultural 
relevance. Together with the use of the previously unseen Melody Maker file at the 
BBC Written Archives and my 2012 interview with Chilton, I have traced the 
connections between the subcultural development of jazz and the ways in which war-
imposed necessities brought it to a wider audience, thus accelerating the acceptance 
DQG DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI MD]] DV µVHULRXV¶ PXVLF LQ %ULWDLQ As noted above, the 
FRQYHQWLRQDO µSHRSOH¶V ZDU¶ GLVFRXUVH RI WKH %ULWLVK KRPH IURQW RYHUORRNV D PRUH
complex reality, and further analysis of WKHSUREOHPDWLFµERWWOHSDUW\¶SKHQRPHQRQ
would contribute to a more nuanced understanding of wartime Britain. 
The new ground covered by the thesis has also helped to contextualise projects that 
have already received scholarly attention. For example, by providing the first 
scholarly appraisal of the 1941 radio variety programme Frohe Stunde am 
Nachmittag, which was intended to foster the development of New German 
Entertainment Music, the thesis has shown that the problems experienced with this 
short-lived programme were to be repeated on a far larger scale with the DTUO, the 
foundation of which coincided broadly with the cessation of Frohe Stunde. As I have 
argued, this indicates that Frohe Stunde¶V IDLOXUH DQG ODFN RI TXDOLW\ GLUHFWO\
contributed to the more ambitious establishment of a first-UDWHµOLJKW¶FRXQWHUSDUWWR
the Berlin Philharmonic. The DTUO was therefore was not an isolated project but 
the culmination of pre-existing attempts to nurture New German Entertainment 
Music, and this places the DTUO within a broader pattern of German broadcasting 
policy that challenges the more colourful narrative, repeated by Kater,4 that a chance 
meeting between Franz Grothe and the Luftwaffe ace Werner Mölders led to the two 
men convincing Goebbels to initiate the orchestra. 
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Moreover, in Chapter Three I have demonstrated that the first musical parody 
broadcast on the Lord Haw-+DZSURJUDPPHZKLFK LVPLVVLQJIURP5DLQHU/RW]¶V
otherwise exhaustive discography of Nazi propaganda jazz recordings, was a direct 
result of the offencHFDXVHGE\WKH³LQFRUULJLEOHIOLSSDQF\´RIµ7KH6LHJIULHG/LQH¶5 
The parody established the format which would be used by Charlie and his 
2UFKHVWUDDQGE\ WUDFLQJ WKH LQVWLJDWLRQRI WKH5093¶VSURSDJDQGDSDURGLHV WRD
specific incident, I have provided for the first time concrete evidence to support 
.DWHU¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHµ&KDUOLH¶UHFRUGLQJVZHUHGHVLJQHGWR³SD\WKH%ULWLVKEDFN
LQNLQG´6 This has been accompanied by a detailed reappraisal of the nature of the 
RUFKHVWUD¶V JHQHVLV ZKLFK LQGLFDWHV that the popular Lutz Templin was elected by 
the musicians themselves to lead an existing orchestra consisting of members of 
%HUOLQ¶V tightly-knit jazz clique, and not incomprehensibly commissioned µIURP
DERYH¶to form a new group, as Kater suggests.7 
The discoveries regarding both Frohe Stunde and the µSiegfried Line¶ parody have 
WKHUHIRUHKHOSHGWRµGHP\WKRORJLVH¶WKHJHQHVLVRIWKH5093¶VWZRPRVWDPELWLRXV
jazz projects, the DTUO and Charlie and his Orchestra and place them within a 
pattern of the organic development of policies and projects. Indeed, the wide range 
of sources and perspectives provided by the thesis have helped to contextualise the 
various uses of jazz as propaganda by Britain, Germany and the USA, building upon 
and challenging prior historiography of the area and highlighting areas which will 
require much further research. The thesis has emphasised the unprecedented 
importance which broadcasting and radio entertainment assumed in World War II, 
and the analysis of the malevolent and benevolent uses of jazz music has made 
numerous original contributions to the discourse. It is to be hoped that these will be 
built upon by future scholarship of this highly significant aspect of wartime 
propaganda. 
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